Emergency: California’s Oroville Dam Spillway Near Failure, Evacuations Ordered

Breitbart ^ | Feb 12, 2017 | Joel B. Pollak1

[janetjanet998]

The California Department of Water Resources issued a sudden evacuation order shortly before 5 p.m. Sunday for residents near the Oroville Dam in northern California, warning that the dam’s emergency spillway would fail in the next 60 minutes.

The Oroville Dam is the highest in the nation.

[abb]

http://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/water-and-drought/article150278687.html

May 14, 2017 4:00 AM
‘Lethal arrogance’? Oroville Dam crisis sprang from Pat Brown’s towering ambition

By Ryan Sabalow, Dale Kasler and Christopher Cadelago

rsabalow@sacbee.com

America’s tallest dam was built from earth, stone and concrete – and the towering ambition of Gov. Pat Brown.

Sixty years before a crisis at Oroville Dam sent thousands fleeing for their lives in February, the late governor brought an almost evangelical zeal to erecting the structure that would hold back the Feather River to deliver water to the parched southern half of the state.

Hundreds of pages of state archives, oral history interviews and other documents reveal a portrait of a man hell-bent on building Oroville and the rest of the State Water Project. Determined to leave a personal legacy, Brown misled voters about the State Water Project’s costs, ignored recommendations to delay Oroville’s construction and brushed aside allegations that substandard building materials were being used at the dam. His administration steamrolled past a land-speculation scandal, relentless labor strife and the deaths of 34 workers to get Oroville built on time.

snip

[meyer]

FR is back up!!!

Just catching up - they’re spilling 20,000 plus 5000 going through the Hyatt, but today (Friday), the plan is to close down the spillway and let the Hyatt do all the heavy lifting (errr, dropping). The Hyatt will be picking up as the #1 Penstock is back in service, and the River Valve Outlet System should provide an additional 4000 cfs as needed.

From CA DWR:

http://www.water.ca.gov/news/newsreleases/2017/051717_news_release.pdf

[Jim W N]

Seems like more wight on the side of arguing that dams, especially of this gargantuan size, should be made out of hard material like concrete.

[Jim W N]

differential settlement...is...settlement that is one amount in one area of the dam fill and a different amount in another area

In this case, "different amount" would be difference in density?

[Jim W N]

DWR has sliced bundles of the hydraulic tubing to their broken Piezometers in addition to the last 3 piezometers being non-meaningful in their ability to measure correctly. Thus DWR has zero functional piezometers within the dam to monitor or detect any internal anomalies from a defective phreatic water level seeping into areas and at volumes of flow that pose a potential threat.

Who's in charge of DWR, Lucifer?

[Jim W N]

It would seem to me that the cost and amount of prep work needed on the canyon walls to eliminate or reasonably reduce the likelihood of “Differential Settlement” in an earthen dam would be prohibitive, especially for a dam of his magnitude. Seems like more weight on the side of choosing to build a large dam like this out of hard material like concrete.

[Jim W N]

Good one. Maybe they’ll sell tickets if Oroville dam starts to “lean”.

[Jim W N]

The failure mode of internal leakage is that the erosion process within the core region could develop and escalate to where there is no ability to arrest the escalation. References below have noted that this "failure mode condition" may exist for years, until a sudden transition point to failure.

Back to a concern expressed earlier about the transition from "pre-failure" to "acceleration". It looks like DWR has fixed it so this transition could happen quicker than expected leaving the folks below the dam in sudden grave peril. Just curious if you have thought about what you would do if you were living in Oroville right now knowing what you know, but I think few in Oroville know.

This settlement profile most likely is continuing today as the "settlement" process will continue for the life of the dam...

...which may be shorter than we think...

[Jim W N]

BTW, more praise ER for such excellent and compelling analysis.

[EarthResearcher333]

DWR wants to keep rainfall CEII secret - To prevent against unauthorized rain dances?

New SacBee article "Angry public, insistent media uncloaking Oroville Dam repair secrecy"

DWR wants a "do-over" on how they communicate with the public about Oroville Dam…..Ok. Let's see what this "do-over" looks like.

SacBee reporter: "It would be refreshing to see this state agency figure out how to be more open with the public even as it works to ensure security of the dam. For the past couple of months, officials have regularly refused to release information, citing federal security regulations designed to protect us from terrorism.

Well, here's the new "transparency" => DWR just filed a FERC document May 11, 2017 under CEII secrecy for…wait….for….it…….water. Yes, water.

DWR's secrecy filing infers they believe that terrorists may gain access to unauthorized sources of rainfall (big clouds), make these big clouds rain & snow, then make the snow melt quickly, and then cause a Probable Maximum Flood.

Oh the Hugh Manatee!!!

Intelligence reports must have identified a threateningly effective new "rain dance" that may be perpetrated. Certainly this high risk threat justifiably establishes a CEII secrecy on the new "rain" calculations.

…Tongue => Cheek… Roll eyes… Roll eyes again…

(note: this post is intended to be light hearted, yet it is baffling how rainwater is considered a terrorist threat. No offense intended to "rain dance" or any heritage related to such).

==SacBee article: http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/joyce-terhaar/article151397137.html

=Quote: Officials say they are trying to balance security concerns with transparency. “We’re still trying to hide our vulnerabilities, we don’t want to make our vulnerabilities obvious to everybody, but we also realize you gotta share some information, otherwise folks start thinking you’re keeping secrets,” said David Gutierrez, the retired head of DWR’s Division of Safety of Dams, whom the agency recently hired as a consultant." = end quote

DWR is afraid of "rain dancing" terrorists. Must keep PMF information & discussion CEII secret.

[EarthResearcher333]

14+ foot crack in 5ft thick Gate 8 column - Grew 2 feet towards anchor tendons - structural risk to Trunnion Anchor & Pin

New Catholic Online article:

(more pics in article…plus interesting technical FERC/DWR history on uncertainty in risk of failure - yet no repairs for 2017.. mentions FEMA noted legal risk of dam owners in reference).

(note the steel plates on the spillway bridge and entrances + traffic flaggers. Steel plates at locations where "under bridge" supports are cracking/spalling).

Large 14 Foot Crack in Headworks? Cracking Radial Gate Steel tendons? Threat to Spillway yet no Repairs in 2017?

[meyer]

The condition of the gate area is perhaps worst than I thought. I had stated that they should maybe build a new spillway adjacent to this one, and then, once in service, rebuild this spillway to use as an emergency spillway. It seems that they might want to consider that approach. If they don’t repair the gate area, there will be a failure and people will be lucky if it only drops the lake level to 813 feet (presumed to be the floor of the gate structure excavation.

Thanks for your continued research and posting.

[Ray76]

That’s a good graphic. Very informative.

[Ray76]

I think sometimes it’s better to replace rather than to try to repair something with many faults. It might seem less expensive to repair but it just forestalls the expense, which will be paid, and carries with it the risk of incurring additional expenses tied to failure.

[EarthResearcher333]

Inspector "Unloads" in report - DWR's indifference to maintenance noted per Inspector's report - DWR using seepage flow as "crude" replacement for lost Piezometers

These three DSOD Inspection Photos/Images/Notes are very revealing in noting a contrast in how a professional high reliability operation conducts affairs - such as attending to the highest standards in maintenance, monitoring, and assessing the health of a critical dam structure. More importantly, these images reveal a form of "what not to do" (ever) in a high reliability & safety critical monitoring, methods, & maintenance approach to a dam. This information spans 16 years (1999 - 2015).

DWR has quietly adopted a "crude" method, they believe, to assess the health of the dam. This "crude" method was proposed and is still being used even though FERC is continuing to request that DWR install Piezometers "inside the critical middle sections" of the dam. DWR continues to effectively "ignore" FERC on the critical issue of the dam's broken & non-functional Piezometers (100%). DWR has no ability to assess the structural stability of the dam from an unseen leakage, such as the Wet Area discussion, as this is what piezometers are designed to provide data for. DWR has no ability to assess the structural stability of the dam after an earthquake, as this is what piezometers are designed to provide data for. Instead, DWR has adopted a "crude" method to "infer" the health of the whole dam by monitoring "seepage" of the left and right gallery tunnel drain channels + the toe drain seepage. Why is this a "crude" approach? The main body of the dam has zero instrumentation to detect slow or sudden changes in its structural condition (via internal water pore pressure sensors).

DWR cannot even manage their own drain channels, even in applying this "crude" detection method. Uncleaned caked mineral deposits interrupt seepage flow and concrete steps are hazardous as deposits overflow drains. A DSOD Inspector finally "unloads" in his report. The frustration is clear in the wording. Seeking to get answers, the inspector finds out that workers are "building a float for a Fourth of July" event. If DWR cannot even manage a "crude" setup, how can they manage the demanding critical safety standards & infrastructure for the tallest dam in the U.S.?

= = = DSOD Inspector report: Extreme Frustration is "written into report". Very revealing in a culture of maintenance and the harsh wording of indifference by DWR.

"The galleries continue to deteriorate where seepage flows down the walls and across the walkways. Precipitates from seepage have build up on any surface that is wetted. The steps have thick coatings of deposits that make footing uneven and is becoming hazardous. Also ground wiring, tubing and other piping or equipment anchored to the gallery walls are being encrusted in deposits. Cleaning was done circa 1992 and conditions were much improved for several years thereafter. During the last four or five years conditions have declined. To my knowledge the deposits on the steps has not ever been removed. Cleaning is only the first step. Seepage water needs to be intercepted and routed to the drain gutters and not allowed to run across the concrete or across the internal equipment. I have talked to Alex Samaan about this over the last few years. He said, today, that work has been requested of Civil Maintenance, but they never get to it. They are presently busy constructing a float for the Fourth of July fireworks show. I suggested that perhaps a larger work force was needed or a one-time contract to muck out the galleries. I also asked about escalating the requests but was told there is little support to correct the conditions. Other work has been requested for several years and has not been completed; see Bidwell Saddle Dam."

DWR using "crude" method of measuring "drain gutter" seepage in Grout Gallery tunnels to assess health of dam - FERC continues to push for new Piezometers. Seepage observed swirling on steps. DSOD 2015 report.

"Caked thick" mineral deposits in Gallery Tunnel. DSOD 2015 - Inspector states that continuing deposits need to be cleaned for free flow of seepage water.

DSOD 1999 Inspector "unloads" in report. Reveals DWR management is indifferent to maintenance issues. Workers busy with building a Fourth of July Float instead of attending to critical maintenance ("they never get to it").

[meyer]

We’ll see how they respond now that the spotlight is on them. They can try to hide the information, but the more they hide, the harder people will look.

“work has been requested,... but they never get to it”. We get a LOT of that in the power industry as well. Logistics are a problem - with our work, equipment needs to be outaged to perform much of it, but you run into competing outage work and insufficient redundancy. We always operate the transmission grid, and generation, to the next, worst contingency, to allow for unplanned failures and emergencies. Stuff does happen, a lot.

While the system is extremely robust in the spring and fall (maintenance season), there is much less room for planned work in the summer. So the planning is very tight and things get prioritized and re-prioritized seemingly weekly. And the unplanned always happens - generator boiler tube failure, unavailable gas supply, weather-induced outage, equipment failure, unexpected warm or cold spell - all that kind of thing happens every day somewhere or other. It all keeps my job interesting.

[meyer]

So essentially, it comes down to cleaning the gutters in a sense. :)

[KC Burke]

I may need a safe room if I’m not allow to work on the Float.

I’ll go sit in the Christy Jones Memorial Lawn and someone should get back to me.

[mad_as_he$$]

Hey ER:

So the graphic shows the most noted crack data for the third and fourth area(s) from the left. Does that mean those areas have more cracks or just that they got “good” measurements there. As I recall they were unable to get measurements on some of the rods due to the technique not returning believable data.

[mad_as_he$$]

I said some time ago on this thread that the Main Spillway gate structure needs to be replaced. That statement is based upon items from this thread, talking with others in the water business and my personal observation(s) None of which will have any impact on the outcome. We did however relocate some small assets and one family member out of the downstream area last month - permanently.