Posted on 08/10/2014 12:46:23 AM PDT by Smokin' Joe
I have spent a little time compiling links to threads about the Ebola outbreak in the interest of having all the links in one thread for future reference.
Please add links to new threads and articles of interest as the situation develops.
Thank You all for you participation.
The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is expected to release a report Tuesday predicting as many as 550,000 to 1.4 million cases of the Ebola virus in Liberia and Sierra Leone alone, by the end of January.
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Dear God in Heaven...
90% fatalities or more
I was just thinking the same thing.
This just made the woo-woo hairs on the back of my neck stand up.
The numbers are staggering.
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/suspected-ebola-case-in-lausanne/40796430
“Suspected Ebola case in Lausanne”
Apologies if posted already__
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/23/health-ebola-borders-idUSL6N0RO4FK20140923?rpc=401
Seems that Sierra Leone has sealed their borders with Guinea and Liberia and deployed troops to protect from further spread of Ebola.
We might see aerial photos of scores of thousands of bodies lying in the streets of an empty Monrovia by March.
I won’t dispute that prediction.
Anyone with heart problems, diabetes, who gets pregnant and has a difficult pregnancy, gets malaria or any other disease that would require hospitalization or medicine will be dead as well.
bkmk
I don’t doubt you’re right.
>>90% fatalities or more
This — “Ebola death rates 70% - WHO study — means it was 90% fatalities or more all along.
WHO and other international public health authorities have been all along. Considering the role that the current head of the WHO played in China's response to SARS, this is par for the course. This is how one of the commentors over on the PANDEMIC FLU INFORMATION FORUM put it --
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It is important to note two things:
1. WHO's failure to respond in a timely and energetic fashion is the primary reason for the "insufficient" control efforts, for an absent response.
2. WHO continues to urge (and strongly so) that borders remain open, to advise that travel from and within the outbreak areas should be allowed to remain unhindered and undiminished. WHO continues to advocate for utter freedom of movement, that any and all travel to and within Ebola areas be allowed, even as these findings quite obviously point out that, unsurprisingly, a "large intermixing" population that has transported the virus across borders and between rural and urban areas" and that this unfettered movement has been identified as a major contributing factor to the spread, to the explosion, of this outbreak. Why would allowing this unfettered movement -- including on a global basis -- to continue make any sense?
It's Time.
It's time to learn what role, precisely, the Director General of the WHO played in the failure of the premiere international health agency under her direction and control to respond in a timely and appropriate manner to this Ebola outbreak, and in the failure to sound the appropriate alarm. My instinct is that Margaret Chan's communications to WHO staff likely precisely mirrored the more public utterances of Hartl, her spokesperson. Hartl repeatedly released communications that sought to minimize the nature of this outbreak, to deflect and ignore the calls for greater WHO response, to negate the reality that a crisis was clearly emerging.
To determine what Margaret Chan's role in all of this might have been, perhaps those who received communications from the Director General of the WHO between January and July on the topic of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa and forward them on to some independent clearinghouse? There, a pattern should emerge.
Did WHO and its director really just get fooled by this terrible virus? Were the patterns of this outbreak so different that they simply could not be seen? Perhaps that's what will be found by examining those communications.
Or was the office of the director of the WHO messaged, repeatedly, from many, many, people, including, very likely, a large number of WHO staff, insisting that a major response was required by the agency and that the response window was closing? What was the Director General of the WHO's response to these messages? These people have that on file. It's time for someone, somewhere, maybe at the Defense Department, to gather up those official WHO responses and take a good look at them.
Maybe this outbreak just got away from everybody. But maybe it wasn't quite that simple. It's important to know which it was. Why? Because it heavily informs the appropriate response, globally, going forward.
I know that everyone is busy simply putting out the fire, and that this may seem like an inessential task. But to fully understand how to move out of this mess we really do have to understand how we got here. This is particularly critical in light of the fact that WHO leadership may remain unchanged for the duration of this crisis, a crisis which has no perceivable endpoint at this time. What the Director General of the WHO says on international public health matters -- or whether she says anything at all -- counts. As we've seen. It has counted, and it still counts (see: WHO current policy on unrestricted travel).
Early Release
September 23, 2014 / 63(Early Release);1-14
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/su63e0923a1.htm?s_cid=su63e0923a1_e
Key paragraphs —
Results
If trends continue without additional interventions, the model estimates that Liberia and Sierra Leone will have approximately 8,000 total Ebola cases (21,000 total cases when corrected for underreporting) by September 30, 2014 (Figure 1). Liberia will account for approximately 6,000 cases (16,000 corrected for underreporting) (Appendix [Figure 1]). Total cases in the two countries combined are doubling approximately every 20 days (Figure 1). Cases in Liberia are doubling every 15–20 days, and those in Sierra Leone are doubling every 30–40 days (Appendix [Figure 1]).
By September 30, 2014, without additional interventions and using the described likelihood of going to an ETU, approximately 670 daily beds in use (1,700 corrected for underreporting) will be needed in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Figure 2). Extrapolating trends to January 20, 2015, without additional interventions or changes in community behavior (e.g., notable reductions in unsafe burial practices), the model also estimates that Liberia and Sierra Leone will have approximately 550,000 Ebola cases (1.4 million when corrected for underreporting) (Appendix [Figure 2]). The uncorrected estimates of cases for Liberia on September 9, 2014, were 2,618, and the actual reported cases were 2,407 (i.e., model overestimated cases by +8.8%). The uncorrected estimates of cases for Sierra Leone on September 13, 2014, were 1,505 and the actual reported cases were 1,620 (i.e., model underestimated cases by -7.6%).
Results from the two illustrative scenarios provide an example of how the epidemic can be controlled and eventually stopped. If, by late December 2014, approximately 70% of patients were placed either in ETUs or home or in a community setting such that there is a reduced risk for disease transmission (including safe burial when needed), then the epidemic in both countries would almost be ended by January 20, 2015 (Appendix [Figure 3]). In the first scenario, once 70% of patients are effectively isolated, the outbreak decreases at a rate nearly equal to the initial rate of increase. In the second scenario, starting an intervention on September 23, 2014, such that initially the percentage of all patients in ETUs are increased from 10% to 13% and thereafter including continual increases until 70% of all patients are in an ETU by December 22, 2014, results in a peak of 1,335 daily cases (3,408 cases estimated using corrected data) and <300 daily cases by January 20, 2015 (Appendix [Figure 10]). Delaying the start of the intervention until October 23, 2014, results in the peak increasing to 4,178 daily cases (10,646 cases estimated using corrected data). Delaying the start further, until November 22, results in 10,184 daily cases (25,847 estimated using corrected data) by January 20, 2015, which is the last date included in the model (Appendix [Figure 10]).
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Two points
1. MSF says we should use a 5 times factor, not 2.5 for case load.
2. The CDC is having a WHO-like "Messaging overstatement" regards the effectiveness of medical intervention in reducing the disease "RO." Training five hundred new medical staff a week stating 23 Sept 2014 is far too few when you need at least three healthcare workers per Ebola patient and a <300 new daily cases by January 20, 2015 under the best of conditions. The 70% in hospital by 14 Dec 2014 number is the "lie, warehouse, and let the infected die" rosy scenario which will never ever happen.
These are fragile societies about to collapse to primitive subsidence and hunter-gatherer conditions.
Everyone who can do so in the affected areas of West Africa will walk out to someplace else, and most will die trying.
Here it is—
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/su63e0923a1.htm?s_cid=su63e0923a1_e
[Excerpt]
If trends continue without additional interventions, the model estimates that Liberia and Sierra Leone will have approximately 8,000 total Ebola cases (21,000 total cases when corrected for underreporting) by September 30, 2014 (Figure 1). Liberia will account for approximately 6,000 cases (16,000 corrected for underreporting) (Appendix [Figure 1]). Total cases in the two countries combined are doubling approximately every 20 days (Figure 1).
Cases in Liberia are doubling every 15–20 days, and those in Sierra Leone are doubling every 30–40 days (Appendix [Figure 1]).
By September 30, 2014, without additional interventions and using the described likelihood of going to an ETU, approximately 670 daily beds in use (1,700 corrected for underreporting) will be needed in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Figure 2). Extrapolating trends to January 20, 2015, without additional interventions or changes in community behavior (e.g., notable reductions in unsafe burial practices), the model also estimates that Liberia and Sierra Leone will have approximately 550,000 Ebola cases (1.4 million when corrected for underreporting) (Appendix [Figure 2]). The uncorrected estimates of cases for Liberia on September 9, 2014, were 2,618, and the actual reported cases were 2,407 (i.e., model overestimated cases by +8.8%). The uncorrected estimates of cases for Sierra Leone on September 13, 2014, were 1,505 and the actual reported cases were 1,620 (i.e., model underestimated cases by -7.6%).
Results from the two illustrative scenarios provide an example of how the epidemic can be controlled and eventually stopped. If, by late December 2014, approximately 70% of patients were placed either in ETUs or home or in a community setting such that there is a reduced risk for disease transmission (including safe burial when needed), then the epidemic in both countries would almost be ended by January 20, 2015 (Appendix [Figure 3]). In the first scenario, once 70% of patients are effectively isolated, the outbreak decreases at a rate nearly equal to the initial rate of increase.
In the second scenario, starting an intervention on September 23, 2014, such that initially the percentage of all patients in ETUs are increased from 10% to 13% and thereafter including continual increases until 70% of all patients are in an ETU by December 22, 2014, results in a peak of 1,335 daily cases (3,408 cases estimated using corrected data) and <300 daily cases by January 20, 2015 (Appendix [Figure 10]). Delaying the start of the intervention until October 23, 2014, results in the peak increasing to 4,178 daily cases (10,646 cases estimated using corrected data). Delaying the start further, until November 22, results in 10,184 daily cases (25,847 estimated using corrected data) by January 20, 2015, which is the last date included in the model (Appendix [Figure 10]).
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Note: In this model they are assuming the real numbers are 2.5 times the “official” count.
If Joanne Liu, director of MSF is correct, and the real case numbers are 5 times what is being reported, then this model, alarming though it is, is only half the reality. This really is breathtaking.
Oops. You were much faster than me.
>>We might see aerial photos of scores of thousands of
>>bodies lying in the streets of an empty Monrovia by
>>March.
The question is less whether will we see that in Monrovia, Liberia in March 2014 than will we see it repeated in Lagos Nigeria in August 2015 and Cairo, Egypt in November 2015.
We are in the multiple African nation-state collapse sequence scenario.
Hell, we may see that Lagos/Cairo collapse sequence in reverse order, if ISIS in Libya plays games with this contagion.
“These are fragile societies about to collapse to primitive subsidence and hunter-gatherer conditions.”
“Earth Abides”.
From your link-
The man, who had left Guinea for France two days earlier, had been quarantined in a hospital in Vaud following his arrival, after he told officials at the asylum centre that a member of his family had died of Ebola.
In his first week in the hospital he showed no symptoms and was thus not contagious, according to a press release from the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health. One week after arrival he developed a fever and was transferred to Lausanne according to the criteria set out by the Public Health Office.
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Uh oh. That one could be positive.
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