Emergency: California’s Oroville Dam Spillway Near Failure, Evacuations Ordered

Breitbart ^ | Feb 12, 2017 | Joel B. Pollak1

[janetjanet998]

The California Department of Water Resources issued a sudden evacuation order shortly before 5 p.m. Sunday for residents near the Oroville Dam in northern California, warning that the dam’s emergency spillway would fail in the next 60 minutes.

The Oroville Dam is the highest in the nation.

[EarthResearcher333]

Hi PavewayIV, These three locations would strategically line up with known seepage of the Emergency Spillway. Here is a DSOD 2003 Inspection report set of photographs of seepage paths from the ES. The reservoir level was a few feet below the top of the ES elevation.

The ES concrete blocks were poured "monolithically" which means "individually". So there are seams that will leak too. The "green grass" area near the far or third arrow in your pic aligns near the area that "bubbles" were observed on the other side of the ES. So there are likely "piping" channels that are making there way through in different paths besides the foundation itself.

Having Piezometers installed would be a good idea as they can determine how much water may be coming from the nearby hillside vs when the reservoir rises to a level to contribute.

[EarthResearcher333]

FYI - new article out on some interesting legal viewpoints regarding "inaction" on Potential Failure Modes (Liability). I wonder if Kiewit has been using the spillway bridge... If only "red paint" could fix everything…. :-)

Article clip: === Headworks Cracking Risking 3 Highest Level FERC Category 1 Potential Failure Modes? New Design Flaws Discovered?

Evidence of multiple serious Design Flaws in the Headworks Radial Gate Structure? Diagonal cracking in the end Piers in the Spillway, including a Large 14 foot crack in one of the 5 foot thick piers confirming this serious Flaw? Chipping of the bridge abutment concrete risking a spillway bridge collapse? Is there a legal liability exposure by reputable professionals or construction companies regarding a damage contribution to these serious FERC Category 1 PMF Failure modes?

LOS ANGELES, CA (California Network) - The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) requires Potential Failure Mode (PFM) assessments at dams in a process to proactively identify modes of "potential" failure as a method to ensure appropriate safe operating performance margins [21]. PFM's are an integral part of the FERC Dam Safety and Surveillance Monitoring Reporting process (DSSM's). High Reliability Systems, such as a dam and a spillway structure, require a constant assessment of conditions where FERC and the dam owners cooperate in this proactive DSSM's based exercise. Thus any findings requiring actions, whether further assessment or structural remedies, provide safeguarding the level of failure probabilities to "As Low As Reasonably Practicable" (ALARP)[20]. Civil law is based on this principle when entering into "controlling risk as effectively as possible" (See Fig 4).

Another critical component to Civil law and Risk Liability is noted as "standard of care" (SOC). Engineers have a duty to provide their services in a manner consistent with the 'standard of care' of their professions [19]. J. B. Kardon notes: "A good working definition of the standard of care of a professional, derived from case law (City of Mounds View, 1978; Gagne, 1934, and others), is presented in a standardized jury instruction, Book of Approved Jury Instructions, 6.37, “The Duty of a Professional,” (BAJI, 1986), which reads: In performing professional services for a client, a professional has the duty to have that degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by reputable professionals, practicing in the same or similar locality and under similar circumstances. It is his or her further duty to use the care and skill ordinarily used in like cases by reputable members of his or her profession practicing in the same or similar locality under similar circumstances, and to use reasonable diligence and his or her best judgment in the exercise of professional skill and in the application of learning, in an effort to accomplish the purpose for which he or she was employed. A failure to fulfill any such duty is negligence."

What does all of this have to do with Oroville dam? Everything. These conditions establish the framework for legal liability and duty bound responsibilities by engineers, professionals, and contractors working on high risk structures such as at Oroville Dam. This framework includes the application to professionals that "practice" their services whether through consulting or through contract work. The specific application of these standards become relevant in the case of a "reasonable skill, possessed by reputable professionals" in light of an exposure to Potential Failure Modes (PFMs). This includes the obligation to recognize and appropriately respond to such PFMs as a "duty" whereby "A failure to fulfill any such duty is negligence.".

What if a contractor isn't notified of a PFM risk by the dam owner? Under Civil Law, the contractor still has a professional "duty" in the "standard of care" to exercise their expertise in recognition and awareness of such conditions within the reasonable performance of their services. Indeed, under these conditions, both the dam owner and the contractor could be held legally liable if a subsequent PFM occurs that is attributed to action (or inaction).

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Headworks Cracking Risking 3 Highest Level FERC Category 1 Potential Failure Modes? New Design Flaws Discovered?

Fig 1. (from article) Fig 1. Over half of bearing support of 5 inches of concrete lost in areas from cumulative "chipping" (wide red paint area) in bridge support abutment. Heavy Loads may cause a sudden bridge failure. Design Flaw with no bearing plates causes "concrete on concrete" sliding induced fracture chipping. Growing diagonal crack due to another "design flaw". Threatens Trunnion Radial Gates & anchorage from shear forces and shifting of the 5ft thick Pier Column.

Fig 2 (from article) Fig 2. "Flaws in Headworks Design" - 3 serious FERC Category 1 PMF failure modes. Legal liability arising from "load flexing" of the spillway bridge? Will DWR inform Kiewit or any other engineering services contractors of these PMF bridge associated conditions?

Fig 3 (from article) Fig 3. DSOD Inspection report revealing settlement evidence of Bridge Abutment "design flaw" as evidenced in diagonal cracking at the Pier support notch corner in both Piers 1 and 10 - shear forces created in notch by bridge slab from bridge "load flexure".

[KC Burke]

In some ways the February event is a fortunate occurrence. This dam has many features that could be in pending failure status and needed through and comprehensive examination.

The levels of these problems are not yet being admitted to by the public officials owning and operating the structure, but with the big spillway project underway, they will probably relent and examine and repair the other deficiencies with less fanfare.

[meyer]

Thanks for your continued diligence.

I wonder if Kiewit was informed about potential issues at the gate structure. It would seem to me that they should avoid using that road for anything heavier than a standard pickup truck and only one vehicle on the spillway bridge at a time. You’ve noted some significant chipping on the road support in addition to growth of the crack. I can’t help but think that the heavy traffic use of concrete trucks during the emergency reinforcement of the emergency spillway was a potentially high risk operation.

[meyer]

Additional observations from my daily view of the “dam cam” located across the river of the spillway.

They are making great progress in busting up the lower part of the spillway, and have been systematically removing the end of the upper spillway to give it a clean edge, which is good. It will be interesting to see how they go about busting up the bottom end of the old spillway, or if they decide to re-use that last section (would they even consider this?). Breaking those big concrete “diffusers” will make for some exciting video if they use explosives. Maybe a MOAB would be appropriate. :)

It bugs me a bit to see all the dirt and debris being pushed back into Moonbeam (AKA Kroyles) canyon, because in the event that they need to make emergency use of the main spillway again, that will become debris that will need to again be dredged out of the river.

Looks like the concrete facility between the dam and spillway is almost complete. I’m going to go on a wild guess pathway here and say that this facility will be used for the main spillway work, while the concrete plant they’ve put up in the launch ramp parking lot near the emergency spillway will be used for work on that area.

[KC Burke]

They may need to fill Moonbeam Canyon to access the lower part of the spillway during replacement. They are blasting out the rock to construct that equilevel parallel access-way as I recall.

[meyer]

The problem is, if there is a substantial rainfall before they get the lower spillway finished, enough that they have to use the upper spillway, then they will have a real problem on their hands. I guess maybe that there’s no other way to do it, and I can understand that. Some risks are necessary, and if there’s one thing that they know how to do, it’s dredge the feather river.

[meyer]

I just checked the dam cam - cement trucks are still passing over the spillway roadway bridge as of 1 PM or so today. That’s a lot of weight.

[EarthResearcher333]

I've noticed that at the beginning of the extreme load traffic in the early Emergency Spillway repairs that they did not have steel plates at the "critical" spalling locations on the bridge. The locations are the two ends (where the bridge end slabs are sliding "concrete-on-concrete" in the bearing area of the left and right bridge end abutment support columns). The third location is in the center of the FCO between gates 4 & 5. This is a "contraction joint" seam where the monoliths of gates 1-4 abut the counterpart monolith of gates 5-8.

The chipping/spalling is the worst at the ends of the bridge.

Sometime later, during this extreme load traffic, the steel plates were emplaced. This is a likely indicator that someone noticed something, possibly more spalling at the abutment support bearing areas.

DWR has known for nearly 20 years that there were no "sliding" bearing pads to protect the concrete from chipping away at these expansion support joints. Yet they simply apply more red paint to watch the obvious chip away.

The steel plates help mitigate an immediate "localized" radius flexure (directly at the abutment load bearing surface edge), but the stressing of the 16 ft diagonal crack is not alleviated (i.e. still remains an issue until fully understood).

Here are a few of the before and after pics (plates):

[meyer]

The plates are helpful (spreading the load, reducing the shift from one platform to another, as trucks roll over the seam), but the real issue needs to be dealt with. Based on your earlier images, they really need to minimize the use of heavy loads across that spillway bridge IMHO. If I were running the project (and it would be better that I’m not), I’d require that heavy loads go around and across the bottom if at all possible.

[EarthResearcher333]

FYI - new article out on DWR possibly misleading FERC on "deep void" filling - If DWR misled a Fed agency FERC, would FEMA back out of the funding? (to where the Prez has to intervene to help CA?).

Article clip: === Could DWR forfeit the FEMA & CA customer's $500 million in Spillway repair funding? Will DWR be found Legally Liable in deep void filling? Hid deep voiding from FERC? Who will pay the bills?

Did DWR hide serious deep voiding problems under the Main Spillway from FERC? Searching 20 years in FERC's database of 3,525 Oroville tied documents finds no DWR notification to FERC of serious deep voiding problems? If DWR withheld a Category 1 severe failure problem from FERC, does this risk forfeiture of FEMA funding? What about the CA customers in their expected 25% in repair costs? Will this end up in the courts?

LOS ANGELES, CA (California Network) - California Department of Water Resources (DWR) may soon be facing another crisis, except this crisis may be from the risk of loss or forfeiture of the spillway repair reimbursement from FEMA and DWR's Water Customers. The key to this crisis may be from the withholding of catastrophic rated Category 1 Failure mode information from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). FERC is charged with the oversight of safety of large public dams in the US. FEMA's decision to allow "disaster" event status for Oroville, in granting funding aid, likely rested on the belief that this event occurred from an "unexpected" condition, even though the spillway was operating at 18% of its full design rated capacity when it failed [18]21. FERC undoubtedly believed that this spillway blowout failure was an "unexpected event", as the Regional Engineer of FERC's Division of Dam Safety and Inspections, Mr. Blackett, described in a recent American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) conference in Sacramento May 21, 2017 [5]. Thus, FEMA's decision may have been attributed to information from FERC - in deciding the "disaster status" - although the spillway was operating well under its design rating when it failed.

However the funding reimbursement issue could take a sharp and unexpected turn when looking deeper into new discoveries. FERC expects a high level of expertise and competence when interfacing with dam owners, such as DWR, to facilitate the task of assuring the maximum level of operational safety of a dam. A primary FERC operational safety assurance process is called the Dam Safety Performance Monitoring Program (DSPMP). The tools to this periodic proactive exercise are physical dam Inspections and Potential Failure Mode Assessments (PFMA's) - which are performed by Independent Consultants [6]. As a dam owner, DWR is required to extensively contribute to the formation of a PFM [10] such as probability of a failure causation, the mechanisms involved, and the ability to detect or mitigate the development of a failure mode. Dam owners are ultimately responsible for public safety and are obliged to engage FERC if any sudden or new PFM is discovered.

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Could DWR forfeit the FEMA & CA customer's $500 million in Spillway repair funding? Will DWR be found Legally Liable in deep void filling? Hid deep voiding from FERC? Who will pay the bills?

[Repeal The 17th]

Only about 4 feet of water remaining behind the gates:
http://cdec.water.ca.gov/cgi-progs/queryF?ORO

[KC Burke]

California agencies and many CA government employees are a law unto themselves. They consider Federal Law, other points of view and Republicans within their state all beneath notice. They have what Thomas Sowell called the Vision of the Anointed.

[meyer]

So the plot thickens. It would be ideal if FERC would get FEMA to stop the funds. Let them come to DC begging for money. After California’s stated desire to fund illegals, and to go to their own single-payer system, they should be cut loose. The only way that the fed should even consider funding is if the fed takes control over the dam and spillway. Although, I’m not sure I want that potential disaster on the federal budget either.

[Ray76]

New video

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZKoJ0JJkyPs

[Ray76]

Brief videos of spillway model at Utah State University Water Research Laboratory

https://usu.box.com/s/x8aimhfnk6fzvh78bhxnh0nf8eo046c6

article

http://www.usu.edu/today/index.cfm?id=56835

[WildHighlander57]

More on the blasting:

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=ZKoJ0JJkyPs

[EarthResearcher333]

DWR gets "schooled" by FERC - FERC almost run out of letters in the alphabet in the sub-identifiers in corrections to DWR in QCIP

It seems DWR didn't do their homework. FERC requires an independent quality control program that is solely the responsibility of the licensee (DWR). The reason for this is to prevent a contractor from influencing the quality of construction if simply relying on the contractor. DWR was breaching this protocol by allowing quality control aspects to be left with the contractor - a no-no with FERC requirements. There are other rather sloppy items that FERC noted to DWR that needed correction & identification to responsibilities. Reminds me of a marked up school test with much "red markings". Wonder what the grade would be?

FERC Quality Control Inspection Program (QCIP) Chapter VII link:

FERC CHAPTER VII CONSTRUCTION QUALITY CONTROL INSPECTION PROGRAM

Page 1 DWR to FERC response: Document filed June 6, 2017 on FERC online database: document #20170606-5027

Page 2 DWR to FERC response: Document filed June 6, 2017 on FERC online database: document #20170606-5027

Page 3 DWR to FERC response: Document filed June 6, 2017 on FERC online database: document #20170606-5027

Page 4 DWR to FERC response: Document filed June 6, 2017 on FERC online database: document #20170606-5027

[KC Burke]

I will comment on a couple of items. Our readers from outside construction should be aware that in the Federal and State construction world there are a variety of manners that Quality Control programs can be handled.

For example, in DOD contracting it is standard that the NAVFAC or USACE require the Contractor to provide a Quality Control Program, related staff and outside testing laboratories and consultants and the Government CM agency or their outside engineer provides a separate Quality Assurance Program. The former provides the day to day testing, performs stop-work functions and builds a complete and solid documentation of the QC Program’s actions while the QA Program provides a monitor and duplicate testing that reviews the former. Contractor QC representatives have some special chain-of-command independence and have fulfilled QC training programs conducted by the Government. A typical job-specific QC program is easily a 300 page document custom written for a project this size with a full time staff of 3 to 5 engineers with additional clerks.

In this instance, that is not the method that the Feds require, but Kiewitt can provide it probably better than DWR for CA — i.e. I would trust them more if I lived below the dam.

[WildHighlander57]

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/3524221/posts?page=3485#3485

Bookmarking!

Very interesting!