The Absurdity of 'Thinking in Language'

the author's site ^ | 1972 | Dallas Willard

[unspun]

The Absurdity of 'Thinking in Language'

This paper has been read to the University of Southern California philosophy group and the Boston 1972 meeting of the American Philosophical Association, as well as to the Houston meeting of the Southwestern Philosophical Society. Appeared in The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, IV(1973), pp. 125-132. Numbers in "<>" refer to this journal.

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Among the principal assumptions of major portions of philosophy in recent decades have been: (1) That philosophy somehow consists of (some sort of) logic, and (2) that logic is a study of and theory about (some sort of) language. There, of course, follows from these a third assumption: (3) That philosophy is a study of and theory about (some sort of) language--though this implication should not be taken as representing any phase of the historical development of recent philosophizing. Instead of listing these three points as assumptions, it would probably be more correct to regard them as categories or complexes of assumptions; or perhaps, more vaguely still, as 'tendencies' or proclivities of recent philosophical thinking. But precision of these points need not be put in issue here, as this paper does not seek any large-scale resolution of the problem area in question. The aim here is to examine only one proposition which plays a role in the clearly existent tendencies referred to: Namely, the proposition that we think in or with language. I hope to show, first, that we do not always think in or with language; and then, second, that the very conception of thinking in or with language involves an absurdity. What implications this has for broader philosophical assumptions or tendencies will not be dealt with here, though the implications in question seem to me to be extremely important ones. That human beings think in language is explicitly stated in such diverse places as ordinary newspapers, the more sophisticated popular magazines and journals, and serious discourse in the humanities and the social sciences, as well as in the technical writings of philosophers. To prove this broad range of consensus would be idle; but, in order to have the philosophical context clearly before us, we may give a few brief quotations. <126>       (1) Man, like every living creature, thinks unceasingly, but does not know it: the thinking which becomes conscious of itself is only the smallest part thereof. And, we may say, the worst part:--for this conscious thinking alone is done in words, that is to say, in the symbols for communication, by means of which the origin of consciousness is revealed. (Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom, sub-sec. # 354)      (2) Let no one be contemptuous of symbols! A good deal depends upon a practical selection of them. Furthermore, their value is not diminished by the fact that after much practice, we no longer really need to call forth a symbol, we do not need to speak out loud in order to think. The fact remains that we think in words or, when not in words, then in mathematical or other symbols. (Frege, Mind, Vol. 73, p. 156)      (3) It is misleading then to talk of thinking as of a 'mental activity'. We may say that thinking is essentially the activity of operating with signs. This activity is performed by the hand, when we think by writing; by the mouth and larynx, when we think by speaking; and if we think by imagining signs or pictures, I can give you no agent that thinks. If then you say that in such cases the mind thinks, I would only draw your attention to the fact that you are using a metaphor, that here the mind is an agent in a different sense from that in which the hand can be said to be an agent in writing. (Wittgenstein, Blue Book, pp. 6-7)      (4) ... The woof and warp of all thought and all research is symbols, and the life of thought and science is the life inherent in symbols; so that it is wrong to say that a good language is important to good thought, merely; for it is of the essence of it. (C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, II, p. 129)      (5) Words only matter because words are what we think with. (H. H. Price, Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. XIX, p. 7)      (6) Theorizing is an activity which most people can and normally do conduct in silence. They articulate in sentences the theories that they construct, but they do not most of the time speak these sentences out loud. They say them to themselves.... Much of our ordinary thinking is conducted in internal monologue or silent soliloquy, usually accompanied by an internal cinematograph-show of visual imagery.... This trick of talking to oneself in silence is acquired neither quickly nor without effort.... (Ryle, Concept of Mind, p. 27. See also pp. 282-83 and 296-97) <127>      (7)This helps to elucidate the well-known difficulty of thinking without words. Certain kinds of thinking are pieces of intelligent talking to oneself. Consider the way in which I 'thinkingly' wrote the last sentence. I can no more do the 'thinking' part without the talking (or writing) part than a man can do the being graceful part of walking apart from the walking (or some equivalent activity). (J.J.C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism, p. 89) These quotations will suffice to establish the context within which philosophers speak of thinking in language (or with language). Many other quotations could be added from the literature.1 It is not assumed here that the persons quoted all occupy the same position with reference to the relationship between thought and language. Yet it would be interesting to see what any of these thinkers, or others who suppose that human beings think in language, could save of their position from the critique which follows. Uneasiness about the conception of thinking in or with language has been expressed by a number of writers, but only over limited aspects of it.2 Here we shall consider arguments which purport to call the conception into question entirely and in principle. First, consider a reason for rejecting the view that we always think in language. It consists in the fact that thinking often occurs without the production, manipulation, or perception of sense-perceptible signs, without which there is no use of language. Such occurrences often provoke offers of 'A penny for your thoughts.' Thinking: Whatever we may decide to call them, and however it is that we are conscious of them, there are intentional states of persons, more or less fixed or fleeting, which do not require for their obtaining that what they are about or of be perceived by, or be impinging causally upon, the person involved. In order to think of3 Henry the Eighth, <128> of the first auto one owned, of the Pythagorean theorem, or of the Mississippi River, it is not required that they should disturb my nervous system. Such states (t-states) of persons are often called 'thoughts', especially in contrast with 'perceptions', and being in such a state is one of the things more commonly called 'thinking'. One no more needs to be going through a change of such states in order to be thinking, than he needs to be changing his bodily position in order to be sitting or lying or sleeping. Rarely if ever--as is alleged in the case of mystic contemplation--are these t-states unchanging. Usually they flow, at varying rates, intermingled with person states of many sorts, governed by such transitional structures as inference, goal orientation, objective structures given in perception or in other ways, and elemental association of 'ideas', among others. In what follows, we shall use 'thinking' to cover both the single t-state and the flow of such states, without regard to how intermingled with other person states. Language: Sense perceptible signs or symbols are an essential constituent of language. It is always false to say that language is present or in use where no signs are present or in use. And, whatever else a sign may be, it is something which is apprehendable via its sensible qualities. That is, it is something which can be either seen, heard, felt, tasted or smelled. Moreover, the use of language requires some level of actual sensuous apprehension of the signs which are in use on the occasion. (Confusion or distortion of this sensuous feedback can render a subject incapable of writing or speaking; and, of course, without perception of the sign-sequences emitted, one cannot understand the person emitting language.) Now cases can be produced almost at will where thinking occurs without language being present or in use. This, of course, is something which everyone--including the proponent of thinking-in-language--very well knows. It is these cases which, together with the assumption that we always think in language, create what in (7) was called "the well-known difficulty of thinking without words." If, as in (3), "thinking is essentially the activity of operating with signs," then when there are no signs--and when, consequently, the means by which we produce, manipulate, or perceive signs are not functioning--we do have a difficulty. In fact, a difficulty so severe that it amounts to a proof that thinking is not essentially the activity of operating with signs, and that often we think entirely without language. One cannot operate with signs where there are no signs. <129>  As the above quotations indicate, the most common move made to save 'thinking in language' at this point is the shift to 'silent soliloquy,' as in (6), or to 'pieces of intelligent talking to oneself,' as in (7). These are latter-day shades of John Watson's 'sub-vocal language.' Of course one can talk to oneself or write to onself. But talking and writing to oneself require the production and perception of sensuous signs just as much as talking and writing to another. The realization of this is what drives the thinking-in-language advocate to silent soliloquy or to nonvocal speaking--the written counterpart of which would be invisible writing. That is, they are driven to flat absurdities. A silent soliloquy--that is, silent speaking--is precisely on a par with a silent trumpet solo, for example, or silent thunder. A poet may say:        Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard             Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on;        Not to the sensual ear, but, more endeared,             Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone;...                (Keats, Ode to a Grecian Urn) But there are in fact no unhearable melodies, no ears other than the "sensual," no ditties of no tone. What those who speak of silent discourse have in mind is, no doubt, the fact that interlaced with our thinking of or about things is a great deal of imaging of linguistic entities. (This is especially true of academics or intellectuals in general, because of their great concern with expression of thought. Probably an adequate phenomenology of thinking would exhibit great contrast between them and other classes of persons precisely at the relation between thinking and degree of activity in imaging linguistic entities and events.) But imaging a word is not using a word, any more than imaging a horse is using a horse. Moreover, imaging a word, phrase, or sentence is not producing or perceiving a word, phrase, or sentence any more than imaging a horse is producing or perceiving--or otherwise 'having'--a horse. To image a linguistic sequence is not to have it in a special sort of place--the mind--nor is it to have a special sort of linguistic sequence. To image is to exemplify a certain sort of thinking or intentional state, and a sort which does have interesting relationships with other kinds of thinking. But there is no reason at all to suppose that all kinds of thinking necessarily involve or are accompanied by this kind of thinking (imaging) directed upon language segments. And if there were, it still would not follow that all thinking requires language, since this kind of thinking about language segments is not itself language at all. Nor does it require any <130> language present in order for it to come to pass, since intentional inexistence applies to mental events when language segments are the objects, as well as when sticks and stones and animals are. Having considered a reason for rejecting the proposition that human beings always think in language, let us now consider whether they ever do. In fact, the difficulty is not, as Smart (above) and others have thought, in seeing how one can think without language, but in seeing how one would think with it. Thinking with or in language must consist in doing something with symbols, and so necessarily involves doing something to them--e.g., producing, altering, or perceiving them. If we would do something with the knife (e.g., cut the bread), we must do something to the knife, (e.g., clasp it in our hands). But, as we have seen, thinking occurs where nothing at all is being done to or with signs, there not being any signs in these cases. The power or act of having or changing t-states--that is, the power or act of thinking--is, then, not a power or act of having or altering linguistic symbols. (It is not, in fact, a power of doing anything with or in anything at all. The profound difference in kinds of powers and acts involved here is what Wittgenstein calls attention to in the last sentence of (3) above.) Thought is, of course, practical, in that it exercises an influence upon, or makes some difference in, the world of sense particulars. But it alone is not capable of acting with the sorts of particulars used in linguistic behavior as its immediate instruments. It is just this incapacity which makes it impossible for the advocates of thinking-in-language to give any account of the mechanisms or the 'how' by which the words in which we, allegedly, think are produced, manipulated, and gotten rid of--though they must be produced (or stored and hauled out), manipulated, and, in some sense, gotten rid of, if we are to think with and in them as our tools or instruments. Merely to ask the question of how, in detail, this is done in the course of thinking reveals, I believe, the absurdity of 'thinking in language'. Mere thinking can do nothing to signs which might be used in a language, and hence it can do nothing with such signs, or in the act of modifying the conditions of such signs. It is absurd to suppose that one can do x with y without in some way bringing about a change in the condition, state, relations, or properties of y. It is this and only this that I put by saying that it is absurd to suppose that one can do something with y while doing nothing to y. If it is replied that, of course, the mind or thought does not do these things, but that when we write, speak, hear, see, and otherwise relate to actual words in the actual employment of language, we then are thinking, with bodily parts managing the symbols involved, then it <131> must be pointed out that, while we may indeed also be thinking in such cases, we are not simply thinking. The total event here, to which language certainly is essential, is not thinking. Correct use of language can even occur, as has been pointed out by Wittgenstein, without the occurrence of any peculiarly relevant t-states. On the other hand, thinking does occur without the use of hands, mouth, ears, eyes, fingers in any appropriately relevant manner. Hence, what can only occur by the use of these is not the same as thinking, though it may somehow involve or influence thinking. Smart remarks in (7) that, when he thinkingly wrote the sentence, "Certain kinds of thinking are pieces of intelligent talking to oneself," he could "no more do the 'thinking' part without the talking (or writing) part than a man can do the being graceful part of walking apart from the walking." This may be true of thinkingly writing the sentence (whatever that means). But it does not follow that one cannot think that certain kinds of thinking are pieces of intelligent talking to oneself without the use of language, though Smart clearly thinks that it does. Of course one cannot thinkingly write without writing. But that is nothing to the point of whether or not we can and do think with or without words. Also, the comparison to graceful walking is not apt. We do, as above shown, sometimes think without words or symbols, while no cases of grace without behavior are known. Now it is very certainly true that some processes clearly involving thinking as described above depend for their occurrence upon linguistic behavior and the sensible signs which it involves, for example, the processes of learning algebra or the history of the Basques, or learning how to counsel emotionally upset persons. But it is to be noted that these are not themselves processes of thinking, but rather are extremely complex processes involving all kinds of events and entities other than language and other than thinking--e.g., feelings, perceptions, buildings, other persons, days and nights, books, and so on. None of these processes is a process of thinking; and for that reason alone it is invalid to infer from them that thinking is linguistic behavior, or that one thinks with language. What is essential to things or events of a certain sort must be shown essential to them taken by themselves, not in combination with many other things. With reference to the involved processes in question, it might be more appropriate (though it would still be wrong) to say--as some have said in recent years--that we live in or with language. Nevertheless, it is certain that some kind of dependence relation--probably similar to feedback mechanisms--exists between linguistic processes and their sensuous signs, on the one hand, and certain sequences of t-states on the other. What, exactly, this relation <132> of dependence is continues to be veiled by, among other things, a priori assumptions about what thinking and language must be and do. One such assumption is that which holds thinking essentially to be an operation with signs or symbols, or doing something with--or in--linguistic processes or entities. The view that we (necessarily) think without language is, today, regarded as so outlandish as not to merit serious consideration. But this is not due to a lack of arguments to support it. My object here has been to focus upon certain arguments purporting to show the absurdity of thinking in language. The main points in these arguments are: Thinking does occur without any accompanying language whatsoever, and thus shows itself not to be a power or act of managing linguistic signs, once it is clear what such a sign is. Thinking, as distinct from behavioral processes involving it, can do nothing to signs or symbols, and hence can do nothing with them. NOTES See for example, Ramsey's Foundations of Mathematics, p. 138, and Kneale's remarks in Feigl and Sellars, Readings in Philosophical Analysis, p. 42. Return to text. See S. Morris Engel, "Thought and Language," Dialogue, Vol. 3, 1964, 160-170; Jerome Shaffer, "Recent Work on the Mind-Body Problem," American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. II, 1965, esp. p. 83; R. Kirk, "Rationality Without Language," Mind, 1967, pp. 369-368; G. Ryle, "A Puzzling Element in the Notion of Thinking," in Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action, P. F. Strawson, ed., (Oxford: 1968), pp. 7-23. Interesting remarks on the issues here are also found in Bruce Aune's Knowledge, Mind and Nature, chap. VIII and H. H. Price's Thinking and Experience, Chap. X.  See also Wm. James, "Thought Before Language; A Deaf Mute's Recollections," Mind, Vol. I, 1892; and see Wittgenstein's comments on this in Philosophical Investigations, No. 342. Return to text. I use only think here, for simplicity; but think that and other structures of such intentional states (and sequences thereof) might also be mentioned. Specifically, I would also wish to hold that instances of thinking that, in the sense of inferring or puzzling something out, occur in the absence of appropriate linguistic entities or activities. Return to text.

[unspun]

1. Do we always think in language?

2. Do we ever think in language?

You may have already said, but would you like to post your determinations?

[Cvengr]

Yes, we are able and do think in language. We also have other thoughts associated with meaning, intuition, insight, perception and emotion which might not be immediately communicated by language, but in some cases language is able to communicate them.

There are some who argue that private language exists, in which some experience is not communicable with justifiable certainty.

A counterargument to such private language is that its discussion would therefore be absurd (from a logical perspective). But then again, issues regarding the spirit which might fall into that category, seem to be understandable by those with spiritual experience who describe themselves as 'live' in the Spirit. To those not so exposed, such language appears as foolishness. To those experienced in it with faith, there are few topics more intriquing and worthwhile to study.

[Roscoe]

1. Do we always think in language?

2. Do we ever think in language?

We all have habits.

[tacticalogic]

1. Do we always think in language?

2. Do we ever think in language?

FWIW - I do not think in language when I am working on developing an idea or abstract concept.

I do think in language when I am working on how to convey that idea or concept to someone else.

[ijcr]

1. Do we always think in language?

No. An example would be a goal kicker where they can visualize a kick, play it in their mind and repeat the visualization physically.

2. Do we ever think in language?

Yes.Poetry.

[headsonpikes]

RE Mathematicians:

"They bring epistemological zeal to the table..."

LOL!! I love it!

[tpaine]

"They bring epistemological zeal to the table..."


Last nite my wife brought some excellent sub-epidermal veal to the table..

Good merlot too..

[Alamo-Girl]

Thank you so much for your post!

I do very much love the epistemological zeal that mathematicians bring to the “evolution biology” table.

For one thing, to a mathematician the “absence of evidence IS evidence of absence.”

For another, mathematicians and physicists accept axioms of the level evolutionary biologists do not, such as taking life as an axiom. According to Sir Karl Popper, when given two theories an experiment will decide one true and one false. But in wave-particle duality one experiment proves the electron is a wave, another proves it is a particle. Mathematicians and physicists consider these undecidabilities whereas evolutionary biologists offer “just-so” stories.

Evolutionary biologists speak of function and complexity over time. Mathematicians speak of functional complexity, randomness and probabilities over time.

Evolutionary biologists speak of chemistry and genetics. Mathematicians speak of symbolization, self-organization and syntactic autonomy.

Or to put it more succinctly, the evolutionary biologist describes but the mathematician/physicist explains.

[Consort]

No. An example would be a goal kicker where they can visualize a kick, play it in their mind and repeat the visualization physically.

Of course, the kickers could be thinking in language as they visualize the kick, as in: "I'll bet that the other team is going to call a time out to try to psych me out. I hate those SOBs." "If the placeholder puts the ball down correctly, I can make this field goal; but he hates my guts and he wants to see me fail so that his brother can take my job." "The second cheerleader from the right is a fox."

[headsonpikes]

I think the mathematician brings to the table the constant awareness that he is working within the bounds of a formal system; and he knows also that he could choose different axioms and operating rules than he does.

He is searching for isomorphism between his consciously chosen METAPHOR and reality, both at the sub-atomic and cosmic levels.

Apart from logicians, few others bring such analytical strength to the table - the other 'scientists' are pre-occupied with a sort of anecdotal materialism. Too often, they think they are describing reality when they are simply unbundling their own pet metaphor.

All imho. ;^)

[Alamo-Girl]

Thank you so much for "taking us there!" This is a great description of the mathematicians’ zeal:

He is searching for isomorphism between his consciously chosen METAPHOR and reality, both at the sub-atomic and cosmic levels.

I would add that he also copes with the elusiveness of “reality” at sub-atomic levels (measurement problem) as well as cosmic levels (dimensions).

[unspun]

Cvengr, in addition to Dr. Willard's semantics, looks like this brain research is likely to be informative, regarding questions of whether we ever think in language, and the overall relationship of the mind to the brain. (Please forgive and correct, if I say something out of line, here.) Thanks:

With respect to identity of language with thought and possible independence of logic, consider how many Asian languages, written and learnt in Kanji or katahana, uses a different part of the physical brain when bring processed.

Yes, consider, eh? If this is true, it would indicate one obvious finding: that activity of the brain is specific to the form of a language. But then what would this indicate? Looks to me it likely tells us that while language is such a strongly regarded function and process of the mind, it is something that the mind treats as other than the substance of the mind and other than a controlling factor of the mind. If language were of the substance of the mind, wouldn't one fully formed language have a "manifold" sameness of brain operations with another language? (If I understand "manifold" relationships from a glance at tortoise's post and A-G's linked article.) And if language were a controlling factor of the mind, wouldn't the meaning and flow of words have this same "manifold sameness?" (Can I use that phrase, tort. and A-G?)

But maybe not, due to differences in things such as syntax, that cause thinking through language to be different from one language to another, so the questions include "How different are the brain patterns, using one language or another? -- How well is this measured and in what context? -- What kinds of persons provide the samples (people who speak only that language, or who speak multiple languages)? and so on.

Non-academic as I am, this is interesting stuff. Do you have further information? Links?

Still, I find Dr. Willard's semantical study to be persuasive enough: Language is not a thing which contains thoughts. But some folks "require a sign," in science or parascience, if that's a word.

For many years there had been some suggestion that if people of different cultures using different languages actually were discernibly different with respect to God given rights and how theythink, then such a difference would be most manifest between Chinese/Japanese and Western cultures. Yet it's rather amazing that the same rules of inference and deductive logic are intuitively understood by both cultures.

Right, and so processes of mind are very similar and seem to be definitively so, no matter the language, eh?

More discernible epistemilogically, would be a difference in religious structures....

Excellent observation, since this is the stuff of bases, or foundations (whether one is religiously theistic, or religiously agnostic, or religiously atheistic)

[tortoise]

However, from the outset it really appears to me that to try "to rigorously rationalize Christianity" is an exercise in futility. For if such a project were to succeed, it could only do so by completely "losing" the essence of Christianity, which is superrational (for lack of a better word).

I would disagree, and I acknowledge that not everyone is on the same page in this regard. On one hand, you have many theologians who have argued that the reason people should believe in Christianity is that it is eminently rational. On the other hand, you have many people (and other theologians as well, though they typically seem to fall into the first camp) who believe that rationality has nothing to do with it.

There are two perspectives at play here that aren't really even mutually exclusive. One the one hand, you have people who already believe in Christianity and accept it as essentially axiomatic. From this perspective there is no need to rationalize Christianity any more than you spend time rationalizing any other axiom. On the other hand, I believe many of the rationalizing theologians are concerned selling the idea to everyone else, i.e. people who are not Christians or at least do not automatically consider Christianity to be axiomatic. You can't tell a moderately rational person "this is admittedly irrational but you should believe it anyway". It just doesn't fly that well with a good segment of the population, and would be as difficult to sell as astrology if you put it that way. There are plenty of Christians who believe only because it seems rational to them, not because they've ever had a "religious" experience.

So I don't think that there is necessarily a conflict here, and multiple populations are trying to be addressed in a manner reasonable for that population. Pretty pragmatic, really.

The reason Bartley always intrigued me (and I'm not exactly an expert on his work any more than I am an expert on Objectivism, so I'm not speaking gospel here) is that he seems to have inadvertently discovered the epistemological equivalent of a recent and interesting but relatively obscure area of mathematics called "non-axiomatic reasoning". While the concept seems odd at first, it now seems to be the correct and optimal type of reasoning system from a FSM information theoretic standpoint, an increasingly relevant perspective of reality.

[unspun]

Cv, this post made me smile.

BTW, heads, you might be interested in what CV has brought up, referred to in my post immediate prior.

[unspun]

BTW, when I wrote "thinking through language," it would have been better to write thinking utilizing the functions of language.

[js1138]

Or to put it more succinctly, the evolutionary biologist describes but the mathematician/physicist explains.

Succinct perhaps, but not necessarily correct. All science is descriptive. Using the word "explain" at the level your sentence implies would require and assertion of relationships beteen or among phenomena that have no exceptions and no range of applicability. There are no such laws or formulas in physics and no self proving statements in mathematics.

[unspun]

One the one hand, you have people who already believe in Christianity and accept it as essentially axiomatic. From this perspective there is no need to rationalize Christianity any more than you spend time rationalizing any other axiom.

If I can butt in as lunchtime dwindles, I have two "thoughts":

1. A Christian must use reason to understand what matters Christian are and are not.

2. Also (shoot, what was it?) -- I guess I'll use #2 to say that generally, everybody including the most devout Christian is served well by using reason to understand their axioms! -- which I suppose should be point 1.A (and a horse that gets my bet).

BTW, as for non-axiomatic reasoning, isn't it axiomatic to say that reason is something worthwhile to do?

[tortoise]

Language is not a thing which contains thoughts.

I don't think we (whoever "we" may be :-) were saying anything that disagrees with this. Language is an efficient learned protocol for communicating and managing thoughts at a high level of abstraction.

The thing to remember is that when we think there are a multitude of layers of abstraction that are being computed on simultaneously, though we are really only aware of the results for the most part. The reason it is convenient to overload languages is that we remember things as "diffs" from existing patterns, and reusing existing patterns that share some commonality for many different purposes reduces the memory requirements at many different levels. In other words, it makes more efficient use of finite resources so that we can remember more.

This is also why it is easier to learn additional languages, particularly languages related to your own, than learning your first language. Most new languages are just small diffs of the one you already know conceptually and gets mapped as such, creating most of the new patterns only at the language level of abstraction, not at any of the other conceptual levels.

[Alamo-Girl]

You have hit upon a very important point, tortoise. You said:

On the other hand, I believe many of the rationalizing theologians are concerned selling the idea to everyone else, i.e. people who are not Christians or at least do not automatically consider Christianity to be axiomatic.

The problem here is that when we wander beyond the teachings of Christ, we leave God behind. Christianity is not for everyone, it was never intended to be. And it is not intended to make sense to the world at large:

My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me: - John 10:27

Why do ye not understand my speech? [even] because ye cannot hear my word. – John 8:43

Jesus goes on to explain why it is so:

Who hath ears to hear, let him hear.

And the disciples came, and said unto him, Why speakest thou unto them in parables?

He answered and said unto them, Because it is given unto you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is not given. For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath.

Therefore speak I to them in parables: because they seeing see not; and hearing they hear not, neither do they understand.

And in them is fulfilled the prophecy of Esaias, which saith, By hearing ye shall hear, and shall not understand; and seeing ye shall see, and shall not perceive: For this people's heart is waxed gross, and [their] ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes they have closed; lest at any time they should see with [their] eyes, and hear with [their] ears, and should understand with [their] heart, and should be converted, and I should heal them.

But blessed [are] your eyes, for they see: and your ears, for they hear. - Matthew 13:9-17

And Paul further explained it this way:

For Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the gospel: not with wisdom of words, lest the cross of Christ should be made of none effect.

For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness; but unto us which are saved it is the power of God.

For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Where [is] the wise? where [is] the scribe? where [is] the disputer of this world? hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?

For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe.

For the Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom: But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumblingblock, and unto the Greeks foolishness; But unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God. - I Corinthians 1:17-24

In sum, theologians who seek to rationalize Christianity (or whatever) to sell it, wander beyond the teachings of Christ and actually work against God's stated will in the matter.

[tacticalogic]

Yes, consider, eh? If this is true, it would indicate one obvious finding: that activity of the brain is specific to the form of a language. But then what would this indicate? Looks to me it likely tells us that while language is such a strongly regarded function and process of the mind, it is something that the mind treats as other than the substance of the mind and other than a controlling factor of the mind. If language were of the substance of the mind, wouldn't one fully formed language have a "manifold" sameness of brain operations with another language? (If I understand "manifold" relationships from a glance at tortoise's post and A-G's linked article.) And if language were a controlling factor of the mind, wouldn't the meaning and flow of words have this same "manifold sameness?" (Can I use that phrase, tort. and A-G?)

An interesting test, IMHO, would be to compare the brain patterns of people processing various languages with those same people working in more "universal" contexts, like mathematics, geometry, or spatial relationship problems.