The Donald Rumsfeld I know isn't the one you know

St. Paul Pioneer Press ^ | Nov. 12, 2006 | Douglas J. Feith

[rhema]

Much of what you know about Donald Rumsfeld is wrong.

I know, because I worked intimately with him for four years, from the summer of 2001 until I left the Pentagon in August 2005. Through countless meetings and private conversations, I came to learn his traits, frame of mind and principles — characteristics wholly at odds with the standard public depiction of Rumsfeld, particularly now that he has stepped down after a long, turbulent tenure as defense secretary, a casualty of our toxic political climate.

I want to set the record straight: Don Rumsfeld is not an ideologue. He did not refuse to have his views challenged. He did not ignore the advice of his military advisers. And he did not push single-mindedly for war in Iraq. He was motivated to serve the national interest by transforming the military, though it irritated people throughout the Pentagon. Rumsfeld's drive to modernize created a revealing contrast between his Pentagon and the State Department — where Colin Powell was highly popular among the staff. After four years of Powell's tenure at State, the organization chart there would hardly tip anyone off that 9/11 had occurred — or even that the Cold War was over.

Rumsfeld is a bundle of paradoxes, like a fascinating character in a work of epic literature. And as my high school teachers drummed into my head, the best literature reveals that humans are complex. They are not the all-good or all-bad, all-brilliant or all-dumb figures that inhabit trashy novels and news stories. Fine literature teaches us the difference between appearance and reality.

Because of his complexity, Rumsfeld is often misread. His politics are deeply conservative, but he was radical in his drive to force change in every area he oversaw. He is strong-willed and hard-driving, but he built his defense strategies and Quadrennial Defense Reviews on calls for intellectual humility.

Those of us in his inner circle heard him say, over and over again: Our intelligence, in all senses of the term, is limited. We cannot predict the future. We must continually question our preconceptions and theories. If events contradict them, don't suppress the bad news; rather, change your preconceptions and theories.

If an ideologue is someone to whom the facts don't matter, then Rumsfeld is the opposite of an ideologue. He insists that briefings for him be full of facts, thoughtfully organized and rigorously sourced. He demands that facts at odds with his key policy assumptions be brought to his attention immediately. "Bad news never gets better with time," he says, and berates any subordinate who fails to rush forward to him with such news. He does not suppress bad news; he acts on it.

In late 2002, Pentagon lawyers told Rumsfeld the detainee interrogation techniques in the old Army field manual were well within the bounds of the Geneva Conventions and U.S. statutes. Detainee information could help us prevent another terrorist attack, and al-Qaida personnel were trained to resist standard interrogations. So, with the advice of counsel, military officers at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, asked Rumsfeld to authorize additional techniques thought to fall within the bounds of the law. He did so.

Less than a month later, in December 2002, Jim Haynes, the Defense Department's general counsel, brought him the disturbing news that some lawyers in the military departments questioned the legality of the additional techniques. Rumsfeld did not brush off the questions or become defensive. In short order, he directed Haynes to revoke the authority for the new techniques. He told him to gather all the relevant lawyers in the department and review the matter — and he would not approve any new techniques until that review was completed. It took almost four months.

I was impressed by how quickly Haynes brought the information to Rumsfeld and how Rumsfeld changed course upon receiving it. It seemed to me if the country's leading civil libertarians had been in on the meetings with us, they would have approved of the way Rumsfeld handled the service lawyers' dissent. This story bears telling because when the cruel and sexually bizarre behavior at Abu Ghraib occurred many months later, critics inaccurately depicted Rumsfeld as disrespectful of laws on detainee treatment.

Rumsfeld's drive to overhaul the Pentagon — to drop outdated practices, programs and ideas — antagonized many senior military officers and civilian officials in the department. He pushed for doing more with less. He pushed for reorganizing offices and relationships to adapt to a changing world. After 9/11, he created the Northern Command (the first combatant command that included the U.S. homeland among its areas of responsibility), a new undersecretary job for intelligence and a new assistant secretary job for homeland defense. Seeking to improve civil-military cooperation, Rumsfeld devised new institutions for the Pentagon's top civilian and military officials to work face to face on strategic matters and new venues for all of them to gather a few times a year with the combatant commanders. He also conceived and pushed through a thorough revision of how U.S. military forces are based, store equipment, move and train with partners around the world — something that was never done before in U.S. history.

When he told organizations to take on new missions, their instinct — typical of bureaucracies — was to say they needed more people and more money. Rumsfeld responded: If changes in the world require us to do new things, those changes must also allow us to curtail or end old missions that we continue for no good reason. He made numerous major changes in the Defense Department at the cost of goring a lot of oxen.

On Iraq, Rumsfeld helped President Bush analyze the dangers posed by Saddam Hussein's regime. Given Saddam's history — starting wars; using chemical weapons against foreign and domestic enemies; and training, financing and otherwise supporting various terrorists — Rumsfeld helped make the case that leaving him in power entailed significant risks. But in October 2002, Rumsfeld also wrote a list of the risks involved in removing Saddam from power. (I called the list his "parade of horribles" memo.) He reviewed it in detail with the president and the National Security Council. Rumsfeld's warnings about the dangers of war — including the perils of a post-Saddam power vacuum — were more comprehensive than anything I saw from the CIA, State or elsewhere.

Though we knew that the risks involved in ousting Saddam were high, it hardly means that Bush made the wrong decision to invade. I believe he made the correct call; we had grounds to worry about the threats Saddam posed, especially after 9/11 reduced our tolerance for security risks. But Rumsfeld continually reminded the president that he had no risk-free option for dealing with the dangers Saddam posed.

Rumsfeld has been attacked for insisting that troop levels for the Iraq operation be kept low, supposedly out of ideology and contrary to the advice of the military. What I saw, however, was that Rumsfeld questioned standard military recommendations for "overwhelming force." He asked if such force was necessary for the mission. And he asked what the consequences might be of having a large footprint in Iraq and playing into propaganda about the United States wanting to take over the country.

But Rumsfeld never told Gen. John Abizaid or Gen. Tommy Franks that U.S. Central Command could not have the number of troops that the commanders deemed necessary. Rumsfeld is more politically sensitive than that — he would never expose himself to the risk of a commander later saying that he had denied him the forces needed. If other generals are unhappy with the troop levels in Iraq, the problem is not that they failed to persuade Rumsfeld, but that they failed to persuade Abizaid or Franks.

Historians will sort out whether Rumsfeld was too pushy with his military, or not pushy enough; whether he micromanaged Ambassador L. Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority, or gave them too much slack. I know more about these issues than most people, yet I don't have all the information for a full analysis. I do know, however, that the common view of Rumsfeld as a close-minded man, ideologically wedded to the virtues of a small force, is wrong.

Rumsfeld had to resign, I suppose, because our bitter and noxious political debate of recent years has turned him into a symbol. His effectiveness was damaged.

For many in Congress and the public, the Rumsfeld caricature dominated their view of the Iraq war and the administration's ability to prosecute it successfully. Even if nominee Robert Gates pursues essentially the same strategies, he may garner more public confidence.

What Rumsfeld believed, said and did differs from the caricature. The public picture of him today is drawn from news accounts reflecting the views of people who disapproved of his policies or disliked him. Rumsfeld, after all, can be brutally demanding and tough. But I believe history will be more appreciative of him than the first draft has been. What will last is serious history, which, like serious literature, can distinguish appearance from reality.

Douglas J. Feith, a professor at Georgetown University, served as undersecretary of defense for policy from 2001 to 2005.

[Tribune7]

bump

[La Enchiladita]

What are you talking about? Feith is already gone.

Douglas J. Feith, a professor at Georgetown University, served as undersecretary of defense for policy from 2001 to 2005.

[La Enchiladita]

Next?

Mr Cheney's closest allies have gone, says a former senior administration official. "He does not have the state department. He does not have the defence department or his chief of staff, Scooter Libby, who made him most effective. John Bolton is still there, but at the United Nations. Doug Feith has gone. Paul Wolfowitz has gone and now Rumsfeld has gone. These were all the people he worked with."

Financial Times: Mid-term hunting trip suggests Cheney prefers duck shooting to lame duck future

[Gondring]

Well, we have retrained many of our troops in Special Ops, prior to deployment to Iraq. But the fact is, we don't have a large Active Duty Special Ops contingent (only one unit, IIRC, at Ft. Bragg), and if we are going to be doing these sorts of missions, you're right, we definitely need to transform our military in that way, too!

[x]

Probably not. Here's the Don Rumsfeld Feith knows:

"Doug Feith, of course, is without question, one of the most brilliant individuals in government. He is – he’s just a rare talent. And from my standpoint, working with him is always interesting. He’s been one of the really the intellectual leaders in the administration in defense policy aspects of our work here." -- Donald Rumsfeld

But wait, there's more:

Years from now, unfortunately it may be many years, accurate accounts of what’s taking place these past four years will be written and it will show that Doug Feith has performed his duties with great dedication, with impressive skill and with remarkable vision during this perilous and indeed momentous period in the life of our country.-- Donald Rumsfeld

With praise and support like that, is it any surprise Feith feels the same way about Rummy?

[Cheburashka]

He destroyed the Army. He transformed the Army to a concoction of boutique brigades without adequate artillery support, suited to fight small actions only and little prepared to face the huge Chinese Army and another North Korean Army.
---
I don't know where you see us fighting the huge Chinese Army. Taiwan? The Taiwanese are going to have to provide most of the manpower for that. The ChiComs don't have the transport capacity to put a huge army on Taiwan. We will supply air and naval support.

The North Koreans? Same thing for the South Koreans. The only thing we should be providing is Naval and Air Force support. And if you're expecting a Chinese Army there, you have to explain why the Chinese will risk a huge army to give Chiahead a bigger playground. What would they get out of that that they can't get already from South Korea?

Siberia? The Russians don't seem to think anything's coming their way. And they're trying to undercut us in every way they can. So it's their problem.

Some people are bent out of shape over the cancellation of the Crusader artillery system, what, four years ago? It sounded real nifty, just the thing to break up Soviet tank army assaults in Europe. Only problem, no Soviet tank armies exist. So there's no use for it. I don't see the value of paying $11 billion for equipment and then leaving it to rust on Army bases.

We're in a different war, it requires different weapons. His job is Secretary of Defense, not Santa Claus.

[Quix]

Thanks.

Am not surprised.

Great for the truer picture.

[baa39]

and the sexiest

[Incorrigible]

 

 

[Cheburashka]

The de-baathification and de-nazification are not comparable.
---
They are exactly comparable. You have to break up the political ties in the old Iraqi Army. That's the only way you break up old habits of obedience, old ways of doing things. Otherwise evetyone's standing around waiting for the Americans to leave, whereupon things will return to "normal".

Separate Sunni and Shiite security forces may or may not have been a good idea, but the old Iraqi Army would have had to have been dissolved anyway.

Another thing I remember is that the Kurds demanded the abolition of the Baathist army, or they wanted their own state.

[jan in Colorado]

The DUmmies want the terrorists to win.

I wouldn't have believed it if I hadn't heard it with my own ears. I have worked in Boulder the past few weeks with the absentee ballots, and I have been left speechless(NEVER happens) by things I overheard them say. The hatred they have for this Country and this President is unfathomable. It isn't just Cindy Sheehan and the far left that hates this Country MORE than they hate the terrorists. My heart is still in denial of this, even though I now know it is true. I feel like I did on 9/11...

[NordP]

I sat next to a former Marine on an airline ride and asked him what was the big deal about Rumsfeld. He told me that although he had great respect for the man; Rumsfeld was attempting to make the military run like a business, and that it couldn't be done. He said that Rumsfeld didn't seem to respect the "social" elements of the military.

I looked at him with a shocked face and said, "SOCIAL???" He said words to the effect that the branches of the military weren't formed to work together as one, and that each had their own budget and power. No branch wanted to lose in either category.

I flat out told him that from a civilian's point of view (and I realize that doesn't hold any water) that I saw Rumsfeld as a SUPER hard working, character driven, strive for the very best for America, TOTAL Patriot with a schedule that I couldn't even BEGIN to undertake at 20 some years his junior. I told him that I had nothing but the utmost respect and awe for the man, and I felt this way before, but that our conversation confirmed my beliefs that as far as how most of them dealt with Rumsfeld, the VIPs of the various branches of the military were working with their OWN interests at heart, and NOT that of the Country they swore to protect...TOGETHER.

I held back other thoughts, because I owe a great deal to our military and their individual sacrifices on our behalf. I would part ways with them about Rumsfeld; because in THIS case I think many top military guys are acting like the Senators we've lost respect for, when it comes to their "earned power."

NordP

[ArtyFO]

And what are we going to use to fight Iran, our reserves and the national guard? More air strikes, I guess, or maybe the Littoral Navy. We can't even close off our southern border.

[NordP]

Oh...and one more thing...

I just made a sign for my car window. It reads:

MY MESSAGE TO THE MILITARY

ALL AMERICANS AREN'T:

Self-Centered,

Impatient, and

Short-Sighted.

THE REST OF US VOTED REPUBLICAN!

[NordP]

To that I say:

...AND, Don Rumsfeld is the type of boss that when you do your work well, he doesn't have a problem letting you know about it.

When was the last time YOU had a boss like THAT???

Add this to the list of great things about the man!

[La Enchiladita]

Thanks for the insight, NordP. I salute SECDEF Rumsfeld for what he accomplished and what he tried to accomplish. We will never have a SECDEF close to his likes again. This is not just sad, but frightening. We are losing our militancy.

Enough already with the petty bickering and posturing among the branches. What a disappointment. The brass needs to go back to boot camp.

[SomeCallMeTim]

Here's another great thing to add: According to reports I've read, Rumsfeld TRIED to resign several months ago, but Bush wouldn't accept it. Rummy is smart enough, and politically savvy enough to know that he was becoming too much of a symbol..

Had he left 5 months ago, I'm virtually certain the Rep's would still hold the Senate at least, and maybe the House..

I've been a W supporter for a long time.. but, his mis- handling of Rumsfeld will be hard for me to forget.

[SomeCallMeTim]

Here's another great thing to add: According to reports I've read, Rumsfeld TRIED to resign several months ago, but Bush wouldn't accept it. Rummy is smart enough, and politically savvy enough to know that he was becoming too much of a symbol..

Had he left 5 months ago, I'm virtually certain the Rep's would still hold the Senate at least, and maybe the House..

I've been a W supporter for a long time.. but, his mis- handling of Rumsfeld will be hard for me to forget.

[ntnychik]

ping

[ac-rep]

I don't think there's any country on earth that could have accomplished what we did in Iraq and Afghanistan in so short a time and with so few casualties.I served in Iraq myself and I can say that our victory there was and is overwhelming despite what the media says.This country owes alot to Donald Rumsfield