Iran Update, January 30, 2025
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with his British counterpart David Lammy on January 29 to discuss nuclear negotiations.[69] Araghchi emphasized Iran’s willingness to engage in negotiations “in line with [Iran’s] national interests.” Araghchi and Lammy likely discussed the possibility of the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggering snapback sanctions on Iran.[70] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.” [71] Araghchi separately held a phone call with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Raphael Grossi to discuss technical cooperation between Iran and the IAEA.[72] These calls come after Araghchi implicitly threatened on January 28 that Iran could decide to pursue a nuclear weapon if the E3 triggers snapback sanctions on Iran before October 2025.[73]
Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov on January 29 to discuss developments in Syria.[74] Jalali and Bogdanov likely discussed Bogdanov’s recent visit to Syria on January 28. Bogdanov and Russian Presidential Special Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev met with HTS-led interim government officials in Damascus to discuss Russia’s continued access to its military bases in Syria.[75]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-30-2025
The Cipher Brief Iran & Trump 2.0: Imagining a New Deal
27JAN2025
Paula Doyle served as Assistant Deputy Director for Operations at CIA, where she oversaw worldwide HUMINT operations and activities that required the use of air, land, maritime, space-based and cyber technologies.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6p6Z0YaV8KE
17 min video
Iran is financially supporting the military reconstitution of Lebanese Hezbollah. Israel submitted a complaint to the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire committee, claiming that Iranian envoys are delivering “tens of millions of dollars in cash” to Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut to fund the revival of Hezbollah, according to an unspecified US defense official representing the ceasefire committee and people familiar with the content of the complaint.[1] Western media reported in December 2024 that Iran may seek to establish a new “hub” in the Beirut airport for military shipments to Hezbollah.[2] Lebanese airport security forces searched an Iranian Mahan Air flight in Beirut on suspicion of transporting funds to Hezbollah in early January.[3] The Wall Street Journal also reported that 28 branches of al Qard al Hassan—one of Hezbollah's main banking and financial arms—have resumed operations.[4] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has frequently struck al Qard al Hassan branches in Lebanon in recent months to isolate Hezbollah's financial networks. Unspecified sources familiar with Israel's complaint to the ceasefire committee stated that Israel accused Turkish citizens of moving money for Hezbollah from Istanbul to Beirut by air.
Israeli media reported in December 2024 that Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Ahmad al Shara decided to prevent Iranian civilian and military flights from transiting Syrian airspace, possibly explaining why Iran may now rely on access from Turkey.[5] Iran has historically moved materiel via Syria. CTP-ISW previously assessed that loss of access to Syrian airspace would severely limit Iran's ability to rearm Hezbollah and require Iran to establish other access routes.[6] Iranian cash deliveries alone will likely not be enough to reconstitute the group militarily without additional arms supplies, however. Shara’s decision—if true—to cut off Iran's supply route to Hezbollah via Syria will still make it difficult for Iran to help Hezbollah reconstitute militarily.
Hamas leadership is privately debating what role the group should play in the post-war Gaza Strip, according to The Economist.[7] Hardliners in the group reportedly seek to prioritize the reconstitution of Hamas’ military while selecting a group of technocrats to govern the strip. The Economist reported that other options that Hamas faces include trying to return to the pre-war status quo in the strip or pursuing a more pragmatic political reconciliation with Fatah, which governs the West Bank. Hamas and Fatah split from one another in 2007.[8]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-31-2025