Right, but the key point is that at first glance the Legends and Heritages are nearly identical, and both appear more capable than the LCSs in all but speed, if the LCSs worked properly, which they decidedly don't.
"And again there are two Navy Littoral Combat Ships, the Independence class and the Freedom class.
This whole thread is regarding the Freedom class LCS which is a monohull design, not the trihull Independence class."
Right, each class has its own issues, the Freedom's main problem being its "transmission".
I'd certainly agree, if it worked properly & reliably, it would make a pretty awesome cutter.
But right now it's a piece of junk, and if I were the coastguard I'd tell the navy to use it for target practice, make a fish reef out of it.
Unless... unless some genius in the coastguard knows a trick about those combining gears... ;-)
Op-Ed: Littoral Combat Ships Would Make Great Coast Guard CuttersPUBLISHED DEC 19, 2021 9:58 PM BY CIMSEC
[By Lt. James Martin and Lt. Jasper Campbell, USCG]
In the spring of 2021, defense-minded internet message boards and social media were ablaze at headlines that the U.S. Navy would be decommissioning the first hulls of the decade-old Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). A chorus of “good riddance” posts and thought pieces followed. Though the Navy maintains it intends to keep using both Independence and Freedom variants of the LCS, it is no secret that the program has been beleaguered with class-wide mechanical issues. As many in naval thought circles lament and debate what the Navy will do in the way of near shore combatants in contested waters, a unique opportunity has emerged for the U.S. Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard is currently in the throes of one of the largest asset recapitalizations in its history. 9 of 11 National Security Cutters (NSCs) and 40 of 64 planned Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) are in service, and 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs) are planned. The service also plans to acquire 6 icebreakers and a fleet of waterways commerce cutters. Based on a legacy fleet size circa 2007, this profound growth represents a 20 percent increase in cutters. But is this sufficient, given the global demand signal for the unique combination of soft power, capabilities, authorities, and agreements the Coast Guard brings to the national security table? This demand is compounding yearly, with the service continuing their obligations in the Polar Regions and the Middle East, alongside new commitments in the Indo-Pacific, Oceania, and Mediterranean.
The Coast Guard’s acquisition boom will simply replace its legacy stable of assets; if the service expects to operate successfully as a global representative of U.S. interests, it will need every additional hull it can get. While the fraught LCS program leads many to ponder its future in the Navy, the Coast Guard could inherit a boon in the now 31-hull LCS program and close this gap.
[Excerpt - see link for full article]
And a rebuttal con article:
Beware Buyer's Remorse: Why the Coast Guard Should Avoid the LCSPUBLISHED APR 6, 2022 5:27 PM BY CIMSEC
[By Lt. Joseph O’Connell]
With all the negative publicity surrounding the Navy’s littoral combat ship (LCS) program, it would seem self-evident the Coast Guard has no interest in acquiring the LCS as a hand-me-down. However, with the recent publishing of “In Dire Need: Why the Coast Guard Needs the LCS,” a newly found interest in acquiring problematic navy platforms may be growing and deserves to be judged on its merits. The central thesis proposes the U.S. Coast Guard acquire decommissioned LCSs from the U.S. Navy, remove the installed combined diesel engine and gas turbine (CODAG) plant, and install a direct drive diesel. While the proposal is noticeably light on details of propulsion layout (it is unclear if the new layout would have one diesel per water jet or use a splitting/combining gear arrangement), it relies upon the Coast Guard’s historical precedents of accepting old navy ships and converting CODAG plants into direct diesel drives. The concept merits an analytic look to determine if the primary conclusion, that acquiring recently decommissioned LCS’s in lieu of commissioning new Off-shore Patrol Cutters (OPCs) has the potential to save scarce Coast Guard dollars, holds true. To do so, a rough exploration of what this program would achieve and at what cost must be compared to OPC designs and costs.
The LCS: Built for Speed
One of the driving requirements for the LCS acquisition was “sprint” speeds in excess of 40 knots. Such speeds effectively ruled out traditional propellers as prime movers with water jet systems taking their place. The Coast Guard does not and has not operated large vessels with water jet drives, and significant propulsion inefficiencies exist when operating these drives at lower speeds (Fig 1). Because of the governing physics behind water jets, they are rarely used in vessels that normally operate under 30 knots. While re-engining itself may be a cost effective way to gut the newly minted cutters of an expensive gear issue, it does not solve the propulsion issue of low speed water jet operation.
For argument’s sake, we can assume that the Coast Guard would re-engine the LCS with a comparable engine to the two 7,280 KW fairbanks diesels planned for the OPC, with a total combined brake horsepower (BHP) of 19,520. Using publicly available data points on the LCS speed power curve, and understanding its cubic nature, we see this would deliver an underwhelming 15 to 20 knots at flank speed. And while 15-20 knots may be acceptable for legacy Coast Guard operations, it does not match the OPC’s promised 22-plus knots or the fuel efficiency and lower operating cost of the OPC’s designed loiter drive. Because of the water jet propulsion system, an additional operating cost for the Coast Guard LCS would be fuel and maintenance. Water jets are terribly inefficient at low-medium speeds and would consume 20-50 percent more fuel than the OPC at similar speeds.
[Excerpt - see link for full article]