Iran Update, January 27, 2025
Reuters cited a Student News Network interview on January 27 in which Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Khatam ol Anbiya Central Headquarters Deputy Coordinator Ali Shamdani stated that Iran had purchased Su-35 fighter jets from Russia.[84] Shamdani did not elaborate on how many Su-35 fighter jets or whether they had arrived in Iran, according to Reuters. CTP-ISW has not seen the original interview at this time. An Iranian Armed Forces chief of staff-affiliated news outlet published the same interview on January 27. The outlet cut the interview into three parts and may have omitted parts of the interview. Shamdani discussed Iran’s domestic military equipment production and ”foreign” purchases in the interview clips but did not include that Iran had purchased Su-35s from Russia.[85] The outlet did tag the altered interview‘s webpage with ”Su-35,” however. Iran likely reached an agreement with Russia in late 2022 to acquire Su-35 fighter jets, potentially as part of a trade that included Iranian military support for Russia’s actions in Ukraine.[86] Iran and Russia likely confirmed the Su-35 fighter jets sale, when they signed their comprehensive strategic agreement this month, which covered military and defense industry cooperation.[87] The acquisition of Su-35s could enable Iran to more readily and independently project air power relative to Iran’s current capabilities.[88]
The Iranian Artesh conducted two military exercises in western Iran on January 26 and 27.[89] The Artesh Air Force carried out the “100-helicopter Air Force” exercise at the First Air Force Combat base near Naftshahr city in Kermanshah Province. The exercise tested more than ten helicopter models, including Bell 205, 206, 209, and 214 helicopters. Artesh Ground Forces and Air Force Commanders Kiomars Heydari and Ghasem Khamoshi watched the exercise. The Artesh Ground Forces’ 35th Commando Brigade also conducted airborne and night counterterrorism exercises in Kermanshah Province.
The IRGC unveiled a new Iranian-made heavy-weight drone called the “Gaza” on January 26.[90] The “Gaza” drone has a range of up to 7,000 kilometers (km) and an operational radius of 4,000 km. The drone can carry up to at least 500 kilograms (kgs) for up to 35 hours with a maximum speed of 35 km per hour.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-27-2025
Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally shifted and intensified the Russo-Iranian relationship. Tehran has leveraged Moscow's growing material and financial requirements to sustain its war effort and support Tehran’s own domestic and foreign policy objectives. The core of the Russo-Iranian relationship is a mutually binding interest in challenging and eventually overturning the US-led world order. This shared ideological core allowed the Russo-Iranian relationship to weather and survive tensions and challenges that have arisen since 2022, and the United States should not expect this ideological core to weaken in the years ahead. Russo-Iranian cooperation is occurring along seven major axes that relate to and overlap in the defense, economic, and political spheres. It is also not a perfectly one-to-one relationship—Moscow and Tehran are seeking different outcomes from their collaboration. The interrelated nature of these nodes of cooperation should emphasize to the United States and its allies that the success of Russia cannot be separated from the success of Iran.
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Russia-Iran%20Coalition%20Deepens.pdf
40 pages
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi implicitly threatened that Iran could decide to pursue a nuclear weapon during an interview with Sky News on January 28.[5] Araghchi stated that Iran would ”have to look for an alternative” if the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered snapback sanctions on Iran before October 2025. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[6] The E3 has until October 2025 to trigger snapback sanctions if it decides to do so. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) passed a censure resolution proposed by the E3 in November 2024 that requires the IAEA to produce a ”comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[7] The IAEA Board of Governors is next set to meet in March 2025.[8] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose snapback sanctions.[9] Araghchi added that there is a “heated debate” in Iran about what an “alternative” to diplomacy would be.[10] Araghchi is likely referring to the debate among Iranian officials about whether Iran should revise its nuclear doctrine and pursue a nuclear weapon.[11] That Araghchi interviewed with British outlet Sky News in English suggests that his statements were directed at the E3.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-28-2025