Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

Iran Update, January 3, 2025

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei attempted to justify Iran's sacrifices in Syria and emphasized resilience amid setbacks during a speech on January 1 that commemorated the death of former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Qassem Soleimani. Khamenei praised Soleimani’s leadership and defended Iran's regional interests.[1] Khamenei asserted that the sacrifices of “Defenders of the Shrine” in Syria were meaningful and essential, dismissing claims that their efforts were in vain. Iran refers to all of the Iranian and allied personnel who fought in Syria as “defenders of the shrines.” This speech adopted a notably defensive tone by attempting to justify Iran's efforts rather than lashing out against the United States for the strike that killed Soleimani. Khamenei has previously said that Iran would seek revenge for the killing of Soleimani by attacking the United States and its partners.[2]

The speech also omitted references to current IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, who some in Iran hold responsible for the rapid unraveling of Iran's project in Syria and the defeat of Hezbollah and Hamas. This is the second time Khamenei has discussed Soleimani publicly while eschewing any mention of Ghaani.[3] An unspecified Iranian official claimed in early December that many officials in Iran blamed Ghaani for the fall of Assad and were calling for his removal as IRGC Quds Force commander.[4]

Khamenei continued to advance a hard line on Syria, however, emphasizing that Syrian youth will resist “foreign occupation” in Syria, comparing the “Syrian youth” to Iraqi militias mobilized by Soleimani in the mid-2000s against the United States. These militias, which continue to operate in Iraq and today control many government institutions, formed death squads to kill Sunnis and contributed to the ethno-sectarian civil war in Iraq that al Qaeda in Iraq launched in the mid-2000s.[5] Khamenei emphasized that Syrian youth will expel ”foreign occupiers,” which presumably include the United States, Turkey, and possibly HTS.[6] Khamenei previously emphasized the role of Syrian youth in a December 11, 2024 speech, again likening their efforts to Iraqi militias.[7]

Lebanese Airport security forces searched an Iranian Mahan Air flight in Beirut on suspicion of transporting funds to Hezbollah, which is in line with Lebanese obligations under the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire agreement. The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement requires the Lebanese government to “monitor and enforce” the entry of arms and related materiel to prevent the rearming of Hezbollah.[8] Lebanese media reported that Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport increased security measures following leaks to the media on January 2 that Iran was planning to transfer “millions of dollars” to Hezbollah via a Mahan Air flight.[9] Mahan Air has frequently transported Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force funds, weapons, and operatives in support of Iranian proxy activities abroad and to support Hezbollah directly.[10] The airport security forces searched an Iranian Mahan Air flight that landed at Rafic Hariri International Airport on January 2.[11] An Iranian delegation refused to allow Lebanese security forces to inspect a diplomatic bag containing funds for embassy operations.[12] Iranian media claimed that the security forces did not find suspicious cash transfers for Hezbollah during their searches.[13] Lebanese media posted videos on X (Twitter) on January 2 showing a small group of pro-Hezbollah supporters protesting the inspection of the Mahan Air flight.[14]

Tehran interim Friday Prayer Leader Ahmad Khatami expressed concern over Iran's worsening economic crisis by citing the soaring dollar exchange rate and the national currency's devaluation during his sermon on January 3.[79] Other Iranian Friday Prayer Leaders echoed similar sentiments, criticizing the government inaction and emphasized “resistance economy” policies to stabilize the currency.[80] The Iranian rial free market rate, reflecting the true value of transactions, has depreciated from approximately 60,000 tomans per USD in September 2024 to 81,000 tomans in January 2025.[81]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-3-2025

Rumor mill::

31DEC2024 SVR General

There is every reason to believe that an assassination attempt was made on former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. On Sunday afternoon, Assad complained to his security about feeling unwell and having trouble breathing and asked for medical help. Almost immediately after the request, he began to cough violently and began to choke. Assad was given water and this helped to ease the attack a little, but normal breathing was still not restored, and headaches and stomach pains were added to this. By the time the medics arrived, the former Syrian president's condition was deteriorating. Representatives of the Russian leadership were promptly informed about Bashar al-Assad’s condition. While the medics were providing Assad with first aid, an order was received to treat him at home whenever possible and not to place the “patient” in medical institutions. After first aid was provided, “reinforcements” arrived to the medics and a treatment ward was set up in Assad's apartment. As of Monday evening, according to the doctors treating him, Bashar al-Assad’s condition is stable and he feels fine. The tests that were taken from the former Syrian president showed traces of exposure to a toxic substance in his body. As reported in the report to the Russian presidential aide Nikolai Patrushev, an investigation is underway, but it has not yet been possible to determine how Bashar al-Assad was exposed to the poison.
https://t.me/generalsvr/2892

3JAN2024 Кремлевская табакерка
Assad tried to fly to Iran
Our readers have a fair question - what is happening to Bashar al-Assad in Russia? Why is there so much fuss around him, while Assad himself does not appear in public? Sources say that after moving to Moscow, Bashar al-Assad tried to fly to Iran. Very serious people, on the instructions of Vladimir Putin, clearly explained to him that this should not be done. Note that after this, Putin did not meet with Assad and at least three times refused to even talk to him on the phone. It was not possible to find out where exactly Assad is now.

https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/5121

It is difficult for Putin to engage the new leaders in Syria with Bashar al-Assad in Russia.

Iran Update, January 4, 2025

Iran is signaling its readiness to resume nuclear talks, probably in an attempt to prevent the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) from triggering “snapback sanctions” later in 2025. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasized Iran's readiness to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiations during an interview with Chinese CCTV on January 4.[18] Araghchi stressed trust-building and sanctions relief as key pillars of the negotiations.[19] The statement likely reflects Iran's concerns over potential snapback sanctions, which could go into effect in October 2025 and, would reimpose all pre-2015 UN sanctions on Iran. The E3 previously said it is prepared to impose international “snapback” sanctions on Iran. The E3 announcement has likely prompted this diplomatic signal from Iran.[20]

Araghchi also reaffirmed Iran's commitment to a unified Syrian government and emphasized cooperation with regional countries to ensure Syria's territorial integrity, which appears to be at odds with statements by other Iranian government officials, including the supreme leader.[21] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has promoted a hardline approach centered on mobilizing Syrian youth against foreign occupiers.[22] Araghchi framed Iran's approach as a constructive effort to ensure stability and reject external interference. Araghchi stressed that Iran supports an inclusive political process in Syria.[23]

Yemeni sources told UK-based the Telegraph on January 4 that Iran has significantly increased its support for the Houthis, providing weapons and expertise to sustain missile strikes on Israel and attacks on global shipping.[33] Yemeni military spokesman Abdul Basit al Baher stated that Iran's assistance includes parts of advanced missiles and drones that are assembled in Yemen.[34] Weapons smuggling has almost certainly persisted throughout the US naval action in the Red Sea, especially due to at least one breakdown in UN inspection mechanisms at Hudaydah that enabled several cargo vessels to enter uninspected.[35] The Houthis more often rely upon overland transport and small dhows that are difficult to intercept, however.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-4-2025

Iran Update, January 5, 2025

Iranian media outlets continue to stoke sectarian conflict over the Shia Sayyida Zeinab Shrine in Damascus. Tabnak reported on January 4 that an HTS-linked commander entered the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus and repeated “sectarian and sarcastic sentences.”[6] Tabnak claimed that the provocative video could lead the Shiites and Alawites in Syria to respond with “harsh actions.” Tabnak has previously claimed that HTS fighters have threatened the security of the sacred Shia shrine.[7]

Syrian Popular Resistance, which is a purportedly Syrian telegram channel espousing sectarian narratives, accused the HTS-led government of killing six Sayyida Zeinab Shrine workers after six dead bodies were reportedly found on January 5.[8] The channel provided no evidence of the deaths or whether the killings were motivated by sectarian violence. This is also the first time the channel has discussed Sayyida Zeinab, which is notable given that most of the claims about the shrine have come from the Iranian information space.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-5-2025

Iran Update, January 6, 2025

Iran appears to be feeling more vulnerable after the fall of the Assad regime, Israeli military action against Iranian air defenses and missile production, and the defeats suffered by Hamas and Hezbollah. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Spokesperson Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini told the Financial Times that Iran has doubled the number of military drills this year “in response to the evolving threat landscape” and they have “expanded participation of brigades engaged in realistic operations.”[1] These increases in the scope and quantity of Iranian military exercises indicate that Iran feels increasingly vulnerable after the setbacks it suffered in the October 7 War and after the fall of the Assad regime. Naieini also announced that the IRGC and Artesh will conduct 30 joint land, air, and naval exercises in six western and southern provinces until the end of the Iranian year in mid-March. Naini specified that maritime exercises will start at the end of this week with a large naval parade in the Strait of Hormuz at the end of February, to unveil new equipment.[2] Khatam ol Anbia Joint Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Ghadir Rahimzadeh separately stated that there will be a nationwide joint air defense exercise in the vicinity of sensitive centers “with new and unknown systems” in the next few days.[3]

Iranian Parliament's Internal Affairs and Councils Committee member Ali Asghar Nakhairad announced on January 6 that Parliament has halted its impeachment of the oil minister Mohsen Paknejad.[77] Parliament began Paknejad’s impeachment process on January 4.[78] Nakhairad stated that Parliament's Energy Commission is still conducting an interagency investigation over violations regarding power plant fuel shortages and will present its findings to Parliament.[79] President Masoud Pezeshkian separately issued an order on January 4 to establish an Energy Optimization and Strategic Management Organization to accelerate the implementation of the National Plan to Improve Energy Imbalance.[80] Pezeshkian’s government continues to prioritize fuel shortages.[81]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-6-2025

Iran Update, January 7, 2025

Jordan and Syria agreed to form a joint security committee to combat drug and weapons smuggling on their border.[43] Syrian Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani, Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra, and Interim Intelligence head Anas Khattab met with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi in Amman on January 7.[44] Shaibani and Safadi announced in a joint press conference that Jordan and Syria have agreed to cooperate through several committees on security, defense, energy, and trade, with a particular emphasis on border security and combatting drug and weapon smuggling efforts along the Syria-Jordan border.[45] The Jordanian Armed Forces have conducted several airstrikes since May 2023 targeting Iranian-backed attempts to smuggle drugs and weapons into Jordan and often accused the former Assad regime of failing to stem Iranian-run smuggling networks.[46] Jordanian coordination with the HTS-led interim government may enable the two parties to more firmly crack down on remaining former regime-sponsored smuggling networks than Jordan could on its own.

Local Daraa residents protested HTS’s border control policies at the Nassib border crossing between Daraa Province and Jordan on January 7. A small group of local protestors blocked off the entrance to the crossing in protest of the interim governments’ prevention of certain “irregular” vehicles from crossing.[47] The Nassib crossing had been formerly controlled for years by Imad Abu Zurayq. Zurayq, like many commanders in the Southern Operations Room, was a Syrian opposition commander who later reconciled with the regime and then—as Assad fell—joined the Southern Operations Room.[48] Iranian-backed militias and smuggling rings have historically used this crossing and the areas surrounding it to smuggle weapons into Jordan and then into the West Bank to arm Palestinian militias.[49] Regime-affiliated groups—including Zurayq himself—also used the crossing to smuggle drugs.[50] HTS security forces formally took over the Nassib crossing on December 14, 2024.[51] The local protests against the HTS-led management of the crossing may represent local backlash against HTS control as the previous owners of the Nassib crossing lose access to rents there.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-7-2025

Iran Update, January 8, 2025

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani traveled to Iran on January 8, likely to try to urge the Iranian regime to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iranian media reported that Sudani would likely discuss “suspending the activities” of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and Kataib Hezbollah, during his visit to Tehran.[19] Sudani’s visit to Tehran comes after Iraqi media reports that the United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[20] Iraqi National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim stated on January 4 that the incoming Trump administration has warned the Iraqi federal government that it will “target” Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[21] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[22] The PMF reports directly to Sudani on paper, but many of the militias that comprise the PMF answer to Iran in reality.[23] Sudani’s visit to Iraq also follows Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad on January 5.[24]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appears to have rejected Sudani’s request for Iran to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Khamenei stated during a meeting with Sudani that the PMF must be “further strengthened and preserved.”[25]

Sudani separately discussed decreased Iranian gas exports to Iraq.[26] Iran typically supplies approximately 40 percent of Iraq’s gas supply but has reportedly ceased gas exports to Iraq in the past two months.[27] Iran is currently facing a severe energy crisis marked by electricity and natural gas shortages, which has presumably caused it to reduce gas exports to Iraq.[28] Iraq and Turkmenistan signed an agreement in October 2024 for Iraq to import Turkmen gas via Iran to reduce Iraqi dependence on Iranian gas exports.[29] Iranian media reported on January 8 that the agreement has not come into effect, however.[30] It is unclear why Iraq and Turkmenistan have not implemented the agreement, given that there are existing gas pipelines between Iran and Turkmenistan and Iran and Iraq.

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, Azerbaijan, on January 8 to discuss strengthening political and security ties[31] Aliyev thanked Iran for supporting Azerbaijani “territorial integrity” and congratulated Azerbaijan on the “liberation of its land” after the September 2023 Azerbaijani military offensive into the Nagorno-Karabakh region.[32] Aliyev’s praise for Iran is notable given the recent tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia after Russian air defense likely shot an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane on December 25, causing it to crash in Kazakhstan.[33] Ahmadian separately emphasized the need to strengthen energy and transportation cooperation between Azerbaijan and Iran, including by completing the International North-South Transport Corridor.[34] Ahmadian will visit Armenia after his visit to Azerbaijan.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-8-2025

Afgantsy Redux: How Russian military intelligence used the Taliban to bleed U.S. forces at the end of America's longest war

The GRU, Russia's military intelligence agency, spent years financing terrorist groups in Afghanistan to target U.S. and coalition forces. An investigation by The Insider has not only confirmed the existence of the program but also identified GRU officers responsible for its coordination. The Russian intelligence agency used a gemstone trading company as a front to run a network of Afghan couriers who delivered money to Taliban fighters and other militant groups. Once their missions were completed, the couriers were provided with Russian documents and granted asylum in Russia.

The network mapped by The Insider — which includes both the GRU handlers responsible for the program and their Afghan agents — appears to contain information previously unknown to the NDS and its U.S. intelligence partners.

The program, as per the ex-NDS sources, averaged $200,000 per killed American or coalition soldier, with the payment being disbursed to the network responsible. There were smaller allowances for killed Afghan troops and security officers. One former NDS official estimated that Russia paid a total of approximately $30 million to the Taliban via the scheme, a fraction of the $3 to $4 billion the CIA spent on Operation Cyclone, the covert program to fund, arm, and train the mujahideen to drive the Soviet Army out of Afghanistan in the 1980s. “I think $30 million was a small amount to give the United States a bloody nose,” one former NDS officer said. Another ex-NDS source claimed that at least that much had also been spent on funding other armed groups opposing the U.S.-supported Afghan government, a claim partly corroborated by data showing close contacts between the GRU spymasters and members of Afghan resistance movements dating back to 2014.

https://theins.ru/en/politics/277723

Iran Update, January 9, 2025

Behrouz Esbati, one of the seniormost Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Syria, discussed in a leaked video Iranian plans to rebuild proxy and partner militia networks in Syria that would oppose the HTS-led interim government.[18] These remarks are consistent with CTP-ISW’s ongoing assessment that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Syria and exploit it to rebuild the Axis of Resistance there. Esbati claimed to command over 10,000 Syrian fighters before the fall of Bashar al Assad.[19] Esbati said that Iran can “activate all the networks” that it has developed over the years in Syria and use social media to “form resistance cells.”[20] Esbati made these comments during a speech to military members at the Vali-ye Asr mosque in Tehran. An unspecified IRGC official—likely a member of the IRGC Quds Force—told the New York Times that Esbati’s comments about recruiting militia fighters were aspirational rather than reflective of discrete IRGC plans.[21] This denial is likely meant to suppress the narrative that the IRGC is trying to subvert the new Syrian government. The unspecified IRGC official also said that Iran would have a better chance at securing its interests in the Middle East if Syria descended into chaos, which is consistent with CTP-ISW‘s assessment that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Iran.

Esbati also notably said candidly that Iran “was defeated very badly, [and] took a very big blow and it’s been very difficult.”[22] Esbati’s statements are a stark contrast from the formal Iranian regime line that has aimed to downplay the fact that the fall of Assad marks a strategic defeat for Tehran.[23] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the fall of Assad marks the end of the greater Iranian project in the Levant for the foreseeable future and will make it extremely difficult for Iran to transfer the resources needed to recuperate other actors within its Axis of Resistance namely Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah.[24]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-9-2025

Iran Update, January 10, 2025

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) unveiled a new underground missile depot on January 10, as IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami and IRGC Aerospace Force Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh visited the site.[82] The facility reportedly played a role in the Iranian missile attacks against Israel in April and October 2024.[83] The IRGC claimed that the facility contains medium-range Emad and Ghadr ballistic missiles and short-range Qiam ballistic missiles.[84]

The IRGC held the Rahiyan-eh Ghods exercise in Tehran on January 10, likely as a show of force aimed at deterring both internal dissent and external threats.[85] The Fatehin, Imam Ali, and Imam Hossein battalions, which are the Basij’s most elite and loyal units, participated in the exercise. These units are notably responsible for protest suppression and have previously been deployed abroad to deal with external security threats.[86] Commander of the IRGC Tehran Provincial Corps Brigadier General Hassan Hassan Zadeh said that the exercise was meant to showcase the Basij’s readiness to counter threats.[87] Iranian state media claimed that 110,000 Basij members participated and displayed military equipment, likely to signal that Iran has a large force to deal with any threats.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-10-2025

Iran Update, January 11, 2025

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Khuzestan Province Unit claimed that it identified and arrested a spy network linked to the intelligence services of an unspecified Persian Gulf country on January 11.[52] The IRGC claimed that the arrested individuals gathered sensitive information from critical sites in Khuzestan Province. The IRGC has transferred the suspects to judicial authorities.[53]

Iran shut down government offices and educational centers in around 22 provinces on January 11 due to energy shortages caused by a spike in gas consumption and increased electricity usage.[54] The shutdowns occurred despite weather reports indicating rising temperatures rather than a decrease.[55] The energy crisis has also sparked concerns over increased fuel consumption, with officials pointing to rising gas use in households and limited energy production capabilities.[56] Iranian media reported that educational centers in several provinces will be closed on January 12.[57] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the energy crisis could generate internal unrest in Iran.[58] Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei recently ordered Iranian security forces to prepare for potential unrest in late December 2024.[59]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-11-2025

Ali Alfoneh’s Iran Gambit podcast:

IRGC Commander, on Assad's Ineptitude and Putin's Treachery

Commander Behrouz Esbati, the Public Affairs Director of the Joint Force Cyber Command, on January 7 centered his speech on his firsthand observations of the systemic collapse of the Assad regime. Approximately one hour of his speech was published by Tabnak News Agency, an outlet affiliated with Dr. Mohsen Rezaei, the longest-serving Chief Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Commander Esbati’s remarks can be categorized into two distinct sections. The first section presents an Iranian perspective on the progressive disintegration of the Syrian regime, including the erosion of military morale and widespread demoralization among the Syrian populace. This portion of his analysis appears to be both credible and candid. The second section, however, where Commander Esbati projects the future trajectory of the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance,’ is imbued with ideological rhetoric and serves more as propaganda. I have chosen to place limited emphasis on this part of his discourse.

https://overcast.fm/+ABLBqZqONl8

The first part of Esbati's speech about the corruption in Syria is probably a true description. It remains to be confirmed if it is true that the Russians disconnected the air defense.

Iran Update, January 12, 2025

Iran conducted an air defense exercise for the second time in recent days. This activity reflects Iranian concerns about possible airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, as Tehran has continued to expand its nuclear program. The Artesh—the conventional Iranian military—conducted the latest air defense exercise across northern and western Iran on January 12.[1] This exercise notably covered the Iranian nuclear facilities around Arak and Fordow.[2] Though Iran typically conducts air defense exercises around this time of year, this activity nonetheless probably reflects Iranian leaders’ assumption that they will face airstrikes against their nuclear program in the near term. This assumption has no bearing on the likelihood that the United States or Israel would actually conduct such a strike, however.

The Artesh exercises tested the manned and unmanned aircraft as well as the following air defense systems, according to Iranian state media:[3]

Rad missile. An Iranian-made, short-range, anti-tank missile designed for T-72 tanks, fired from a 125 millimeters (mm) caliber barrel, and with a target distance of four kilometers (km).[4]
Majid missile. An Iranian-made, short-range, shoulder-fired, electro-optical-guided missile with a maximum target range of 15 km.[5]
Talash missile. An Iranian-made, long-range, mobile surface-to-air air defense missile system, capable of hitting all altitude targets with a a maximum range of 200km.[6]
Misagh-3 missile. An Iranian-made, short-range, shoulder-fired system with a laser fuse and a maximum range of five km and flight altitude of 3,500 meters (m).[7]
Khordad-15 system. An Iranian-made, long-range air defense system with a detection range of 85 km and target range of 45 km.[8]
Shahid Jalilvand radar system. An Iranian-made, medium-range, phased array radar system able to detect small flying targets with low cross-sections in three dimensions and a 24-hour operational continuity.[9]
Samavat radar-controlled artillery system. A short-range Iranian version of the Swiss low-altitude Skyguard radar system with a range of 4 km and uses an anti-aircraft 35mm Oerlikon caliber barrel gun.[10]
Seraj radar-controlled air defense artillery system. Iranian-made artillery system with a 35mm caliber barrel gun, radar, and a new optical system.[11]

This activity comes after the IRGC Aerospace Force conducted an air defense exercise around the other major Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz on January 7.[12] This flurry of air defense activity is part of the larger military exercise that the Iranian armed forces are holding across Iran until March 2025.[13] This exercise includes the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). It is unlikely that Iran could repel a US or Israeli airstrike given the inferiority of the Iranian systems that have been used in these exercises relative to the modern US and Israeli capabilities. This is especially the case given that Israel neutralized Iran's S-300s—its most advanced air defense platform—in October 2024.

Iran could use part of its exercises to prepare for an attack on US or Israeli targets, though CTP-ISW assesses that this possibility is relatively unlikely at this time. Iran previously conducted exercises ahead of its Operation True Promise and Operation True Promise II attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 respectively.[14] And Iranian officials have yet to fulfill their vow to conduct a third missile attack on Israel.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-12-2025

Iran Update, January 13, 2025

UK outlet the Times reported on January 12 that Senior Adviser to the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Larijani has been covertly flying between Iran and Russia to meet with unspecified senior Russian officials.[80] The Times added that Larijani‘s trips are part of Iran’s effort to gain Russian assistance on Iran’s nuclear program and air defense capabilities. Israeli airstrikes on October 25 destroyed much of Iran’s advanced air defense capabilities.[81] These meetings reportedly occurred just before the Kremlin and Tehran both confirmed Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian‘s January 17 visit to Moscow to sign the new Russo-Iranian comprehensive strategic agreement, which will cover areas of defense and energy trade.[82] The talks will also cover Iran’s nuclear program. An Iranian delegation is separately meeting with E3 countries — the United Kingdom, France, and Germany — in Geneva on January 13 and 14 for the second round of nuclear talks.”[83] The German foreign ministry told AFP that these talks were ”consultations” and ”not negotiations.”

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-13-2025

Iran Update, January 16, 2025

Iraqi Foreign Minister Faud Hussein told Reuters on January 16 that the Iraqi government is attempting to convince Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to either surrender their weapons or join the official Iraqi security apparatus.[59] Many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias incorporated portions of their militias into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an Iraqi state security service, in the mid-2010s. An Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework member of Parliament similarly told Iraqi media on January 16 that the Iraqi government is currently attempting to contain the militias and place weapons “in Baghdad’s hands,” rather than trying to seize militia headquarters or weapons.[60] A militia source separately told Iraqi media on January 16 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba (HHN) Secretary-General Akram al Kaabi rejected Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s suggestion to integrate members of HHN, Kataib Hezbollah, and Kataib Sayyad al Shuhada into the PMF.[61] Many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias include brigades that are part of the PMF and additional forces that are not part of the PMF.[62] Neither the official brigades within the PMF nor the non-official forces outside of the PMF answer to the Iraqi prime minister in practice, however.[63]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said that Iran would be willing to engage in direct nuclear talks with the United States if Iran got “assurances” that the US would maintain its commitments during an interview with NBC on January 15.[82] Pezeshkian’s statement likely aims to signal to the West that Iran maintains open to nuclear negotiations and prevent the West from triggering further sanctions—including snapback sanctions—against Iran. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ultimately will decide Iran’s official policy on negotiations, however. Khamenei has previously delivered intentionally vague statements on Iran’s official position about negotiations with the West. He has expressed openness to negotiations to relieve sanctions pressure on Iran but he maintains that Iranian officials should not “trust” Iranian adversaries and focus on Iranian interests.[83] Iranian hardliners continue to express unwillingness to negotiate with the West and have encouraged Khamenei to revoke his 2003 fatwa banning the production and use of nuclear weapons.[84]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-16-2025

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