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I have been reading the sky is falling thraeds on FR for years. For those of you who believe there will be a civil war in Britaian and that the Muslims will win go on believing it. You may be frighten by Muslim teenagers most with a taste for bling fast cars and such like.

Even though they have no real training no command and control no real logistics no rael safe areas.

While on the government side is the Army, the police the security services. And rather a lot of us ex forces personal. But one thing I have found is that personal believes have nothing to do with logic.

Dont bother to reply all you can do is be sarky or personal attacks you know nothing about what I am talking about. U sound nothing like any USMC NCOs I have mixed with they are intelligent types who know how to argue there corner

re : you are the type of minor league functionary that does nothing to assure success and every thing to tear down those that are successful by stabbing them in the back.

Personal attacks eh go on spout more bollox. A bit different from the oh it’s all liberal propaganda cr*p. Tell you what mate when Sept 11th happened I volunteered to be reactivated not with the Americans with the British. Which if you had read my private email you would of known. I didn’t have to but I did because the Americans were allies.

Did two tours of Basra and one at home, been shot at, rocketed stones chucked at me.

And I have first hand experience of what total clusterf**k the operation came so don’t give me that stab in the back cr*p because people use that as a operation cover your ass.

If you bothered reading what I sent you it would show that the intension was to go in take out saddam and pull out and that what we on this side of the pond predicted would happen did happen and took the American political leadership by surprise so you stay nice and safe in Middle America, living in your nice little world of your own, with your blinkers on.

In August 2002, leading administration officials circulated a top-secret document blandly titled, "Iraq: Goals, Objectives and Strategy." Months of wrangling at the United Nations were still ahead, but senior officials were drafting the principles that would guide the invasion if the president gave the order to strike. The goals for Iraq were far-reaching. The aim was not just to topple a dictator, but also to build a democratic system. The United States would preserve, but reform, the bureaucracies that did the dayto- day work of running the country. There were some unstated objectives as well. Policy makers hoped that installing a pro-American government would put pressure on Syria to stop supporting terrorist groups and Iran to halt its nuclear weapons program. But grand goals did not mean huge forces. From the start, the Pentagon's plan to invade Iraq was a striking contrast to the doctrine for using military power that was developed by Colin L. Powell when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Instead of assembling a giant invasion force over six months, as he did in the Persian Gulf war in 1991, the administration intended to attack with a much smaller force as reinforcements were still streaming to the Middle East.

The strategy was consistent with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's push to transform the military so it would rely less on heavy ground troops and more on technology, intelligence and special operations forces.

Mr. Rumsfeld had long been impatient with what he thought was a plodding, risk-averse and overly costly way of waging war. At General Franks's Central Command, planners thought that the new approach was necessary for another reason: to catch the Iraqis by surprise and prevent any efforts to sabotage the oil fields or stiffen their Baghdad defenses.

"Almost everybody worried about what would happen if the war were prolonged," Douglas J. Feith, the under secretary of defense, said in an interview. "This highlighted the importance of speed and surprise. It argued for this unusual and creative way of starting the war, with fewer forces than Saddam expected us to have and to have the flow continue after the war started."

If the Iraqi Army mounted a tougher fight than anticipated, Mr. Feith said, the Pentagon could continue to send forces. If the resistance was light, as many civilian aides expected, Washington could stop the troop flow. There would be "off ramps," in the vernacular of the Pentagon.

Achieving the administration's ambitions meant dealing with any turmoil that followed the collapse of Mr. Hussein's government and his iron-fisted security services. Administration officials assumed that American and multinational troops would help stabilize Iraq, but they also believed that the newly liberated Iraqis would share the burden. "The concept was that we would defeat the army, but the institutions would hold, everything from ministries to police forces,"

Condoleezza Rice, the president's national security adviser, said in an interview. "You would be able to bring new leadership but that we were going to keep the body in place."

Early Warnings Some military men, though, were worried that the administration would be caught short. Gen. Hugh Shelton, who served as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the first nine months of the Bush administration, was one of them.

General Shelton had contacts in the Middle East who had warned that Iraq could devolve into chaos after Mr. Hussein was deposed.

At a Pentagon meeting early in 2003 with former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former vice chairmen and their successors, he voiced concerns that the United States would not have sufficient troops immediately after the dictator was ousted. He cautioned that it was important to have enough troops to deal with the unexpected. At the White House, officials also were thinking about how many troops would be needed.

Military aides on the National Security Council prepared a confidential briefing for Ms. Rice and her deputy, Stephen J. Hadley, that examined what previous nation-building efforts had required.

The review, called "Force Security in Seven Recent Stability Operations," noted that no single rule of thumb applied in every case. But it underscored a basic principle well known to military planners: However many forces might be required to defeat the foe, maintaining security afterward was determined by an entirely different set of calculations, including the population, the scope of the terrain and the necessary tasks.

If the United States and its allies wanted to maintain the same ratio of peacekeepers to population as it had in Kosovo, the briefing said, they would have to station 480,000 troops in Iraq. If Bosnia was used as benchmark, 364,000 troops would be needed. If Afghanistan served as the model, only 13,900 would be needed in Iraq.

The higher numbers were consistent with projections later provided to Congress by Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, then the Army chief of staff, that several hundred thousand troops would be needed in Iraq. But Mr. Rumsfeld dismissed that estimate as off the mark.

More forces generally are required to control countries with large urban populations. The briefing pointed out that three-quarters of Iraq's population lived in urban areas. In Bosnia and Kosovo, city dwellers made up half of the population. In Afghanistan, it was only 18 percent.

Neither the Defense Department nor the White House, however, saw the Balkans as a model to be emulated. In a Feb. 14, 2003, speech titled "Beyond Nation Building," which Mr. Rumsfeld delivered in New York, he said the large number of foreign peacekeepers in Kosovo had led to a "culture of dependence" that discouraged local inhabitants from taking responsibility for themselves.

The defense secretary said he thought that there was much to be learned from Afghanistan, where the United States did not install a nationwide security force but relied instead on a new Afghan Army and troops from other countries to help keep the peace. James F. Dobbins, who was the administration's special envoy for Afghanistan and had also served as the ambassador at large for Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti, thought that the administration was focusing on the wrong model. The former Yugoslavia - with its ethnic divisions, hobbled economy and history of totalitarian rule - had more parallels with Iraq than administration officials appeared willing to accept, Mr. Dobbins believed. It was Afghanistan that was the anomaly.

"They preferred to find a model for successful nation building that was not associated with the previous administration," Mr. Dobbins said in an interview. "And Afghanistan offered a much more congenial answer in terms of what would be required in terms of inputs, including troops." As the Iraq war approached, Mr. Dobbins was overseeing a RAND Corporation study on nation building. The larger the number of security forces, the fewer the casualties suffered by alliance troops, the study asserted. When L. Paul Bremer III was appointed the chief administrator for Iraq in May 2003, Mr. Dobbins slipped him a copy. By the end of 2002, the military was scrambling to get ready. The troop deployment plan had been devised so that the Pentagon could regulate the flow and send only as much as was needed. Throughout the process, Mr. Rumsfeld was scrutinizing the troop requests. Defense officials said he had wanted to ensure that the deployments did not outrun the United Nations diplomacy and added that requests for Iraq had to be examined because the United States faced other potential crises. Concern in the Field But some military officers were concerned about what they perceived as second-guessing at the Pentagon, and complained of delays. One major troop request submitted in late November was not approved until a month later, for example. The issue came to the attention of Newt Gingrich, the former Republican Congressional leader and a member of the Defense Policy Board that advises Mr. Rumsfeld, during an early February 2003 meeting with American officers in Kuwait. He said he would go back and press the secretary to stop messing around with tactical-level decisions, according to an account of the session by participants. "The worst they can do is take my designated parking space away," he said.

As the war drew near, Mr. Bush asked his senior commanders if they had sufficient forces, including enough to protect vulnerable supply lines. "I can't tell you how many times he asked, 'Do you have everything that you need?' " Ms. Rice said. "The answer was, these are the force levels that we need." Senior military officers acknowledge that they did not press the president for more troops. But some said they would have been more comfortable with a larger reserve. And some officers say the concept of beginning the invasion while reinforcements were still being sent did not work so smoothly in practice.

On March 18, the day before the conflict began, the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff met to discuss plans for removing American forces once they had triumphed. Aides to General Franks argued that the meeting was premature.

As the American forces drove toward Baghdad in the early days of the war, the fighting was different than had been expected. Instead of a clash of armies, however mismatched, the American forces had to contend with paramilitary forces and even suicide bombers. Thousands of Saddam Fedayeen paramilitary troops had infested Iraq's southern cities and were using them as bases to attack American supply lines.

But after several days of hard battle, the Americans resumed their march north and began moving in for what they thought would be a climactic confrontation with the Republican Guard. With seemingly little doubt that the Americans would win, talk of withdrawal soon resurfaced.

In mid-April, Lawrence Di Rita, one of Mr. Rumsfeld's closest aides, arrived in Kuwait to join the team assembled by General Garner, the civil administrator, which was to oversee post-Hussein Iraq. Mr. Bush had agreed in January that the Defense Department was to have authority for postwar Iraq. It was the first time since World War II that the State Department would not take charge of a post-conflict situation.

Speaking to Garner aides at their hotel headquarters in Kuwait, Mr. Di Rita outlined the Pentagon's vision, one that seemed to echo the themes in Mr. Rumsfeld's Feb. 14 address. According to Col. Paul Hughes of the Army, who was present at the session, Mr. Di Rita said the Pentagon was determined to avoid open-ended military commitments like those in Bosnia and Kosovo, and to withdraw the vast majority of the American forces in three to four months. "The main theme was that D.O.D. would be in charge, and this would be totally different than in the past," said Tom Gross, a retired Army colonel and a Garner aide who was also at the session. "We would be out very quickly. We were very confused. We did not see it as a short-term process."

Mr. Di Rita said in an interview that he had no responsibility for force levels, but added that military commanders wanted the postwar troop numbers to be as low as necessary.

Thomas E. White, then the secretary of the Army, said he had received similar guidance from Mr. Rumsfeld's office. "Our working budgetary assumption was that 90 days after completion of the operation, we would withdraw the first 50,000 and then every 30 days we'd take out another 50,000 until everybody was back," he recalled. "The view was that whatever was left in Iraq would be de minimis."

Not Enough Troops Even as Mr. Hussein's government was losing its struggle to hold onto power, some preliminary reports suggested that Iraq could remain a battleground. The National Intelligence Council had cautioned in a January 2003 report that the Iraqis would resent their liberators unless the American-led occupation authority moved quickly to restore essential services and shift political controls to Iraqi leaders. But those efforts turned out to be frustratingly slow. While much of the country was chaotic and lawless, the American generals there were still not sure that they were facing a determined insurgency. The limited number of United States troops, however, posed problems in policing the porous borders, establishing a significant presence in the resistant Sunni Triangle and imposing order in the capital.

"My position is that we lost momentum and that the insurgency was not inevitable," said James A. (Spider) Marks, a retired Army major general, who served as the chief intelligence officer for the land war command. "We had momentum going in and had Saddam's forces on the run. "But we did not have enough troops," he continued. "First, we did not have enough troops to conduct combat patrols in sufficient numbers to gain solid intelligence and paint a good picture of the enemy on the ground. Secondly, we needed more troops to act on the intelligence we generated. They took advantage of our limited numbers."

In Baghdad, some neighborhoods were particularly restive, but American forces were hampered in carrying out patrols. The Third Infantry Division, the first big unit to venture into the city, had about 17,000 troops. But it was a mechanized division, and only a fraction could carry out patrols on foot. The tank crews had to wait for body armor. North and west of Baghdad, in the volatile cities of the Sunni Triangle, resisters found refuge while they plotted new attacks.

In Falluja, which would become a hotbed of the insurgency, no troops arrived until April 24, two weeks after American forces entered Baghdad. Soldiers from the 82d Airborne were the first ones there. But because of constant troop rotations and the limited number of forces, responsibility for the city repeatedly shifted. The chronic turnover made it difficult for the Americans to form ties to residents and gather useful intelligence. Today, the city is a no-go zone surrounded by United States marines.

Lt. Col. Joseph Apodaca, a Marine intelligence officer who is now retired, said there were early signs in the Shiite Muslim-dominated south that the paramilitary forces American troops faced might be the precursor of a broader insurgency. But chasing after potential rebels was not the Marines' assigned mission, and they did not have sufficient troops for this, he said.

"The overall plan was to go get Saddam Hussein," Colonel Apodaca recalled. "The assumption seemed to be that when people realized that he was gone, that would get the population on our side and facilitate the transition to reconstruction. We were not going to chase these guys when they ran to the smaller cities. We did not really have the force levels at that point to keep the insurgency down."

Thanks for the debate I am more than happy to leave it to history to prove me right. Have a good Christmas

Will reply privetly

Got some PC time so thought I would check what you wrote and reply I am replying only to you because as a Military man even if what I say goes against your Political leanings you cannot deny my military logic.

Ok the roll with the punches thing my reply is grandmother and suck eggs like teach..

I am not sure if you grasp what my complaint with rummy is.

Here goes as a military man you will know all offensive actions break down into 5 phases. 1) Movement

2) Softening up

3) The Attack

4) Consolidation

5) Next phase

Whether you are taking a position or a country. Rumsfeld squashed all phase 4 planning. It being that we were to withdraw once Saddam was toppled the reason being that Iraq would welcome his demise and build a new democratic country.

This in my book was a major mistake. In any country yours or mine if you topple a system or a system breaks down as in Katrina you get a breakdown of law and order.

Iraq not the most stable country reacted the way intelligence predicted it would.

You also said no plan survives first contact with the enemy that is carved on my backside that is what contingency plans are for. Except we didn’t have a plan and we didn’t have a contingency plan.

We had a window of opportunity to put a phase 4 plan into action; I have had experience of phase 4 operations in both Bosnia Kosovo and Sierra Leone. One experience I have gained is work through the local police and Army units.

A major mistake was disarming all the Iraqi Army units many would have worked for us. Instead we disbanded them and many took there talents elsewhere.

Any civilians Phase 4 is

Pacification

Stabilisation

Normalisation

Will look in again next time i get PC time

Thanks for all the replies sorry I cant reply back, but my time is limited this is only a short leave. And although I am smart I am only a Staff Sgnt so not important enough to dictate policy.

Sorry if I annoyed you all, I have no care for politics only political policy that dictates out I myself and my men are used.

Will post again in say two or three months. My reserve duty will be over in March and then I will once more be a regular on FR.

Gents I am on leave wife is awake I am of out, will continue this in a couple of months time

re :When they're quoted heavily by all the liberal "peace and justice" groups, they've lost all credibility around here.

That does not mean they are wrong or right.

I don’t understand the lot of you.

We made no provision for phase 4 for fks sake I was there I saw it with my own eyes we made no sodding provision.

In the weeks following Saddams fall we should of initiated a stabilisation, pacification normalisation program to take advantage of the window of opportunity we did not there was no orders just confusion.

I feel that you are all defending Donald Rumsfeld not because you think he is right but because he is a Republican and its all to do with internal politics.

very funny very sarky, pity you got nothing real to say

Ok so you are ex Military instead of going down the usual trade insults because we don’t agree with each other, leave that to civilians who don’t know what they are talking about.

Lets discuss Iraq from a pure military angle.

What did you think of are immediate post Saddam policy, I don’t want what we should of done I want to discuss what did you think of what we did

re :You know Rumsfeld didn't implement Phase Z either.

So the best way to plan a military operation is on a suck it and see op.

Thank you its nice to know you value the troops who serve you

I asked you a question, you challenged me did we or did we not have a phase 4 plan for Iraq, the fact that yoiu challenged me must prove that you know something about this so prove it.

Military Times the Army Times, Navy Times, Air Force Times, and Marine Corps Times, November 4, 2006,:

It is one thing for the majority of Americans to think Rumsfeld has failed. But when the nation’s current military leaders start to break publicly with their defense secretary, then it is clear that he is losing control of the institution he ostensibly leads.... Rumsfeld has lost credibility with the uniformed leadership, with the troops, with Congress and with the public at large. His strategy has failed, and his ability to lead is compromised. And although the blame for our failures in Iraq rests with the secretary, it will be the troops who bear its brunt.

Army Brig. Gen. Mark Scheid, an early planner of the war

Months before the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld forbade military strategists from developing plans for securing a post-war Iraq, the retiring commander of the Army Transportation Corps said Thursday.

In fact, said Brig. Gen. Mark Scheid, Rumsfeld said “he would fire the next person” who talked about the need for a post-war plan.

As part of G2 I was surprised that there was going to be no phase 4 plan, which is why I went on FreeReepublic to talk about it

re :You can easily check how long I've been here but it appears to me that you're getting your info from press reports.

That is a pile of bollox. Most of my information is military mainly from being a long time serving member of the British Army

Don’t like the message, it must be wrong.

Ok lets do this one question at a time.

Did we have a phase 4 plan yes or no

re :I don't doubt you but might I ask how you get info as to the inner goings on of the DoD, I'd like to get in that loop.

That is a very sad thing to say, have you not read the news about Iraq right from the start, have you not taken a real interest.

Maybe as someone who took part in the initial and subsequent COIN ops I have a real interest in this

At the beginning during the planning stage there were enough stories in the press on TV about whether we needed a phase 4, what should we do with the Iraqi Army what were are plans for Iraq once we toppled Saddam.

I don’t know how long you have been freeping, but I was talking about this before we went into Iraq. Tell you what google Donald Rumsleld and goodle phase 4..

Sorry if I sound angry at you, but if those who say they support the troops don’t know the reality then how the hell can we mobilise the rest of the population

re :I expect a book from Rummy in the near future ripping some in the Bush administration. Possibly before the 2008 election.

So do I, I look forward to the bit where he said that after Saddam it will be plain sailing and that there will be no need to put a phase 4 COIN plan into action so don't even prepare one, because the American people don't want to know.

re :I know nothing of Gates, but just don't see him standing up to anyone like Rumsfeld did.

Standing up to whom, the terrorist or his own military advisors.

re :Rumsfeld has done his duty; it's time for him to take five and enjoy some good brandy.

Complete and utter rubbish, he was responsible for making sure we had no real phase 4 plan to put into operation.

I wish those who support the war in Iraq took time out to actually understand what happened and what is happening out there.

Donald’s plan was go in take out Saddam get out.

The Military and Intelligence both told him that it would not happen like that, and that we needed to plan for phase 4 operations, he said NO NO NO.

Well I am on my third tour out there hardly get in and get out.

We had a window of opportunity which we were not allowed to take advantage of, because of Rumsfeld.

In the Military we have a hierarchy that means as a Sergeant I follow the orders of a Junior Officer, but although he is my CO if he has sense he will listen to what I have to say based on experience.

Rumsfeld refused to it was his way or no way.

If you want to debate t6his I will happily take you through the whole operation detailing where Rumsfeld refused to listen and the aftermath of that refusal

The sad fact here reading the comments of other freepers is that Iraq the WOT they are all side shows compared to the political infighting in America between Republican and Democrats. You all jump to Rumsfeld defence because he is a Republican.

Never mind he refused to allow any plans or preparations for Phase 4, even though the Military and Intelligence advised him we should and that it could be a disaster if we don’t.

But what the hell support for the troops is writing I support the troops and tactics is posting sexy pics of Military hardware.