Iran Update, January 29, 2025
Unspecified political sources told Iraqi media on January 29 that some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias seek to obtain “sensitive government positions that influence political decisions” in return for their integration into the Iraqi security establishment.[45] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment would facilitate the Iranian capture of the Iraqi security sector by further entrenching Iranian-backed groups into the Iraqi state.[46] The appointment of Iranian-backed militia members to “sensitive government positions,” which likely refers to ministerial or senior defense and security positions, would further facilitate the Iranian capture of the Iraqi security and political sectors.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-29-2025
Iran Update, January 30, 2025
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with his British counterpart David Lammy on January 29 to discuss nuclear negotiations.[69] Araghchi emphasized Iran’s willingness to engage in negotiations “in line with [Iran’s] national interests.” Araghchi and Lammy likely discussed the possibility of the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggering snapback sanctions on Iran.[70] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.” [71] Araghchi separately held a phone call with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Raphael Grossi to discuss technical cooperation between Iran and the IAEA.[72] These calls come after Araghchi implicitly threatened on January 28 that Iran could decide to pursue a nuclear weapon if the E3 triggers snapback sanctions on Iran before October 2025.[73]
Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov on January 29 to discuss developments in Syria.[74] Jalali and Bogdanov likely discussed Bogdanov’s recent visit to Syria on January 28. Bogdanov and Russian Presidential Special Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev met with HTS-led interim government officials in Damascus to discuss Russia’s continued access to its military bases in Syria.[75]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-30-2025