Poster-boy losers: David Hackworth whacks military's inexperienced 'Perfumed Princes'

Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, the guy who saved our nation during the Civil War, probably wouldn't make major in today's Army. He was mule-skinner abrasive, enjoyed his sauce and wasn't exactly what you'd call a pretty face.

Today most generals and admirals are highly attractive smooth talkers with some sort of master's degree and a Ph.D. in how to work the corridors of power.

But while these uniformed central-casting smoothies know how to schmooze for funds for their latest silver-bullet project, they unfortunately don't know how to fight guerrilla wars.

The Somali debacle, and now the recent major foul-up in Afghanistan, prove in spades that our warrior class has lost out to a professional-management culture that's virtually destroyed our armed forces, less the Marine Corps – which is slowly veering in that direction as well.

Long before the first regular American soldier headed to Vietnam, the hardened vets who'd slugged it out on hundreds of killing fields knew the post-World War II ticket-punching personnel system was on its way toward destroying the leadership needed to win America's future wars.

Going, going, gone were the days when lieutenants like Frank Gunn stayed with a regiment from the first shot of the war until the last. Gunn led a platoon and company in Africa, was a major by '43 in Sicily, skippered a battalion in France the next year, and by the end of the war, at the ripe old age of 24, was commanding the storied 39th Regiment fighting across Germany. General Gunn, now retired, became skilled at his trade down in the mud with the soldiers he loved and would have died for – and they, in turn, followed him to hell and back. Gunn never got caught up in the type of career management that produced the current lot of Perfumed Princes. He learned to soldier by listening to his old sergeants and being with the troops.

In Vietnam, officer leaders were churned almost as quickly as customers at Starbucks. Ticket-punching was in, and leading from the front was out. The Washington personnel chiefs' agenda was to use the war as a training vehicle for officers so they'd have blooded leadership when the big fight with the Soviets exploded.

Post-Vietnam studies concluded ticket-punching was a major cause of our failure, and that the personnel system desperately needed surgery. But nothing was done, and over the years the cancerous system disabled our senior officer corps and is now infecting our proud NCOs. Their foremost concern always used to be for the welfare of their troops and how sharply their unit was trained, not what kind of rating they got on a report. My First Sergeant in Italy took great pride in showing us 'cruits the chain scars from his time in a Georgia prison. But with his fifth-grade education, the old Top could still run a lean-and-mean company of soldiers.

Afghanistan was going just fine while the old-pro Special Forces sergeants, chiefs and captains were running the fight. But when Perfumed Princes like Maj. Gen. Franklin Hagenbeck – with his M.S. degree in exercise physiology (but no combat experience) and Pentagon punches such as director for politico-military affairs for global and multilateral issues (I kid you not) under his shiny general's belt – took over the fighting with the conventional, non-mountain-trained 10th Division, our Army came away with that Vietnam Heartbreak Ridge look: high body count without many bodies and too many friendly casualties.

A fine sergeant in Kuwait says it all: "My generals worry about what kind of engraved Buck knives to buy to give as gifts to the foreign generals, do we have enough potpourri-scented Pledge to make sure our mahogany desks are dust-free, color ink for our laser printers, oh and let's not forget the staffers have to eat better than the rest of the Army, so we have to plan at least one big dinner function so the fat-cats can get fatter. I've seen these generals cancel a visit to troops training in the desert so they could drink coffee and have lunch with another general visiting from the War College. Where are their damn priorities?"

Please don't use Vicksburg as an example, it was a seige of overwhelming superior land and naval forces at the disposal of someone who could apply basic principles of warefare.

Grant's activities before the siege set in were definitely of a very high order of skill and success. He won five battles in 17 days: Port Gibson (May 1st), Raymond (May 12th), capture of Jackson, Mississippi (May 14th), Champion's Hill (May 16th), and Big Black River Bridge (May 17th).

In all these battles he applied maneuver warfare techniques to confuse and defeat his opponents. His force was numerically inferior to the aggregate force of CSA troops in the area. He defeated them by turns. Even crossing the Misssissippi river demonstrated a maneuver warfare technique and a willingness to take a calculated risk (are you hearing this Monty?).

There was a time during the Overland campaign where Grant's skill stole a march on Lee and would have allowed him to get into Petersburg virtually unopposed, but his subordinate leaders flubbed it.

Walt

Well, I'm not an infantry soldier, but in my line of work if you close with an aware enemy to engage in "hand-to-hand" combat, you've screwed up

Spoken like a true air-force or navy techno-puke. Unless you have been and done, in real combat, not the video-game crap that you seem to love, keep your opinions to yourself. Your reliance on weapons that provide distance as a measure of protection are usurped by the need for "eyes on" intelligence gathering and assessment. But wait, there is technology for that too sin't there??? Get real bucko... I can't wait to see you in any form of combat, you will be easy to find, what with the big stain on your trousers...

Semper Fi

Since we were writing about the Civil War, I thought I would give you a statistic about bayonets. During the spring campaign of 1864, out of 50,000 men, only about 50 were victims to bayonet thrusts.

I'll agree with Rokke. If you're forced to close with the enemy or the enemy is in your lines, you've screwed up. Never bring a knife, no matter how long, to a gunfight.

Hey, that's a classy retort. I'll tell you what, next time your on the frontlines, why don't you fix bayonets and give a good charge for ole' times sake. No point in using the technology we've developed since the Civil War. Lets just arm our troops with sabers and muskets. In the meantime, you can leave the killing to the techno-pukes who aren't mired in the glory of tradition. And for the record, I'd be willing to bet I've been in combat more recently than you, and will return to it a lot sooner than you. I look forward to sending a few arabs to meet their 52 virgins in your honor. And I'll do it without sacrificing a bunch of good, young American troops to antiquited, obsolete tactics.

Hand-to-hand combat is not as rare as one would think, there were reports from Afghanistan that special forces were taking on Al Qaida with knives in some instances. I don't think SF troops are stupid or suicidal, they wouldn't use knives unless they had to.

Generally concur with your post but Montgomery was/is the most overrated general of all times. His "Victory" at El Alamein came against a foe whom he outnumbered 2-1 in manpower 4-1 in tanks, 3-1 in planes, and 10-1 in artillery -- and the Axis forces ran out of gas!

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In that battle over a 30 mile front Montgomery had 1,000 new tanks to the Germans' 500. That's a new tank every 150 feet along a frontal attack. The Germans were hard up for fuel. Due to Hitler's mistake, the Germans had just had 360,000 gallons of desperately needed fuel sunk on its way to Africa. Furthermore, the lost British tanks were being replenished by American tanks. Replenishment of ten tanks a day would result in massive superiority.

Still, the Germans managed to take out 500 of Mongomery's tanks, which is as much as the Germans had to start with.

With 10,000 more gallons of fuel and 100 more tanks, Mongomery would have been wiped out.

I think that's a good point, however, I would imagine they weren't closing with an aware enemy to do it, as is implied by a bayonet charge. The whole discussion is a little silly. I used the term "bayonet charge" in my original post as being representative of outdated tactics. I am sure arguements could be made for the use of just about any weapon or tactic. Heck, one of my favorite pictures from Afghanistan is the SF troop riding horseback. But the story behind the picture is that man was where he was to locate targets and guide new technology weapons into those targets. He wasn't riding the horse because he thought mounted cavalry is still an effective way to win battles. Interestingly enough, he also was an Air Force "techno-puke". Go figure.

Say, that's a good point. And if the average grunt starts walking right now, he ought to make it to the combat zone in just a couple years. And when he finally gets there, I'm sure he'll be very glad the Air Force and Navy got there first to pulverize enough of the enemy that the average grunt will only need to mop up the mess. Of course, if the average grunt wants to do it on his own, I guess the other two services would be willing to let him try. But fortunately, today's average grunt, just like today's average sailor and airman, understands that it takes the effort of all the services to win a war.

The average grunt also understands that air force can give a shi+ about tactical air. The average grunt also understands that the air force is a a group that joined for a job. The average grunt also knows that when asked to describe themselves as either "warrior" or "I fly for the goverment" the air force F-15E strike pilots picked the "I fly for the government. This quote says it best " I will be happy doing my 20 years with out ever killing someone, but I also am extremely glad to be in the middle of 1000 19 year old Marines who can't wait too" Air Force EOD tech Kandahar.

"The average grunt also understands that air force can give a shi+ about tactical air. "

Maybe you missed all the reports and pictures of the B-1/B-52/F-16/F-15E strikes in Afghanistan? Maybe you've never heard of an AC-130. Maybe you don't know there are currently A-10's flying out of Bagram airfield. Maybe you don't know that the purpose of most of the special forces in Afghanistan during the first several weeks of the war was to coordinate Navy and Air Force airstrikes. Maybe you don't realize that your obvious ignorance puts you in a category several levels below today's average grunt. Then again, maybe you do know that much. If "aimlow" is your goal in life, I think you have acheived it.

You mean the same air force that tried to get rid of the A-10's. The same air force that spends ungodly sums of money on bombers that do nothing for tactical air? That cost so much that they are named after states? The same air force that got rid of the F-111 electronic warfare platforms even though they are responsible to the CJCS for them. The same air force that calls a C2 tent a weapon in order to justify the cost? The same air force that has to use B-52's as weapon platforms because they have spent so much money on B-2's and B-1's and they are uncapable of influencing the action. The same air force that does not allow Marines to use there clubs but are happy as hell to hide behind one or have one show up to rescue his ass. The same air force that it's pilots were turning around in the middle of mission's during the Gulf that the General had to publish a message reminding them that war means they too could be shot at. The us air force is the best in the world. And staffed by a bunch of wussies that spend more money than can be imagined.

In Afghanistan, the B-1 has flown just 5% of the strike sorties, but dropped 40% of the ordnance. It has the largest weapons payload of any aircraft flying, and can drop 24 2000lb JDAMs on a single sortie. Not bad for an aircraft "uncapable of influencing the action." I could provide similar facts to prove each of your statements is equally as poorly thought out and wrong, but it isn't worth my time.

I've served in the Navy and Air Force, but would say the Marine Corps is probably, pound for pound, the best led and most effective service we've got. But I could give you a list a mile long of stupid things the Marine Corps has done, and even more stupid things some Marines have said. Fortunately, I have my head far enough out of my ass to recognize the strengths and weaknesses of each service, and would never claim that any service could win a war without the capabilities of all the others. If you are/were a Marine, stick to writing about the Marines. Your knowledge of the Air Forceis is so gross it merits no further response.

Ticket punching and career maneuvering has evolved into a science and institutionalized within the Army, at least. It has also reached the senior NCO corps.

Guess what, the business world is rotten with it, too -- think the best knowledge workers and engineers survive when corporate honchos are under constant pressure from the money-runners to smash headcounts and outyear G&A liabilities? Guess again.

Yeah, there are similarities, unfortunately they end at the bottom line. One is about dollars, the other life and death decisions.

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