Posted on 07/15/2019 2:25:00 PM PDT by LS
This continues my attempt to bring noteworthy books to the attention of Freepers. Vanity? Not really, but it is a way for me to organize in a short review the main points of relevant books to our current economic, military, or political issues.
"Armies of Sand" is an analysis by former CIA analyst and AEI scholar Kenneth Pollack. Although this was in part his doctoral dissertation, he has gone on to write many books about the military and especially the Middle East.
He begins by looking at the Six-Day War and Arab/Egyptian military ineffectiveness, noting the AE military superiority of 3.5:1 in aircraft, 2:1 in men; and 1.8:1 in tanks. Despite that, the Israeli Air Force knocked out almost 300 of Egypt's 420 combat aircraft in the first hours of the war. What happened next was key:
The Egyptian air force commanders lied. They told Nasser they had won a great victory, destroying 3/4 of the Israeli planes. Then the Israelis destroyed half the Syrian air force, including all but four of its new MIG-21 fighters. Once the ground war started, "In battle after battle, Egypt's field commanders demonstrated almost none of the skills needed to prevail in mechanized maneuver warfare." Egypt's "senior leadership was psychologically paralyzed by the speed and extent of the unfolding catastrophe." Egypt's frontline commanders refused to admit they were losing and instead sent back glowing reports of their "victories."
What accounted for the collapse? Pollack says the Arab/Egyptian armies had "no understanding of combined arms operations." But, to methodically build his case over a 500 page book, he looks at several accepted explanations for Arab military ineffectiveness. Among those theories are:
*Arabs were too wedded to Soviet doctrine and tactics. *Arab militaries were really "praetorian guards" designed to crush revolts, not fight enemies *Military ineptness is a direct result of Arab culture.
Pollack comes down hard on #3. Getting there, however, he engages in a meticulous study of numerous Arab wars, of the Soviet doctrine at work in Korea, Angola with the Cubans, and elsewhere, and of the charge of "praetorianism."
Pollack concludes that "in war after war, Arab junior officers were generally unimaginative and passive, making it nearly impossible for formations under their command to engage effectively in maneuver warfare [or of any combat] in which authority devolved upon the local commanders on the spot." Arab personnel "consistently exaggerated and even falsified reporting to higher echelons." Because of poor weapons handling skills and TERRIBLE maintenance practices, Arab armies and air forces with "advanced, even state-of-the-art equipment were often defeated by adversaries possessing less advanced, even primitive weapons. . . ."
Arab generals, he maintains, were NOT routinely bad---that they ran the gamut, and Arab soldiers individually proved quite brave, citing numerous rear guard actions where units fought to annihilation to protect their retreating comrades.
In his analysis of Soviet doctrine, Pollack notes that the 1991 Gulf War, which resulted in astounding loss-to-kill ratios for the Iraqis, came because once deprived of Soviet guidelines and command and control, Iraqis were "icapable" of "dogfighting or even fleeing effectively." Many Iraqi fighters FLEW INTO THE GROUND.
Looking at North Korean and Cuban (in Angola) combat performance, he asserts this "puts the nail in the coffin " of the theory that Soviet military doctrine was at the root of Arab problems. (He highly praises the Cuban military in Angola)
He analyzes and dismisses the notion that Arab armies are overly politicized, returning to the 1973 war to show that front line Egyptian commanders simply lied about their engagements. The Chief of Staff himself had to go to the front to see the disaster. In one engagement, 2 Israeli Phantoms took on 28 MiG-21s and MiG17s and shot down 8, chasing off the other 20 without a loss. He claims "in all three cases [he examined] when politicization was present, it had a profound impact on the strategic leadership, strategic intelligence gathering, and strategic information management," but that while it contributed to "poor performance . . . over time, it was not the only factor and not even the most important factor in their ineffectiveness."
The real culprit Pollack argues is Arab culture. There is a "constant pressure to conform [which] is a corresponding stifling of originality." The culture "consistently suppresses creativity, innovation, imagination, and all similar divergences from established patterns of action and thought." The culture favors centralization of authority and virtually all authority is centralized at the top, whether in the family, the government, or the military. There is also a strong honor and shame component. In Arab society, to do something wrong is much worse than to do nothing at all. By acting, an individual risks shame, but by not acting, there is no such risk. There are high levels of loyalty and solidarity, which accounts for Arab courage. If shame is present, though, it is better to conceal one's mistake than admit it.
What Pollack does stay far away from is Islam itself, trying to explain in terms of culture what might better be explained through religion. In Christianity, the notion of being flawed does not in itself involve shame because of forgiveness. In the American system derived from Christianity, even in business there is bankruptcy, which allows a do-over. There is no such concept in Islam. Likewise, in Islam there is an aversion to work, especially with one's hands. Manual labor is viewed as dishonorable. In Christianity, however it is celebrated. Paul even notes that he made tents with his own hands so as not to inconvenience his sponsors.
Pollack is ruthless in pointing out that Arab culture is in the toilet when it comes to innovation and invention, and even when Arab scholars manage to produce "scholarship," on average it is worse than their colleagues. One Arab scholar looked at the contributions made by Arab scientists in scientific journals. It came to 1% of the Israeli contribution. In 1973, when Arabs (based on population) should have had 8,000-14,000 papers in scientific journals, they had 847. "No matter what method was used to assess [Arab] productivity of scientific workers, the gap between what was actually produced and what was to be expected . . . was exceedingly large." There was a "notable absence of scientific contributions from Arab institutions." Israel registered 100 TIMES as many patents as Saudi Arabia. In the Arab world, a book that sold 5,000 copies was a best seller. [MAN, I WISH I COULD GET THAT DEAL!]
In addition, GDP per worker in Arab countries was negative during the 1990s for both oil-producing and non-oil producing states and was the lowest in the world. Because independent thought is frowned upon in Arab education, one Arab scholar said "The institutions of higher learning which mushroomed throughout the Arab world in the post-independence period produced scientists but not science, medical doctors but not medical science, social scientists but not social science, and so forth.
In conclusion, Pollack finds that the problems of Arab militaries are almost exclusively "derived from the dominant Arab culture." Even Iraqi allied units, hand-picked by American advisors, trained by Americans, and equipped by Americans still couldn't maintain their tanks and often drove them into Wadis. Since nothing can be done so far to change Arab culture (or Islam, which Pollack sidesteps), there will be no improvement in Arab militaries.
” One of our favorite conversations was the different ways our clients lied to us”
What an interesting bit of cultural observations. Thanks.
Perhaps, most polls I’ve seen show that some 10% of muslims worldwide support jihad/murder of non muslims. The Saudi’s are particular scum for funding Wahhabist mosques in other countries, no doubt to keep the murderers away from them.
I read that in the 1967 war, while Israel was beating the crap out of Egypt, their allies, the Syrians, asked how things were going. Egypt in effect, said they were slaughtering the Israelis and now was the time to get in.
The Israelis got wind of this and because they were doing so well, moved a lot of troops up the entire length of Israel and waited.
The Syrians believed the Egyptians, stormed across,got their azz beat, and lost the Golan Heights to boot.
[Sidebar] Dunno if it’s an Urban Legend, but Israel was supposed to have a mole in the Syrian military. He mentioned how hot it was for their troops on the Golan Heights and suggested they plant trees to shade the emplacements. A few years later when the war broke out, the Israelis targeted all the groves of trees and wiped out the emplacements.
In fact Egypt learnt the lesson and their initial offensive against Israel in 1973 was a sweeping success.
Then the Syrians bogged down and asked Egypt to keep pushing on their front but the Egyptian generals had no plans to move forward as they reached initial objectives.
Egyptian politicians took over to pushed further and it ended in another disaster for Egypt and Israel’s victory.
You are 100% correct. Pollack discusses this. It came during the first day of the war when the Egyptian air was being slaughtered, and yet reported they were winning. The Syrians heard about it, and jumped in on day 2, only to have the Israelis turn their attention to THEM!
Just cuz a guy went nuts doesn’t mean all his analysis was bad, and just cuz a guy was a “war hero” (aka McTurd) doesn’t mean that his subsequent positions are honorable.
MacArthur’s “Island Hopping” was brilliant for 1944, but his requests for multiple atomic bombs in Korea was idiotic in 1951.
Honor and trust are strengths of our culture. The strength of that, however, is dependent upon the ability to declare that X is a liar and untrustworthy.
The great WEAKNESS of our current culture, is that openly saying that Arabs, as a culture, cannot be trusted, will get you declared a "racist" and get YOU held in contempt and dishonor, and shunned by "proper" people.
Yes. As Pollack says, making the mistake is bad, but admitting it is worse.
This article reminded me of the Patton quote regarding Arabs and how the fatalistic teachings of Muhammad is what keeps them stuck in the eighth century.
Funny thing. While searching Bing or Google I can’t find it. It appears that it is being scrubbed from the Internet. Curious.
It’s not an urban legend. That “Mole” was Eli Cohen (Eliyahu/Elijah), an Egyptian born Jew, who became the advisor to the Syrian Minister of Defense. I believe that he was found out by a quirk of fate power outage in Damascus, during a routine radio transmission, but I have forgotten the details. He was a good “friend” of Assad the Elder, who became so embarrassed that nothing, not a huge ransom, or pleas from nations around the world, could dissuade him from having Cohen publicly hanged.
Google the name, ELI COHEN. Should be an interesting read.
Islam has no recognition, let alone respect, and observance, of the Ten Commandments (NOT Suggestions!). Islam is such that it could ONLY have been conceived by the “EVIL IMPULSE”, Satan, the Devil himself, and nothing else.
Only a Muslim, a Liberal (even those who think of themselves as Jews, or Christians), a Moron, or a Madman, could possibly think otherwise.
Egyptian ground forces were pushed beyond the protection of the missile defense umbrella that held off the Israeli Air Force, which then swooped in and wreaked havoc upon them. Then the tanks came in. Unfortunately, the armored corps had such success during the ‘67, Six Day War, that they got big headed, and in ‘73, they moved forward without infantry cover, and suffered disastrous consequences. Wire guided anti-tank missiles took them completely by surprise, and they paid a heavy price until they realized that if the machine gunner fired at the operator who guided the missile to its target with a sort of joy stick, it really tended to disrupt his concentration, and aim...especially if it killed him outright. Arrogance cost them dearly, as it always does to those who succumb to it.
Israeli Command knew that the attack was coming, but Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel at the time, insisted that the Arabs be allowed to strike first for PR reasons, so the world would not see Israel as the aggressor. Really stupid, unforgivable mistake that cost many, many Israeli lives, for no worthwhile reason at all. Every person, or government, sees what they want to see. Posing and posturing is nothing compared to reality. In a street fight, gun fight, or a war, NEVER let the other guy get the first shot in if you can help it at all. Violence is not tiddly winks! She made a great mistake that haunted her to the day she died. May she Rest in Peace.
I’ll tell ya, I’ve been called the worst, by the worst, stood alone against many with nothing but G-D and TRUTH to uphold me, and I don’t now, nor have I ever, nor will I ever, give a rat’s azz about the opinions, or catcalls of morons.
And I take great pride in that. They can ALL kiss my patootie (whatever the hell that is!).
Thanks for the tip. I think it was on the History Channel’s airing of the 1967 War. I broke up when I heard it, then had second thoughts and wondered if it was an exaggeration.
Truth is always stranger than fiction. Fiction has to make sense, Truth don’t care. Like they say, “Can’t make this Schiff up!”
In the 80s that was the general estimate of Russian pilots as well in case they had no command and control: “highly trained monkeys”
In the 1973 war, the Soviet pilots who had trained the Egyptian air force openly ridiculed the Egyptian fliers (the ones who'd managed to survive). Show us how it's done? They also got their asses handed to them, and those who survived passed on the invitation to an after-action party given by their allies, the Egypt pilots. I don't have an argument against Pollack's apparent general thesis, but wonder if he took motivation into account.
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