Posted on 06/24/2002 8:04:58 AM PDT by Cagey
The Supreme Court, by ruling that the jury must define the sentence to be handed down is in alignment with the impartial jury as stated in the Sixth Amendment. To remain consistent the Supreme Court needs to acknowledge that an impartial jury is to judge the facts of the case as well as judge the law as it applies to the case.
For when the Supreme Court acknowledges the fact as supported by the Sixth Amendment that the jury is to judge how the law is to be applied in the life or death of a person, surely the jury must be judging how the law applies to the person.
When a judge fails to inform the jury that it is to be impartial and judge both the facts and the law as it applies to the case is subverting honest justice. Honest justice cannot be attained void of an impartial jury and instead upholds political agenda "justice".
It makes me wonder why they understand some of the Constitution but not other parts.
Selective omission to support political ends/agendas.
IMHO anything that takes power away from activist judges = good.
Especially good at doing that is the impartial jury. That is why judges in 1893 stopped routinely telling the jury that they were to judge both the facts and the law as it applies to that case.
In any event, the superiority of judicial factfinding in capital cases is far from evident. Unlike Arizona, the great majority of States responded to this Courts Eighth Amendment decisions requiring the presence of aggravating circumstances in capital cases by entrusting those determinations to the jury. 6Of the 38 States with capital punishment, 29 generally commit sen-tencing decisions to juries. See Ark. Code Ann. §54602 (1993); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §190.3 (West 1999); Conn. Gen. Stat. §53a46a (2001); Ga. Code Ann. §171031.1 (Supp. 1996); Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann., ch. 720, §5/91(d) (West 1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. §214624(b) (1995); Ky. Rev. 22 RING Although the doctrine of For the reasons stated, we hold that Stat. Ann. §532.025(1)(b) (1993); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. §905.1 (West 1997); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §413(b) (1996); Miss. Code Ann. §9919101 (19732000); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§565.030, 565.032 (1999 and Supp. 2002); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §175.552 (Michie 2001); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §630:5 (II) (1996); N. J. Stat. Ann. §2C:113(c) (Supp. 2001); N. M. Stat. Ann. §3120A1 (2000); N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §400.27 (McKinney Supp. 20012002); N. C. Gen. Stat. §15A2000 (1999); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2929.03 (West 1997); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §701.10(A) (Supp. 2001); Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. §163.150 (1997); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §9711 (Supp. 2001); S. C. Code Ann. §16320(B) (1985); S. D. Codified Laws §23A27A2 (1998); Tenn. Code Ann. §3913204 (Supp. 2000); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 2001); Utah Code Ann. §763207 (Supp. 2001); Va. Code Ann. §19.2264.3 (2000); Wash. Rev. Code §10.95.050 (1990); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §62102 (2001). Other than Arizona, only four States commit both capital sentencing factfinding and the ultimate sentencing decision entirely to judges. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §1611103 (2001) (three-judge panel); Idaho Code §192515 (Supp. 2001); Mont. Code Ann. §4618301 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. §292520 (1995). Four States have hybrid systems, in which the jury renders an advisory verdict but the judge makes the ultimate sentencing determi-nations. See Ala. Code §§13A546, 13A547 (1994); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §4209 (1995); Fla. Stat. Ann. §921.141 (West 2001); Ind. Code Ann. §355029 (Supp. 2001). U. S., at 647649. Because Arizonas enumerated aggra-vating factors operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense, n. 19, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. *** The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered. . . . If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it. The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendants sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death. We hold that the Sixth Amendment applies to both. The judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 7We do not reach the States assertion that any error was harmless because a pecuniary gain finding was implicit in the jurys guilty verdict. See
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 155156 (1968).
22 RING v. ARIZONA Opinion of the Court Although the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law[,] . . . [o]ur precedents are not sacrosanct.
Except Roe....
Sadly true.
Hey, I've got something for you...
I hope your interpretation is correct.
But knowing the proclivities of lawyers and judges, I'm uneasy with where this could go.
What strikes me as more interesting about today, however, is the Court's ruling in Harris v. US, in which the Courts approved the practice of allowing judges to lengthen prison sentences if a gun was used in the commission of a crime, even if the defendant hasn't been convicted of any charge specifically involving the weapon (my emphasis).
Do these two opinions seem at all at odds with one another, or is it just me. What am I missing? The ruling in Harris was 5-4, and a bizarre mix of folks, including Scalia and the Chief in the majority, with Thomas, Ginsburg, Stevens and Souter in the dissenters. Seems exactly backwards of what one might expect!
Thoughts?
I have not read the Harris opinion yet. I will gladly post my thoughts on it after reviewing it.
Suddenly I feel a cold chill running down my spine!
The state legislatures giveth, and SCOTUS taketh away.
Judicial activism has reference to a court's exercising de facto legislative power by nullifying (effectively rescinding) legislation, imposing conditions and restrictions on legislation that are not present in the legislation or discernable from its legislative history, or generally exercising powers that are properly the function of the legislature.
Judicial activism is often irsksome and counterproductive because it infantalizes state legislative bodies and teaches the electorate that the REAL power lies in unelected life-tenured judges and justices--not in the legislature.
Agree with this, as with the rest of your post.
The only distinction I was making with your post at #53 was that this Supreme Court decision was "activist." At this point, I don't believe that's the case.
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