How NOT to Use Light Armored Vehicles

Military.com ^ | Aug 13, 2003 | William S. Lind

[centurion316]

William S. Lind: How NOT to Use Light Armored Vehicles

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About the Author

William Sturgiss Lind, Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation, is a native of Cleveland, Ohio, born July 9, 1947. He graduated magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa from Dartmouth College in 1969 and received a Master's Degree in History from Princeton University in 1971. He worked as a legislative aide for armed services for Senator Robert Taft, Jr., of Ohio from 1973 through 1976 and held a similar position with Senator Gary Hart of Colorado from 1977 through 1986. He joined Free Congress Foundation in 1987.

Mr. Lind is author of the Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Westview Press, 1985); co-author, with Gary Hart, of America Can Win: The Case for Military Reform (Adler & Adler, 1986); and co-author, with William H. Marshner, of Cultural Conservatism: Toward a New National Agenda (Free Congress Foundation, 1987). He has written extensively for both popular media, including The Washington Post, The New York Times, and Harper's, and professional military journals, including The Marine Corps Gazette, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and Military Review.

Mr. Lind co-authored the prescient article, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," which was published in The Marine Corps Gazette in October, 1989 and which first propounded the concept of "Fourth Generation War." Mr. Lind and his co-authors predicted that states would increasingly face threats not from other states, but from non-state forces whose primary allegiance was to their religion, ethnic group or ideology. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the article has been credited for its foresight by The New York Times Magazine and The Atlantic Monthly.

Mr. Lind is co-author with Paul M. Weyrich of the monograph: "Why Islam is a Threat to America and The West." He is the author of "George W. Bush's `War on Terrorism': Faulty Strategy and Bad Tactics?" Both were published in 2002 by the Free Congress Foundation.

August 13, 2003

One day in the late 1970's, when I was a defense staffer for Senator Gary Hart, I got a call from an Armed Services Committee staffer asking if I knew anything about Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), which are what we used to call armored cars. A bit, I replied. What did I think of them, he asked? I said I liked them for operational maneuver, because they are wheeled, and most operational (as opposed to tactical) movement is on roads.

That was the beginning of the Marine Corps' LAV program. We soon roped in a one-star at Quantico named Al Gray, and within a few years the Corps had some LAVs. The concept for which they were purchased was very clear: to form soviet-style Operational Maneuver Groups for use against Third World countries. We all knew that LAVs are tactically fragile, and must be used in ways that avoid heavy combat. We also knew that the tank the U.S. armed forces were then buying, the M-1, was too heavy and used too much fuel to be able to maneuver rapidly over operational distances. The LAVs could fill the gap.

As one of the Urvater of the Marines' LAV program, I was pleased to hear a couple years ago that the Army was now also planning to buy LAVs. Good, I thought; they too have recognized that the M-1 is more a Sturmgeschuetz or a Jagdpanzer than a real tank, and they need something else for operational maneuver.

I should have known better, given that we are talking about the U.S. Army. Nonetheless, it was with unbelief, then horror, that I learned what the Army was really buying LAVs (called Strykers) for: urban combat. And now, the first Stryker units are to be sent to Iraq.

The magnitude of the idiocy involved in using Light Armored Vehicles in urban fighting, where they are grapes for RPGs, is so vast that analogies are difficult. Maybe one could compare it to planning a fireworks display on board the Hindenburg. Urban combat is extremely dangerous for any armored vehicle, including the heaviest tanks, as the Israelis can testify after losing several Merkavas in the Gaza strip (to mines--real big ones). Why? Because for opposing fighters, regular infantry or guerillas, the old sequence from the German "men against tanks" is easy. The sequence is, "blind 'em, stop 'em, kill 'em." Armored vehicles are already blind in cities, because distances are short; the safest place near a hostile tank is as close to is as you can get, because then it can't see you. Stopping is also easy, because streets are narrow and vehicles often cannot turn around. And with LAVs, once they are blind and stopped, killing is real easy because the armor is, well, light. That's why they are called Light Armored Vehicles.

In the first phase of the war in Iraq, the jousting contest, the Marine Corps lost M-1 tanks and it lost Amtracks, its amphibious personnel carrier. But it lost no LAVs. That is a testament, not to the vehicles, but to how they were employed.

But now, in the second phase of the Iraq war, and in future phases as well, there will be no role for operational maneuver. And there will be no role for LAVs or Strykers. If the Army insists on sending them into Iraqi towns and cities, they should first equip them with coffin handles, because all they will be is coffins for their crews.

When I first came to Washington in 1973, I was quickly introduced to an old saying about the American armed forces: the Air Force is deceptive, the Navy is dishonest, and the Army is dumb. It seems some things never change.

William S. Lind is Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation. © 2003 William S. Lind. All opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of Military.com.

[centurion316]

William S. Lind pontificates from time to time on matters military, but has zero experience with same. Graduate magna cum laude from any eltie eastern university and you are thereby entitled to forever put forward your opinion as necessary government policy. God save us from men such as this.

[l33+h4x0r]

So he clearly has a low view of the leadership and these vehicles, but they are pretty lightly skinned (if not actually lighter than some tracked apcs), and vulnerable to 50cal fire. But is there any evidence they are more or less easy to disable than an M2 or M3?

[Blood of Tyrants]

The last place you want to be when being attacked by RPG's is in a LAV. Especially in a city street where you cannot turn around.

[Tallguy]

I agree with your general conclusion re: Mr. Lind, but he happens to be right about the LAV in the urban environment. They are RPG-bait.

[Salgak]

Well, from MY experience, Armor of ANY sort is of limited use in areas with either limited mobility or limited visibility. Urban Combat is both. Give me something small, light, and fast: A HUMMV with a M60 or two top mounted. . .

[Khurkris]

William S. Lind pontificates from time to time on matters military, but has zero experience with same. Graduate magna cum laude from any eltie eastern university and you are thereby entitled to forever put forward your opinion as necessary government policy. God save us from men such as this.

roger that. His points are valid. However he, and a great many others, are overlooking the fact that the Stryker is capable of putting boots on the streets in a fairly rapid and protected manner.

If they quickly place a platoon or 2 in a contested area and loiter on the perimeter, maybe even provide a little cover fire, then they are viable for urban warfare. I am not discounting the RPG factor. But speed of ingress is a major factor in urban conflicts.

[Seydlitz]

Worse still, note that he has his Master's degree from Princeton. Princeton only has a Ph.D. program. Given Princeton's huge endowment, Ph.D. students get a very generous financial package. However, candidates are weeded out after two years. Therefore, if someone has a Master's from Princeton, it usually means that they washed out of the Ph.D. program.

I saw Lind speak back in the mid-1980s. At that time, he was advocating disbanding most of the US Navy and replacing it with high-speed coastal defense boats. After all, why would Gary Hart's America ever need to project power overseas?

[Tailback]

The following article includes most of the people involved in the Army's Stryker program. I'll let the readers be the judge of why they might be getting the can right after Gen. Shinsecki's retirement.


InsideDefense.com
August 6, 2003

Army Vice Chief Says Wave Of Early General Officer Retirements Not
Unusual

Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. John Keane this week told Inside the
Pentagon the impending early retirements for several
senior general officers are not unusual in a service that sees similar
turnover every summer.

Acting as chief of staff before Gen. Peter Schoomaker assumed the post
Aug. 1, Keane called in several senior general officers
who rose under now-retired Army chief Gen. Eric Shinseki and directed
them to take early retirement, InsideDefense.com first
reported Aug. 4. Pentagon insiders said the move appeared to be part of
a ÇÄúhousecleaningÇÄù effort that will allow Schoomaker
to fill key positions with fresh faces.

Early send-offs are focused, to a great extent, on the Army's
acquisition community. High-ranking officers asked to leave the
service, senior sources said, include Lt. Gen. John Caldwell, military
deputy to the Army's civilian acquisition director; Lt. Gen.
Joseph Cosumano, commanding general of the Army's Space and Missile
Defense Command; and Lt. Gen. Dennis Cavin,
commanding general of the Army Accessions Command.

Caldwell and Cavin -- each of whom has spent less than two years at
current rank -- have told their staffs they are retiring,
Army officials said. But Cosumano, who has spent just over two years as
a three-star, has not notified staff, officials said.

Those told to retire are just the first wave of nearly a dozen Army
generals on Keane and Schoomaker's list, according to
senior defense officials. More are expected to follow at Schoomaker's
direction, defense officials said.

ÇÄúBoth the number of generals leaving -- and [the] fact [they are]
being
asked to retire, rather than leaving at their own instigation
-- strikes me as pretty unusual,ÇÄù says Richard Kohn, head of the
Curriculum in Peace, War and Defense at the University of
North Carolina and a former Air Force historian. Kohn also expressed
surprise that the ÇÄúsoon-to-retire acting chief [would]
initiate the request rather than the incoming chief.ÇÄù

In response to a widespread perception that the developments are unusual

and perhaps a sign of big changes to come, Keane
insisted the anticipated retirements do not exceed those in recent
years.

ÇÄúThe number of expected three-star retirements this year (about 13)
does
not vary significantly from our five-year average
(about 11),ÇÄù Keane told ITP in an Aug. 5 written statement.

However, Keane did not offer data on how many departures in years past
were early retirements. A reporter asked the Army
to provide information to support the contention that actions over the
past several weeks are not an aberration, but the service
was unable to do so by press time (Aug. 6).

Several other active and retired Army officers said the new developments

differ in significant ways from prior years.

ÇÄúLook, it is in the never-been-done-before category that, one, a chief

of staff has been pulled out of retirement, two, another
service's secretary [Air Force head James Roche] has been taken from
that service, and . . . three, never have so many
generals been asked to leave,ÇÄù said retired Army Col. David Hunt, a
former Green Beret and airborne Ranger.

Military officers who retire before spending three years at their
current rank must revert to a lower rank and receive less
retirement pay, unless ÇÄúexceptional circumstancesÇÄù prompt the
service to
waive the requirement, according to Title 10 of the
U.S. Code and Army personnel rules.

The Army personnel office has implemented a strict ÇÄúno exceptionsÇÄù
policy over the past couple of years, barring unusual health
or family circumstances for leaving service early, officials said. The
Army Personnel Command's Web site displays a notice that
reads: ÇÄúThere will be no officer or enlisted early retirement,
[voluntary separations] or time-in-grade waivers.ÇÄù Sources say this
provision remains in effect.

But one retired senior Army officer said the service ÇÄúroutinelyÇÄù
waives
the requirement for three- and four-star generals, if they
serve less than three years in grade.

Title 10 -- the federal law that governs military affairs -- says the
president may waive the three-years-in-rank requirement ÇÄúin
individual cases involving extreme hardship or exceptional or unusual
circumstances.ÇÄù The provision is aimed at discouraging
officers from retiring shortly after attaining a higher rank.

Three-star general or flag officers ÇÄúmay be retired in that grade . .
.
only after the secretary of defense certifies in writing to the
president and Congress that the officer served on active duty
satisfactorily in that grade,ÇÄù the law states.

Keane maintains that Army three-star generals are told not to expect to
remain in service as a three-star for more than two
years. Effectively speaking, without extension or promotion, every
lieutenant general will retire after two years and -- unless
given a waiver -- will revert to two stars and receive less retirement
pay, according to the Army vice chief.

ÇÄúIt is important to remember that when a two-star general takes a
three-star assignment, the term is, in fact, for two years,ÇÄù
Keane said. ÇÄúConsequently, there is no expectation that any three-star

general has an indefinite term of service. Sometimes
factors dictate these general officers will hold their jobs beyond that
term, [but] often they do not. Simply put, our general
officers understand both the commitment and the limitations, and feel
privileged to serve.ÇÄù

Title 10 appears to provide a longer term for three-star generals than
Keane suggests. The law allows a lieutenant general -- ÇÄúif
not earlier retiredÇÄù -- a five-year term or 38 years of active-duty
service, whichever period is longer.

Gen. Paul Kern, who commands the Army Materiel Command, is also among
those tapped for early retirement, according to
one defense official.

ÇÄúThere's been no decision on his future,ÇÄù Army Col. Joe Curtin, a
top
service spokesman, said of Kern on Aug. 6. ÇÄúThere's
been no decision either way.ÇÄù

Kern will have served just two years at his four-star rank as of late
October, and is already appealing for an exception to being
taken down a notch in rank upon retirement, the defense official earlier

told ITP.

Curtin responded, though, that Kern's office says the general is not
appealing any action in regard to his career. But the defense
official who initially provided the information continued to stand by
its veracity this week.

Keane also asked Lt. Gen. Johnny Riggs, director of the Army Objective
Force Task Force, to retire, according to senior
officials. But Riggs, who was promoted in August 1999, has spent more
than three years ÇÄúin gradeÇÄù and thus is eligible to retain
his full rank after retiring.

Lt. Gen. Charles Mahan is another leader Keane has selected to retire,
one defense observer said last week. The deputy chief
of staff for logistics, Mahan is expected to retire Aug. 27, his office
confirmed. He will have served a full three years as of Oct.
6.

An Army spokesman said Aug. 4 that none of the six retirements has been
announced formally and thus could not be
confirmed. But Curtin said two days later that Mahan announced his
retirement last January and will leave the Army on Nov. 1.

InsideDefense.com reported earlier this week that one senior defense
official said Caldwell, the acquisition deputy, is being
retired virtually ÇÄúfor cause.ÇÄù

ÇÄúThat statement is incorrect from the viewpoint of the leadership of
the
Army and my viewpoint,ÇÄù Caldwell told ITP Aug. 6. ÇÄúIf
there's such a senior defense official out there that would like to make

that comment, I would like to have a discussion with
them -- if they are big enough to do that.ÇÄù

Defense officials say Caldwell's retirement is likely meant to send a
signal to the Army acquisition community that Schoomaker
will usher in buying reform.

But Keane said this week that all the generals tapped to retire have
offered excellent service.

ÇÄúWhile we do not discuss the particular factors involved in individual

general officer assignments, the implication that the officers
named in this article have performed in anything less than an exemplary
fashion is simply false,ÇÄù Keane said. ÇÄúI can say
unequivocally that each of the officers mentioned in this article are
dedicated, competent professionals committed to our
mission, our soldiers, and our nation. I consider myself fortunate to
serve with them.ÇÄù

ÇÄúAt the end of the day, Jack Keane is a nice guy and he'll try to put
a
happy faceÇÄù on a difficult situation, said a joint strategic
planning official.

Maj. Gen. Joseph Yakovac, program executive officer for ground combat
systems, is widely regarded as a likely candidate to
gain another star and replace Caldwell, defense officials said.

Keane charged the InsideDefense.com report this week contained
unspecified ÇÄúinaccuracies,ÇÄù and was ÇÄúmisleadingÇÄù and ÇÄúunfair
to the officers named.ÇÄù

ÇÄúI am surprised at the apparent visceral reaction from the service,ÇÄù

said another senior officer, ÇÄúgiven that things like this
happen. We make changes for a reason. There's nothing wrong with it.ÇÄù
No
one disputes that Keane's move involves a notable
ÇÄúset of retirements throughout the Army acquisition community,ÇÄù this

officer said.

The statements Keane provided to ITP ÇÄúdo not deny the center of [the]
piece that this is a sweep-out of much of the Army's
current leadership,ÇÄù Hunt said this week. ÇÄúI [call it] 'window
dressing'
because it still does not get at the self-serving nature of
our senior officer corps, who spend more time figuring out their next
assignment and who is on their promotion boards than on
doing their jobs.ÇÄù

Schoomaker remarked last week that change is always difficult, and
several Army officers and observers said this week that
the group of retirements is the first tangible sign of challenging
overhauls to come.

-- Elaine M. Grossman

[CatoRenasci]

I don't know Lind, but I have both armor and artillery experience. The road speed and mobility of LAV's is seductive, but they are really like Jackie Fisher's battle cruisers: too thin-skinned for a fight and not fast enough to run away from a determined enemy.

I was one of those, during the development phase, who was very concerned about the weight and appetite of the M-1 Abrams tank. But the alternatives are not attractive and involve trade-offs.

Our history with light tanks and LAVs since WWII has not been good. The best of our lights is still the M-41 Walker Bulldog light tank used in Korea. They were remarkably fast (close to 60mph on good roads with the governors removed). The problem, of course, was thin armor and a relatively weak gun -- had to hit a T-34 just right to kill it, couldn't kill a Stalin heavy. We tried another light tank in the M551 Sheridan. It was also fast. Had an innovative gun/missle system that didn't really work very well. Ahead of its time. The think had aluminum armor. A deathtrap that was despised in 'Nam. Troops preferred M-41s or M48s or M60s.

The Brits, Germans and French have always been big fans of armored cars, especially for dealing with other than opposing armor. American experience with them has been mixed and less successful. Into the mid-70s, all the European armies had lots of armored cars, but since the '60s they have gone out of fashion.

I haven't read any of the test results, but my own instincts tell me the stryker is a loser.

[truth_seeker]

If a man is walking, he has no armor. If a man is flying in a heliopter, he has little armor.

My understanding of Stryker is to MOVE people quickly. Infantry people.

I guess you could always have the infantry ride in tanks, but then wouldn't they be "tankers?"

[Seydlitz]

Another point: Anyone who would compare the M-1 Abrams with a Sturmgeschutz is declaring his ignorance for all of the world to see. The Sturmgeschutz were assault guns, not tanks (and if Lind is saying that the Abrams ain't a tank, then he deserves to be committed to a loony bin). They were used as mobile artillery (ever conscious of military history, German commanders were taught to use assault guns as horse artillery was used a century before), not in traditional tank roles (e.g. riding hell-for-leather behind enemy lines, seizing key junctures and destroying artillery, HQs, etc).

[Ispy4u]

In urban environments nothing is better than LPCs.

They get you where you need to go and are more manueverable than anything else on the battlefield.

[Tailback]

Give me something small, light, and fast: A HUMMV with a M60 or two top mounted. . .

As a guy who just got out of the light cav (HMMWV) as a gunner, vehicle commander, and squad leader, I can say that you're nuts. Most of the casualties since the end of offensive operations in Iraq have been from RPG's and command detonated improvised mines. RPG's kill Humvees, LAV's and other soft-skinned wheeled vehicles easily. Anyone with half a brain knows that third world countries have RPG's out the ying-yang that the locals use for anti-tank, anti-vehicle, hasty artillery, and ambushes. South Africa had specially designed mine proof vehicles back in the eighties! Isreal has M113's fitted with (RPG proof) bolt on armor. But the US Army is using Humvees as convoy escort. Really good freaking idea!

[jjm2111]

I'm not an expert on urban combat, but I certainly would not want to be in an LAV on a narrow street.

[r9etb]

Another point: Anyone who would compare the M-1 Abrams with a Sturmgeschutz is declaring his ignorance for all of the world to see.

And another point: anyone who sprinkles his discussion of LAV's with German words like Sturmgeschutz and Urvater is too enamored of cuteness to be taken at his word.

He leaves something out, too: any explanation of why an LAV would be any more vulnerable than a HUMV (or a Chrysler LeBaron, for that matter).

His alternative seems to be to use "real" armor, which he has already dismissed as unworkable, or to restrict our guys to moving around on foot.

Such obvious oversights suggest to me that the guy's got an alternative agenda of some sort.

[centurion316]

The last place you want to be when being attacked by RPG's is in a LAV.

I don't agree. The last place you want to be includes HMMWVs, trucks, AAV's, M113s, LAV-25. The first place you want to be is in a M-1. Stryker lies somewhere in between.

Mr. Lind errs by comparing the Stryker and the LAV-25 with the M-1 tank. No such comparison is possible, and certainly not meaningful. What Stryker does provide is enhanced mobility, enhanced firepower, enhanced optics for surveillance, enhanced command and control; along with limited protection from artillery, small arms, and with add-on armor (being fitted to those Strykers being deployed to Iraq), protection from RPG's.

The Stryker is not replacing the M-1, nor the M-2. Like any weapons system, it must be employed in accordance with its capabilities and limitations. Mr Lind, who has never heard a shot fired in anger, would be unlikely to understand such subtleties.

[centurion316]

Your historical examples, both naval and military, are enlighting and, I believe, help make the point. The Stryker is not a fighting vehicle in the sense that we tried with the M-41 or M-551. It must rely on terrain and stand-off to provide protection from direct fire anti-tank weapons. Try to use it as a light tank, or even worse, as a substitute for the M-1, and you lose. Lind doesn't know the difference between a M-1 and a Stryker, so he tries to convince us that they are interchangable on the battlefield. Note that he believes that the M-1 is a dinosaur - I wonder if tankers of the 3ID would agree with his assessment.

Employed properly, the Stryker provides mobility, protection, and firepower far beyond that available to the light infantryman. I am abivilent on the argument between tracked and wheeled vehicles. Hard to beat a tracked vehicle, but they have made considerable progress in suspension, etc. for wheeled vehicles; so we'll just have to see.

[centurion316]

Good response. Amazing how hostile fire focuses the mind and clarifies issues. I'm with you.

[Tallguy]

At that time, he was advocating disbanding most of the US Navy and replacing it with high-speed coastal defense boats.

I heard the lead-ship in Gary Hart's Navy was the "USS Hanky-Panky".

[Lion Den Dan]

He has the Stryker and the corrupt and idiotic Army command figured out.