US Navy scraps NINE anti-submarine warships that cost $3.2 billion to make - some under three years old

FOR DAILYMAIL.COM ^ | 13 May 2022 | ADAM SOLOMONS

[BroJoeK]

"Amen. Ships, tracked vehicles and stationary artillery are as obsolete as the sling.
It is almost certain that twenty years from now wars will be fought by robots or humans behind screens.
There will be no more pilots.
The navy fleet will be no more than subs and that too should be a dangerous occupation."

Sure... sure they are obsolete.
And when I was a boy I watched the Jetsons cartoons where people flew around in their own personal jet-cars, and we expected to see colonies on Mars in a few years.

Of course there's no doubt technology is changing fast, but some things don't change as much as you might suppose...

[BroJoeK]

"Wonder how many of the Congressional representatives would want their children to crew those ships, tanks or helicopters."

War has always been a very deadly business, with many unknowns.
The US Civil War, using somewhat basic technology killed more soldiers than many wars combined since.

If anything, Russia in Ukraine demonstrates that military doctrine, training and motivation are at least as important as technology.

[riverdawg]

“When you are playing poker, once you put chips in the pot, they aren’t yours anymore.

If the hand develops in a way that is not favorable to you, it doesn’t matter how many chips you have put in, or often, even what your hole cards are.

If it’s a certain loser, you have to fold and wait for a better situation.”

Also known as the “sunk cost fallacy” or in the vernacular, “throwing good money after bad.”

[Yo-Yo]

Legend class Coast Guard cutters are listed as 28 knots, max., with a range over 12,000 miles versus the LCS's 3,500 miles.

The Coast Guards new OPC has a max designed speed of 22.5 knots, with a 10,000 mile range at 14 knots.

https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/Surface-Programs/Offshore-Patrol-Cutter/

I wouldn't speculate on the range of a diesel-only DCS hull, but removing the gas turbine and trouble-prone diesel-gas turbine power combining gearbox, extra fuel storage could be provided.

And keep in mind that the idea (not mine, really) is for the DCS to replace just some of the planned 25 $411 million OPCs. You can do a lot of modifications with a $400 million budget when you get the hulls for free.

[Bookshelf]

With Pearl Harbor the battleship, which had a hayday of some forty years, was made obsolete.
This world is turning more rapidly month by month. The battle for Ukraine should provide myriad lessons to be learned; however, much of what I wrote previously should have been realized a decade ago.
Parenthetically, the Navy is sending ships less than ten years old to the graveyard because they are obsolete. And the Pentagon at this moment is trying to determine the future role of the U.S. Marine Corps. And the US airlines are hunting for pilots because the forces are not training as many pilots as they once did. In other words obsolescence in the military is everywhere apparent.

[BroJoeK]

"The Coast Guards new OPC has a max designed speed of 22.5 knots, with a 10,000 mile range at 14 knots."

Which makes it less capable than the current Legend class:

"The Legend-class cutter, also known as the National Security Cutter (NSC) and Maritime Security Cutter, Large, is the largest active patrol cutter class of the United States Coast Guard.
Entering into service in 2008, the Legend-class is the largest of several new cutter designs developed as part of the Integrated Deepwater System Program.[9]"

Compare to Heritage class:

"The Heritage-class cutter, also known as the Offshore Patrol Cutter and the Maritime Security Cutter, Medium, is a cutter class of the United States Coast Guard (USCG), developed as part of the Integrated Deepwater System Program and built by Eastern Shipbuilding.[4]
Construction of the first vessel in the class began in January 2019."

The two cutter classes appear to be quite similar in size & performance, with Legend slightly longer, wider, faster & longer range.
The Legend class has combined diesel & gas engines and so a higher max speed of 28+ knots, while Heritage has only diesel engines and 24.5 knots max speed.

Given their current issues, I don't see how the Navy's LCSs could ever replace the Coast Guard's most advanced cutters.

Heritage Class Argus:

Legend Class Bertholf:

[BroJoeK]

Bookshelf: "Parenthetically, the Navy is sending ships less than ten years old to the graveyard because they are obsolete."

Naw... not "obsolete", the fact is LCSs never performed as advertised, and the issues suggested basic design & engineering misunderstandings.
To a non-engineer like myself the lessons learned include -- smaller incremental changes will be more likely to succeed than radical new designs.

Bookshelf: "In other words obsolescence in the military is everywhere apparent."

Sure, but that has **always** been true, military forces are always in a race to develop better weapons, tactics & logistics.
Sometimes change *appears* slower than at other times, but the only thing that really matters is we stay at least one step ahead of our potential enemies, so it's their rate of progress which must dictate our own.

Progress in one weapon system necessarily means potential obsolescence in older systems.

[Yo-Yo]

"The Coast Guards new OPC has a max designed speed of 22.5 knots, with a 10,000 mile range at 14 knots."

Which makes it less capable than the current Legend class:

"The Legend-class cutter, also known as the National Security Cutter (NSC) and Maritime Security Cutter, Large, is the largest active patrol cutter class of the United States Coast Guard.
Entering into service in 2008, the Legend-class is the largest of several new cutter designs developed as part of the Integrated Deepwater System Program.[9]"

Compare to Heritage class:

"The Heritage-class cutter, also known as the Offshore Patrol Cutter and the Maritime Security Cutter, Medium, is a cutter class of the United States Coast Guard (USCG), developed as part of the Integrated Deepwater System Program and built by Eastern Shipbuilding.[4]
Construction of the first vessel in the class began in January 2019."

The Coast Guard's Offshore Patrol Cutter (Heritage class) is not meant to replace the Legend class cutters. It is supposed to replace the Famous and Reliant classes [Medium Endurance cutters.]

The OPCs will provide the majority of offshore presence for the Coast Guard’s cutter fleet, bridging the capabilities of the 418-foot national security cutters, which patrol the open ocean, and the 154-foot fast response cutters, which serve closer to shore. The OPCs will conduct missions including law enforcement, drug and migrant interdiction, search and rescue, and other homeland security and defense operations. Each OPC will be capable of deploying independently or as part of task groups and serving as a mobile command and control platform for surge operations such as hurricane response, mass migration incidents and other events. The cutters will also support Arctic objectives by helping regulate and protect emerging commerce and energy exploration in Alaska.

And again there are two Navy Littoral Combat Ships, the Independence class and the Freedom class. This whole thread is regarding the Freedom class LCS which is a monohull design, not the trihull Independence class.

And last, the proposal is to replace some, not all, of the 25 planned OPCs (Heritage class) with reworked Freedom class LCSs, saving money.

[citizen]

...the answer was a highly placed admiral was behind it and the system would continue to be built up until he was gone.

---

I'm sure the "highly placed admiral" was handsomely paid to steer $billions on behalf of the bribers.

[BroJoeK]

Yo-Yo: "The Coast Guard's Offshore Patrol Cutter (Heritage class) is not meant to replace the Legend class cutters.
It is supposed to replace the Famous and Reliant classes [Medium Endurance cutters.]"

Right, but the key point is that at first glance the Legends and Heritages are nearly identical, and both appear more capable than the LCSs in all but speed, if the LCSs worked properly, which they decidedly don't.

"And again there are two Navy Littoral Combat Ships, the Independence class and the Freedom class.
This whole thread is regarding the Freedom class LCS which is a monohull design, not the trihull Independence class."

Right, each class has its own issues, the Freedom's main problem being its "transmission".
I'd certainly agree, if it worked properly & reliably, it would make a pretty awesome cutter.
But right now it's a piece of junk, and if I were the coastguard I'd tell the navy to use it for target practice, make a fish reef out of it.

Unless... unless some genius in the coastguard knows a trick about those combining gears... ;-)

[Yo-Yo]

Here's an article touting the pros of adapting the LCS to Coast Guard use:

https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/op-ed-a-derated-littoral-combat-ship-would-make-an-ideal-uscg-cutter

Op-Ed: Littoral Combat Ships Would Make Great Coast Guard Cutters

PUBLISHED DEC 19, 2021 9:58 PM BY CIMSEC

[By Lt. James Martin and Lt. Jasper Campbell, USCG]

In the spring of 2021, defense-minded internet message boards and social media were ablaze at headlines that the U.S. Navy would be decommissioning the first hulls of the decade-old Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). A chorus of “good riddance” posts and thought pieces followed. Though the Navy maintains it intends to keep using both Independence and Freedom variants of the LCS, it is no secret that the program has been beleaguered with class-wide mechanical issues. As many in naval thought circles lament and debate what the Navy will do in the way of near shore combatants in contested waters, a unique opportunity has emerged for the U.S. Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard is currently in the throes of one of the largest asset recapitalizations in its history. 9 of 11 National Security Cutters (NSCs) and 40 of 64 planned Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) are in service, and 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs) are planned. The service also plans to acquire 6 icebreakers and a fleet of waterways commerce cutters. Based on a legacy fleet size circa 2007, this profound growth represents a 20 percent increase in cutters. But is this sufficient, given the global demand signal for the unique combination of soft power, capabilities, authorities, and agreements the Coast Guard brings to the national security table? This demand is compounding yearly, with the service continuing their obligations in the Polar Regions and the Middle East, alongside new commitments in the Indo-Pacific, Oceania, and Mediterranean.

The Coast Guard’s acquisition boom will simply replace its legacy stable of assets; if the service expects to operate successfully as a global representative of U.S. interests, it will need every additional hull it can get. While the fraught LCS program leads many to ponder its future in the Navy, the Coast Guard could inherit a boon in the now 31-hull LCS program and close this gap.

[Excerpt - see link for full article]

And a rebuttal con article:

https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/beware-buyer-s-remorse-why-the-coast-guard-should-avoid-the-lcs

Beware Buyer's Remorse: Why the Coast Guard Should Avoid the LCS

PUBLISHED APR 6, 2022 5:27 PM BY CIMSEC

[By Lt. Joseph O’Connell]

With all the negative publicity surrounding the Navy’s littoral combat ship (LCS) program, it would seem self-evident the Coast Guard has no interest in acquiring the LCS as a hand-me-down. However, with the recent publishing of “In Dire Need: Why the Coast Guard Needs the LCS,” a newly found interest in acquiring problematic navy platforms may be growing and deserves to be judged on its merits. The central thesis proposes the U.S. Coast Guard acquire decommissioned LCSs from the U.S. Navy, remove the installed combined diesel engine and gas turbine (CODAG) plant, and install a direct drive diesel. While the proposal is noticeably light on details of propulsion layout (it is unclear if the new layout would have one diesel per water jet or use a splitting/combining gear arrangement), it relies upon the Coast Guard’s historical precedents of accepting old navy ships and converting CODAG plants into direct diesel drives. The concept merits an analytic look to determine if the primary conclusion, that acquiring recently decommissioned LCS’s in lieu of commissioning new Off-shore Patrol Cutters (OPCs) has the potential to save scarce Coast Guard dollars, holds true. To do so, a rough exploration of what this program would achieve and at what cost must be compared to OPC designs and costs.

The LCS: Built for Speed

One of the driving requirements for the LCS acquisition was “sprint” speeds in excess of 40 knots. Such speeds effectively ruled out traditional propellers as prime movers with water jet systems taking their place. The Coast Guard does not and has not operated large vessels with water jet drives, and significant propulsion inefficiencies exist when operating these drives at lower speeds (Fig 1). Because of the governing physics behind water jets, they are rarely used in vessels that normally operate under 30 knots. While re-engining itself may be a cost effective way to gut the newly minted cutters of an expensive gear issue, it does not solve the propulsion issue of low speed water jet operation.

For argument’s sake, we can assume that the Coast Guard would re-engine the LCS with a comparable engine to the two 7,280 KW fairbanks diesels planned for the OPC, with a total combined brake horsepower (BHP) of 19,520. Using publicly available data points on the LCS speed power curve, and understanding its cubic nature, we see this would deliver an underwhelming 15 to 20 knots at flank speed. And while 15-20 knots may be acceptable for legacy Coast Guard operations, it does not match the OPC’s promised 22-plus knots or the fuel efficiency and lower operating cost of the OPC’s designed loiter drive. Because of the water jet propulsion system, an additional operating cost for the Coast Guard LCS would be fuel and maintenance. Water jets are terribly inefficient at low-medium speeds and would consume 20-50 percent more fuel than the OPC at similar speeds.

[Excerpt - see link for full article]

[Grampa Dave]

You are correct.

With the new tech, the danger and deadly levels seem to have increased for the sailors on ships, at this time.

[Grampa Dave]

Thanks for posting this excellent reality post!

“When you are playing poker, once you put chips in the pot, they aren’t yours anymore.

If the hand develops in a way that is not favorable to you, it doesn’t matter how many chips you have put in, or often, even what your hole cards are.

If it’s a certain loser, you have to fold and wait for a better situation.”

Also known as the “sunk cost fallacy” or in the vernacular, “throwing good money after bad.”

[Kevmo]

Why can’t they strip them and sell them as cruise ships or sumthin?

[BroJoeK]

Hmmmmm... from your articles I gather there are pros & cons to it, with the cons outweighing the pros... seemingly.
Water-jets are inefficient at low speeds, don't work at high speeds... oh dear.
I'd just hope our coastguard doesn't get bull-dozed into doing something stupid.