Stryker Strikes Out

The United States Army’s Stryker program is misguided because Desert Storm demonstrates that threats still exist to which Stryker’s protection and firepower are insufficient.[1] In addition, it does not pass basic mobility and deployability requirements.

The measure of success for a combat vehicle is determined by its level of crew protection and its firepower. Many modern vehicles in various stages of testing and development attempt to make maximum use of technological sensors and diagnostics to augment the vehicle’s protection. Modern variants also use technology to augment their fire capabilities by attempting to digitally link them to other modern weapons platforms on the battlefield. But what happens if the vehicle temporarily loses power, or the computer “locks up?” The answer is that those technological systems are no longer available, and the vehicle instantly becomes extremely vulnerable. Such circumstances are not a matter of speculation, they will and do happen all the time. Combat vehicle designers must therefore design the vehicles so that they can fight – and win – in such a “degraded mode.” A vehicle that cannot fight in degraded mode should get a grade of “F” for survivability.

This paper will show why the Stryker concept is misguided, by comparing the Stryker to the M2/M3 Bradley. The Bradley is the most comparable modern fighting vehicle, and as such the Stryker should be markedly better if the Army is to adopt it for its Interim Brigade Combat Teams. This paper will compare the two systems in the areas of Protection, Firepower, Mobility and Deployability.

The most obvious area to measure from a protection standpoint is the vehicle’s armor. The Bradley provides 65mm of protection on the sides compared to the Stryker’s 14.5mm.[2] These figures are provided by the respective manufacturers. Bradley armor is supposed to offer protection against everything short of direct hits by artillery or tank main gun rounds. However, this writer (an Armor officer with 15 years of experience, to include combat in Desert Storm) personally witnessed the effects of .50 caliber, 25 millimeter (both American), and 12.7 mm (Soviet) machine gun fire against a Bradley. All calibers easily penetrated the front, sides and rear of the Bradley, killing the crew.[3]

As stated above, the Stryker protection level should be better than the Bradley’s; but is it? It appears that the Stryker’s armor is no better than the Bradley’s, and may be worse. During a rigorous field test of the Stryker (Millenium Challenge 2002) conducted in August 2002, “thirteen of fourteen Strykers were destroyed by small arms fire, grenades and guns mounted on enemy vehicles, during ambushes and other encounters on one of the exercise’s missions.”[4] Such performance does not outshine the Bradley’s; but perhaps the Stryker is more lethal?

A reasonable criterion to measure success is whether the vehicle can shoot while on-the-move. Stabilized gun platforms have been used on various American and Soviet weapons systems for over two decades; therefore it is well within the limits of technology that such systems be incorporated into future designs due to the decided advantage they provide. In fact, not having a stabilized platform has become a serious disadvantage.

The Bradley’s main weapon systems are a 25 millimeter chain gun, and a TOW missile launcher. One of the vehicle’s offensive limitations is that it cannot fire its TOW while on-the-move. The Bradley must first stop, raise the TOW launcher, arm the missile, then fire. This entire process takes approximately 30 seconds. Therefore, the TOW is usually employed while the vehicle is in a defensive position offering as much protection as possible (hull defilade), but its 4000 meter range gives it exceptional stand-off distance.[5]

The Bradley’s 25mm chain gun can be effectively fired while moving, and has an effective range of 2000 meters.[6] It is a very lethal weapon, capable of penetrating all infantry fighting vehicles on the modern battlefield. This writer has also seen the effects of the 25mm chain gun against older Soviet tanks (T-54/55 and T-62). When able to get a shot at the tank’s thinly armored engine compartment in the rear, the Bradley caused enough damage to disable the tank and engulf it in flames from its own fuel.

In contrast, the Stryker’s main weapons are a 105mm gun (on the Mobile Gun System variant) and a grenade launcher; but neither variant can fire on-the-move. Furthermore, the entire target acquisition process takes approximately two minutes.[7] An evaluation by the Army’s Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) noted that soldiers had trouble using the vehicle’s remote weapon station periscope, and instead were forced to engage the enemy by climbing on top of the vehicle and using Javelin missiles (not part of the vehicle’s weapons system).[8]

Once again, the Stryker cannot compete against the Bradley. Stryker loses the lethality battle.

The Bradley is capable of maximum speeds of 45 miles per hour, and has a range of 300 miles. It was specifically designed to be able to keep up with the M1 series tank on the modern battlefield, over any terrain. In fact, over extremely broken terrain, the Bradley can actually travel slightly faster than the M1. The reason for the Bradley’s cross-country success is that is has a set of wide tracks, powered by a 600 horsepower engine.

It is important to note that General Shinseki and his supporters (during the vehicle selection phase of Stryker’s development) attempted to seed disinformation by claiming that wheeled vehicles are more mobile than tracks, in a blatant attempt to effect vehicle selection. There are also many allegations of rigged tests in favor of the wheeled vehicle, and Shinseki has stated that his ultimate goal is to rid the Army of tracked vehicles. But despite Shinseki’s disinformation attempts, armor experts know very well that wheeled vehicles cannot compete against tracked vehicles for mobility.[9]

In addition to the Bradley’s superior off-road mobility, it is fully amphibious. Different variants have either a pontoon or a skirt, which take between 15 and 30 minutes to deploy, respectively. Once ready, the Bradley can swim by using its tracks to propel it through the water at a top speed of four miles per hour.[10]

The Stryker also has a maximum range of 300 miles, but can travel at a top speed of 62 miles per hour while on roads. During its Millennium Challenge field testing, the Stryker impressed some dismounted soldiers by its speed at getting them to the fight. But the vehicle had its problems when operating off-road; “a total of 13 tires on the 16 Strykers needed to be replaced during the 96-hour war game."[11]

Wheeled vehicles in Desert Storm, to include the much-vaunted HMMWV, had significant problems operating in the desert sands; and the rocky portions of the desert wreaked havoc on tires. Every wheeled vehicle in this writer’s unit had tire problems. The situation became so bad that the brigade leadership issued a directive requiring all wheeled vehicles to remain on paved (or improved) surfaces whenever possible.

The Bradley weighs approximately 25 tons. It can be transported by any mean, to include transport aircraft, but must utilize aircraft larger than the C-130 which is only capable of transporting 13 tons when it is fully fueled and outfitted for combat operations.[12]

The original requirement for an interim armored vehicle stated that it must be easily transportable by C-130. At 19 tons the basic version of the Stryker is lighter than the Bradley, yet it is still too heavy and too tall to be deployed by C-130.[13] The Stryker is not yet certified for C-130 transport. While Strykers were transported by C-130 for their field test during Millenium Challenge 2002, they required a special one-time waiver from the Air Force. In addition, the C-130s lightened their load by using as little fuel as possible, and by discarding additional armor protection normally required for combat operations.[14]

The Strykers do not meet the “easily transportable” test because they must be modified for flight. The crew must disassemble and remove the remote weapon station (40mm grenade launcher, or .50 caliber machine gun), as well as externally mounted ammunition and racks, so that the Stryker can fit into a C-130.[15]

In conclusion, the Stryker cannot surpass the Bradley in lethality or survivability, as demonstrated by the Bradley’s successes during Desert Storm and Stryker field-testing. The Stryker is, in fact, inferior to the Bradley in these areas. Mobility and deployability are two additional fields in which the Stryker demonstrates its inferiority. Stryker is not a leap ahead in technology or innovation, but merely an inadequate weapons system championed by senior Army leadership who have wed themselves to a wheeled vehicle, at any cost. Ultimately, Stryker will fail before it reaches full production, and where it counts the most – on the battlefield. This failure will have a significantly adverse effect on Army Transformation, and will cause the new Army leadership to cancel (or drastically change) the entire transformation process.

[1] Preliminary data coming back from units in the more recent Operation Iraqi Freedom confirm the same.

[2] “M2A3 Bradley,”[data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/banzaidyne/heavygear/M2A3.html; accessed 11 August 2003; and “Stryker Family of Vehicles,” General Dynamics Land Systems [data on-line] www.gdls.com; accessed 11 August 2003. The Stryker’s 14.5mm armor is applique (bolt-on) that must be added to the vehicle once it reaches its destination. No data is available concerning the Stryker’s actual armor thickness, although it is rumored to be only ½ inch aluminum.

[3] This incident occurred on 26 February 1991 in southern Iraq, during an engagement between a Bradley from Task Force 4-32 Armor (3rd Armored Division) and an Iraqi Republican Guard T-72 tank. A partial account is given in Brigadier General Robert H. Scales Certain Victory (Washington: Brassey’s, 1994), 274. Staff Sergeant Christopher Stephens and Private First Class Adrian Stokes were both killed in action.

[4] Frank Tiboni, “Stryker Falls Short in First Major Field Test,” Defense News, September 16, 2002: 2.

[5] “M2A3 and M3A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems,” in Military Analysis Network, May 5, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.fas.org.man/dod-101/sys/land/m2.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.

[8] Don Loughlin, “Army Leadership and the Stryker Armored Car Program Have Failed ‘Army Transformation,’” 9 October 2002 [data on-line] http://www.combatreform.com/gg021006a.htm; accessed 11 August 2003. Loughlin uses quotes from the Army Test and Evaluation Command’s (ATEC) 6 August 2002 report entitled “Stryker Findings.” The report was originally presented as a vugraph presentation, and was formerly available at http://www.geocities.com/lavdanger/strykerfindings.htm. Several authors reference this ATEC report, yet I have been unable to locate a working link the actual document.

[9] Loughlin, 16-19; and David T. Payne Esq. “Memorandum to Secretary of Defense Designate Donald Rumsfeld: A Feasibility Study on the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Transformation Plan” December 7, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/2116/tanklessarmy.htm; accessed 17 August 2003, 2.

Clancy, Tom and General Franks, Fred, Jr., Into the Storm – On the Ground in Iraq. New York: Berkley Books, 1998.

Kraus, Theresa L. and Schubert, Frank N. General Editors, The Whirlwind War – The United States Army in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1995.

Scales, Brigadier General Robert H. Certain Victory – The U.S. Army in the Gulf War. Washington: Brassey’s, 1994.

Cox, Matthew. “Airborne Units Land Fast, Hit Hard, Remain Relevant,” Army Times, August 14, 2000.

Svitak, Amy and Tiboni, Frank. “DoD May Scale Back Stryker to Fund FCS,” Defense News, October 7, 2002.

Tiboni, Frank. “Stryker Falls Short in First Major Field Test,” Defense News, September 16, 2002.

Loughlin, Don. “Army Leadership and the Stryker Armored Car Program Have Failed ‘Army Transformation,’” October 9, 2002 [data on-line] http://www.combatreform.com/gg021006a.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.

Payne, David T. Esq. “Memorandum to Secretary of Defense Designate Donald Rumsfeld: A Feasibility Study on the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Transformation Plan” December 7, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/2116/tanklessarmy.htm; accessed 17 August 2003.

“Future Combat Systems: Badly Reinventing the M113 or ‘Cash Cows’ That Will ‘Morph’ into the ‘LAV-4’ Armored Car?” [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/wheeledfcscashcow.htm; accessed 12 August 2003.

“M2A3 and M3A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems,” in Military Analysis Network, May 5, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m2.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.

“M2A3 Bradley,” [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/banzaidyne/heavygear/M2A3.html; accessed 11 August 2003.

“M2/M3 Series Bradley Fighting Vehicle,” United States Army Center for Military History, June 11, 2001 [data on-line] http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/www/256.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.

“Stryker Family of Vehicles,” General Dynamics Land Systems, available from www.gdls.com; Internet, accessed 11 August 2003.

Happy retirement! While I don't believe that the Stryker is the perfect vehicle for the job (I really don't like it a whole lot) there are valid reasons to attack the vehicle, and many of the valid reasons don't get covered. It usually boils down to comparisons with Bradley, and then expectations of the Stryker that exceed those of the Bradley, especially when it comes to armor protection. The Bradley cannot stop an RPG round without heavy add on armor, yet no one was talking about it being a death trap, and that despite, as the Matthew James indicates in the article, heavy machine gun rounds will go through the thing.

There is a large caveat to all armor protection that nearly always gets overlooked, and that is the range at which that protection is valid. It is ALWAYS listed as protection against X, "at classified range." One is not sure (unless privy to that range) how much protection that actually affords. Surely everyone will agree that protection to 12.7mm ball ammo at 1000m is far inferior to protection against 12.7mm ball ammo at 100m. But that doesn't account for AP ammunition, which will increase the range necessary for that protection to apply.

And these vehicles are not currently replacing M113s and tanks in Iraq when they arrive, either. We're talking about a force of around 3000 soldiers, intermixed with the rest of the 160,000. There are currently plans for 6 Stryker brigades. That is not nearly a large enough force to convert the entire army to Stryker brigades.

Sounds like the promise that the 82nd Airborne would get their M551 Sheridans replaced with the M8 Ridgeway/Buford Antitank Gun System when their obsolete M551s were withdrawn. Instead they got TOW Hummers, and when it comes down to having to stop tanks with 'em, it'll go badly for their families back home.

"......setting here on the couch in retirement I yield to those still in the arena to bring me up to speed."

We don't need to be "brought up to speed" old friend...We don't "have the legs" to keep up! We need to allow the new era warriors to fight the fights being fought today...

They seem more than capable and have had successes we NEVER matched....

Just sit back, relax and enjoy the show....and keep your head down..

Semper Fi

The Stryker is not a mere APC, but is the U.S. Army's "Interim Force" combat vehicle. It is supposed to be light, lethal, survivable, and easily transportable to the world's hot-spots.

Sure, light infantry loves it; but it's not an APC. There are many variations to the Stryker, from "fightable" transporters and mortar vehicles to one armed with a 105mm cannon.

The Army's Transformation team is claiming that it can do everything it was chartered to do. My point is that it CANNOT.

One of the criteria stated at the beginning of the process was that it must be C-130 deployable. This is not based on other countries' capabilities, but on our desired capability of getting to the fight by the quickest means possible.

Do we need a light, armored vehicle? Yes. But the Stryker does not meet the basic standards that were layed out at the beginning of its design cycle. It's the product of Eric Shinseki's dream of a trackless (wheeled) "armor" force. Ric's dream is an illusion.

My point is that if we are designing a new vehicle whose very designers are telling us that it offers better armor protection (survivability), lethality, mobility and deployability than anything else we currently have in the inventory, then it is important for us to compare it to another armored combat vehicle to see if those claims are true.

It is also important to see what characteristics the vehicle was chartered to have in the first place. These characteristics are requirements -- they are not "options" or optional.

FReegards,

We Only Pretend to Fly Armored Vehicles

"September 23, 2003: The Army has overlooked the problems of getting a Stryker brigade on and off air transports at an air base. The Stryker brigades were created to get mobile American combat units to far off places in a hurry. Each Stryker brigade contains 3494 troops and over 300 Stryker LAVs (of various types.) The total weight of the brigade is about 13,000 tons. In addition, you need a steady flow of supplies (about 600 pounds per man per day) to keep the brigade in action. That adds another 1,000 tons (or more) a day. You want to have the Stryker brigade go in with a least three days of supplies, and have another 30 days worth stockpiled nearby.

No problem moving a Stryker brigade by ship. It takes about 40 hours to load, or unload, the brigade from typical ships. Getting a Stryker brigade to Korea (the port of Pusan), from Washington State, would thus take about 11 days (loading, sea travel, unloading).

The original concept was to airlift the Stryker brigades to distant combat zones. But this has never been practical because of a shortage of transports, higher priority users (like the Air Force supporting their warplanes overseas) and the difficulty of getting all that stuff on and off the transports. One recent RAND study calculated that a Stryker brigade could get to Seoul, Korea (from Seattle, Washington) faster by ship (by a couple of hours) than the same brigade could do by air (from Washington State to Osan, Korea), mainly because of the operational difficulties of moving a ready-for-combat ground unit. It takes a lot of time, and precious airbase space, to load a Stryker brigade onto transports, and then unload them at the other end.

The basic problem is that the Air Force has never seen it's transports as practical transportation for any ground combat units except paratroopers and small numbers of armored vehicles. Sure, the specs for air transports always list what kinds of armored vehicles they can carry, but that's mainly for show. The air transports are much more useful, and valuable, moving spare parts for armored vehicles, crews for armored vehicles and just about anything but the armored vehicles themselves. But sometimes fantasies come to life, and that's what seems to have happened with the concept of moving Stryker brigades by air."

Thanks for the ping.
MJ, anyone pointed out yet that the bogus claim was made that the Stryker with a 105 gun mount can be a one on one tank replacement?
That was one of it's selling points.

The mobility point is extremely valid.
My artillery unit (light towed) got stuck in Fort Drum sand, and had tracked vehicles drive by with a smile and a wave.
And outright laughter and finger pointing at the 'wheelies' that got axle deep in sand.
My guess was that Shinseki and his brown-nosing buttbots never got stuck in Fort Drum sand.
Especially after hearing his claim that wheels are more manueverable.
They're only more manueverable on paved roads, or on parade grounds in cantonment.
Wonder if that was the whole idea.

When Shinseki first came on board (under Clinton) I think the prevailing "wisdom" was that we'd only be involved in peacekeeping missions in the future. That "meels-on-wheels" mentality eventually led to what I call the "Shinseki" (IMO we should name the failed vehicle after it's failed champion).

Yeah, I've heard the tank replacement argument too. What I did NOT include in the paper was the story about the Stryker not being able to fire the 105mm main gun over the side deck. The recoil reportedly causes the vehicle to tip over! The Army's answer? Instead of using off-the-shelf ammo (as required), they've reportedly cut down the "powder" load of the ammo, and told the crews to try not to fire over the side deck! [I've heard this from a few different sources, and it's supposed to be in the original Army Test and Evaluation Command's report dated 6 August 2002.]

I've also heard that the Marines have had problems with their LAVs getting stuck in sand. I'd like to talk to one who has a lot of amphib experience to hear the real deal.

When I worked in an S-4 shop I prepared plans for air deployment, because it was policy that we maintained them. The logistics guys said privately we'd never use them because there isn't enough airlift available and what there is would be used mostly by the Air Force in the early going to transport their own units. Have you ever seen an Air Force pronouncement that they will dedicate enough airlift to transport a Stryker brigade overseas in the even of an emergency? I've never seen it.

Plus, the C-130 has never been viewed as a long haul transport for troop units. On the other hand, the long haul transport, the C-17, isn't used to move units into combat zones.

I'd like to see a calculation of how many C-130 sorties, along with tankers to refuel, would be required to move a Stryker brigade to Europe or Asia with enough fuel, ammo, food and parts to keep it sustained in the early weeks of an operation. I'd be willing to bet a steak dinner we don't even have enough spare C-130's and tankers to do it.

A think tank report, I think it was RAND, indicated when the transport issue was finally looked at, the likely solution would be to preposition Stryker equipment - the same solution we use for the present armored force.

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