Posted on 10/18/2012 7:39:31 PM PDT by DogByte6RER
Lincoln Assassination Eyewitness appears on television's "I've Got a Secret" on February 9, 1956.
On a 1956 game show, a man appeared who had been present at Ford's Theatre on the night of April 14, 1865.
(Note: Link over to the YouTube site provided to watch this amazing historical video.)
(Excerpt) Read more at youtube.com ...
Thanks for the clarification. However I note that Article 1 sec.9 refers to ‘’the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus’’, not ‘’the right of’’. It’s my understanding rights are immutable whereas a ‘’privilege’’ can be revoked.
Not Lincoln alone. Chief Justice Rehnquist spoke and wrote on the subject numerous times. In an address to a Virginia Bar Association he noted, "The provision of the Constitution dealing with habeas corpus is found in Article I, dealing with the legislative power vested in Congress, and provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless in time of war or rebellion the public safety shall require it. The question of whether only Congress may suspend it has never been authoritatively answered to this day, but the Lincoln Administration proceeded to arrest and detain persons suspected of disloyal activities." He later repeated his position in "All The Laws But One: Civil Liberties In Wartime".
There is no doubt that Chief Justice Marshall believed that only Congress can suspend habeas corpus; comments made by him in dicta in more than one Supreme Court case indicate that. There is also no doubt that Hamilton and Jay, as well as Jefferson and almost certainly other leaders of that period, believed that only Congress should be entrusted with the power to suspend this most basic of rights. But the Constitution itself is not specific on the subject, and the Supreme Court itself has never taken the matter up. Had they done son in 1861 then I think they would have ruled against Lincoln's actions and we wouldn't be having this interesting debate. But they didn't, and haven't since then. So the right and wrong of Lincoln's suspension is one of those things that's fun to argue but impossible to prove.
Thanks, BJK. I did not realize the indemnity had been removed.
It is my understanding that Jefferson Davis suspended habeas corpus only after receiving authority to do so from the Confederate Congress for various limited time periods.
FYI, here is a link to the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863: Link.
Section 4 of that Act instructs the courts that any order of the President during the existence of the rebellion shall be a defense from prosecution, criminal or civil.
Strictly speaking, Congress did not suspend the privilege, they merely passed the authority to do that to the President. I don't know whether one branch of government delegating to another branch of government something the first branch was responsible for under the Constitution is strictly correct under the Constitution. There is a term for that sort of delegation that I don't remember.
jmacusa, I'm not sure why the wording of Article I, Section 9 was left as ambiguous as it was. Perhaps they felt by its being in the Article that dealt with the powers of Congress, there was no need to specify that Section 9 dealt with a power of Congress.
On the subject of Confederate marshall law and habeas corpus:
"In some areas of the Confederacy, like eastern Tennessee, martial law led to the summary executions of a few civilians and the mass incarceration of others.
By the end of the war, Vice President Alexander Stephens and other leading politicians no longer supported the administration, in part because of Davis's 'betrayal' of Southern Constitutional principles. 'Our liberties, once lost,' he declared, 'may be lost forever.' "
What a damning observation by Stephens. Of course this was the same Stephens who presciently warned, "This step, secession, once taken, can never be recalled. We and our posterity shall see our lovely South desolated by the demon of war."
Hmmm. I'm not familiar with this. I see where the Confederate Congress authorized the suspension of habeas corpus on February 27, 1862 [Link. That is generally listed as the first time Davis suspended the privilege of the writ. February 27, 1862 was five days after Davis' second inaugural address on February 22, 1862. Davis had already been in office for more than a year at this point. His first inaugural speech was February 18, 1861.
Perhaps your source does not count the provisional Confederate government and only counts Davis taking office in 1862 after the November 1861 election.
Or perhaps you have another explanation?
Perhaps you are right. A great many people did not find it ambiguous and understood that the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus belonged to Congress.
I've been doing further data mining in my records and came across an extensive post by former poster nolu chan quoting from Prisoner of State by Dennis A. Mahony (1863). Nolu's original post was on a long thread that no longer exists, so I cannot link to it. The thread was later pulled by our host because of a flame war that developed some time after nolu's benign and informative post. For your benefit, I repost nolu's comments below. Spellings, word breaks, punctuations, etc., are as they appeared in the original post.
To: rustbucket
OTHER AUTHORITIES AND PROOFS TO SHOW THAT THE RIGHTFUL POWER IS NOT IN THE PRESIDENT TO SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGES OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, OR TO ARREST A CITIZEN OTHERWISE THAN AS THE LAWS PRESCRIBE.
Under ordinary circumstances it would not be necessary to add any weight to the decision of the Chief Justice of the United States in a question be¬tween him and Abraliam Lincoln involving a prin¬ciple of constitutional law, but as unfortunately the American public mind is as much if not more af¬fected in these times by the mere acts of will of the President as it is by the judgment of a learned, en¬lightened and illustrious jurist, I have thought it becoming the object in view to add the weight of historical facts, and the opinions of other eminent jurists, to the decision of Judge Taney.
English authorities, legal and historical, Blackstone and Hallam have been quoted by the Chief Justice in support of his decision. Other British authorities might be cited confirming the same views and doctrines, but I will content myself with stating a fact which is in itself proof incontroverti¬ble that even in Great Britain where the preroga¬tives of the crown are certainly more extensive in relation to the liberties of the subject than the Constitutional authority of the President is over citizens of the United States, it is not conceded to be the right of the crown to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and during the long period of time intervening between the dethronement and execution of Charles the First and the present day, no British monarch has dared to assume the prero¬gative of power which has been arrogantly and de-fiantly seized and exercised by Abraham Lincoln and subordinates under his command. During the period referred to England and Ireland were con¬vulsed on several occasions with insurrections and rebellion; yet it was only when Parliament thought it proper to be done that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended. This fact is both sig¬nificant of the sacred regard entertained both in the public mind of Great Britain for the sanctity of pri¬vate rights, and of the respect which the British crown is obliged to pay to these constitutionally recognized rights of British subjects.
The history of the Writ of habeas corpus in our own country dates properly for its origin in the Convention which formed the Constitution of the United States.
This Convention met in May, 1787, in Philadel¬phia. On the 29th of May, Mr. Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, laid before the House a draft of a plan of a Federal Constitution, the VIth Article of which provided, "The Legislature of the United States shall pass no law on the subject of religion, nor touching or abridging the liberty of the press; nor shall the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus ever be suspended, except in the case of rebellion or invasion."
On the 6th of August the Committee of Detail, consisting of Rutledge, Randolph, Gorham, Ells-worth, and Wilson, reported a draft of a Constitution, but it contained no provision on the subject of the writ of habeas corpus.
On the 20th of August Mr. Pinckney submitted to the House, in order to be referred to the Committee of Detail, the following proposition, among others: "The privileges and benefits of the writ of habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this Government in the most expeditious and ample manner, and shall not be suspended by the Legislature, except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time, not exceeding ______ months."
On the 28th of the same month, "Mr. Pinckney, urging the propriety of securing the benefit of the habeas corpus in the most ample manner, moved that it should not be suspended but on the most urgent occasions, and then only for a limited time, not exceeding twelve months."
"Mr. Rutledge was for declaring the habeas cor¬pus inviolate. He did not conceive that a suspen-sion could ever be necessary at the same time through all the States."
"Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved that the privi¬lege of the writ of habeas corpus should not be sus-pended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or inva¬sion, the public safety may require it."
"Mr. Wilson doubted whether in any case a sus¬pension could be necessary, as the discretion now exists with judges in most important cases to keep in gaol, or admit to bail."
"The first part of Mr. Gouverneur Morris's motion, to the word 'unless,' was agreed to nem. con. On the remaining part the vote stood: Aye -- New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsyl¬vania, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia -- 7. Nay -- North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia -- 3." (Elliott's Debates, Vol. V., pp. 131, 376, 445, 484.)
It will be seen from this original draft of the proposition to incorporate the habeas corpus clause in the Constitution that it was manifestly the de¬sign to restrain the Federal Legislature from sus-pending the privileges of the writ except in the prescribed contingency. There was no thought that the Executive would either possess that right by virtue of office or by any implication whatever, and therefore no reference was thought to be necessary to the executive in this connection. Without this qualified restraint proposed by Mr. Pinckney upon the power of the Legislature, it would perhaps be inferred that as Congress would hold nearly the same relation as the law-making power in the United States that Parliament held to Great Britain, Congress, unless restricted by constitutional inhibi¬tion, might assume to exercise the same power in the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and in passing laws in relation to the religious worship. -- And as there is no restraint upon the British Par¬liament nor contingency prescribed to it when it may or may not suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, it was obviously Mr. Pinckney's object to restrain Congress from suspending the privilege of this great writ of right at its own dis¬cretion. Hence the restriction on its power to the contingency of rebellion or invasion.
But some sophist might say just as Mr. Lincoln has assumed the right to do, this restriction upon the power of the Legislature only proves the greater power in the President, for the power must be lodged somewhere. According to this theory, which is not merely a theory now-a-days, any power of govern¬ment withheld from Congress is by implication vest¬ed in the President, so, it should be concluded, ac¬cording to this, that whenever the Constitution says Congress shall not do a thing the President has a right to do the act inhibited; and where Congress is permitted to do an act under certain prescribed contingencies, the President may act in such cases, his own discretion only being the rule and limit of his power.
Absurd as this theory is to common sense, it is nev¬ertheless made the rule of action by Mr. Lincoln in his administration of the Federal Government. Le¬gislative powers denied by the Constitution to the Legislative Department are assumed by him as if it were a matter of course that what the Constitu¬tion withheld from Congress it vested in the Presi¬dent. Still more absurd is Mr. Lincoln's assump¬tion that the power not vested in him as President belongs to him by virtue of his being Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, a position which he holds only by virtue of his being the President, an ex-officio position which derives no power or au¬thority from any other source than the Constitution of the United States and through no other means than that of the Presidency. But as Mr. Lincoln is more used to illustrations than he is to arguments to guide or influence his actions, he might better appreciate the force of an attempt to hold himself up by the seat of his breeches, an experiment it is suggested to him to make, than of any argument, however conclusive in reason or law which might be made for him from common sense, historical facts and judicial authority to prove to him the absurdity of the pretensions he makes to a right of Betting aside the Constitution, and existing neverthe¬less as President of the United States. He forgets that the act of his which destroys the Constitution puts him out of existence as Chief Magistrate of this Republic, and that if he continues in power after his destruction of the Constitution and his subver¬sion of the government, he does so only as an usurper. But let us continue our historical proofs. I quote from Bullitt's compilation of such facts.
In the Massachusetts Convention, called to determine whether the Constitution should be ratified or not, the habeas corpus clause being under consid¬eration on the 26th of January, 1788, "Dr. Taylor asked why this darling privilege was not expressed in the same manner as in the Constitution of Mas¬sachusetts? ...... He remarked on the differ¬ence of expression, and asked why the time was not limited?
"Judge Dana said: The answer in part to the honorable gentleman must be that the same men did not make both Constitutions; that he did not see the necessity or great benefit of limiting the time, supposing it had been as in our Constitution, 'not exceeding twelve months;' yet, as our Legisla¬ture can, so might Congress continue the suspension of the writ from year to year. The safest and best restriction, therefore, arises from the nature of the cases in which Congress are authorized to exercise that power at all, namely, in those of rebellion or invasion. These are clear and certain terms, facts of public notoriety; and whenever these shall cease to exist, the suspension of the writ must necessarily cease also. He thought the citizen had a better se¬curity for his privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under the Federal than under the State Constitution for our Legislature may suspend the writ as often as they judge, 'the most urgent and pressing occas-ions' call for it.
"Judge Sumner said, that this was a restriction on 'Congress, that the writ of habeas corpus should not be suspended, except in cases of rebellion or invasion. The learned Judge then explained the nature of the writ. ...... The privilege, he said, is essential to freedom, and, therefore, the power to suspend it is restricted. On the other hand the State, he said, might be involved in danger; the worst enemy may lay plans to destroy us, and so artfully as to prevent any evidence against him, and might ruin the country, without the power to suspend the writ was thus given. Congress have only power to suspend the privilege to persons commit¬ted by their authority. A person committed under the authority of the States will still have a right to the writ' " (2d Elliott's Debates, 108.)
In the act of ratification by the Convention of New York is this remarkable clause, among others, explanatory of their understanding of the Constitu¬tion: "That every person restrained of his liberty is entitled to an inquiry into the lawfulness of such restraint, and to a removal thereof, if unlawful; and that such inquiry and removal ought not to be denied or delayed, except when, on account of public dan¬ger, the Congress shall suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. *
"Under these impressions, and declaring that the rights aforesaid cannot be abridged or violated, and that the explanations aforesaid are consistent with the said Constitution,.... we, the said del-egates, in the name and on behalf of the people of the State of New York, do by these presents assent to and ratify the said Constitution." (Supplement to the Journal of the Federal Convention, published in Boston in 1819, pp. 428 and 431.)
The Convention of Rhode Island also ratified the Constitution with certain explanatory declarations; among them is the following:
"VII. That all power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any authority, without the consent of the representatives of the people in the Legislature, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised." (Idem, p. 455.)
In the debate in the Virginia Convention, Mr. Patrick Henry, in speaking of the 9th section, used this language:
"The design of the negative expressions in this section is to prescribe limits beyond which the pow¬ers of Congress shall not go....... The first prohibition is, that the privilege of the writ of ha-beas corpus shall not be suspended, but when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it. It results clearly that, if it had not said so, they could suspend it in all cases whatsoever.... (Elliot's Deb., Vol. III, p. 461.) See also remarks of Gov. Randolph, quoted ante, p. 9.
These were the declarations in four Conventions called for the ratification of the Constitution; and in that of New York, it will be observed, that it is ex¬pressly set forth, in their act of ratification, that the power of suspension is in Congress.
The first occasion for the consideration of the question of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus after the Federal Government went into opera¬tion, arose in consequence of Burr's conspiracy. -- Mr. Jefferson was then President, and it is well known was not a personal friend of Burr. It ought to be presumed that Mr. Jefferson knew as much as Mr. Lincoln does of the intention, objects and de¬signs of the framers of the Constitution, and wheth¬er he, as President, was invested by the Constitu¬tion or otherwise with, the power assumed by Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Jefferson not only recognized Con¬gress as the depositary of this power, but requested that body to exercise it so that he might be better able to suppress the impending insurrection. The Senate passed the bill, "An act to suspend the priv¬ilege of the writ of habeas corpus for a limited time in certain cases." The vote on the passage of this bill in the Senate appears to have been unanimous. In the House the bill was rejected, so jealous was this body of the rights of the American people. --
The following extracts from the debates on the ques¬tion, as collated by Mr. Bullitt in his Review of Binney's pamphlet on the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, will show that there was no question then as to where the power was vested to suspend tin privilege of this act.
Mr. Burwell said, "If that be the case, upon what ground shall we suspend the writ of habeas corpus? ..... Nothing but the most imperious ne¬cessity would excuse us (i. e. Congress,) in confiding to the Executive, or any person under him, the power of seizing and confining a citizen, upon bare suspicion, for three months, without responsibility for the abuse of such unlimited discretion." ...
Mr. Elliott said, "We can suspend the writ of habeas corpus only in a case of extreme emergency. ...... But we shall be told that the Constitution has contemplated cases of this kind, and, in reference to them, invested us with unlimit¬ed discretion. When any gentleman shall advance such a position, we shall meet him upon that ground, and put the point at issue."
Mr. Eppes said, "By this bill we are called on to exercise one of the most important powers vested in Congress by the Constitution of the United States....... The words of the Constitution are, 'The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.' The wording of this clause of the Constitution deserves peculiar attention. It is not in every case of inva¬sion, nor in every case of rebellion, that the exer¬cise of this power by Congress can be justified un¬der the words of the Constitution. ...... The Constitution, however, having vested this pow¬er in Congress, and a branch of the Legislature hav¬ing thought its exercise necessary, it remains for us to inquire, whether the present situation of our country authorizes, on our part, a resort to this extraordinary measure."
Mr. Varnum said, " I consider the country, in a degree, in a state of insecurity; and if so, the power is vested in Congress, under the Constitution, to sus¬pend the writ of habeas corpus ......
Mr. Smilie said, "A suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is, in all respects, equivalent to repealing that essential part of the Constitution which secures that principle which has been called the palladium of 'personal liberty.' If we recur to England, we shall find that the writ of habeas corpus in that country has been frequently suspended. But under what circumstances?. ...... We have taken from the statute of this country (England) this most valuable part of our Constitution. The Convention who framed that in¬strument, believing that there might be cases when it would be necessary to vest a discretionary power in the Executive, have constituted the Legislature the judges of this necessity; and the only question to be determined now is, does this necessity exist?" (3d vol. Benton's Deb., 504-514.) On the 17th of February, 1807, the House of Representatives proceeded to consider the motion of Mr. Broom, to wit: "Resolved, that it is expedient to make fur¬ther provision by law for securing the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to persons in custody, un¬der or by color of the authority of the United States."
Mr. Broom said, "This privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been deemed so important that by the ninth section of the first Article of the Con¬stitution it is declared that it shall not be suspen¬ded, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.' Such is the value of this privilege that even the highest legislative body of the union -- the legitimate representatives of the nation -- are not intrusted with the guardianship of it, or suffered to lay their hands upon it, unless when, in cases of extreme danger, the public safety shall make it necessary. This constitutional provision was intended only as a check upon the power of Congress in abridging the privilege, but was never intended to prevent them from intrenching it around with sound and wholesome laws; on the contrary, it was expected that Congress were prohibited from impairing at their pleasure this privilege, -- that they would re¬gard it as of high importance, and, by coercive laws, insure its operation."
Mr. Bidwell said, "The Constitution, by restrict¬ing the Legislature from suspending it, except when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require a suspension, had recognized it as a writ of right, and our statutes had authorized certain courts and magistrates to grant it."
Mr. G. W. Campbell said, "This provision evident¬ly relates to Congress, and was intended to prevent that body from suspending by law the Writ of ha¬beas corpus, except in the cases stated, and has no re¬lation whatever to the act of an individual in refus¬ing to obey the writ, -- such refusal or disobedience would not certainly suspend the privilege of that Writ, and must be considered in the same point of view as the. violation of any other public law made to protect the liberty of the citizen."
Mr. Holland said, "But, sir, so far as respects the habeas corpus, the suspension of it applies to the Legislature, and not to persons. The Constitution says, it shall not be suspended but in case of rebel¬lion, or when the public safety requires it. This prohibition manifestly applies to the Legislature, and not to persons in their individual capacity."
Mr. J. Randolph said, "The Writ of habeas cor¬pus is the only Writ sanctioned by the Constitution. It is guarded from every approach, except by the two Houses of Congress." (3d vol. Benton's Debates, pp. 520-540.)
In 1842, in the debate on the bill to idemnify Gen. Jackson for the fine imposed on him by Judge Hall, at New Orleans, Mr. Bayard said, "Congress may indeed suspend the privilege of the Writ of ha¬beas corpus, but cannot declare martial law to be the law of the United States, or any part of them...... The Constitution says, Congress shall have power to declare war, to raise armies, to provide a navy, to provide arms and munitions of war, and to make rules for the government of the land and naval forces. On these limited and specific powers it has been inferred that Congress may declare mar¬tial law. To avoid this very conclusion there is an express provision in the very next section, among the restrictions on the powers of Congress, declar¬ing that the remedy of the Writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in cases of rebellion or invasion All Congress can do, even in cases of rebellion or invasion, is to suspend the privilege of the Writ of habeas corpus; and that can be done by Congress only -- not by an officer of the Government -- without its authority." (Vol. XIV Benton's Debates, pp. 627.)
On January 14, 1843, the same subject was dis¬cussed in the House of Representatives.
Mr. Hunt said (after quoting the ninth section of the first Article of the Constitution, which provides that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it), "Who was to be the judge of that necessity? Was it the President of the United States, or any subordinate officer in command? No; it was the Legislature of the country that was the judge, and the only judge of that necessity. He supported the position by citing the practice of Mr. Jefferson, who, in 1807, as President of the United States, applied to Congress for a temporary suspension of the writ of habeas corpus for three months; which, however, was refused by the House of Representatives, where the bill was defeated, which had passed the Senate for that purpose."
In the House of Representatives, in the debate on the bill to indemnify General Jackson, January 2, 1844, Mr. Barnard said, " The Constitution gave Con¬gress authority to pass laws for the regulation of the army and navy of the United States, and under that, Congress have passed laws for the government of the army and navy and the militia. That code was ap¬plicable to the officers and soldiers, and to the militia, when in service; but it was not applicable to any other human being. Congress itself could not pro¬claim martial law. It might suspend the habeas corpus act, but it could not suspend the Constitution. A proclamation of martial law by the Congress of the United States would, of itself, be a violation of the Constitution." (Vol. XIV. Benton's Debates, p. 657.)
In an opinion delivered by Mr. Attorney-General Cushing, upon the subject of martial law, and the suspension of the habeas corpus, in February, 1857, growing out of a proclamation of martial law by the Governor of Washington Territory, in order to sus¬pend the habeas corpus, this language is used : "The opinion is expressed by commentators on the Con¬stitution, that the right to suspend the writ of ha¬beas corpus, and also that of judging when the exi¬gency has arisen, belongs exclusively to Congress.
It may be assumed, as a general doctrine of constitutional jurisprudence in all the United States, that the power to suspend laws, whether those granting the writ of habeas corpus, or any other, is vested exclusively in the Legislature of the particular State." (Opinions of Attorneys-General, Vol. VIII, p. 365.)
So much for historical proofs embracing also the opinions of the statesmen, patriots and jurists of the better days of the Republic.
Judge Taney having already quoted the opinion of his illustrious predecessor, Chief Justice Marshal, I shall not repeat the opinion of that eminent jurist as given in the case, ex-parte Bollman and Swartwout, but refer the reader to it as quoted by Judge Taney. I will only add one quotation from Judge Story, who in his commentaries on the Constitution, says: Sec. 1336, "Hitherto, no suspension of the writ has been authorized by Congress since the establish¬ment of the Constitution. It would seem, as the power is given to Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in case of rebellion or invasion, that the right to judge whether the exigency had arisen, must exclusively belong to that body."
To the understanding and judgment of the reader, these facts, historical proofs, decisions of illustrious judges, and opinions of eminent jurists are com¬mitted in contrast with the act of will of Abraham Lincoln; and unless the interested motive of the parti¬san has usurped the place in the American mind which was once occupied by patriotism, it wrll not be in vain for our country's well being that history, common sense and the judgment of our most illustri¬ous ancestors have been cited to prove how utterly absurd are the pretensions to power of Abraham Lin¬coln, how unwarrantable has been his assumptions of right to set aside the Constitution, to subvert the government, and to deprive individual citizens of their rights of person; and how dangerous to liber¬ty it is to permit these assumptions of power to pass unrebuked, and to be exercised unrestrained.
-------
* No proof can be more conclusive than this is as to the under¬standing and intention of the framers of the Constitution. This action of the Convention is in itself a complete corroboration of the argument under consideration. No ingenuity can mystify it. No controversal skill can weaken or destroy its force.
-------
SOURCE: Dennis A. Mahony, Prisoner of State, (1863), pp. 75-88.
2,703 posted on 07/15/2004 4:40:06 PM CDT by nolu chan
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to spur industrial growth? What? One sentence in a wiki? What BS. As far as freedom of the press in the South the Richmond papers certainly didn't mince words of consternation of the wars progress.
>>>Nolu’s original post was on a long thread that no longer exists,
Often old threads can be found at archive.org, if you have a URL. I’ve managed this successfully several times.
On the off chance you didn’t already know this, and hadn’t tried.
thank you for that audio link. :)
Come to think of it, I think I can remember seeing that too.
Rustbucket, do what I did,get a copy of the Constitution and read Article 1 sec.9. It’s all right there.
Thanks. I just now tried it, and it didn't recognize the URL for the thread.
I kept trying various things on archive.com. Finally a page popped up that was the same page I had gotten without archive.com. It was a note from Jim Robinson saying the thread had been pulled.
Usually a bunch of dates come up in calendar format. See if there are any older ones that have a link, where it might be from before the thread deletion.
No, it is not "all right there." You are reading it as though it is in isolation without considering where it is in the Constitution and the historical interpretation of the clause. According to you, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, Thomas Jefferson, various ratifiers and ratification conventions, and various Supreme Court Justices had it all wrong, but you and Lincoln had it right.
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia put it this way:
"Our Federal Constitution contains a provision explicitly permitting suspension, but limiting the situations in which it may be invoked: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." Art. I, §9, cl. 2. Although this provision does not state that suspension must be effected by, or authorized by, a legislative act, it has been so understood, consistent with English practice and the Clause's placement in Article I. See Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 101 (1807); Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 151–152 (CD Md. 1861) (Taney, C. J., rejecting Lincoln's unauthorized suspension); 3 Story §1336, at 208–209"
Are you perhaps an advocate of a "living Constitution" where the interpretation of the Constitution changes to suit political desires?
Taney's Ex Parte Merryman order was a legal order and should have been obeyed by Lincoln until it was possibly overturned on appeal to the full court. I suspect Lincoln would have lost on appeal, so he simply ignored a legal order thereby putting himself above the law.
For what it’s worth, here is the URL of that nolu chan post:
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1123201/posts?page=2703#2703
The Man Who Last Saw Abraham Lincoln
“with the death of Fleetwood Lindley on February 1, 1963 the world lost the last person to look upon Abraham Lincoln’s face.”
http://new.yankeemagazine.com/article/man-who-last-saw-abraham-lincoln
No, the Constitution isn’t a ‘’living document’’. What I mean is the way the article is written defines a ‘’privilege’’, not a ‘’right’’. And why did FDR do in WW2 much the same Lincoln did ?
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