Posted on 04/25/2002 6:39:50 PM PDT by PsyOp
Patriotism, liberty and identification with the power of the state constituted the many elements united in the harmonious personality of Clauswitz. He did not need to have a recourse to sophistry, to deceive himself or to raise a barrier between his intelligence and his humanity. Clauswitz was a whole man. - Anatole Rappaport.
Do not take the first step without considering the last. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
Truth in itself is rarely sufficient to make men act. Hence the step is always long from cognition to volition, from knowledge to ability. The most powerful springs of action in man lie in his emotions. He derives his most vigorous support, if we may use the term, from that blend of brains and temperament which we have learned to recognize in the qualities of determination, firmness, staunchness, and strength of character. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
Critical analysis is not an evaluation of the means actually employed, but of all possible means. One can, after all, not condemn a method without being able to suggest a better alternative. - Karl von Clauswitz.
Machiavelli, who has very sound judgement in military affairs, asserts that it is more difficult to defeat with fresh troops an army which has just been victorious than to defeat it beforehand. - Karl von Clauswitz.
You have seen the steadfastness of one of the forces trained and led by Bonaparte... seen them under fierce and unrelenting fire – to get some sense of what can be accomplished by troops steeled by long experience in danger, in whom a proud record of victories has instilled the noble principal of placing the highest demands on themselves. As an idea alone it is unbelievable. - Karl von Clauswitz.
An army which keeps to its ordinary formations under the most devastating fire; which does not give way to imaginary fears, and which resists, foot by foot, in the face of well-grounded; which, proud in its victories, retains in the adversity of defeat its sense of obedience, its respect for its leaders, and its confidence in them; an army whose physical powers are drained by the privations and effort, like the muscles of an athlete; an army which sees its efforts as a means of victory and not as a curse attached to its standards, and in which the catechism of one idea, that of honor of arms, is enough to remind it of its duties and virtues; such an army is imbued with the military spirit. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
Choose the greatest aim and the most decisive one you feel you can attain. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
When this part of the army has... gradually exhausted it's warlike ardor and there remains nothing but cinders, it is withdrawn and replaced by another. So the battle burns, with an element of moderation, slowly away like wet powder. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
There is a point beyond which perseverance can only be termed folly, of which no critic could approve. I note that most celebrated of all battles, that of Waterloo, Bonaparte engaged his last forces to retrieve a battle which could no longer be retrieved. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
When a young man leaps across a deep ravine to show his skill in horsemanship, he is being bold; if he does it to escape from a troop of head-chopping Janissaries, he is resolute. The further the necessity is from the action... the less does necessity reduce the part played by boldness. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
This mass of individuals which the smallest military unit presents to the eye, united in a common long and painful journey, which should lead it to the theater where a thousand threats of death await it, the exalted and sacred goal that they are pursuing, all this makes my soul find in this sight a significance which moves it deeply. - Karl von Clauswitz, letter, September 11, 1806.
A strong sensitivity is not one which is only capable of strong emotion, but one which maintains equilibrium under the influence of strong emotions in such a way that, despite the storms raging within, perception and conviction continue to act with same subtlety as the needle of a compass in a storm-tossed ship. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
The French Revolution originates from two essential causes. The first is the tension between estates or social classes, the very privileged position of the nobility, the great subjection and, in truth, the particularly strong oppression of the peasant class. The second is the disorder and favoritism and wastage which haunts the administration of this government. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
Danger is part of the friction of war. Without an accurate conception of danger we cannot understand war. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
Defense without an active purpose is self-contradictory both in strategy and tactics. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
It is only aggression that calls forth defense, and war along with it. The aggressor is always peace-loving (as Bonaparte always claimed to be); he would prefer to take over our country unopposed. To prevent his doing so one must be willing to make war and be prepared for it. In other words it is the weak, those likely to need defense, who should always be armed in order not to be overwhelmed. Thus decrees the art of war. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
This cold spirit of despotism, of a mortal in uniform, leans with all his weight on the whole nation which he takes good care not to stir up by thoughtless or tyrannical measures, so stifling all by sheer logic and cold ability. Where is the slightest sign here that France has raised herself morally above her previous condition? It is a fall that she has experienced, of that there is no doubt. - Clauswitz, commenting on the French Revolution.
Combat is the only effective force in war; it's aim is to destroy the enemies forces as a means to a further end. That holds good even if no actual fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption that if it came to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
Admittedly, an aggressor often decides on war before the innocent defender does, and if he contrives to keep his preparations sufficiently secret, he may well take his victim unawares. Yet such surprise has nothing to do with war itself, and should not be possible. War serves the purpose of the defense more than that of the aggressor. It is only aggression that calls forth defense, and war along with it. The aggressor is always peace-loving (as Bonaparte always claimed to be); he would prefer to take over our country unopposed. To prevent his doing so one must be willing to make war and be prepared for it. In other words it is the weak, those likely to need defense, who should always be armed in order not to be overwhelmed. Thus decrees the art of war. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
Between two peoples and two states there can be such tensions, such a mass of inflamable material, that the slightest quarrel can produce a wholly disproportionate effect — a real explosion. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
No reading is more necessary than that of Machiavelli; those who affect to be shocked by his principals are nothing but petty intellectuals posing as humanists. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
Truth in itself is rarely sufficient to make men act. Hence the step is always long from cognition to volition, from knowledge to ability. The most powerful springs of action in man lie in his emotions. He derives his most vigorous support, if we may use the term, from that blend of brains and temperament which we have learned to recognize in the qualities of determination, firmness, staunchness, and strength of character. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
If a critic points out that a Frederick or a Bonaparte made mistakes, it does not mean that he would not have made them too. He may even admit that in the general's place he might have made greater errors. What it does mean is that he can recognize these mistakes.... - Karl von Clauswitz.
Bear in mind how wide a range of political interests can lead to war.... - Karl von Clauswitz.
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive. - Karl von Clauswitz.
War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
When whole communities go to war — whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples — the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
If the state is thought of as a person, and policy as the product of its brain, then among the contingencies for which the state must be prepared is a war in which every element calls for policy to be eclipsed by violence. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
Woe to the government, which, relying on half-hearted politics and a shackled military policy, meets a foe who, like the untamed elements, knows no law other than his own power! Any defect of action and effort will turn to the advantage of the enemy, and it will not be easy to change fencer's position to that of a wrestler. A slight blow may then often be enough to cause a total collapse. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
A certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of general policy. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War. 1832.
The art of war in its highest point of view becomes policy, but, of course, a policy which fights battles instead of writing notes. - Karl von Clauswitz.
Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not visa versa. No other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political. - Karl von Clauswitz.
When people talk, as they often do, about harmful political influence on the management of war, they are not really saying what they mean. Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence.... - Karl von Clauswitz.
Kind hearted people might... think there was some ingenious way to disarm and defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, [but] pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
Probability would become certainty, hope would be transformed into conviction if I had complete freedom to organize the conduct of all this war and to organize each of the armies as I understand them. - Karl von Clauswitz, letter to his fiancee, Sept. 29, 1806.
The passions which are inflamed during the war must already be latent in the peoples: the range which the exercise of courage and talent will assume in the realm of probabilities of chance depends on the particular characteristics of the commander-in-chief and of the army; the political ends belong to the government alone. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
A people of corrupted morales is not capable of liberty. -Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
Money is to be considered like a lubricant which, by reducing all natural frictions, allows a much greater diversity and mobility of all forces. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
All military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects. - Karl von Clauswitz.
When we speak of destroying the enemy's forces, we must emphasize that nothing obliges us to limit this idea to physical forces: the moral element must also be considered. - Karl von Clauswitz.
No one starts a war — or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so — without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. - Karl von Clauswitz.
As war... is dominated by the political object the order of that object determines the measure of the sacrifice by which it is to be purchased. As soon, therefore, as the expenditure in force becomes so great that the political object is no longer equal in value this objective must be given up, and peace will be the result. - Karl von Clauswitz.
If you can vanquish all your enemies by defeating one of them, that defeat must be the main objective of the war. In this one enemy we strike at the center of gravity of the entire conflict. - Karl von Clauswitz.
The preservation of our own state and the overthrow of the other is the ultimate end. Peace will be obtained because the conflict is resolved and completed in a way affecting both. - Karl von Clauswitz.
War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled. - Karl von Clauswitz.
The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
Principles and opinions can seldom reduce the path of reason to a simple line. As in all practical matters, a certain latitude always remains. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time. - Carl von Clauswitz.
Bonaparte wished to conduct and conclude the war in Russia in the same way as he had conducted and concluded his other campaigns. Using decisive blows to start with, and using the advantage thus gained t deliver new blows, he always gambled to win on a single card until he had broken the bank. - Karl von Clauswitz.
If the enemy is to be coerced you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifices you call on him to make. The Hardships of the situation must not of course be merely transient--at least not in appearance. Otherwise the enemy would not give in but would wait for things to improve.... - Karl von Clauswitz.
Suppose a small power is at war with a greater one; if the political initiative lies with the smaller power, it should take the military offensive. - Karl von Clauswitz.
Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.... Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper. - Karl von Clauswitz.
Only the commander who imposes his will can take the enemy by surprise. - Karl von Clauswitz.
If general moral superiority enables one opponent to intimidate and out-distance the other, he can use surprise to greater effect, and may even reap the fruits of victory where ordinarily he might fail. - Karl von Clauswitz.
Tactics is the art of using troops in battle; Strategy is the art of using battles to win the war. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
Any theory is constrained by virtue of its own construction, either because it will be an abstraction from the history of war, or at least, because it has to be compared with actual historical experience. This limitation is in any case more formal than substantial. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
Principles and rules are intended to provide a thinking man with a frame of reference. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and tangled. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
Only a theory that will follow the simple thread of internal cohesion can get back to the essence of things. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
Theory will have fulfilled it's main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects, to define clearly the nature of the ends in view, and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry. Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books.... - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
One country may support another's cause, but will never take it so seriously as its own. - Karl von Clauswitz.
Truth in itself is rarely sufficient to make men act. Hence the step is always long from cognition to volition, from knowledge to ability. The most powerful springs of action in man lie in his emotions. He derives his most vigorous support, if we may use the term, from that blend of brains and temperament which we have learned to recognize in the qualities of determination, firmness, staunchness, and strength of character. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
There is only one decisive victory: the last. - Karl von Clauswitz, Arming the Nation.
A major victory can only be achieved by positive measures aimed at a decision, never by simply waiting on events. In short, even in the defense, a major stake alone can bring a major gain. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
The original means of strategy is victory--that is tactical success--it's ends, in the final analysis, are those objects which will lead directly to peace. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
In war many roads lead to success. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
victory alone is not everything — but is it not, after all, what really counts? - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
Let us accept the risk of repaying cruelty with cruelty, of answering violence with more violence. It will be easy for us to overtake the enemy and to draw him back within the limits of moderation and humanity. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
When whole communities go to war — whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples — the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
It would be an obvious fallacy to imagine war between civilized peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the part of the government and to conceive of war as gradually ridding itself of passion, so that in the end one would never really need to use the physical impact of fighting forces — that comparative figures of their strength would be enough. That would be a kind of war by algebra. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
War possesses, it is true, its own grammar but not its own logic. War can never be separated from political relations, and if this separation occurs anywhere in the study, all the threads of the relations are broken in one way or another and there only remains a thing without meaning or purpose. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
War is the shock of opposed forces; from this it immediately follows that the stronger not only destroys the other but sweeps it along in its movement. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
All war presupposes human weakness, and seeks to exploit it. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
It is the weak, those likely to need defense, who should always be armed in order not to be overwhelmed. Thus decrees the art of war. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
In war more than anywhere else in the world things happen differently from what we had expected, and look differently when near from what they did at a distance. - Karl von Clausewitz, On War, 1832.
It would be futile — even wrong — to try and shut one's eyes to what war really is from sheer distress at it's brutality. - Karl Von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
But no matter how savage the nature of war, it is fettered by human weaknesses; and no one will be surprised at the contradiction that man seeks and creates the very danger that he fears. - Karl Von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
All war presupposes human weakness, and against that it is directed. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and design of policy shall not be inconsistant with the means.... the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose. - Karl Von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
The more modest your own political aim, the less importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must.... The political object — the original motive for the war — will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires. The political object cannot, however, in itself provide the standards of measurement. - Karl Von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
The conduct of war branches out in almost all directions and has no definite limits; while any system, any model, has the finite nature of a synthesis. An irreconcilable conflict exists between this type of theory and actual practice. - Karl von Clauswitz.
War is the province of uncertainty; three fourths of the things on which war is based lie hidden in the fog of greater or less uncertainty. - Karl von Clauswitz.
War is the realm of chance. No other human activity gives it greater scope; no other has such incessant and varied dealings with this intruder. Chance makes everything more uncertain and interferes with the whole course of events. - Karl Von Clausewitz.
War is nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means. - Karl von Clauswitz.
War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. - Karl von Clauswitz.
The activities characteristic of war may be split into two main categories: those that are merely preparation for war, and the war proper. - Karl von Clauswitz.
Not every war need be fought until one side collapses. - Karl von Clauswitz.
In war the result is never final. - Karl Von Clauswitz.
We must always consider that with the conclusion of peace the purpose of the war has been achieved and its business is at an end. - Karl von Clauswitz, On War, 1832.
Next thing you know you'll want to spell Klinton with a C.
American speakers do tend to change spelling and shorten things. Besides the E in Clausewitz is silent.
BTT for a Great Political and military theorist second only to Machiavelli.
If you can find the time, read the "Discourses" from which The Prince was compiled. They include a more in-depth treatment of the subjects covered in the Prince.
There are no silent letters in German.
It is pronounced Klow-se-vitz.
I can't believe I mis-spelled Clausewitz! Doh! Doh! Doh! & Doh!
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