The Absurdity of 'Thinking in Language'

the author's site ^ | 1972 | Dallas Willard

[unspun]

The Absurdity of 'Thinking in Language'

This paper has been read to the University of Southern California philosophy group and the Boston 1972 meeting of the American Philosophical Association, as well as to the Houston meeting of the Southwestern Philosophical Society. Appeared in The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, IV(1973), pp. 125-132. Numbers in "<>" refer to this journal.

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Among the principal assumptions of major portions of philosophy in recent decades have been: (1) That philosophy somehow consists of (some sort of) logic, and (2) that logic is a study of and theory about (some sort of) language. There, of course, follows from these a third assumption: (3) That philosophy is a study of and theory about (some sort of) language--though this implication should not be taken as representing any phase of the historical development of recent philosophizing. Instead of listing these three points as assumptions, it would probably be more correct to regard them as categories or complexes of assumptions; or perhaps, more vaguely still, as 'tendencies' or proclivities of recent philosophical thinking. But precision of these points need not be put in issue here, as this paper does not seek any large-scale resolution of the problem area in question. The aim here is to examine only one proposition which plays a role in the clearly existent tendencies referred to: Namely, the proposition that we think in or with language. I hope to show, first, that we do not always think in or with language; and then, second, that the very conception of thinking in or with language involves an absurdity. What implications this has for broader philosophical assumptions or tendencies will not be dealt with here, though the implications in question seem to me to be extremely important ones. That human beings think in language is explicitly stated in such diverse places as ordinary newspapers, the more sophisticated popular magazines and journals, and serious discourse in the humanities and the social sciences, as well as in the technical writings of philosophers. To prove this broad range of consensus would be idle; but, in order to have the philosophical context clearly before us, we may give a few brief quotations. <126>       (1) Man, like every living creature, thinks unceasingly, but does not know it: the thinking which becomes conscious of itself is only the smallest part thereof. And, we may say, the worst part:--for this conscious thinking alone is done in words, that is to say, in the symbols for communication, by means of which the origin of consciousness is revealed. (Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom, sub-sec. # 354)      (2) Let no one be contemptuous of symbols! A good deal depends upon a practical selection of them. Furthermore, their value is not diminished by the fact that after much practice, we no longer really need to call forth a symbol, we do not need to speak out loud in order to think. The fact remains that we think in words or, when not in words, then in mathematical or other symbols. (Frege, Mind, Vol. 73, p. 156)      (3) It is misleading then to talk of thinking as of a 'mental activity'. We may say that thinking is essentially the activity of operating with signs. This activity is performed by the hand, when we think by writing; by the mouth and larynx, when we think by speaking; and if we think by imagining signs or pictures, I can give you no agent that thinks. If then you say that in such cases the mind thinks, I would only draw your attention to the fact that you are using a metaphor, that here the mind is an agent in a different sense from that in which the hand can be said to be an agent in writing. (Wittgenstein, Blue Book, pp. 6-7)      (4) ... The woof and warp of all thought and all research is symbols, and the life of thought and science is the life inherent in symbols; so that it is wrong to say that a good language is important to good thought, merely; for it is of the essence of it. (C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, II, p. 129)      (5) Words only matter because words are what we think with. (H. H. Price, Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. XIX, p. 7)      (6) Theorizing is an activity which most people can and normally do conduct in silence. They articulate in sentences the theories that they construct, but they do not most of the time speak these sentences out loud. They say them to themselves.... Much of our ordinary thinking is conducted in internal monologue or silent soliloquy, usually accompanied by an internal cinematograph-show of visual imagery.... This trick of talking to oneself in silence is acquired neither quickly nor without effort.... (Ryle, Concept of Mind, p. 27. See also pp. 282-83 and 296-97) <127>      (7)This helps to elucidate the well-known difficulty of thinking without words. Certain kinds of thinking are pieces of intelligent talking to oneself. Consider the way in which I 'thinkingly' wrote the last sentence. I can no more do the 'thinking' part without the talking (or writing) part than a man can do the being graceful part of walking apart from the walking (or some equivalent activity). (J.J.C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism, p. 89) These quotations will suffice to establish the context within which philosophers speak of thinking in language (or with language). Many other quotations could be added from the literature.1 It is not assumed here that the persons quoted all occupy the same position with reference to the relationship between thought and language. Yet it would be interesting to see what any of these thinkers, or others who suppose that human beings think in language, could save of their position from the critique which follows. Uneasiness about the conception of thinking in or with language has been expressed by a number of writers, but only over limited aspects of it.2 Here we shall consider arguments which purport to call the conception into question entirely and in principle. First, consider a reason for rejecting the view that we always think in language. It consists in the fact that thinking often occurs without the production, manipulation, or perception of sense-perceptible signs, without which there is no use of language. Such occurrences often provoke offers of 'A penny for your thoughts.' Thinking: Whatever we may decide to call them, and however it is that we are conscious of them, there are intentional states of persons, more or less fixed or fleeting, which do not require for their obtaining that what they are about or of be perceived by, or be impinging causally upon, the person involved. In order to think of3 Henry the Eighth, <128> of the first auto one owned, of the Pythagorean theorem, or of the Mississippi River, it is not required that they should disturb my nervous system. Such states (t-states) of persons are often called 'thoughts', especially in contrast with 'perceptions', and being in such a state is one of the things more commonly called 'thinking'. One no more needs to be going through a change of such states in order to be thinking, than he needs to be changing his bodily position in order to be sitting or lying or sleeping. Rarely if ever--as is alleged in the case of mystic contemplation--are these t-states unchanging. Usually they flow, at varying rates, intermingled with person states of many sorts, governed by such transitional structures as inference, goal orientation, objective structures given in perception or in other ways, and elemental association of 'ideas', among others. In what follows, we shall use 'thinking' to cover both the single t-state and the flow of such states, without regard to how intermingled with other person states. Language: Sense perceptible signs or symbols are an essential constituent of language. It is always false to say that language is present or in use where no signs are present or in use. And, whatever else a sign may be, it is something which is apprehendable via its sensible qualities. That is, it is something which can be either seen, heard, felt, tasted or smelled. Moreover, the use of language requires some level of actual sensuous apprehension of the signs which are in use on the occasion. (Confusion or distortion of this sensuous feedback can render a subject incapable of writing or speaking; and, of course, without perception of the sign-sequences emitted, one cannot understand the person emitting language.) Now cases can be produced almost at will where thinking occurs without language being present or in use. This, of course, is something which everyone--including the proponent of thinking-in-language--very well knows. It is these cases which, together with the assumption that we always think in language, create what in (7) was called "the well-known difficulty of thinking without words." If, as in (3), "thinking is essentially the activity of operating with signs," then when there are no signs--and when, consequently, the means by which we produce, manipulate, or perceive signs are not functioning--we do have a difficulty. In fact, a difficulty so severe that it amounts to a proof that thinking is not essentially the activity of operating with signs, and that often we think entirely without language. One cannot operate with signs where there are no signs. <129>  As the above quotations indicate, the most common move made to save 'thinking in language' at this point is the shift to 'silent soliloquy,' as in (6), or to 'pieces of intelligent talking to oneself,' as in (7). These are latter-day shades of John Watson's 'sub-vocal language.' Of course one can talk to oneself or write to onself. But talking and writing to oneself require the production and perception of sensuous signs just as much as talking and writing to another. The realization of this is what drives the thinking-in-language advocate to silent soliloquy or to nonvocal speaking--the written counterpart of which would be invisible writing. That is, they are driven to flat absurdities. A silent soliloquy--that is, silent speaking--is precisely on a par with a silent trumpet solo, for example, or silent thunder. A poet may say:        Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard             Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on;        Not to the sensual ear, but, more endeared,             Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone;...                (Keats, Ode to a Grecian Urn) But there are in fact no unhearable melodies, no ears other than the "sensual," no ditties of no tone. What those who speak of silent discourse have in mind is, no doubt, the fact that interlaced with our thinking of or about things is a great deal of imaging of linguistic entities. (This is especially true of academics or intellectuals in general, because of their great concern with expression of thought. Probably an adequate phenomenology of thinking would exhibit great contrast between them and other classes of persons precisely at the relation between thinking and degree of activity in imaging linguistic entities and events.) But imaging a word is not using a word, any more than imaging a horse is using a horse. Moreover, imaging a word, phrase, or sentence is not producing or perceiving a word, phrase, or sentence any more than imaging a horse is producing or perceiving--or otherwise 'having'--a horse. To image a linguistic sequence is not to have it in a special sort of place--the mind--nor is it to have a special sort of linguistic sequence. To image is to exemplify a certain sort of thinking or intentional state, and a sort which does have interesting relationships with other kinds of thinking. But there is no reason at all to suppose that all kinds of thinking necessarily involve or are accompanied by this kind of thinking (imaging) directed upon language segments. And if there were, it still would not follow that all thinking requires language, since this kind of thinking about language segments is not itself language at all. Nor does it require any <130> language present in order for it to come to pass, since intentional inexistence applies to mental events when language segments are the objects, as well as when sticks and stones and animals are. Having considered a reason for rejecting the proposition that human beings always think in language, let us now consider whether they ever do. In fact, the difficulty is not, as Smart (above) and others have thought, in seeing how one can think without language, but in seeing how one would think with it. Thinking with or in language must consist in doing something with symbols, and so necessarily involves doing something to them--e.g., producing, altering, or perceiving them. If we would do something with the knife (e.g., cut the bread), we must do something to the knife, (e.g., clasp it in our hands). But, as we have seen, thinking occurs where nothing at all is being done to or with signs, there not being any signs in these cases. The power or act of having or changing t-states--that is, the power or act of thinking--is, then, not a power or act of having or altering linguistic symbols. (It is not, in fact, a power of doing anything with or in anything at all. The profound difference in kinds of powers and acts involved here is what Wittgenstein calls attention to in the last sentence of (3) above.) Thought is, of course, practical, in that it exercises an influence upon, or makes some difference in, the world of sense particulars. But it alone is not capable of acting with the sorts of particulars used in linguistic behavior as its immediate instruments. It is just this incapacity which makes it impossible for the advocates of thinking-in-language to give any account of the mechanisms or the 'how' by which the words in which we, allegedly, think are produced, manipulated, and gotten rid of--though they must be produced (or stored and hauled out), manipulated, and, in some sense, gotten rid of, if we are to think with and in them as our tools or instruments. Merely to ask the question of how, in detail, this is done in the course of thinking reveals, I believe, the absurdity of 'thinking in language'. Mere thinking can do nothing to signs which might be used in a language, and hence it can do nothing with such signs, or in the act of modifying the conditions of such signs. It is absurd to suppose that one can do x with y without in some way bringing about a change in the condition, state, relations, or properties of y. It is this and only this that I put by saying that it is absurd to suppose that one can do something with y while doing nothing to y. If it is replied that, of course, the mind or thought does not do these things, but that when we write, speak, hear, see, and otherwise relate to actual words in the actual employment of language, we then are thinking, with bodily parts managing the symbols involved, then it <131> must be pointed out that, while we may indeed also be thinking in such cases, we are not simply thinking. The total event here, to which language certainly is essential, is not thinking. Correct use of language can even occur, as has been pointed out by Wittgenstein, without the occurrence of any peculiarly relevant t-states. On the other hand, thinking does occur without the use of hands, mouth, ears, eyes, fingers in any appropriately relevant manner. Hence, what can only occur by the use of these is not the same as thinking, though it may somehow involve or influence thinking. Smart remarks in (7) that, when he thinkingly wrote the sentence, "Certain kinds of thinking are pieces of intelligent talking to oneself," he could "no more do the 'thinking' part without the talking (or writing) part than a man can do the being graceful part of walking apart from the walking." This may be true of thinkingly writing the sentence (whatever that means). But it does not follow that one cannot think that certain kinds of thinking are pieces of intelligent talking to oneself without the use of language, though Smart clearly thinks that it does. Of course one cannot thinkingly write without writing. But that is nothing to the point of whether or not we can and do think with or without words. Also, the comparison to graceful walking is not apt. We do, as above shown, sometimes think without words or symbols, while no cases of grace without behavior are known. Now it is very certainly true that some processes clearly involving thinking as described above depend for their occurrence upon linguistic behavior and the sensible signs which it involves, for example, the processes of learning algebra or the history of the Basques, or learning how to counsel emotionally upset persons. But it is to be noted that these are not themselves processes of thinking, but rather are extremely complex processes involving all kinds of events and entities other than language and other than thinking--e.g., feelings, perceptions, buildings, other persons, days and nights, books, and so on. None of these processes is a process of thinking; and for that reason alone it is invalid to infer from them that thinking is linguistic behavior, or that one thinks with language. What is essential to things or events of a certain sort must be shown essential to them taken by themselves, not in combination with many other things. With reference to the involved processes in question, it might be more appropriate (though it would still be wrong) to say--as some have said in recent years--that we live in or with language. Nevertheless, it is certain that some kind of dependence relation--probably similar to feedback mechanisms--exists between linguistic processes and their sensuous signs, on the one hand, and certain sequences of t-states on the other. What, exactly, this relation <132> of dependence is continues to be veiled by, among other things, a priori assumptions about what thinking and language must be and do. One such assumption is that which holds thinking essentially to be an operation with signs or symbols, or doing something with--or in--linguistic processes or entities. The view that we (necessarily) think without language is, today, regarded as so outlandish as not to merit serious consideration. But this is not due to a lack of arguments to support it. My object here has been to focus upon certain arguments purporting to show the absurdity of thinking in language. The main points in these arguments are: Thinking does occur without any accompanying language whatsoever, and thus shows itself not to be a power or act of managing linguistic signs, once it is clear what such a sign is. Thinking, as distinct from behavioral processes involving it, can do nothing to signs or symbols, and hence can do nothing with them. NOTES See for example, Ramsey's Foundations of Mathematics, p. 138, and Kneale's remarks in Feigl and Sellars, Readings in Philosophical Analysis, p. 42. Return to text. See S. Morris Engel, "Thought and Language," Dialogue, Vol. 3, 1964, 160-170; Jerome Shaffer, "Recent Work on the Mind-Body Problem," American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. II, 1965, esp. p. 83; R. Kirk, "Rationality Without Language," Mind, 1967, pp. 369-368; G. Ryle, "A Puzzling Element in the Notion of Thinking," in Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action, P. F. Strawson, ed., (Oxford: 1968), pp. 7-23. Interesting remarks on the issues here are also found in Bruce Aune's Knowledge, Mind and Nature, chap. VIII and H. H. Price's Thinking and Experience, Chap. X.  See also Wm. James, "Thought Before Language; A Deaf Mute's Recollections," Mind, Vol. I, 1892; and see Wittgenstein's comments on this in Philosophical Investigations, No. 342. Return to text. I use only think here, for simplicity; but think that and other structures of such intentional states (and sequences thereof) might also be mentioned. Specifically, I would also wish to hold that instances of thinking that, in the sense of inferring or puzzling something out, occur in the absence of appropriate linguistic entities or activities. Return to text.

[js1138]

I'm surprised to learn that you feel so detached from the past, js.

Only in my dreams. That is one of the qualitative differences between dreaming and waking consciousness -- my dreams, anyway, seem to have neither past nor future tense. I can sometimes, however, when waking, remember several minutes of a dream event.

[Alamo-Girl]

Thank you so very much for your explanation, especially concerning the state of the art! It is a most excellent summary of the phenomenon of consciousness from the information theory/math perspective.

The next logical step would be a theory regarding the bio-physical mechanism of function, which is always IMHO prejudiced by whether one sees the brain function as self-contained or as a communication apparatus for a non-spatial, non-temporal and non-corporeal consciousness.

I doubt if either prejudice could be falsified because achieving self awareness in strong A.I. would not ipso facto prove what is happening biologically or dimensionally. That is, a successful model does not the original make.

Penrose proceeds under the first prejudice theorizing the bio-physics of the brain as self-containing consciousness but prejudices that strong A.I. cannot be achieved because of non-computables. I don’t really see that either depends on the other and don’t understand why he would create such a snare. I’m not sure about Crick’s position on A.I. but he is so far prejudiced to self-containment that he says the soul is the manifestation of the bio-physics of the brain. I leave Walker up to Phaedrus or betty boop to summarize.

Fascinating musings, all of them!

Platonist that I am, I have the second prejudice which sees the brain as the communication apparatus for a non-spatial, non-temporal and non-corporeal consciousness. I look for support in my view indirectly from quantum field theory and string theory.

[betty boop]

p.s.: I just thought of an exception to my own "rule" RE: dreaming. I recalled that I have had dreams in which I was "processing" explicit symbols. It's been a very rare occurrence, and when it has happened it was probably related to the fact that I had been struggling with some thorny analytical problem in my then waking life.

But I wasn't conscious that I'd been doing this kind of symbolic processing, until I woke up and recalled the dream. I've actually gained some insights in this way. I wish I knew how I could harness this potential for dream states at will! I'd have a reason to sleep more. :^)

But I merely report. I don't really know what this means.

[Alamo-Girl]

Thank you so much for your very interesting views and for sharing your dream experience! Hugs!

[Hank Kerchief]

Thanks for the response. I almost missed it.

Your's is the typical answer I get to that question. Instead of telling my what you mean by consciousness, you explain how you think it works. You begin:

My sole assumption is that the human mind is essentially finite state....

A little further along you use the term that is common to all such explanations that indicates that what is being talked about is not consciousness at all, "self-awareness."

Concsiousness may rightly be called, "awareness," but there is no necessity for that awareness be able to recognize a self, a thing impossible, in fact, until one has a fairly will developed set of concepts.

The consciousness I am talking about is the direct perception of things, like colors, and smells, vertigo, and music. My kitty is capable of this kind of consciousness, and my kitty does not even know she is a "self" much less is she aware of it.

I am not interested in "how it works," but what we mean when we use the word. When I see a patch of red, and you see a patch of red, we may agree to call it red, but the actual conscious experience each of us had might be entirely different. You might actually experience as red, what I experience as blue. It would make not difference, as long as we agreed on what to call it, what our subjective experience was.

That is the consciousness I am talking about. The actual experience of color, taste, smell, and touch for example. Two things about consciousness are very important, and completely ignored by those who believe it can be created. One is, it is totally subjective and whatever one experiences consciously cannot be demonstrated to anyone else. I can say, this taste just like strawberry, and you can taste it, and declare the same thing. And the particular esthers that constitute that "flavor" can be identified, and the portion of the brain that reacts to the particular olefactory data can be identified, but that actual experience of tasting strawberry cannot be identified or demonstrated by anyone to anyone else. Your taste of strawberry might by my taste of chocolate.

The other peculiarity of consciousness that is usually ignored is that there is only one. It is the same consciousness that tastes all flavors, hears all sounds, feels all sensations, and also thinks.

They are not separate events processed as bits of data at all. Take a musical chord, for example. It is comprised of several notes played simultaneously. There is no electrical, mathematical, or mechanical way to process sound (signal) information without "separating" (signal analysis) the components of the signal. Perception does just the opposite. It integrates an almost incomprehendable quantity of data into single percepts, and several percepts are simultaneously perceived. The same consciousness that hears the music, tastes the coke, and reads the book at the same time, not as separate events in a processor, but a single thing.

That is what I mean by consciousness. Even if it were possible to produce consciousness at the lowest possible level, it could never be known. Because, even if a "machine" did it, it would still be non-demonstrable.

Hank

[Alamo-Girl]

Thank you so much for the heads up to your response! It is very interesting and well written.

[tortoise]

That is the consciousness I am talking about. The actual experience of color, taste, smell, and touch for example. Two things about consciousness are very important, and completely ignored by those who believe it can be created.

You are wrong. These very things are dealt with in the same conceptual framework I already put forth. If one understands that framework, one also sees where this trivially falls out of it.

You see, my answer doesn't just "explain how it works", it also defines what it is. Maybe you don't see that, but a lucid and complete explanation of the matter is a fairly lengthy exposition. In the face of limited time to talk about it here, I throw down the important points and hope that people grok it enough to derive the rest. After a number of years discussing things like this, I can say with certainty that this is rarely the case.

Another problem in these discussions (more others than you actually), is that many people involved are walking collections of other people's opinion that they defer to. This is an insubstantial basis of argumentation, and while the points sound good (because someone very smart created them), it is obvious to me at least that they people using those points don't truly understand the full scope of those points.

[tortoise]

They are not separate events processed as bits of data at all. Take a musical chord, for example. It is comprised of several notes played simultaneously. There is no electrical, mathematical, or mechanical way to process sound (signal) information without "separating" (signal analysis) the components of the signal.

Hank, you are out of your depth here. As a point of fact, mammalian hearing does the rough equivalent of a Fourier transform on the front-end, and it is the spectral components that are individually sent (in parallel) over the nerves to the aural cortex in the brain. Human brains only really process phase (between ears) and magnitude on the spectral data. (This is also how cochlear implants work. They replace the part of the body that does the spectral separation by doing an electronic spectral transform and feeding the respective spectral components to the individual nerves directly.)

It is an interesting point of trivia that bats, dolphins, dogs, humans, and all other mammals have the exact same hearing hardware. The only difference is the quantity and quality of processing that occurs in their respective aural cortices. As a second point of trivia, humans can do moderately competent echo-location, but our species does not fully exploit it due to reliance on our strong visual capabilities.

Perception does just the opposite. It integrates an almost incomprehendable quantity of data into single percepts, and several percepts are simultaneously perceived. The same consciousness that hears the music, tastes the coke, and reads the book at the same time, not as separate events in a processor, but a single thing.

Definitely wrong conceptually. Our brain does not receive integrated data and I don't know of anybody working in neural sciences that would subscribe to this. It is well-known that our sensory front-ends transform the signal into very simple linear data, with more complex patterns being inferred from the large quantity of simple data streams.

Your sense of complex things is actually your brain selectively integrating a large quantity of very simple data streams. The front-end "de-integrates" sensory data into a bunch of one-dimensional spectral streams that get sent to the brain, the brain then discards some of the data and processes it for higher-order patterns in the respective cortices, and the brain re-integrates what is left in a continuously variable fashion depending on the circumstances. It is a lossy but very efficient process. It is also how brains process their sensory data.

[unspun]

Good to know your mind's at work, k.

[Hank Kerchief]

mammalian hearing does the rough equivalent of a Fourier transform on the front-end

Well sure, just like a radio tuner, and it's analog too, but that has nothing at all to do with what I am talking about.

This is my last shot. Assuming you understand how the retina's cones work, you do understand that the nerve "data" that responds to magneta is only data. But what you see consciously, that color you call "magenta" (or purplish pink) [think of how that color looks, not the processing that is going on] what is that. Nothing you have described even approximates what you or I mean when we say, "this is blue" and are thinking of what the color is to our conscious perception.

It is the actual conscious experience you have omitted in everything you have described, because it cannot be described. But you know when you see blue, whether because you are looking at something blue, or pressing on your eyeballs, or looking at a white wall after looking for a long time at an orange spot, or only imagining the color, that color as you subjectively consciously experience it cannot be "explained" by any physical event of any kind.

(There is nothing mystical about this. It is merely an aspect of the nature of life itself, which would require another discussion altogether.)

I suspect that you may not be able to comprehend what I am referring to. I have almost reached the place in my life where I believe the behaviorists are correct about some large portion of humanity and that they really are not conscious in the same way as others, and that they are only behaving (and speaking) as though they were.

I mean, maybe you really do not have a direct conscious experience of the color blue. That would certainly explain why what I am talking about would be a mystery to you, and would certainly not be your fault. On the other hand, if you really do have the conscious experience, you could not possibly mistake it for any physical phenomenon, because, even if it were one, why and how would it be a blue one?

Hank

[tortoise]

Nothing you have described even approximates what you or I mean when we say, "this is blue" and are thinking of what the color is to our conscious perception.

Actually, it is related and I understand precisely what you are talking about far better than you imagine, so bear with me. There are so many threads going right now I don't know whether I explained the fundamentals required to get from where I was to where you are on this particular thread, but I have put all the pieces out there in some fashion. The pieces just have to be put together. I don't want to spend too much time on this because I really DO have a lot of work to do. :-)

"Blueness" corresponds to a unique state in the context of our minds (obvious corollary: there is no objective concept of "blueness"). However, there is an equivalent state in any reasonably good finite state implementation of a mind, whether in silicon or in biological wetware. Of interest is that the experience is essentially unique to every mind, ignoring the trivial cases, which aren't conscious in any meaningful sense anyway. One could argue that humans are slightly more complicated in this regard because we are born with color biasing ("biasing" being another topic that I definitely haven't discussed, but which is related to both emotions and goal systems) whereas an artificial system would develop biasing without the paleo bootstrap code (the bootstrap not being necessary in the theoretical case, but very useful in nature).

I suspect that you may not be able to comprehend what I am referring to.

You are talking about qualia. It is a very old argument for me, one that I have hammered out with many bright minds for years, and it never fails to pop up because people just love the topic and most haven't seen a really rigorous discussion of it. The short answer is that qualia is a necessary property of any FSM (but not infinite systems), but doesn't even become worth studying until you have some semblence of consciousness. Even then, qualia is not particularly meaningful or important. Rather it is a factor that has to be taken into consideration because it causes biasing (or perhaps IS a form of biasing) that can impact strict rationality in a system. It is an artifact of how data interacts with the current state of your mind, such that you can't observe something without the act of observation biasing your experience of that thing.

No, I'm pretty sure I understand precisely what qualia is and therefore why it is important. The difference is that the mystery of it disappeared a while ago for me so I don't think about it. I consider what you are talking about to be a side-effect, whereas I am more concerned with the the fundamental things that create and allow for that side-effect in the first place.

[Fiddlstix]

Bump
To read later

[Alamo-Girl]

Thank you so very much for all the information! It’s quite helpful.

Concerning the issue Hank raised, the different subjective conscious reactions we would surely have walking through an art museum is an example that sticks in my mind.

I realize that you do not consider qualia to be particularly meaningful, important or mysterious because your endeavor is in the front-end and qualia ought to accrue along the way.

However, to the rest of us out here the subject is rather engaging, so for other Freepers and Lurkers who may be interested in the subject of qualia here’s a good starting point and an excerpt:

Qualia

Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this standard, broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental states have qualia, whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers, and how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside the head. The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem…. Representationalists about qualia are typically also externalists about representational content. On this view, what a given experience represents is metaphysically determined at least, in part, by factors in the external environment. Thus, it is usually held, microphysical twins can differ with respect to the representational contents of their experiences. If these differences in content are of the right sort then, according to the wide representationalist, microphysical twins cannot fail to differ with respect to the phenomenal character of their experiences. What makes for a difference in representational content in microphysical duplicates is some external difference, some connection between the subjects and items in their respective environments. The generic connection is sometimes called ‘tracking’, though there is no general agreement as to in what exactly tracking consists.

On wide representationalism, qualia (like meanings) ain't in the head. The classic, Cartesian-based picture of experience and its relation to the world is thus turned upside down. Qualia are not intrinsic qualities of inner ideas of which their subjects are directly aware, qualities that are necessarily shared by internal duplicates however different their environments may be. Rather, they are representational contents certain inner states possess, contents whose nature is fixed at least in part by certain external relations between individuals and their environments.

Representationalism, as I have presented it so far, is an identity thesis with respect to qualia: qualia are supposedly one and the same as certain representational contents. Sometimes it is held instead that qualia are one and the same as certain representational properties of experiences; and sometimes it is is argued that these representational properties are themselves irreducible (Siewert 1998). There is also a weaker version of representationalism, according to which it is metaphysically necessary that experiences exactly alike with respect to their representational contents are exactly alike with respect to their qualia. Obviously, this supervenience thesis leaves open the further question as to the essential nature of qualia…

[man of Yosemite]

Four red horses (reddish brown, not fire engine red) were gigantic in size, standing high over suburban homes. The Arab man was then seen with a normal sized red horse, holding up his hoof to clean it.

[unspun]

He was serving it and likely what it represents. Interesting. Four planes? Four nations? Four principalities? And one might surmise what was being cleaned off (thankfully from a small horse). But the interpretation belongs to God, as, if I recall correctly, Joseph and Daniel both said, eh?

Thanks for the relatin'.

Pray and do, do and pray.

[Doctor Stochastic]

Although attributed variously to Dorthy Parker, Aldous Huxley, William James, Mrs Amos Pinchot, Bertrand Russell, or Ogden Nash, this was supposedly written by a famous author who woke up one night and wrote the most important thing ever. On awaking the next morning, the author found that the paper contained:

Hogamus higamus, men are polygamous;
Higamus hogamus, women monogamous.

[js1138]

Hard exponential distributions have this effect; a higher mammal with 25% of the higher brain capacity of a human may only have 2% of the "consciousness" of a human because self-modeling capability deteriorates VERY fast with shrinking brain capacity.

I have no proof either way, but intuitively, base on living mosst of my life with cats and dogs, I think you are quite wrong about this. What differs between animal consciousness and human consciousness is not self-awareness of the present, but the ability to place oneself between the past and the future. This seems directly related to language and syntax functions, and seems to be diminished in people with normal brains who do not learn language.

[unspun]

Yes, it's fascinating that God entrusts us, whether we're up to it or not.

[tortoise]

I have no proof either way, but intuitively, base on living mosst of my life with cats and dogs, I think you are quite wrong about this. What differs between animal consciousness and human consciousness is not self-awareness of the present, but the ability to place oneself between the past and the future.

I've lived most of my life with cats and dogs as well (and many other animals -- I grew up way out in the sticks), so we're even here. I think your assertion here is stretched past the breaking point because it is based on a really superficial analysis of what the internal mental state of animals is or isn't.

I would anecdotally assert that at least some smarter domesticated animals such as cats and dogs show clear evidence of having a sense of history and the past. It is easy to come up with examples of this if you've owned animals. To give an example, when I was very young we got two kittens (siblings actually) that lived with us out in the country and were apparently very close to each other their entire lives. Anyway, at the age of 14 one of them died of a stroke and was buried out by one of the fields. His brother went to that spot and cried for days. It permanently changed the personality of the remaining cat, who would frequently go out and just sit on the spot where we had buried his brother for years until the day my parents moved. Those two cats were about the smartest we ever owned, but there were many cases where it was apparent that these two had both quite a long memory and a sense of history. They weren't people, but they weren't automatons either. (Incidentally, the other brother died at the age of 21 or 22, and amazingly old age for any cat.)

As for the future, I would assert that if you look at the human race just by observing their behaviors and without any communication or real context, there is little evidence that we engage in thought about the future beyond the foraging, family-building, nesting, and other behaviors that other higher animals exhibit. I am quite sure we actually do think deeper thoughts about the future than other animals, but it is not particularly evident solely in our behavior. I would say that most higher animals clearly have some sense of the future, though obviously not anything close to what humans are capable of. I would agree that the lack of complex language ability seriously limits their capacity in this regard.

But to assert that animals do or don't have any cognizance of the past or future in some kind of boolean sense doesn't seem to hold water, or at the very least is not particularly supportable. I would agree that they have much less capacity than humans in this regard, but it is a gradient, not a boolean proposition.