These three DSOD Inspection Photos/Images/Notes are very revealing in noting a contrast in how a professional high reliability operation conducts affairs - such as attending to the highest standards in maintenance, monitoring, and assessing the health of a critical dam structure. More importantly, these images reveal a form of "what not to do" (ever) in a high reliability & safety critical monitoring, methods, & maintenance approach to a dam. This information spans 16 years (1999 - 2015).
DWR has quietly adopted a "crude" method, they believe, to assess the health of the dam. This "crude" method was proposed and is still being used even though FERC is continuing to request that DWR install Piezometers "inside the critical middle sections" of the dam. DWR continues to effectively "ignore" FERC on the critical issue of the dam's broken & non-functional Piezometers (100%). DWR has no ability to assess the structural stability of the dam from an unseen leakage, such as the Wet Area discussion, as this is what piezometers are designed to provide data for. DWR has no ability to assess the structural stability of the dam after an earthquake, as this is what piezometers are designed to provide data for. Instead, DWR has adopted a "crude" method to "infer" the health of the whole dam by monitoring "seepage" of the left and right gallery tunnel drain channels + the toe drain seepage. Why is this a "crude" approach? The main body of the dam has zero instrumentation to detect slow or sudden changes in its structural condition (via internal water pore pressure sensors).
DWR cannot even manage their own drain channels, even in applying this "crude" detection method. Uncleaned caked mineral deposits interrupt seepage flow and concrete steps are hazardous as deposits overflow drains. A DSOD Inspector finally "unloads" in his report. The frustration is clear in the wording. Seeking to get answers, the inspector finds out that workers are "building a float for a Fourth of July" event. If DWR cannot even manage a "crude" setup, how can they manage the demanding critical safety standards & infrastructure for the tallest dam in the U.S.?
= = = DSOD Inspector report: Extreme Frustration is "written into report". Very revealing in a culture of maintenance and the harsh wording of indifference by DWR.
"The galleries continue to deteriorate where seepage flows down the walls and across the walkways. Precipitates from seepage have build up on any surface that is wetted. The steps have thick coatings of deposits that make footing uneven and is becoming hazardous. Also ground wiring, tubing and other piping or equipment anchored to the gallery walls are being encrusted in deposits. Cleaning was done circa 1992 and conditions were much improved for several years thereafter. During the last four or five years conditions have declined. To my knowledge the deposits on the steps has not ever been removed. Cleaning is only the first step. Seepage water needs to be intercepted and routed to the drain gutters and not allowed to run across the concrete or across the internal equipment. I have talked to Alex Samaan about this over the last few years. He said, today, that work has been requested of Civil Maintenance, but they never get to it. They are presently busy constructing a float for the Fourth of July fireworks show. I suggested that perhaps a larger work force was needed or a one-time contract to muck out the galleries. I also asked about escalating the requests but was told there is little support to correct the conditions. Other work has been requested for several years and has not been completed; see Bidwell Saddle Dam."
DWR using "crude" method of measuring "drain gutter" seepage in Grout Gallery tunnels to assess health of dam - FERC continues to push for new Piezometers. Seepage observed swirling on steps. DSOD 2015 report.
"Caked thick" mineral deposits in Gallery Tunnel. DSOD 2015 - Inspector states that continuing deposits need to be cleaned for free flow of seepage water.
DSOD 1999 Inspector "unloads" in report. Reveals DWR management is indifferent to maintenance issues. Workers busy with building a Fourth of July Float instead of attending to critical maintenance ("they never get to it").
