Posted on 03/27/2002 7:05:44 PM PST by JohnHuang2
Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, the guy who saved our nation during the Civil War, probably wouldn't make major in today's Army. He was mule-skinner abrasive, enjoyed his sauce and wasn't exactly what you'd call a pretty face.
Today most generals and admirals are highly attractive smooth talkers with some sort of master's degree and a Ph.D. in how to work the corridors of power.
But while these uniformed central-casting smoothies know how to schmooze for funds for their latest silver-bullet project, they unfortunately don't know how to fight guerrilla wars.
The Somali debacle, and now the recent major foul-up in Afghanistan, prove in spades that our warrior class has lost out to a professional-management culture that's virtually destroyed our armed forces, less the Marine Corps – which is slowly veering in that direction as well.
Long before the first regular American soldier headed to Vietnam, the hardened vets who'd slugged it out on hundreds of killing fields knew the post-World War II ticket-punching personnel system was on its way toward destroying the leadership needed to win America's future wars.
Going, going, gone were the days when lieutenants like Frank Gunn stayed with a regiment from the first shot of the war until the last. Gunn led a platoon and company in Africa, was a major by '43 in Sicily, skippered a battalion in France the next year, and by the end of the war, at the ripe old age of 24, was commanding the storied 39th Regiment fighting across Germany. General Gunn, now retired, became skilled at his trade down in the mud with the soldiers he loved and would have died for – and they, in turn, followed him to hell and back. Gunn never got caught up in the type of career management that produced the current lot of Perfumed Princes. He learned to soldier by listening to his old sergeants and being with the troops.
In Vietnam, officer leaders were churned almost as quickly as customers at Starbucks. Ticket-punching was in, and leading from the front was out. The Washington personnel chiefs' agenda was to use the war as a training vehicle for officers so they'd have blooded leadership when the big fight with the Soviets exploded.
Post-Vietnam studies concluded ticket-punching was a major cause of our failure, and that the personnel system desperately needed surgery. But nothing was done, and over the years the cancerous system disabled our senior officer corps and is now infecting our proud NCOs. Their foremost concern always used to be for the welfare of their troops and how sharply their unit was trained, not what kind of rating they got on a report. My First Sergeant in Italy took great pride in showing us 'cruits the chain scars from his time in a Georgia prison. But with his fifth-grade education, the old Top could still run a lean-and-mean company of soldiers.
Afghanistan was going just fine while the old-pro Special Forces sergeants, chiefs and captains were running the fight. But when Perfumed Princes like Maj. Gen. Franklin Hagenbeck – with his M.S. degree in exercise physiology (but no combat experience) and Pentagon punches such as director for politico-military affairs for global and multilateral issues (I kid you not) under his shiny general's belt – took over the fighting with the conventional, non-mountain-trained 10th Division, our Army came away with that Vietnam Heartbreak Ridge look: high body count without many bodies and too many friendly casualties.
A fine sergeant in Kuwait says it all: "My generals worry about what kind of engraved Buck knives to buy to give as gifts to the foreign generals, do we have enough potpourri-scented Pledge to make sure our mahogany desks are dust-free, color ink for our laser printers, oh and let's not forget the staffers have to eat better than the rest of the Army, so we have to plan at least one big dinner function so the fat-cats can get fatter. I've seen these generals cancel a visit to troops training in the desert so they could drink coffee and have lunch with another general visiting from the War College. Where are their damn priorities?"
The 'bayonet charge' you refer to appears to have been replaced by a charge of a different name performed by special forces....and yet, their blood sheds just as easily as the bayonet charging infantryman.
..."As this war continues, the perfumed princes who rose to their positions by punching the right tickets, will fall to the wayside, replaced by true leaders and warriors. Just like they always have at the start of every one of our major conflicts"....
And at what cost....how many more men have to die or be seriously wounded before the perfumed ones fall away so the true warrior/leaders rise from the ashes?
I'm a female, never been in the service so I've never seen combat or even a make-believe combat scenario, but I believe this is what Colonel Hackworth is getting at......its the rank and file who are biting the dust while the strutting peacocks continue to preen...it seems his first concern is always with and for the men, as was great leaders like Gunn.
I can picture Gunn's men following him willingly through the gates of hell and back.....something I can't envision with the likes of a Wesley Clark.
This IS definitely Hackworths' point about what leadership has to be in managing true combat situations. My earlier point was - the importance of this current war has to do with Lieutenants and Captains getting REAL combat experience. That and our killing monsters, of course.
Yep, he sure does. The current conflicts where we have combat personnel (Columbia, Afghan, etc.) are true training for the ongoing guerrilla wars in front of us, IMHO.
Has it ever been different? I'm not saying that is the way things should be, but it is the way things always have been. I'm sure Hackworth isn't advocating putting Colonels and Generals on the frontlines. Can you imagine some 50+ year old man trying to keep up with a bunch of 20 year old special forces troops doing what they do best. Personally, the last place I want a commanding officer is anywhere near me in the heat of battle.
With regard to bayonets, I would be interested to know the recency of experience of anyone who still advocates a bayonet charge as a productive, useful tactic. For years our combat pilots were taught to ingress into a target area at low altitude. After all, that was the way we'd always done it. Nevermind the fact that we had developed technology that allowed even more precise bombing from higher altitudes outside the ranges of enemy air defenses. After we lost some great aircraft and even better pilots flying the old low altitude tactics in the Gulf War, we learned our lessons and shifted tactics to match the technology available. We've been kicking butt ever since, and haven't lost a man to enemy fire. It's not as dramatic as the old way, but it is a heck of a lot more effective. What's more important?
A great general like Lee, with good troops like those of the Army of Northern Virginia, cannot be defeated without a willingness to incur losses. Furthermore, great generals are often very aggressive, and are sometimes over-bold and take heavy losses as a result. You will see this phenomenon abundantly present in the campaigns of Frederick, Napoleon, Rommel and Lee (for example, Pickett's charge and Malvern Hill).
As I indicated, I wouldn't be the one to be asking this; hence the flagging of sneaky and ImpBill. I would note that I suggested the charge today is using special forces jargon. When our men were let off the copters, they were there to take out the enemy.....and there were some bad problems, it seems--and we lost men and we had a lot injured.
As an American, and a female, I'm glad the Colonel is speaking out for the men and appears to put a priority on their lives over the peacocks and their ticket punching antics...I can understand what Hack is saying, while these peacocks tend to spout whatever is the PC BS in current vogue or whatever serves the Admin.
Chalk it up to my using feminine rationalization or whatever.... :)
Sure we can bomb them back into the dark ages, but in this engagement in Afghanistan, as it was in RVN the enemy always has a way of adapting to constant incoming (air and artillery barrages). So, in that regard, yes when a piece of dirt needs to taken it is going to require face to face, hand to hand combat at times to accomplish the mission. But it is a far cry from the vision of a "bayonet charge". Remember, the "art" of conducting effective warfare is as old as mankind himself and history proves armies are constantly adapting to new technologies and new missions.
Now the point Colonel Hackworth is making here is simply that the "leadership" at the top, is in many instances not comprised of "battle tested", life long front line officers.
Of course, while I am sure this PC "ticket punching" process took on new meaning during the past decade, it is not something new. Re-read Hack's piece and see how a very young Lt. became a Battalion Commander in a very short time. During wars, of any duration, it is a fact that promotions come quickly for a myriad of reasons to include combat fatalities and replacements needed.
Unfortunately, but as a fact in a military controlled and commanded by civilian authority, in-between wars budgets are cut, promotions are slow and therefore careerists do have to find ways of making themselves noticed in a much different environment than combat. A certain amount of "butt kissing" goes on in most occupations.
What Hack doesn't address in this piece, and through no fault, because it was not his point, is the lack of combat preparedness in line units due to long periods of non combat missions, where Congress in their infinite wisdom cuts military budgets to the bone. In many cases, just as an example, half the tanks in a armored division aren't available because the unit is having to scavenge parts from one vehicle to make another serviceable. Broaden that view to the entire military force structure; aircraft, jeeps, artillery pieces, etc. etc. etc.
Add that to manpower shortages where units are only up to strength by paper work games and shifting of "clerks and jerks" into combat slots on paper only.
These problems are as old as the military itself and normally in each and every "conventional" type unit casualties are higher in the beginning of the mission than they are as time goes by and the budget and proficiency of the leaders and the soldiers improves from necessity.
I remember my father, a career Infantry Officer, telling me stories of after W.W.II and before Korea his Infantry units were drilling with wooden sticks because there was not enough money in the defense budget for all soldiers to drill with real rifles.
But as I began, there is little doubt the quality of the command and general staff suffered as never before during eight years with a "draft dodger" as Commander In Chief.
Fortunately it appears as if our "Special Forces" types of units have maintained an edge. The "leg" outfits may take a bit of time to get up to speed but I am hopeful under Rummy's direction they will.
The bigger question in all of this is more to the resolve and willingness of the American people to accomplish "the" mission. And of course the mission has to remain concise and well defined from the top. While it is good for the current President to talk about the mission in terms of "defeating terrorism" when it comes to combat operations a great deal more specificity is required. That is where, my concerns are with the current crop of "ticket punchers", in general, in charge. But again, Rummy and his past experience give me hope that in time, and unfortunately inevitably with losses, the problem will be addressed.
Hope, my opinion here, long I agree, helps in some small way.
Thanks for flagging me.
I'm well aware of the problems with spare parts, lack of ammo, the un-readiness of units, etc. I do try to keep up with at least reading some in that regards.
As it regards bayonet charges.....my Dad is 89 and not long ago he was telling me about his oldest brother-in-law, who was in WWI. Uncle Mark was involved in bayonet charges, up and out of trenches, and through fields of mud and muck...and was exposed to mustard gas at some point in Europe.
You're silly, if you think Grant was anything but average, in a group of horrible below average peers. The only thing that could make Grant look good, or gives the appearance of competence in the "operational art" is that most all his peers on the Union side were much worse.
Please don't use Vicksburg as an example, it was a seige of overwhelming superior land and naval forces at the disposal of someone who could apply basic principles of warefare.
So you need to hit the history books other than those unfortunate books read in our elementry and high schools.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.