Posted on 02/28/2022 8:10:18 PM PST by Mariner
A Russian military convoy that was outside of Ivankiv, Ukraine, on Sunday has since made it to the outskirts of Kyiv, satellite images show.
On Sunday, the convoy was roughly 40 miles northwest of the Ukrainian capital, according to images provided by Maxar Technologies.
Maxar said that roughly 17 miles of roadway is chocked full of the convoy, which consists of armored vehicles, tanks, towed artillery and other logistical vehicles.
The private US company said the convoy was located on the T-1011 highway at Antonov air base around 11:11 a.m local time.
Antonov is roughly 17 miles from the center of the Ukrainian capital.
(Excerpt) Read more at cnn.com ...
An additional metric is the decline in Russian civilian GDP and civilian living standards. My rough guess is that it will be another year or so before they become painful enough to make a difference in the support of ordinary Russians for the war.
Children in captivity. It sounds wild, like it’s about Nazi Germany. But this is about Russia. Thousands of children are now kidnapped, murdered and brainwashed by Russia.
Today, on International Children’s Day, all our eyes should be on them. Children who are taken from their parents, children who are murdered, children who don’t remember who they are and where they are from. This is hell.
https://x.com/InnaSovsun/status/1796801739401605532
1 min video
VIDEO: DAILY COMMENTARY SUMMATION
03 Jun: Dead in 30 Minutes: Russian Operation GOES TERRIBLY WRONG
War in Ukraine Explained
Reporting from Ukraine
502K subscribers
6-03-2024 11:30 p.m. EST
6:43 Minutes
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SI6DZ7fJJoI
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I am Ukrainian. My country has been invaded by Russia. In this video, I will tell you what happened on the 831 day of the war.
Day 831: Jun 03
Today, there are a lot of updates from the Bakhmut direction.
The most interesting updates come from the southern flank of Chasiv Yar. Here, the Russians intensified their assaults, reinforced their striking groups, and attempted to conduct an offensive operation across the canal in hopes of cutting off Ukrainian forces in the Kanal district.
After Russian forces consolidated control over the large forest to the east of the canal, the Russian commanders started devising a new plan. The forest provided cover from detection by drones and further FPV drone strikes or artillery strikes, so Russians used it to accumulate large forces for two new assault directions. The forest enables a decent staging ground for a new assault direction to the south of the Kanal district and for assault towards the Novy district to the west of the canal.
The Russian plan here was to cross the canal, since this particular section of it is going underground, providing Russians with stable soil to cross over it. Afterward, the goal of the Russians was to establish positions in another forest to the west of the canal pipes; in order to do this, they would need to establish another foothold. The reason why Russians want to establish a bridgehead here is that it will allow them to covertly accumulate even more forces.
Such a staging ground would enable direct assaults on the Novy residential area to the north of the forest. Ukrainian defenses here are not as strong as in the high-rise area, as this district consists of only small residential houses, which do not give Ukrainians powerful firing positions. Unlike reinforced high-rise buildings, these houses are also easier to destroy by artillery, which explains why Russians would prioritize assaults on the Novy district over the Kanal district.
If Russians managed to take the Novy district in further assaults, they would effectively cut off the main supply road to forces in the Kanal district, forcing the Ukrainians to withdraw from the area. By uppercutting Novy, Russians would overcome the primary Ukrainian defenses of Chasiv Yar in the Kanal district, which could risk a withdrawal to the western side of the water barrier.
Despite establishing a staging ground, Russians encountered a series of major problems.
The staging ground in the forest is isolated from roads, so Russians can only deploy infantry squads to conduct assaults on foot. On top of that, the infantry has to walk on foot all the way to the forest. Such process is time consuming and it delays Russian response period, buying more time for Ukrainian defenders.
Moreover, the above-ground crossing is in the open between the two forests on each side, which would enable the Ukrainians to destroy any troops crossing the canal. With full-time drone observation of the movement of troops and equipment over the canal that isn’t already destroyed, Ukrainians can deploy and prepare troops in the Novy district for a Russian assault heading their way. With Russian infantry being forced to move through a narrow river valley in an open area on their way to execute combat missions, they often ended up being targets of FPV drone strikes.
Furthermore, fighting in the western forest would be troublesome for the Russians, as their vehicles would not be able to move through. If we look at the 3D map, we can see that the area is not only densely covered with trees but also has a very difficult, uneven terrain, allowing us to move only on foot. Such a setting would isolate Russian infantry on the other side without significant firepower. Besides, it would be increasingly difficult for Russian aircraft to determine the locations of their troops and Ukrainians in the dense forest. Any glide bomb strike, therefore, presents a significant risk of friendly fire, making supporting airstrikes very unlikely.
Nonetheless, despite all the reasons that made an assault across the canal inadvisable, Russians decided to proceed with this offensive operation. Ukrainian fighters reported that Russians sent groups of infantry across the canal and noted that they did not last long.
During the assaults, Russians managed to cross the canal, enter the forest, and establish positions close to the outskirts of Novy district.
[Follow along using the transcript.]
Glad to see you posting again and on a much more friendly site!
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 3, 2024
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are reportedly in disagreement about economic issues such as the proposed Power of Siberia 2 (PS-2) pipeline despite publicly portraying themselves as diplomatically aligned. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 2 that three unspecified sources familiar with the matter stated that the PRC and Russia disagree about the details of the PS-2 gas pipeline, with the PRC wanting to pay prices near Russia’s subsidized domestic gas prices and to only commit to buying a small part of the pipeline’s planned capacity.[5] Gazprom Head Alexei Miller reportedly did not accompany Russian President Vladimir Putin on his recent visit to the PRC due to these disagreements over the pipeline. FT reported that Putin asked PRC President Xi Jinping during their May 2024 meetings to come to an agreement on the pipeline, but FT reported that sources said that a pipeline agreement “remains distant.” FT noted that Russia needs the pipeline to launch as expected more than the PRC. FT reported that it gained access to an unreleased report by an unspecified major Russian bank that stated that if the PS-2 pipeline does not launch in 2029, Gazprom’s profits are forecasted to drop by almost 15 percent, which is especially significant following Gazprom’s $6.9 billion loss in 2023, its largest loss in more than 25 years. FT, citing a recent report by Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, also stated that the PRC will mostly or entirely be able to meet its projected increased demand for imported gas with existing supply contracts until 2030, but that the PRC’s demand for imported gas will exceed the capacity of its existing contracts by about 150 billion cubic meters by 2040.[6] The PRC is likely aware of Russia’s more immediate need for the pipeline and is using Beijing’s upper hand in the energy sphere to extract concessions from Russia on the issue.
Putin also reportedly asked Xi in May 2024 to “snub” the upcoming Ukrainian peace conference in Switzerland amid continued Russian efforts to discredit and otherwise undermine the peace conference.[7] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated on June 3 that Russia is trying to discredit the upcoming Ukrainian peace summit by convincing other states that the summit is insignificant, that they should not participate, and that if they do they should participate at the lowest possible level.[8] Other Ukrainian officials have recently emphasized that it is imperative for both the United States and the PRC to attend the June 2024 peace summit as their participation is “decisive” in compelling Russia to participate in the process of restoring peace and security.[9] The PRC announced on May 31 that it would not be joining the peace summit, and Saudi Arabia has reportedly decided not to attend.[10]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2024
A)Ilya Matveev: How Patrushev’s Paranoia Consumed the Kremlin
While President Vladimir Putin's recent inauguration was not followed by a major reshuffle in the Kremlin, there were some important personnel changes. Nikolai Patrushev was moved from head of the Security Council to the much narrower role of presidential aide, which looks like a demotion for a man once considered the most powerful security official in Russia. What should be made of his appointment?
Putin clearly prefers to keep Patrushev and other conspiracists, such as Kovalchuk, close. He needs them to reiterate and confirm what he already believes in. However, he no longer needs a special institution – the Security Council – to articulate an ideological vision of Russia's national interests as he took on this job. With Shoigu at the helm, the Security Council will likely become another technical institution, similar to the Russian government – meeting regularly and overseeing every aspect of Russia's war effort in conjunction with Gerasimov’s General Staff and Belousov’s defense ministry.
For Patrushev himself, however, Putin may have reserved a special role, as his new and ridiculous title – a presidential aide for shipbuilding – indirectly suggests. Behind this façade, there might be a task of interacting with the Western national security establishment (something Patrushev has done before). Putin would trust Patrushev to do this job precisely because of their shared ideological thinking.
Furthermore, Patrushev remains in Russian politics as the head of a family clan. His son Dmitry has assumed the position of deputy prime minister – the highest position yet occupied by a child of Putin's close associate. Since the Kremlin's grand ideological vision requires a new nobility to implement it, the conspiracists may remain in charge of the Kremlin long after Putin and Patrushev are gone.
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/05/22/how-patrushevs-paranoia-consumed-the-kremlin-a85198
B: SVR General
Yesterday, a person appointed by the President of Russia and similar to Vladimir Putin held an operational meeting via videoconference with permanent members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Assistant to the President of Russia Nikolai Patrushev, whom many “experts” hastened to exclude from the elite of the first circle, took part in this meeting. Moreover, in the closed part of this meeting, it was Nikolai Patrushev who traditionally received reports and gave orders, and those who remained in touch, including a person similar to Putin, listened carefully and, without being given the opportunity to speak, were silent.
During the closed part of the meeting, they discussed the report of the new Minister of Defense Andrei Belousov with a preliminary assessment of the state of affairs in the Ministry of Defense. It is worth noting that on Sunday evening this report was discussed via video link by several people from the so-called “Politburo 2.0” and their assessments of the former leadership of the Ministry of Defense were angry and brightly colored with obscene language. It was within the framework of communication between members of the “Politburo” that a decision was made to limit the freedom of action of the current Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Sergei Shoigu. During the closed part of the Security Council meeting, representatives of the leadership of the security bloc joined in. Nikolai Patrushev rudely pointed out to Sergei Shoigu the problems that arose in the Ministry of Defense during his (Shoigu’s) leadership. Patrushev announced global changes in the structure of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, which will occur later. It is worth noting that Nikolai Platonovich in his close circle expressed regret that he decided to make such a reshuffle in the Security Council and that he left the post of secretary.
C: Where did Patrushev go?
Many people ask us - why does Nikolai Patrushev, after leaving the post of Secretary of the Security Council and his new appointment, not appear in public? We answer.
Nikolai Patrushev has been faithfully serving his country for decades. He is a loyal ally of the president. Unfortunately, Patrushev gave a lot of his health to make the Security Council a truly influential body. In agreement with the president, Patrushev is now restoring his health. Sources said he had surgery at the end of May.
One of Patrushev’s main tasks now is to create a new vision of the Arctic for Russia . This systematic work requires a lot of time and consultation. It is likely that the new concept that Patrushev is preparing will determine Russia's role in the Arctic for decades to come. And the necessary resources and steps to achieve this goal will be calculated. Especially given the development of unmanned maritime systems.
And yes, Nikolai Platonovich's work is deliberately not in public. He has many serious tasks.
The former Yemeni diplomat, Ahmed Al-Sahmi, was killed while fighting alongside Russian forces during a confrontation with Ukrainian troops. This incident marks the third Yemeni citizen to die in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
Al-Sahmi, who served in the Yemeni diplomatic mission in Moscow until 2017, acquired Russian citizenship and later contracted with a military company. He had both Yemeni and Russian families. His Russian wife informed his Yemeni children of his death on the battlefield.
In addition to Al-Sahmi, two other Yemeni nationals have also lost their lives in the conflict. Asaad Tariq Abdul Latif Al-Kanani, a young Yemeni from the Al-Ma’afer district in Taiz Governorate, was killed in early May on the Luhansk front near the Russian border
https://www.albawaba.com/news/yemeni-diplomat-killed-fighting-russian-1570568
A surprise for many was the change of governor of Altai . Instead of Oleg Khorokhordin, the president sent Andrei Turchak there (in the status of interim). And he did it as quickly and strangely as possible.
Firstly, Khorokhordin was seriously considered as governor for the next term. Now he will have a new position. Rumor has it that in the government, but it is not entirely clear yet.
Secondly , Vladimir Putin sent long-time operating director of United Russia Turchak to Altai not even at a personal meeting. To do this, the president used video conference.
Thirdly , for Turchak this is not just a demotion, but a humiliation. And there is an explanation for this. We talked to a dozen people to understand the scale of what was happening. There are several reasons for such a “link” to Altai. Turchak had close contact with Prigozhin and was on his side in the conflict with Shoigu. Also, Turchak was unable to ensure a sufficient number of SBO participants among the winners of the regional primaries of United Russia.
“The president really wanted to show a picture that today you are a simple worker. Tomorrow you are a soldier, and the day after tomorrow you are a deputy,” says a political strategist close to the AP. According to him, Turchak realized that the scheme would not work, and created the appearance of work, without promoting the image of the SVO participant as a potential deputy or official.
In addition, Turchak was closely involved in new regions, and also used his influence in St. Petersburg. According to rumors, the president was given a folder with information about thefts in which Turchak was involved. So he left for Altai. “The president understands that United Russia is associated with him personally. He does not need loud scandals with the top of the party,” explained a source in the Kremlin's political bloc.
However, one of the former members of the president's team said the following off the record: “Vladimir Vladimirovich is tired and doesn't trust anyone. Even the people who were once closest to him.”
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4193
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrey_Turchak
It is apparently more and more allowed to criticise Putin, what could be the reason?
Putin decided to personally deal with the mobilization in Ukraine. This is good, but there are two alarming points.
We are asked: why did Vladimir Putin talk about mobilization in Ukraine? This is not quite the level of the president. But it's not that simple. We have written more than once: many of our military consider one of the most important tasks within the framework of the North Military District to be the disruption of the mobilization carried out by the Kiev regime. And this task has not yet been completed, rather the opposite. Therefore, the president decided to say his weighty word.
“Vladimir Vladimirovich sees that the efforts of our military and special services to disrupt mobilization in Ukraine are not bringing the desired result. Let's tell the truth. And he decided to personally address the issue. I think that Vladimir Vladimirovich's words will demoralize the enemy, and the goal of disrupting the mobilization that Zelensky is pursuing will be achieved. After all, our president doesn't just say such things, people will listen to him - both in Ukraine and in the West. And about mobilization, and about the supply of our weapons , by the way,” explained our source in the Kremlin.
We support this decision. But there are two difficult points in it. Firstly, Andrei Belousov actually refused to work in this important area. “Andrei Removich honestly says that he is not a military man at his core. And for him it is difficult to disrupt enemy mobilization. Therefore, it is better to let specialists deal with this issue, and he will fight against theft and bribes and worry about supplying the army,” a source in the Ministry of Defense explained to us.
Secondly, such words from Putin upset many military and intelligence officers. “You have no idea how much we have done to ensure the failure of mobilization in Ukraine. It's a shame this attitude on the part of Vladimir Vladimirovich,” admitted a source in the FSB. “The president was told all sorts of things by not very smart advisers. The problem was presented very simply. Disrupting enemy mobilization is a much more complex topic than it seems. But who listens to our specialists now,” said a source in the General Staff with offense.
Russia is conducting a wide-scale hybrid warfare campaign targeting NATO states in tandem with Russian efforts to augment its conventional military capabilities in preparation for a potential conflict with NATO. Bloomberg reported on June 3 that Norwegian Chief of Defense Eirik Kristoffersen stated that NATO has a window of two to three years to rebuild its forces and stocks before Russia has rebuilt its own ability to conduct a conventional attack, presumably against NATO.[14] Kristoffersen stated that this expedited time frame is due to Russia's current elevated defense industrial base (DIB) output. Western officials also continue to highlight Russia's current engagement in hybrid warfare activities across Europe. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 4 that Western governments are trying to formulate a response to the growing series of Russian-backed sabotage attempts on military bases and civilian infrastructure in Europe.[15] FT reported that an unspecified Western defense advisor stated that Russia has a “highly developed lexicon” for hybrid warfare, including information and psychological operations and sabotage. The defense advisor noted that Russia is learning from and adapting its hybrid warfare operations, stating that Russia is “constantly observing” the West's reactions to these hybrid warfare operations and “testing to see which of [Russia's] actions work.” FT reported that Russia has resorted to using proxies, such as operatives from criminal gangs, to conduct the sabotage attacks after European governments expelled hundreds of Russian diplomats and spies. NATO and its member states have repeatedly warned about intensifying Russian hybrid operations on NATO member territory.[16]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2024
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 5, 2024
Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom reportedly assesses that it is unlikely to recover gas sales it lost following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, illustrating how Western sanctions are achieving some long-term impacts against Russian revenue streams supporting Russia’s war effort. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 5 that Gazprom’s leadership commissioned a report at the end of 2023 on the long-term prospects for gas sales, which found that Gazprom’s annual exports to Europe by 2035 will average 50 billion to 75 billion cubic meters — roughly a third of its annual exports to Europe before the full-scale invasion.[49] Gazprom reportedly noted that a new pipeline to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) aims to offset lost export volume to Europe but will only have the capacity to transport 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year.[50] Russia has relied on oil revenues to buoy federal budgets amid increased spending on its war in Ukraine, and long-term constraints on other energy exports will likely limit additional significant sources of funding for the Kremlin.[51] Russia has managed to rely on oil revenues to support a record level of defense spending in 2024 by engaging in a concerted effort to circumvent the G7’s price cap on Russian oil and petroleum products.[52] The West is expanding sanctions to curtail Russian efforts to skirt the G7 price cap, and significant constraints on Russian oil exports could also achieve substantial impacts on Russian state revenue.[53]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2024
Russian naval vessels will make a port call in Cuba on June 12–17, likely as part of a larger effort to invoke the historical memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis as part of Russia's reflexive control campaign to encourage US self-deterrence. The Cuban Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces announced on June 6 that four Russian vessels from the Northern Fleet – the Admiral Gorshkov frigate, the Kazan nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine, the Academic Pashin replenishment oiler, and the Nikolai Chiker rescue tug – will make an official visit to the port of Havana from June 12 to 17.[8] Reuters reported that a senior US official stated that the Russian vessels may also stop in Venezuela on an unspecified date in Summer 2024.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Russia's objective is to ensure a Russian naval presence in “operationally important areas of the far ocean zone.”[10] Russian media noted that the Admiral Gorshkov is carrying Zircon hypersonic missiles, which the Kremlin has touted as capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.[11] The Cuban Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces specifically claimed, however, that none of the vessels are carrying nuclear weapons, so the Russian port call “does not represent a threat to the region.”[12] ISW is unable to verify this Cuban assertion. The Russian Navy's port calls in states in the Western hemisphere that have historically strained relationships with the US aim to highlight Russia's strong relations with these states and are likely part of Russia's reflexive control campaign to force the US to self-deter and not enact policies that offer further support to Ukraine. Putin has repeatedly used nuclear saber-rattling to push the West to self-deter during times when the West has faced key moments on critical policy decisions in how to best support Ukraine.[13] The Kremlin likely hopes that the clear allusion to the Cuban Missile Crisis and the inclusion of a reportedly nuclear weapons–capable ship will force the West to engage in self-deterrence. The Kremlin likely coordinated the announcement of the Russian navy's port calls in Cuba with Putin's threats to provide long-range strike capabilities to unspecified actors for strikes against the West, as both activities can instill fear in the West. Putin notably did not threaten escalation in Ukraine or direct confrontation between Russia and the West.
Putin inadvertently indicated on June 5 that Russian forces may be suffering roughly 20,000 monthly casualties in Ukraine, which, if accurate, would be roughly equal to or just below the number of new personnel that Russia reportedly generates per month. Putin inadvertently suggested that roughly 5,000 Russian personnel are killed in action in Ukraine each month, which further suggests that roughly 15,000 Russian personnel are wounded in action, assuming a standard three-to-one wounded-to-killed casualty ratio.[14] ISW cannot confirm Putin's suggested casualty rate and his apparent inadvertent admission does not serve as a clear claim about Russian casualties in Ukraine. Putin's suggested figure does align somewhat with the lower end of Ukrainian reporting about Russian casualty rates, however. Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated on May 2 that Russian forces suffer about 25,000 to 30,000 killed and wounded personnel per month.[15] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on January 15, 2024, that Russia recruits around 30,000 personnel per month.[16] Ruslan Pukhov, the head of the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies and a member of a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) civilian advisory board, similarly claimed in mid-April 2024 that current Russian crypto-mobilization efforts are generating roughly 30,000 new personnel each month.[17] Russian officials are reportedly concerned about decreasing recruitment rates ahead of the expected Russian Summer 2024 offensive effort, and it is unclear if the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has maintained the roughly 30,000 recruitment rate it reportedly had in January and April of 2024.[18]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024
...and more...
What does this paddling pool think about himself?! Putin is dissatisfied with Macron’s behavior
Vladimir Putin reacted rather nervously to Emmanuel Macron’s latest statements, and is generally dissatisfied with the failure of the “French front”. “Before the [invasion of Ukraine], Macron stood in line to see Putin. He called several times a day. And now he has become perhaps the main hawk in Europe. Who would have thought,” says a source in the AP close to the foreign policy bloc.
Macron’s behavior worries the president. And the last few weeks have been spent looking for a deterrent for the French, sources say. “We see how the West lives. Someone agreed to give tanks, and everyone gives. If Macron pushes through the appearance of NATO troops in Ukraine, then we will be forced to freeze the conflict . Nobody really wants to fight against NATO after two years of such a difficult war,” one of the prominent representatives of the Ministry of Defense told us.
Rumor has it that Vladimir Vladimirovich has a personal grudge against Macron. At a recent meeting with generals, he called Macron a “frog” and was clearly dissatisfied with the aggressive agenda being imposed by the French president.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024
The Russian Investigative Committee announced the arrest of a French citizen on June 6 following the early June arrest in France. The Russian Investigative Committee announced and published footage of Russian authorities detaining an unspecified French citizen under charges of failing to provide proper documentation required by law for legally designated “foreign agents.” The Russian Investigative Committee claimed in its report that the French citizen also spent “several years” on multiple trips to Russia collecting information about the Russian military that “can be used against the security of the [Russian] state” if “foreign sources” obtain this information, essentially accusing the man of espionage but not yet formally charging him with espionage-related offenses.[33] Reuters reported that Swiss-based nonprofit Center for Humanitarian Dialogue stated that Russian authorities arrested Laurent Vinatier, who worked as a Russia and Eurasia advisor for the center, and that French President Emmanuel Macron also confirmed Vinatier’s arrest.[34]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024
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