Posted on 09/18/2002 12:37:57 AM PDT by Snow Bunny
Edited on 09/18/2002 5:20:52 PM PDT by Jim Robinson. [history]
![]()
Happy 55th Birthday to the U.S. Air Force |
Almost from the beginning of military aviation in the U.S., some men such as Billy Mitchell had urged the creation of a separate air force. During World War II, the Army Air Force was almost independent from the Army, but this was only a temporary wartime situation. However, experience gained during the war had shown that an air arm independent and co-equal with the Army and Navy could perform satisfactorily.
After months of inter-service and congressional negotiations and compromise, on July 26, 1947 President Harry S. Truman on board the presidental aircraft "Sacred Cow" signed the National Security Act of 1947. The measure established an independent Air Force for "offensive and defensive air operations" and placed the Army, Navy, and Air Force on an equal level under a civilian Secretary of Defense. The Department of the Air Force began operating as a separate entity on Sep. 18, 1947 at which time W. Stuart Symington was sworn in as the first Secretary of the Air Force. General Carl Spaatz, WW II commander of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe and in the Pacific, was named the first USAF Chief of Staff.
The U.S. Air Force thus entered a new era in which airpower became firmly established as a major element of the nations defense and one of its chief hopes for deterring war.
Under the National Security Act, the functions assigned to the Army Air Forces commanding general transferred to the Department of the Air Force. The act provided for an orderly two-year transfer of these functions as well as property, personnel and records.
Later, under the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, the departments of Army, Navy and Air Force were eliminated from the chain of operational command. Commanders of unified and specified commands became responsible to the president and the secretary of defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The act redefined the functions of the military departments to those of essentially organizing, training, equipping and supporting combat forces for the unified and specified commands. Each military department retained resource management of its service.
Aviation Firsts |
To assure unit preparedness and overall effectiveness of the Air Force, the secretary of the Air Force is responsible for and has the authority to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Air Force. This includes training, operations, administration, logistical support and maintenance, and welfare of personnel. The secretary's responsibilities include research and development, and any other activity prescribed by the president or the secretary of defense.
The secretary of the Air Force exercises authority through civilian assistants and the chief of staff, but retains immediate supervision of activities that involve vital relationships with Congress, the secretary of defense, other governmental officials and the public.
Major commands are organized on a functional basis in the United States and a geographic basis overseas. They accomplish designated phases of Air Force worldwide activities. Also, they organize, administer, equip and train their subordinate elements for the accomplishment of assigned missions. Major commands generally are assigned specific responsibilities based on functions. In descending order of command, elements of major commands include numbered air forces, wings, groups, squadrons and flights.
The basic unit for generating and employing combat capability is the wing, which has always been the Air Forces prime war-fighting instrument. Composite wings operate more than one kind of aircraft, and may be configured as self-contained units designated for quick air intervention anywhere in the world.
Other wings continue to operate a single aircraft type ready to join air campaigns anywhere they are needed. Air base and specialized mission wings such as training, intelligence and test also support the Air Force mission. Within the wing, operations, logistics and support groups are the cornerstones of the organization.
Field operating agencies and direct reporting units are other Air Force subdivisions and report directly to Headquarters U.S. Air Force. They are assigned a specialized mission that is restricted in scope when compared to the mission of a major command. Field operating agencies carry out field activities under the operational control of a Headquarters U.S. Air Force functional manager. Direct reporting units are not under the operational control of a Headquarters U.S. Air Force functional manager because of a unique mission, legal requirements or other factors.
![]() |
Major Commands
|
Historic Air Force Songs![]() Itazuke Tower(Tune of "Wabash Cannonball") "Itazuke Tower, this is Air Force 801, ![]() Let's Have a PartyParties make the world go roundWorld go round, world go round Parties make the world go round Let's have a party. Now, we're gonna tear down the bar in the Officers' Club (Boo) We're gona build us a new bar (Yay) It's only gonna be one foot wide (Boo) But it's gonna be a mile long (Yay) There's gonna be no bartenders at our bar (Boo) There's only gonna be barmaids (Yay) Our barmaids will wear long dresses (Boo) Made out of cellophane (Yay) You can't take our barmaids to your bunks (Boo) They take you to their bunks (Yay) You can't sleep with our barmaids (Boo) They don't let you sleep (Yay) Soda's gonna be ten bucks a glass (Boo) Whiskey free (Yay) Only one to each pilot (Boo) Served in buckets (Yay) We're gonna throw all the beer in the river (Boo) And then we'll all go swimming (Yay) Now no girls are allowed in the USO hall (Boo) With their clothes on (Yay) There'll be no lovin' on the dance floor (Boo) And no dancing on the lovin' floor (Yay) ![]() Glory Flying Regulations(Tune of "Glory, Glory Hallejulia")Hap Arnold built a fighting team that sang a fighting song, About the wild blue yonder and the days when men were strong. But now we're regulated 'cause we don't know right from wrong, The Force is shot to hell... CHORUS: Glory flying regulations Have them read at all the stations Burn the ass of those that break them The Force is shot to hell. Once they flew B-26s through a hell of flak, and bloody dying pilots gave their lives to bring 'em back, Now they're playing ping-pong in the operations shack, The Force is shot to hell... I've seen them in their T-Bolts when their eyes were dancing flame, I've seen their screaming power drive that blasted Goering's name; But now they fly like sissies and they hang their heads in shame; The Force is shot to hell... Now one day I buzzed an airfield with another happy chap, We flew a hot formation with my wingtip on his lap, So they passed a new directive and we'll have no more of that, The Force is shot to hell... So now mine eyes are dim with tears for happy days of old, We loved to take our chances for our hearts were young and bold, From now on we have no choice but live to be quite old, The Force is shot to hell... ![]() |
At approximately 3:15 p.m.on April 6, U.S. Air Force Captain Fred Boli took off from the American air base at Da Nang in a prop-driven Douglas A-1 Skyraider fighter-bomber (known as a "Sandy"). With Boli, whose call sign was Sandy 01, were three other A-1s, Sandys 02, 05 and 06, and two Sikorsky HH-53 rescue helicopters (known as "Jolly Greens"), Jolly Greens 67 and 60. A few minutes later two more Jolly Greens, led by Captain Mark Schibler, took off as backups.
The task force had two possible objectives. Colonel Hambleton, the EB-66 survivor, had now been on the ground four days and needed to be resupplied. Therefore, one A-1 (Boli's) was rigged to drop him a Madden resupply kit with food, water, ammunition and extra radios. A rescue attempt could also be made if Boli, the Sandy leader, felt the situation warranted it. It would be Boli's call.
Lt. Col. Bill Harris, commander of the Jolly Green squadron, was concerned about the mission. Harris knew that there was still likely to be a significant enemy presence around the two downed Americans. He discussed the situation with his commander, Colonel Cecil Muirhead, in Saigon. Muirhead and his staff were also worried and were monitoring the ongoing rescue effort very closely.
Harris had intended to fly as aircraft commander on the lead Jolly Green during the April 6 mission. But he had participated in one of the earlier pickup attempts, when the choppers had been badly shot up, and his squadron mates insisted that he had already done his share. When Harris reluctantly stood aside, Captain Peter Chapman stepped forward and insisted that he be allowed to fly as aircraft commander on the mission. Harris was deeply impressed with Chapman's volunteering, especially since Chapman was not next in the duty rotation and, in fact, had orders to return to the United States to fly with the presidential air unit at Andrews Air Force Base, in Maryland. But Chapman's attitude was typical of all of the men in his squadron, who were ready to risk their lives to save others. With Chapman on Jolly Green 67 were 1st Lt. John H. Call, III, co-pilot; Tech. Sgt. Roy D. Prater, mechanic; Sergeant William R. Pearson and Tech. Sgt. Allen J. Avery, pararescuemen; and Sergeant James H. Alley, photographer.
The gaggle of airplanes proceeded to a holding point southeast of Quang Tri, where Jolly Greens 67 and 60 and Sandys 05 and 06 circled while Sandys 01 and 02 entered the battle area to assess how dangerous it might be to attempt a pickup. There, they took over from the two FACs on station, Captain Harold Icke (call sign Bilk 11) and Captain Gary Ferentchak (call sign Nail 59). Icke and Ferentchak had been working the area jointly and finishing up the preparatory airstrikes. The two backup Jolly Greens were on hold at a position east of Hue, just off the South Vietnamese coast.
Boli noticed a friendly tank position approximately six kilometers south of the survivors and decided to make the final holding point for the helicopters right over them. But he was very concerned about the five enemy battalions that intelligence had told him were directly around the survivors. He spent the next 30 minutes trolling the planned ingress route for the helicopters, using his 7.62mm minigun to strafe anything that looked suspicious. Neither Boli, in Sandy 01, nor Sandy 02 observed any appreciable enemy reaction, but they did receive some enemy surface-to-air-missile (SAM) signals on the radio while they were checking out the area.
At 4:15 p.m., Boli directed the two FACs to terminate the airstrikes so that he could overfly the survivors' immediate area. He requested that Icke and Ferentchak as well as Sandy 02 and both Hambleton and Clark, on the ground, all listen on the same radio frequency and watch while he flew low around the survivors' positions. Boli also tried to drop the Madden supply kit to Hambleton, but the arming wire on the device failed and the kit did not release from the aircraft. Boli did not know that, however, until he landed back at Da Nang.
Boli also strafed a few suspected NVA locations with his 20mm cannons and had Sandy 02 drop cluster bombs on other areas, widening his area of search as he did so. Boli directed the FACs to hit several areas with more airstrikes. While all of that was going on, Boli ordered Jolly Green 60 to hold southeast of Quang Tri and ordered Jolly Green 67 and Sandys 05 and 06 to proceed to the final holding point.
As the aircraft were repositioning, Captain Boli began his final briefing for all the participants in the rescue attempt. They would first try to pick up Hambleton, he said, then--depending on how the situation developed--they would try to extract Clark. The two would be picked up either by Jolly Green 67 or one of the other choppers. But the briefing was rudely interrupted by a SAM call, which forced all of the aircraft to dive for the deck to avoid the missiles. Boli noted that the SAM launches were not accompanied by any anti-aircraft artillery (AAA, or triple-A).
At 5:10 p.m., Sandy 03 joined the force with a full load of white phosphorus smoke, which could be used to lay a smoke screen. Boli finished the plan briefing--Sandy 02 would lead Jolly Green 67 in with a series of smoke rockets to pick up Hambleton and then Clark, in that order, if the area was quiet. Sandy 02 would then join with Sandys 05 and 06 in a "daisy chain" around the Jolly Green to provide suppressive fire. Sandy 03 would lay a series of well-placed smoke screens and then join the daisy chain. Sandy 01 would orbit above to direct the operation and call ground fire.
At 5:15 p.m., Boli determined that all requested targets had been struck to his satisfaction. He had the FACs and remaining strikes hold high and dry while he re-entered the survivors' immediate area to brief them and take one last look. He reviewed the plan and situation in his mind. He knew that it could be a trap, but the preparation had been thorough, the trolling and probing had been intense, and the enemy response so far had been slack. It was time to go!
Boli directed the task force to execute the pickup. Sandy 02 immediately laid down his marks for the helicopters to follow to Hambleton. Sandy 03 put down his smoke screen. Sandys 02, 05 and 06 began the daisy chain to protect the vulnerable helicopter and began dropping cluster bombs and strafing with their 20mm cannons anything that looked in any way threatening. A slight wind shift caused some of the smoke screen to partly obscure Hambleton's position. But the confusion was quickly resolved, and the force pressed on. Overhead, in the swirling mass of airplanes, Captain Ferentchak took out his camera and began to take pictures. He wanted to record what he thought was going to be a historic rescue.
As Jolly Green 67 crossed the river near Cam Lo, the helicopter began to take ground fire from all quarters. Seconds later, as it approached to within 100 meters of Hambleton, Boli called for the survivor to pop his red smoke so that the Jolly Green crew could locate him. Almost simultaneously, someone on Jolly Green 67 called, "I'm hit." It was later determined that they also had added, "... they got a fuel line." Hambleton heard all of this on his survival radio and, realizing the gravity of the situation, did not pop his smoke and reveal his position.
The crew of Jolly Green 67 fought to control their damaged aircraft. Boli had briefed the helicopter crews that if they began taking ground fire, they were to immediately exit the area on a southeast heading. Realizing their desperate situation, the crew began to turn their craft to escape the cauldron of withering fire. The North Vietnamese gunners seemed to increase the intensity of their fire.
Boli ordered the other Sandys to cover the wounded Jolly Green, and he began strafing in front of the lumbering helicopter as it tried to gain speed. But instead of turning southeast as briefed, the crew began heading due east, toward the enemy concentrations north of the river nearby. Apparently one of the crew members on the Jolly Green was holding down his microphone transmit button, since numerous calls directing the chopper to "Turn south, Jolly, turn right!" were blocked. The crew finally turned south about one kilometer east of the planned route after Boli warned them not to cross over a village full of enemy troops. As the Jolly Green crew made their turn, Boli flew up behind them and strafed the enemy soldiers.
Jolly Green 67 overshot its turn and took up a heading to the southwest. Boli ordered the chopper to turn back to the left. Someone else came on the radio and told the chopper to turn right. Boli tells the story from there: "Jolly hesitated, and again I ordered, 'No! Turn left Jolly, turn south.' He initiated the turn, and I was about to order him to climb when, as I passed on a strafe pass, I observed a fire suddenly break out between the middle of the left engine and the main rotor. Immediately pieces flew off of the tail rotor and struck the main rotor, causing it to disintegrate. Jolly Green 67 continued to roll left and crashed on his left side about 1_ kilometers south of Nail 38 Bravo's [Lieutenant Clark's] position. Fire immediately spread throughout the aircraft. No beepers were ever heard.... The time was 1740." On the tactical frequency, Boli began calling: "Jolly's down! Jolly's down!"
Jolly Green 67 lay on its side, a heap of burning, smoking wreckage. It would continue to burn and smoke for several days, with intermittent explosions of the ordnance on board. The fire would become so hot that some of the metal would melt into the ground. There were no survivors and there would be no search and rescue attempt. Instead, the names of six more Americans--Chapman, Call, Prater, Pearson, Avery and Alley--were added to the mounting bill for Hambleton.
Boli conducted a roll call of his task force. All others were present. Captain Schibler, leading the two backup helicopters, monitored all of this and immediately began to move his two aircraft to the holding point, where he encountered the rest of the force. The two groups of aircraft quickly joined into an orbiting aircraft and tried to sort out the disaster. All the pilots agreed that there were apparently no survivors of Jolly Green 67 and that another attempt to rescue Hambleton and Clark did not appear justified at that time, since there was still a strong enemy presence in the area.
As the task force leader, it was Boli's call. He agreed that the area was just too hot; they would abort the mission. Boli then turned on-scene command over to Captain Icke, with another list of targets to be struck, told the survivors to remain hidden, and accompanied his shaken force back to base.
Back at Da Nang, the men of the rescue forces were stunned by the tragic loss of. Jolly Green 67 and its crew. Colonel Harris was very upset. The loss of Jolly Green 67 confirmed his earlier fears that the search area was just too dangerous for helicopters. Once again, Harris called Colonel Muirhead in Saigon; this time Harris told him that they had to find another way.
Muirhead agreed with Boli's decision and Harris' recommendations to terminate the rescue attempts by helicopter. He then notified his superiors that "all reasonable actions had been accomplished," and that the area was just too dangerous for a helicopter pickup.
In their hiding places near Cam Lo, the two survivors had been witnesses to Jolly Green's downing. Lieutenant Clark later recalled that there had been so much firing going on that he could not distinguish who was firing at whom. But as the Jolly Green passed over him heading south, he could tell that it was not gaining altitude. When he heard it crash, Clark was devastated. His immediate thought was: "I really cocked this up. Six more guys dying because I f----d up." And then the realization set in that he was not going to be picked up that day. Clark felt desperately lonely.
Colonel Hambleton--Bat 21 Bravo--cried for the six brave men who had lost their lives lost trying to save his own. Although he was tired, hungry and demoralized, the 53-year-old navigator resolved then and there, "Hell, I'm going to get out of this, regardless."
Hambleton and Clark did get out. But not by helicopter. No more of the vulnerable choppers would be sent in. Instead, a small ground team was dispatched commanded by U.S. Marine Lt. Col. Andy Anderson and led by Navy SEAL Lieutenant Tom Norris. Within a week, the team would infiltrate behind enemy lines to rescue the two downed flyers. It was a risky and dangerous mission, but it got done. The two lucky fliers returned home as heroes.
Nothing could be done, however, for the brave crew of Jolly Green 67. They were lost forever, part of the larger cost of the war. It would be 22 years before their remains would be found and returned to the United States.
Story by Lt Col Darrel Whitcomb, USAF, Nail 25
On November 17th, 1997, the 6 man crew of Jolly Green 67 was laid to rest in Arlington National Cemetery
Lovely flowers, thank you!
Will do...and I'll also go further and say the same to all who are serving--or have served--this great nation's military services!!
FReegards...MUD
Heck, I'll just link'em to this thread!!
"I envy them being in Germany, I have many fond memories from my 7 years there."
Me and the Missuz are supposed to take the young'uns over there next Spring...both my other brothers and my parents have already made the trip and said it was a blast!!
"I can also appreciate the sacrifice of being so far away from your loved ones, and the apprehension of not knowing what's going on back home."
Yeah, we miss my brother, sister-in-law and nephew quite a bit, but you'd be surprised how up-to-date you can stay via the internet.
FReegards...MUD
(It's exactly three years older than I am! The stuff I learn here...)
TO ALL YOU TERRORIST BA$TARD$:
We're not gonna take it
No, we ain't gonna take it
We're not gonna take it anymore
We've got the right to choose and
There ain't no way we'll lose it
This is our life, this is our song
We'll fight the powers that be just
Don't pick our destiny 'cause
You don't know us, you don't belong
We're not gonna take it
No, we ain't gonna take it
We're not gonna take it anymore
Oh you're so condescending
Your gall is never ending
We don't want nothin', not a thing from you
Your life is trite and jaded
Boring and confiscated
If that's your best, your best won't do
Oh, oh, oh
Oh, oh, oh
We're right, yeah
We're free, yeah
We'll fight, yeah
You'll see, yeah
We're not gonna take it
No, we ain't gonna take it
We're not gonna take it anymore
Credit: Dee Snider & Twisted Sister
Snuff Saddam, NOW !!
Death To all Tyrant's !!
The Second Amendment...
America's Original Homeland Security !!
Molon Labe !!
I think this is a cool picture.Very cool.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.