The Absurdity of 'Thinking in Language'

the author's site ^ | 1972 | Dallas Willard

[unspun]

The Absurdity of 'Thinking in Language'

This paper has been read to the University of Southern California philosophy group and the Boston 1972 meeting of the American Philosophical Association, as well as to the Houston meeting of the Southwestern Philosophical Society. Appeared in The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, IV(1973), pp. 125-132. Numbers in "<>" refer to this journal.

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Among the principal assumptions of major portions of philosophy in recent decades have been: (1) That philosophy somehow consists of (some sort of) logic, and (2) that logic is a study of and theory about (some sort of) language. There, of course, follows from these a third assumption: (3) That philosophy is a study of and theory about (some sort of) language--though this implication should not be taken as representing any phase of the historical development of recent philosophizing. Instead of listing these three points as assumptions, it would probably be more correct to regard them as categories or complexes of assumptions; or perhaps, more vaguely still, as 'tendencies' or proclivities of recent philosophical thinking. But precision of these points need not be put in issue here, as this paper does not seek any large-scale resolution of the problem area in question. The aim here is to examine only one proposition which plays a role in the clearly existent tendencies referred to: Namely, the proposition that we think in or with language. I hope to show, first, that we do not always think in or with language; and then, second, that the very conception of thinking in or with language involves an absurdity. What implications this has for broader philosophical assumptions or tendencies will not be dealt with here, though the implications in question seem to me to be extremely important ones. That human beings think in language is explicitly stated in such diverse places as ordinary newspapers, the more sophisticated popular magazines and journals, and serious discourse in the humanities and the social sciences, as well as in the technical writings of philosophers. To prove this broad range of consensus would be idle; but, in order to have the philosophical context clearly before us, we may give a few brief quotations. <126>       (1) Man, like every living creature, thinks unceasingly, but does not know it: the thinking which becomes conscious of itself is only the smallest part thereof. And, we may say, the worst part:--for this conscious thinking alone is done in words, that is to say, in the symbols for communication, by means of which the origin of consciousness is revealed. (Nietzsche, Joyful Wisdom, sub-sec. # 354)      (2) Let no one be contemptuous of symbols! A good deal depends upon a practical selection of them. Furthermore, their value is not diminished by the fact that after much practice, we no longer really need to call forth a symbol, we do not need to speak out loud in order to think. The fact remains that we think in words or, when not in words, then in mathematical or other symbols. (Frege, Mind, Vol. 73, p. 156)      (3) It is misleading then to talk of thinking as of a 'mental activity'. We may say that thinking is essentially the activity of operating with signs. This activity is performed by the hand, when we think by writing; by the mouth and larynx, when we think by speaking; and if we think by imagining signs or pictures, I can give you no agent that thinks. If then you say that in such cases the mind thinks, I would only draw your attention to the fact that you are using a metaphor, that here the mind is an agent in a different sense from that in which the hand can be said to be an agent in writing. (Wittgenstein, Blue Book, pp. 6-7)      (4) ... The woof and warp of all thought and all research is symbols, and the life of thought and science is the life inherent in symbols; so that it is wrong to say that a good language is important to good thought, merely; for it is of the essence of it. (C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, II, p. 129)      (5) Words only matter because words are what we think with. (H. H. Price, Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. XIX, p. 7)      (6) Theorizing is an activity which most people can and normally do conduct in silence. They articulate in sentences the theories that they construct, but they do not most of the time speak these sentences out loud. They say them to themselves.... Much of our ordinary thinking is conducted in internal monologue or silent soliloquy, usually accompanied by an internal cinematograph-show of visual imagery.... This trick of talking to oneself in silence is acquired neither quickly nor without effort.... (Ryle, Concept of Mind, p. 27. See also pp. 282-83 and 296-97) <127>      (7)This helps to elucidate the well-known difficulty of thinking without words. Certain kinds of thinking are pieces of intelligent talking to oneself. Consider the way in which I 'thinkingly' wrote the last sentence. I can no more do the 'thinking' part without the talking (or writing) part than a man can do the being graceful part of walking apart from the walking (or some equivalent activity). (J.J.C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism, p. 89) These quotations will suffice to establish the context within which philosophers speak of thinking in language (or with language). Many other quotations could be added from the literature.1 It is not assumed here that the persons quoted all occupy the same position with reference to the relationship between thought and language. Yet it would be interesting to see what any of these thinkers, or others who suppose that human beings think in language, could save of their position from the critique which follows. Uneasiness about the conception of thinking in or with language has been expressed by a number of writers, but only over limited aspects of it.2 Here we shall consider arguments which purport to call the conception into question entirely and in principle. First, consider a reason for rejecting the view that we always think in language. It consists in the fact that thinking often occurs without the production, manipulation, or perception of sense-perceptible signs, without which there is no use of language. Such occurrences often provoke offers of 'A penny for your thoughts.' Thinking: Whatever we may decide to call them, and however it is that we are conscious of them, there are intentional states of persons, more or less fixed or fleeting, which do not require for their obtaining that what they are about or of be perceived by, or be impinging causally upon, the person involved. In order to think of3 Henry the Eighth, <128> of the first auto one owned, of the Pythagorean theorem, or of the Mississippi River, it is not required that they should disturb my nervous system. Such states (t-states) of persons are often called 'thoughts', especially in contrast with 'perceptions', and being in such a state is one of the things more commonly called 'thinking'. One no more needs to be going through a change of such states in order to be thinking, than he needs to be changing his bodily position in order to be sitting or lying or sleeping. Rarely if ever--as is alleged in the case of mystic contemplation--are these t-states unchanging. Usually they flow, at varying rates, intermingled with person states of many sorts, governed by such transitional structures as inference, goal orientation, objective structures given in perception or in other ways, and elemental association of 'ideas', among others. In what follows, we shall use 'thinking' to cover both the single t-state and the flow of such states, without regard to how intermingled with other person states. Language: Sense perceptible signs or symbols are an essential constituent of language. It is always false to say that language is present or in use where no signs are present or in use. And, whatever else a sign may be, it is something which is apprehendable via its sensible qualities. That is, it is something which can be either seen, heard, felt, tasted or smelled. Moreover, the use of language requires some level of actual sensuous apprehension of the signs which are in use on the occasion. (Confusion or distortion of this sensuous feedback can render a subject incapable of writing or speaking; and, of course, without perception of the sign-sequences emitted, one cannot understand the person emitting language.) Now cases can be produced almost at will where thinking occurs without language being present or in use. This, of course, is something which everyone--including the proponent of thinking-in-language--very well knows. It is these cases which, together with the assumption that we always think in language, create what in (7) was called "the well-known difficulty of thinking without words." If, as in (3), "thinking is essentially the activity of operating with signs," then when there are no signs--and when, consequently, the means by which we produce, manipulate, or perceive signs are not functioning--we do have a difficulty. In fact, a difficulty so severe that it amounts to a proof that thinking is not essentially the activity of operating with signs, and that often we think entirely without language. One cannot operate with signs where there are no signs. <129>  As the above quotations indicate, the most common move made to save 'thinking in language' at this point is the shift to 'silent soliloquy,' as in (6), or to 'pieces of intelligent talking to oneself,' as in (7). These are latter-day shades of John Watson's 'sub-vocal language.' Of course one can talk to oneself or write to onself. But talking and writing to oneself require the production and perception of sensuous signs just as much as talking and writing to another. The realization of this is what drives the thinking-in-language advocate to silent soliloquy or to nonvocal speaking--the written counterpart of which would be invisible writing. That is, they are driven to flat absurdities. A silent soliloquy--that is, silent speaking--is precisely on a par with a silent trumpet solo, for example, or silent thunder. A poet may say:        Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard             Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on;        Not to the sensual ear, but, more endeared,             Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone;...                (Keats, Ode to a Grecian Urn) But there are in fact no unhearable melodies, no ears other than the "sensual," no ditties of no tone. What those who speak of silent discourse have in mind is, no doubt, the fact that interlaced with our thinking of or about things is a great deal of imaging of linguistic entities. (This is especially true of academics or intellectuals in general, because of their great concern with expression of thought. Probably an adequate phenomenology of thinking would exhibit great contrast between them and other classes of persons precisely at the relation between thinking and degree of activity in imaging linguistic entities and events.) But imaging a word is not using a word, any more than imaging a horse is using a horse. Moreover, imaging a word, phrase, or sentence is not producing or perceiving a word, phrase, or sentence any more than imaging a horse is producing or perceiving--or otherwise 'having'--a horse. To image a linguistic sequence is not to have it in a special sort of place--the mind--nor is it to have a special sort of linguistic sequence. To image is to exemplify a certain sort of thinking or intentional state, and a sort which does have interesting relationships with other kinds of thinking. But there is no reason at all to suppose that all kinds of thinking necessarily involve or are accompanied by this kind of thinking (imaging) directed upon language segments. And if there were, it still would not follow that all thinking requires language, since this kind of thinking about language segments is not itself language at all. Nor does it require any <130> language present in order for it to come to pass, since intentional inexistence applies to mental events when language segments are the objects, as well as when sticks and stones and animals are. Having considered a reason for rejecting the proposition that human beings always think in language, let us now consider whether they ever do. In fact, the difficulty is not, as Smart (above) and others have thought, in seeing how one can think without language, but in seeing how one would think with it. Thinking with or in language must consist in doing something with symbols, and so necessarily involves doing something to them--e.g., producing, altering, or perceiving them. If we would do something with the knife (e.g., cut the bread), we must do something to the knife, (e.g., clasp it in our hands). But, as we have seen, thinking occurs where nothing at all is being done to or with signs, there not being any signs in these cases. The power or act of having or changing t-states--that is, the power or act of thinking--is, then, not a power or act of having or altering linguistic symbols. (It is not, in fact, a power of doing anything with or in anything at all. The profound difference in kinds of powers and acts involved here is what Wittgenstein calls attention to in the last sentence of (3) above.) Thought is, of course, practical, in that it exercises an influence upon, or makes some difference in, the world of sense particulars. But it alone is not capable of acting with the sorts of particulars used in linguistic behavior as its immediate instruments. It is just this incapacity which makes it impossible for the advocates of thinking-in-language to give any account of the mechanisms or the 'how' by which the words in which we, allegedly, think are produced, manipulated, and gotten rid of--though they must be produced (or stored and hauled out), manipulated, and, in some sense, gotten rid of, if we are to think with and in them as our tools or instruments. Merely to ask the question of how, in detail, this is done in the course of thinking reveals, I believe, the absurdity of 'thinking in language'. Mere thinking can do nothing to signs which might be used in a language, and hence it can do nothing with such signs, or in the act of modifying the conditions of such signs. It is absurd to suppose that one can do x with y without in some way bringing about a change in the condition, state, relations, or properties of y. It is this and only this that I put by saying that it is absurd to suppose that one can do something with y while doing nothing to y. If it is replied that, of course, the mind or thought does not do these things, but that when we write, speak, hear, see, and otherwise relate to actual words in the actual employment of language, we then are thinking, with bodily parts managing the symbols involved, then it <131> must be pointed out that, while we may indeed also be thinking in such cases, we are not simply thinking. The total event here, to which language certainly is essential, is not thinking. Correct use of language can even occur, as has been pointed out by Wittgenstein, without the occurrence of any peculiarly relevant t-states. On the other hand, thinking does occur without the use of hands, mouth, ears, eyes, fingers in any appropriately relevant manner. Hence, what can only occur by the use of these is not the same as thinking, though it may somehow involve or influence thinking. Smart remarks in (7) that, when he thinkingly wrote the sentence, "Certain kinds of thinking are pieces of intelligent talking to oneself," he could "no more do the 'thinking' part without the talking (or writing) part than a man can do the being graceful part of walking apart from the walking." This may be true of thinkingly writing the sentence (whatever that means). But it does not follow that one cannot think that certain kinds of thinking are pieces of intelligent talking to oneself without the use of language, though Smart clearly thinks that it does. Of course one cannot thinkingly write without writing. But that is nothing to the point of whether or not we can and do think with or without words. Also, the comparison to graceful walking is not apt. We do, as above shown, sometimes think without words or symbols, while no cases of grace without behavior are known. Now it is very certainly true that some processes clearly involving thinking as described above depend for their occurrence upon linguistic behavior and the sensible signs which it involves, for example, the processes of learning algebra or the history of the Basques, or learning how to counsel emotionally upset persons. But it is to be noted that these are not themselves processes of thinking, but rather are extremely complex processes involving all kinds of events and entities other than language and other than thinking--e.g., feelings, perceptions, buildings, other persons, days and nights, books, and so on. None of these processes is a process of thinking; and for that reason alone it is invalid to infer from them that thinking is linguistic behavior, or that one thinks with language. What is essential to things or events of a certain sort must be shown essential to them taken by themselves, not in combination with many other things. With reference to the involved processes in question, it might be more appropriate (though it would still be wrong) to say--as some have said in recent years--that we live in or with language. Nevertheless, it is certain that some kind of dependence relation--probably similar to feedback mechanisms--exists between linguistic processes and their sensuous signs, on the one hand, and certain sequences of t-states on the other. What, exactly, this relation <132> of dependence is continues to be veiled by, among other things, a priori assumptions about what thinking and language must be and do. One such assumption is that which holds thinking essentially to be an operation with signs or symbols, or doing something with--or in--linguistic processes or entities. The view that we (necessarily) think without language is, today, regarded as so outlandish as not to merit serious consideration. But this is not due to a lack of arguments to support it. My object here has been to focus upon certain arguments purporting to show the absurdity of thinking in language. The main points in these arguments are: Thinking does occur without any accompanying language whatsoever, and thus shows itself not to be a power or act of managing linguistic signs, once it is clear what such a sign is. Thinking, as distinct from behavioral processes involving it, can do nothing to signs or symbols, and hence can do nothing with them. NOTES See for example, Ramsey's Foundations of Mathematics, p. 138, and Kneale's remarks in Feigl and Sellars, Readings in Philosophical Analysis, p. 42. Return to text. See S. Morris Engel, "Thought and Language," Dialogue, Vol. 3, 1964, 160-170; Jerome Shaffer, "Recent Work on the Mind-Body Problem," American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. II, 1965, esp. p. 83; R. Kirk, "Rationality Without Language," Mind, 1967, pp. 369-368; G. Ryle, "A Puzzling Element in the Notion of Thinking," in Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action, P. F. Strawson, ed., (Oxford: 1968), pp. 7-23. Interesting remarks on the issues here are also found in Bruce Aune's Knowledge, Mind and Nature, chap. VIII and H. H. Price's Thinking and Experience, Chap. X.  See also Wm. James, "Thought Before Language; A Deaf Mute's Recollections," Mind, Vol. I, 1892; and see Wittgenstein's comments on this in Philosophical Investigations, No. 342. Return to text. I use only think here, for simplicity; but think that and other structures of such intentional states (and sequences thereof) might also be mentioned. Specifically, I would also wish to hold that instances of thinking that, in the sense of inferring or puzzling something out, occur in the absence of appropriate linguistic entities or activities. Return to text.

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If any would still like to read the article,
Please tell us what, in sum or in particle:

1. Do we always think in language?

2. Do we ever think in language?

[Alamo-Girl]

Thank you so much for your post!

On the one hand, I do understand that mathematics becomes unmanageable with infinity and thus the need for ELBFs.

On the other hand, I do not see where infinite God could ever be analyzed by mortal device of logic, i.e. thus create a doctrinal issue.

[unspun]

I think it's because of this that people tend to understand that for God to relate to creation, he in a sense limits himself accordingly, by means of the "interface." Or, it could be said I think, that he only puts a finite portion of himself in that direction or phase.

In another sense, however, God doesn't allow anyone however to "test him." It's a matter of understanding (allowed to creation) vs. comprehension (for God only), continuing source being greater than its derivatives.

[tortoise]

On the one hand, I do understand that mathematics becomes unmanageable with infinity and thus the need for ELBFs.

Infinities aren't unmanagable to mathematicians, but most "average" people don't need to worry about it and tend to transliterate even simple infinities (e.g. aleph_0 or "countable") to ELBFs. There are quite a few historical cases, even in US history, where not making the distinction between infinite and ELBF has come back to bite a lot of people in the ass. A small subset of the "tragedy of the commons" type cases are actually this very thing, where resources have been legally ruled to be truly infinite for all intents and purposes when ELBF is the real case (as it always is in the "real world").

In fact, a lot more of our applied mathematics is premised on infinities (and manipulations thereof) than really should be, and there have been many arguments lately that many inadequacies in our theory are actually the result of using infinities in many places when we should be using the set of all finites (itself uncountably infinite in size).

But generally speaking, I think most mathematicians find infinities to be relatively simple concepts to understand and manipulate. It is just another "type" of number for the most part with simple rules. There are definitely much harder concepts to grok in mathematics than infinity.

[Alamo-Girl]

I agree! He gives us all that we need to know - which is evidently all one needs to brutalize his own thinking whenever he tries to exclude God from his body of knowledge.

[Alamo-Girl]

Thank you for the correction! I have probably been reading too many of those arguments, i.e. many inadequacies in our theory are actually the result of using infinities in many places when we should be using the set of all finites...

[tortoise]

On the other hand, I do not see where infinite God could ever be analyzed by mortal device of logic, i.e. thus create a doctrinal issue.

We could not understand an infinite God, but we do understand the properties that all elements in this set of "things" have. It is trivial to understand and manipulate conceptually as a finite construct even if there is no way for us to fully understand a specific instance of a member of that set.

The doctrinal issue isn't with limits on God per se, so much as it puts severe limits on humans due to the intrinsic and inescapable lack of limits on God. It isn't exactly intuitive, but being infinite essentially forces God to be more pervasive and powerful than doctrine normally allows for. You end up with issues such as it making human predestination in the strongest sense of the word absolutely mandatory. Now, I generally subscribe to a weak "predestination" model mostly because it is a consequence of most reasonable information theoretic models of our world, but the nature of the weak version means that it doesn't have many consequences (yet -- technology may change that) generally speaking and no consequences that I can think of from a doctrinal standpoint. Theologically strong predestination, on the other hand, would have a huge impact on doctrine.

An odd tangent to this is that an infinite God does not imply omnipotence, only omniscience (and even this is limited in an extremely esoteric mathematical sense that we don't need to worry about).

[tortoise]

An odd tangent to this is that an infinite God does not imply omnipotence, only omniscience

To clarify, from the perspective of God, our lives would be fully predestined before we were even born to the extent that "free will" does not exist such that we can control the outcome. This does NOT imply that God actually has the capability to arbitrarily manipulate the universe (even if that is in fact the case).

The concept that I am trying to convey is that an infinite-minded God doesn't have the ability to grant us "free will" because God would immediately be aware of the outcome to any manipulation to the system made by God. God could "stir the pot" and artificially change the internal state of the system, but it wouldn't change the fact that the outcome would still be predetermined.

It's a thorny issue. At least with the ELBF model, one has much less of a legitimate basis to abdicate responsibility for outcomes to God.

[Hank Kerchief]

I asked: How does the inferior mind judge the superior to be superior if it cannot comprehend it?

You answered: We know that man has steadily gained knowledge through science, and reasoning, and invention, and intuition, and a thirst for learning, and intellectual development, and trial and error....

Granted

We can also make use of forces that we don't fully understand.

But only insofar as we do understand them.

We are smart enough, as well, to know that there is much that we still have to learn about all there is to know. We know and understand that we don't know it all.

We are not omniscient. (The unknown, by the way, is what the future is comprised of. All adventure and learning require the unknown.)

We also know that an entity that can create all this and us, as well, is superior to us.

This is a huge leap. What is "an entity that can create all this?" What created the entity? What created that entity?

Superiority, requires some standard of evaluation. It is possible the entity that "created all this" is a totally inferior entity, just as a silk-worm that creates silk, that we cannot create, no one would consider a superior entity.

The scope of it is way beyond anything we can handle. We know it even if we don't understand it. This assumes that one believes in God.

Yes it does. Of course, that is the question, isn't it.

Hank

[Hank Kerchief]

...computational information theory.

Information theory is irrelavent to rational/volitional intelligence. It is entirely deterministic, automatically eliminating half of intelligence in either human or "devine" terms.

Interesting response, otherwise.

Hank

[Hank Kerchief]

There are several ways of knowing about God. Did you have a particular one in mind you didn't like?

If there are several, maybe you would explain one. I have no dislike for any, since I have never heard of one.

I have heard of some presumed such methods, all of which require one to suspend both reason and judgement, and "just accept," something, without either evidence or reason. Otherwise, I have never heard of any method by which one may "know" God.

Hank

[Hank Kerchief]

Nobody discovers God, God reveals himself.

Fine.

But, this does raise a question. If only those to whom He has revealed Himself can know Him, why do you or any other's, who presume to know Him, spend any time arguing, or trying to convince others, that He does indeed exist? If only those to whom He has revealed Himself can know Him, what does your arguing prove. (Job 6:25)

If the witness were false, how do I account for my transformation and infilling with the Holy Spirit.

Indeed, how does one test "uncaused" and "unexplained" experiences and behaviors? Usually they are the result of dementia, neurosis, or some other psychopathology, but sometime it is just something we eat that disagrees with us.

Hank

[cornelis]

eyes

[Consort]

Granted

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OK.

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But only insofar as we do understand them.

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Of course.

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We are not omniscient.

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I agree.

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(The unknown, by the way, is what the future is comprised of.

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OK.

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All adventure and learning require the unknown.)

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That could be relative, e.g., a person can embark on a journey of discover and adventure to a land new to him but well known to others.

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This is a huge leap.

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You consider it a huge leap; others may not. There can be many huge leaps on this huge subject.

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What is "an entity that can create all this?"

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It's whatever supreme being, deity, pantheon, divinity, gestalt, power, mechanism, lord, chance.....or us...or all or none of the above,....or whatever you take on faith. It doesn't matter.

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What created the entity? What created that entity?

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Same answer.

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Silkworm...

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Maybe, or it, like us, was created.

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This assumes that one believes in God.
Yes it does. Of course, that is the question, isn't it.

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In place of God, you can substitute whatever you believe in, or you can leave it blank and fill it in if and when the answer becomes known.

[man of Yosemite]

Many of us who have come to know God searched for years in a vain effort to find and understand him, only to discover that he reveals himself to the humble person who stops striving long enough to listen to the prophetic Word, which has been long available and within the reach of nearly every household in America and many other nations.

I don't consider myself to be arguing, though I am surely taking a stand. I call it witnessing of a life I received, which many others also may receive. I do not know who will beleive me, but I know someone will.

The receiving of the Holy Spirit was taught extensively by Jesus, and was available to everyone who accepted Christ. The book of Acts is replete with the power and moving of the Spirit of God through the disciples. Besides, I have had indigestion many times, and this isn't it. Also, people who have dementia can be clearly diagnosed with mental disorder and frequently are incapable of functioning in society. I, on the other hand, have been steadily employed for 29 years. This may convince you of nothing, and that's okay. God does the saving, I only do the witnessing.

[tortoise]

Information theory is irrelavent to rational/volitional intelligence.

That is an awkward statement, seeing as how "rational" is usually defined in terms of algorithmic information theory. The nice thing about the definition is that it has a valid instantiation no matter what kind of system you are talking about. Finite, infinite -- it doesn't matter, and everything falls into one of those two categories (including the "divine").

More interestingly, we actually FINALLY have a universal definition of intelligence within mathematics (after what, fifty years?), as of roughly three years ago, that essentially every one pretty much buys into (excluding the mystics of course) as a very sound universal definition that covers all aspects. The mathematics of this particular bit also happens to come out of a recently explored area of algorithmic information theory (not surprising that it is related to rationality), and is extremely elegant as such things go. If it matters to you, the published mathematical proofs in this area are very broad and very strong.

It is entirely deterministic, automatically eliminating half of intelligence in either human or "devine" terms.

I don't know about "divine" terms (I never get mystical when talking math and science), but I would humbly suggest that you don't have a sufficient grounding in the theoretical meat surrounding the very concepts and definitions around intelligence to have an informed opinion as to what is reasonable. And I don't think "deterministic" means what you think it means; it does not mean "like how a computer works". You can have purely stochastic non-axiomatic constructs that are still technically deterministic, though not in any conventional computational theory sense. I'm not trying to be too critical, but it sounds like what you think we know is long way from what we actually know and can do. I don't have much to say unless given a substantitive argument.

Give it five years. There are a few new pop-sci books in the works that explain it all (this is a big deal), and some major projects racing against each other to exploit the recent theoretical breakthroughs. We haven't had truly interesting crap like this in computer science in years, but it will take a few years to filter into the public consciousness.

[Alamo-Girl]

Thank you so very much for your excellent, engaging posts!

Predestination v free will is not a doctrinal dilemma for me. Fulfilled prophecy is evidence of predestination. The Word authenticates predestination in Romans 8:30:

Moreover whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified them he also glorified.

Likewise, we have free will, the ability to choose. Our spiritual realm ancestors Adam and Eve choose self will over God's will and thus became mortals grounded to a finite timeline in the physical realm. But God's is eternal, i.e. unchanging.

Please bear with me while I explain why I do not have a problem with predestination v free will.

To begin, I see that "all that there is" - all spiritual realms, physical realms (including dimensions, multi-verses and all geometries) - are God's revealing Himself to creatures He is concurrently creating to commune with eternally.

As one cannot know health if they have never know sickness - likewise, courage appears by contrast to fear, love to hate, good to evil, obedience to disobedience, etc. The "properties" of God are being shown to us in contrast to what He is not. When His kingdom comes, all that is Him emerges and that which is not Him is culled.

But if the process did not exist, we would have no way to know Him.

Only God exists, i.e. has life in Himself; He says we can use the nickname I am to refer to Him. He is outside of space/time, before "the beginning" and after "the end" from our point of view. Thus, being well beyond all form of geometry, He is not constrained to or by any timeline.

That is why He speaks of what is the future to us, as if it were already past. That is why, when He pronounces judgment, it is already done. If this were not so, then Christ's sacrifice would be unecessary.

That Christ became the propitiation for our sin is evidence to me that my concept of eternity v. time-like paths is so. The emphasis on Christ as the Lamb of God in Revelation goes to that understanding as well.

And all that dwell upon the earth shall worship him [the beast], whose names are not written in the book of life of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world. - Revelation 13:8

So, yes, we have free will in the same sense that we have physical reality and physical laws. Life goes on in blissful disregard of wave/particle duality, multi-verses, dimensionality - and the import of time. He of course has always known what we will choose in our individual mortal timelines because He is above and beyond our geometry. As He says in the Word, His sheep hear His voice, He knows us and we follow Him. John 10:14-29 Further, those passages make it clear that He already knows His sheep.

This understanding of free will does not bother me in the least, because the meaning and purpose of our existence is not to be the captains of our ships and the masters of our destiny - but rather, to know Him and thereby, to prepare us as family members for all eternity. From Revelation 4:11:

Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour and power: for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created.

I do realize this analysis would be extremely distressing to anyone - believer or not - who wishes to be the master of their own destiny.. Anyway, that's my two cents...

[DougF]

Nope, don't see any conflicts yet. Anyway...

You have what I see as two seperate points mixed together a bit. So lets go.

I would agree that manipulating AND interpreting symbols (be they language, math, or something that only lives within my brain) are both thought. I see interpreting as: taking in new input, converting them into internal symbols, making a comparison between these new symbols and those I have already developed (based on hard-wiring, upbringing, etc.), trying to create analogies (the ultimate symbol), and then making decisions based on those comparisons. The mechanism of creating, manipulating and interpreting these symbols would be thought.

OK, now onto your question re. thinking about guilt, goodness, beauty. First, I DO NOT ALWAYS THINK WITH WORDS! I think I have made this very clear. More than once. I believe that my definition of thought above incorporates how I think of these thnigs quite well. It is a very complex response with enormous amounts of subtle inputs, and these are simplifications, but... Guilt - I believe that if I do things that I am hardwired not to do, or have been taught not to do, that I have negative, physical hormonal responses. These becomes a significant input into my analysis. Beauty - again, complicated. If we are talking nature, I believe that deep rooted animal responses play a big part. If we are talking women, I believe that features that make good mates (which kicks off some strong hormonal, physical responses) plays a big part. If we are talking art, I beleve that symbols that resonate with internal symbols I like play a big part. etc. etc. etc.

I sense there is something you want to say about this issue, but are, for some reason, avoiding. Why don't you just say what you think, instead of searching for "conficts" (w/o much success imho) in what I am suggesting?

[DougF]

"The concept that I am trying to convey is that an infinite-minded God doesn't have the ability to grant us "free will" because God would immediately be aware of the outcome to any manipulation to the system made by God. God could "stir the pot" and artificially change the internal state of the system, but it wouldn't change the fact that the outcome would still be predetermined. "

Sorry, very behind on this interesting thread. I very much agree - since an ealry teen I have seen this as a VERY big inconsistency.

The concept of an all knowing God, who has any hand at all in setting up intial conditions, leads almost directly to predestination. Even if God has no input on intial conditions, the very fact that God cam know the outcome implies predestination. This does not leave much room for free will.

Directly related: I further struggle with this - if God puts me in a situation, or allows a situation, where God sees that the ultimate outcome is my eternal damnation, I struggle to see this as an all loving God.

Interestingly, although I am not religous, I have conceived of a universe where God does NOT know all outcomes, but creates events that balance all factors, such that each of us is put in situations that gives us exactly the same "chance" at redemption. Of course this would imply costant balancing - by not knowing outcomes, and therefore not knowing how they would impact other events, this would be a full time job (and of course requires negation of a pretty sacred cow -all knowing).

[Hank Kerchief]

Thanks, Consort!

All adventure and learning require the unknown.

That could be relative, e.g., a person can embark on a journey of discover and adventure to a land new to him but well known to others.

Knowledge pertains to one person at a time. Someone else's knowledge is irrelavent.

What is "an entity that can create all this?"

It's whatever supreme being, deity, pantheon ... or whatever you take on faith ....

Assumes creation, or that there is a beginning. This assumption is false. There cannot be a beginning. Thus no faith, in the sense you mean it, is required. What is, does not have to be taken on faith, you can go walk on it.

In place of God, you can substitute whatever you believe in, or you can leave it blank and fill it in if and when the answer becomes known.

Or, in place of reality, you can substitute God, or Allah, or any other superstition that requires the suspension of critical reason, that is faith.

Hank