Why Didn't Louisiana Follow its Required Emergency Plan?

1) Why Didn't Louisiana Follow it's Emergency Plan? Why isn't anyone talking about this?

2) Why hasn't anyone mentioned that a Pre-Requisite for a Federal Response BY LAW is that State Law is Executed and the Emergency Plan is Executed FIRST?

3) Why did the Governor abandon the City of New Orleans for the Safety of Baton Rouge, before the Plan was Executed?

4) Why, when the federal Government was acting in accordance with the Stafford Act, did the State of Louisiana, by its Governors acts, delay making requests when being told this storm was going to hit?

5) Why did Mayor Nagin or Governor Blanco, delay while sleeping on it Saturday night, the Mandatory evacuation spelled out in the Louisiana Emergency Plan? Saturday the Mayor said he may order an evacuation tomorrow. (Sunday)

6) Where were the Parish Presidents who were signatories to the Louisiana Emergency Plan, and why did they fail in its Execution to the plan?

7) In the Parish failure to implement, why didn't the State take over as required by the plan?

8) Why weren't the Hospitals nursing homes, etc. evacuated since the plan required them to do so?

9) Why did the Mandatory evacuation only occur AFTER President Bush called, and why did Governor Blanco stress that it was only after President Bush Called to urging the Evacuation order? Was she concerned for the Citizens, or was she grandstanding so she could blame the President if the Storm didn't hit?

10) Why were the Action Plan implementations required not done by the Local and State Government?

August 29, 2005 Major Disaster Declaration by President Bush:
Major Disaster Dec

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended by Public Law 106-390, October 30, 2000
Federal Law

6:22 PM Pacific Friday 8/26/05
Quote:
Blanco declares state of emergency as Katrina shifts west

The governor this evening has declared a state of emergency as a major shift west in the projected track of Hurricane Katrina threatens Southeastern Louisiana.

At 5 p.m. federal forecasters made a significant westward shift in the projected path of Katrina, moving the New Orleans area much nearer the center of the cone of warning, with projected landfall now in the Biloxi area.

Note this Forecast and the declaration is almost 1 1/2 days Prior to the Mandatory Evac being instituted. This statement is reported at 2:29 pm Eastern Saturday. He should have ordered it Sooner than he finally did.

Saturday August 27, 2005 2:29 Eastern.
Mayor Delaying Evacuation along with Governor

Quote:
"This is not a test," New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin said at a news conference. He said he would probably ask people to leave at daybreak Sunday, and said the Superdome could be pressed into use as a shelter of last resort for people who do not have cars.

That is Proof the Mayor was already stating he was going to delay the Evacuation. This is Past the Time when the Emergency declarations were Issued by the Governor which was done on Friday.

She apparently said this on Saturday, according to a post , at Freerepublic:
Free Republic Link

But that post was placed on 08/27/2005 6:58:21 PM PDT, which is Saturday Night.
Quote:
Kathleen Blanco - "Lots of people are not aware of this storm because last night when they went to bed the forecast was for it to go into Florida, but overnight that changed to Louisiana."

So she is stating that last night, Friday. It didn't change overnight, she is trying to say she didn't know, and she did.

Sunday August 28, 2005
President Urges Evac
Quote:
Louisiana Gov. Kathleen Blanco said that President Bush had called and urged the state to order the evacuation.

All requests for a declaration by the President that an emergency exists shall be made by the Governor of the affected State. Such a request shall be based on a finding that the situation is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that Federal assistance is necessary. As a part of such request, and as a prerequisite to emergency assistance under this Act, the Governor shall take appropriate action under State law and direct execution of the State's emergency plan. The Governor shall furnish information describing the State and local efforts and resources which have been or will be used to alleviate the emergency, and will define the type and extent of Federal aid required. Based upon such Governor's request, the President may declare that an emergency exists.

NOTE, it says the Following:
A) All requests for a declaration by the President that an emergency exists shall be made by the Governor of the affected State.

B) As a part of such request, and as a prerequisite to emergency assistance under this Act, the Governor shall take appropriate action under State law and direct execution of the State's emergency plan.

Note the word PREREQUISITE. So when the Governor REQUESTED the initial declaration, she was basically lying about the Emergency Plan being implemented.

1) A catastrophic hurricane is defined as a hurricane in Category 3 Slow (5 mph or less forward speed), and categories 4 or 5 on the Saffir-Simpson Scale of hurricane strength (See Annex A). Hurricanes in Category 1, 2 and 3 Fast, are considered less destructive and can be met through the use of normal emergency preparedness procedures on the part of the Parish and State governments.

The overall strategy for dealing with a catastrophic hurricane is to evacuate as much of the at risk population as possible from the path of the storm and relocate them to a place of relative safety outside the projected high water mark of the storm surge flooding and hurricane force winds. The Southeastern Region is generally defined as those parishes which have all or a large part of their population east of the Atchafalaya River Basin and south of a line drawn along Interstates 10 and 12 from Baton Rouge, through Hammond to Slidell. The Region includes the parishes of Ascension, Assumption, Jefferson, Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, St. John the Baptist, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, and Terrebonne

2) When a hurricane enters or takes form in the Gulf of Mexico, it is perceived as a potential catastrophic threat to the Southeast Louisiana Region. As the danger from the hurricane requires the initiation of emergency actions, the State Office of Emergency Preparedness and each parish will activate Emergency Operating Centers (EOCs) and declare a state of emergency. The State and parishes will commence planned emergency operations and coordinate their actions including activating and maintaining all means of communications.

Let's Look at the Responsibility of whom during an Evacuation. This can be found beginning on Page 16 0f 45 of the Louisiana Plan.

State of Louisiana
1. Activate EOC and prepare for 24-hour operations.
2. Put State Departments and the ARC on standby alert in accordance with OEP Implementing Procedures.
3. Put National Guard units on standby alert.
4. Call all nursing homes and other custodial care organizations in the risk areas to insure that they are prepared to evacuate their residents.
5. Alert FEMA of the situation and advise that the State may need Federal assistance.
6. Establish communications with risk area parish EOCs and test all communications means, including conference call procedures.
7. Prepare a proclamation of emergency for the State so that, when needed, State resources can be mobilized to support risk area evacuation and host area sheltering operations.

Prepare proclamations for the State to intervene in local situations if local governments fail to act, in accordance with RS 29:721-735.

***NOTE IT SAYS So State Resources can be mobilized to support evacuation.***
***NOTE IT SAYS for the State to Intervene if Local Governments fail to act.***

1) Local transportation resources should be marshaled and public transportation plans implemented as needed.

2) Announce the location of staging areas for people who need transportation. Public transportation will concentrate on moving people from the staging areas to safety in host parishes with priority given to people with special needs.

Mobilize State transportation resources to aid in the evacuation of people who have mobility and/or health problems. Deploy to support risk area parishes.

Coordinate with neighboring states, Mississippi, Arkansas and Texas, and other states to which evacuees may go, such as Tennessee and Alabama. Advise states of the possible extent of Louisiana's evacuation and recommend appropriate traffic control measures.

Mandatory Evacuation:

NOT ISSUED UNTIL SUNDAY MORNING, so the Governor and Mayor got a good nights sleep Saturday Night, and only after the President urged them to do so, which was publicized in a press conference by Blanco.

1. Coordinate evacuation orders with State and other risk parishes.
2. Instruct persons living in designated evacuation zones to leave.
3. Impose traffic control to funnel persons to designated evacuation routes.
4. Designate staging areas and other facilities as last resort refuges. People at these locations who cannot be evacuated in time to avoid the storm will remain and take refuge in the designated buildings.
5. Assist persons with mobility limitations to find last resort refuge. Mobilize all transportation resources and request assistance from the state as needed.
6. Continue to update EAS and news media with evacuation information at two-hour intervals.

1. Implement reception and care and traffic control plans.
2. Continue reporting status of shelter spaces and evacuees
accommodated to LOEP every four hours. 3.Continue 24-hour operations.

1. Continue 24-hour EOC operations.
2. Consult with risk area parishes to finalize mandatory 01/00 III-6 evacuation orders.
3. Implement mandatory evacuation traffic controls. Convert specified limited access routes to one-way outbound operations. Control main evacuation routes with State resources.
4. Direct the evacuation and shelter of persons having mobility limitations, including persons in nursing homes, hospitals, group homes and non-institutionalized persons.
5. Keep neighboring states informed of status and traffic control decisions.
6. Keep EAS evacuation and shelter information updated on a two-hour basis, or more frequently if information is available on a timelier basis.
7. Keep media informed and updated on evacuation and shelter information.

1- Direct the evacuation and shelter of persons having mobility limitations, including persons in nursing homes, hospitals, group homes and non-institutionalized persons.

This was the responsibility of the state, and it DID NOT OCCUR. Evidence Charity Hospital.

NOW, this is very Important to realize, it is the State's plan to implement the Shelter of last Resort. It was not designed for people to stay there:

PART VI: STAGING AREAS / LAST RESORT REFUGE
A. Staging Areas
The definition of a staging area is a central location, easily accessible to those ambulatory people who are in need of transportation to a shelter.

1. Residents who have no means of transportation will be directed to the staging areas.

2. Transportation vehicles will be pre-positioned to transport residents to shelters.

3. Once the evacuation routes are closed, the staging areas will become Last Resort Refuges.

4. After the storm has passed and the evacuation order is rescinded, transportation will be provided to return people dropped off at shelters to the staging area.

B. Last Resort Refuge
The definition of Last Resort Refuge is a place for persons to be protected from the high winds and heavy rains from the storm. Unlike a shelter, there may be little or no water or food and possibly no utilities. A Last Resort Refuge is intended to provide best available survival protection for the duration of the hurricane only.

1. Once evacuation routes are closed, people who were unable to evacuate the risk area will be directed to last resort refuge and /or staging areas.

2. When it is determined that weather conditions permit, rescue teams will be sent into areas designated for Last Resort Refuge to transport evacuees to designated shelters.

People were directed there, but No Transportation from there was used apparently before the storm. The superdome was only to be used during the duration of the hurricane.

Where were the Staging Areas?
Where was the Required Mobilization of State Resources?

Now go to Page 36 of the Plan. Here it starts talking about specifically what is need to evacuate the population.

POPULATION AT RISK ANNEX C
RISK AREA POPULATION SUMMARY*
Ascension 73,667
Assumption 22,862
Jefferson 454,447
Lafourche 88,712
Orleans 462,761
Plaquemines 25,728
St. Bernard 66,903
St. Charles 47,606
St. James 21,362
St. John 41,664
St. Tammany 188,053
Tangipahoa 96,723
Terrebonne 104,317
TOTAL 1,694,805

* 1990 Census Data (as amended by the Louisiana Tech University estimates of Population) 01/00 C-1

CATEGORY 4 FAST HURRICANE - 15 MPH

PARISH EVACUEES VEHICLES

Ascension
Assumption 22,862 9,296
Jefferson 319,968 126,971
Lafourche 74,765 26,701
Orleans 334,192 111,397
Plaquemines 24,256 8,393
St. Bernard 60,539 22,094
St. Charles 41,904 15,718
St. John 15,869 5,491
St. James 7,175 2,307
St. Tammany 105,069 41,529
Tangipahoa
Terrebonne 104,317 37,199
TOTAL 1,110,916 407,096

TIME ESTIMATES FOR EVACUATION DECISIONS:

Depending on the speed and strength of a hurricane and the number of people who are at risk, the time at which decisions must be made to evacuate will vary. The attached tables give information on the times at which action to evacuate people must be taken if the total number of people in the risk area is to be evacuated in Category 3 (Slow), 4 and 5 hurricanes. A summary of information is given for each category. These times are for Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard and St. Tammany. The times for Terrebonne, Assumption, Lafourche, St. Charles, St. James, St. John the Baptist, Ascension and Tangipahoa would be less.

Evacuees: Gives the total number of people assumed to evacuate in response to the threat of a hurricane (not always 100% of vulnerable population).

Vehicles: An estimate of the average number of vehicles that would be used by the maximum number of evacuees.

Cut-Off Hours: The number of hours before a hurricane reaches landfall at which evacuation must be stopped because gale force winds would be blowing over evacuation bridges, making travel dangerous. The number of miles from landfall is also given.

Clearance Hours: The number of hours needed to move 100% of the evacuating population, given smooth traffic flow, out of the risk area. In the larger category storms, figures are slower for clearance times in which traffic flows as it does normally, as well as for traffic flow if designated routes are converted to one-way outbound traffic. A 2+2-hour figure is included to accommodate two hours to begin the evacuation and two hours to bring the evacuation to a stop. Total Decision Hours: The total number of hours before hurricane landfall when the decision to call for evacuation must be made if an effort to move all risk area residents is to be made.

For The Record, President Bush declared the requested State of Emergency on Saturday, August 27,2005
For The Record, President Bush declared a Major Disaster on Monday, August 29, 2005

The Levees were known to be leaking on Tuesday, and newspapers that morning were downplaying the damage done to New Orleans.

The amount of Federal help that did arrive was being mobilized and sent starting Tuesday. It took the Feds two days to get help there. Pretty Good, I say.

It is my contention that due to the incompetence of the Governor of Louisiana as well as others, such as Mayor Nagin, and all affected Parish Presidents, as well as Governor Blanco personally downplaying the ramifications of this storm, and her inability to implement the Emergency Plan when she was given plenty of notice that potentially thousands of people have died.

How could a city that had foreseen this type of event failed so miserably to enact any plan at all. How could these Parish Presidents not have had people go door to door to evacuate them. Orleans Parish contains the City of New Orleans, and their failure to impress on their citizens in advance of this storm through community education the importance of leaving is a sad truth to this story.

Others can feel free to add timeline events or other information, but the Local and State Governments delay in following the plan has killed many. Why were all those buses sitting under water?

Great thread.

These are some excellent overhead pictures of the "Ray Nagin Memorial Motor Pools," now underwater.

http://img161.imageshack.us/my.php?image=raynaginmotorpool11vd.jpg
http://img161.imageshack.us/my.php?image=raynaginmotorpool24qa.jpg

Here's what Nagin said about those school buses a few days ago:

" I need reinforcements, I need troops, man. I need 500 buses, man. We ain't talking about -- you know, one of the (disaster planning) briefings we had, they were talking about getting public school bus drivers to come down here and bus people out here." (New Orleans' Mayor C. Ray Nagin's Interview on WWL-AM, September 2, 2005)

Yes, Mayor Nagin. That's the normal operating procedure for disaster evacuation.

Standard disaster planning procedures call for the use of school & city buses to evacuate nursing home residents, high-risk populations, and people who lack transportation. This evacuation is supposed to be away from the disaster area, not to the middle of it (Superdome).

It seems that the local and state officials got confused about the difference between "shelters" and "last resort refuges." New Orleans residents without transportation were sent to the Superdome, a facility that was a "staging area," an area that was to serve as a collection point to pick people up and send them to "shelters." The Superdome is designated as a "last resort refuge" for a reason. It's because it was to serve as a "staging area" until all the evacuation routes were closed. Then and only then would it serve as a "last resort refuge."

All those people who waited in that long line all day Sunday could have been all the way to Houston by sundown. Instead, the buses remained idle, and they were herded like cattle into a "last resort refuge," better known as a "death trap." This mistake was fatal to a lot of those people.

Indeed, according to the "Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan" (see below), people who lacked transportation should have been transported away from the "Risk Area Parishes" (i.e., flood-prone areas). The disaster plan called for transportation of these people to shelters, not "last resort refuges." Shelters are outside of the flood-prone areas and should be stocked with food, water, and the basic necessities of life.

Instead of using the buses to transport people out of the flood zone, Mayor Nagin opened the Superdome to the general public beginning at 12:00 pm Sunday. They were even expected to bring their own food and water.

This evacuation to safe, out-of-area shelters was to take place all the way up until evacuation routes were closed.
(I think I'm repeating myself now. :-)

Available for download here:

http://www.ohsep.louisiana.gov/plans/EOPSupplement1a.pdf (Excerpted below; emphasis added).

PART I: GENERAL
A. SUMMARY:
The Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan is intended to provide a framework within which the parishes can coordinate their actions with State government in order to deal with a catastrophic hurricane. The overall strategy for dealing with a catastrophic hurricane is to evacuate as much of the at risk population as possible from the path of the storm and relocate them to a place of relative safety outside the projected high water mark of the storm surge flooding and hurricane force winds.
PART II: SITUATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
A. SITUATIONS
3. Tidal surge, associated with the "worst case" Category 3, 4 or 5 Hurricane Scenario for the Greater New Orleans Metropolitan Area, as determined by the National Weather Service (NWS) Sea, Lake and Overland Surge from Hurricanes (SLOSH) Model, could cause a maximum inundation of 20 feet above sea level in some of the parishes in the Region, not including tidal effects, wind waves and storm rainfall.
4. The Area is protected by an extensive levee system, but above-normal water levels and hurricane surge could cause levee overtopping or failures.
8. Many of the Region's emergency shelter facilities may be inundated by floodwaters when threatened by a slow moving Category 3 or above hurricane. Sheltering of evacuees outside of the Region becomes necessary.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
5. The primary means of hurricane evacuation will be personal vehicles. School and municipal buses, government-owned vehicles and vehicles provided by volunteer agencies may be used to provide transportation for individuals who lack transportation and require assistance in evacuating.
14. Hospitals, nursing homes, group homes, etc. will have pre-determined evacuation and/or refuge plans if evacuation becomes necessary. All facilities will have approved Multi-Hazard Emergency Operations Plans as mandated by the State of Louisiana, Dept. of Health and Hospitals (DHH). Before operating permits are given to homes/hospitals, emergency precautions are to be taken, such as the placement of emergency supplies and equipment (i.e., generators and potable water) on upper floors.
23. As evacuation routes are closed, people who are still in the risk area will be directed to last resort refuge within the area.

PART III: EVACUATION (p. 16)
A. PROCEDURES:
The procedures outlined here are the minimum actions that will be required from State, parish and municipal authorities in a hurricane emergency, to move as many people as possible from the areas threatened by the hurricane storm surge as identified by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers' SLOSH estimates.
B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: The Regional Evacuation Plan has three phases: Precautionary, Recommended and Mandatory. Each phase requires specific actions to be taken at about the same time by all the organizations that are operating under this plan. The cycle of Decision, Implementation and Information Feedback is critical to the operation of this plan.

3. Mandatory Evacuation: (p. 20)

a. Risk Area Parishes:

4. Designate staging areas and other facilities as last resort refuges. People at these locations who cannot be evacuated in time to avoid the storm will remain and take refuge in the designated buildings.
c. State of Louisiana:
4. Direct the evacuation and shelter of persons having mobility limitations, including persons in nursing homes, hospitals, group homes and non-institutionalized persons.

PART IV: Evacuation Routes (p. 24)
A. Highways:
There are several major evacuation routes out of the Southeastern Louisiana Hurricane Risk Area.
4. As a hurricane approaches land, high winds and rising water will affect evacuation routes, making travel hazardous. Evacuation orders will take this into account and provide for evacuation routes to be shut down at the point at which travel would become hazardous.
5. As evacuation routes are shut down, people who are still in the risk area will have to be directed to last resort refuge buildings within the area.
B. Concept of Operations:
1. Evacuation will be conducted in three phases as outlined in the basic plan: Precautionary / Voluntary, Recommended and Mandatory.
c. Mandatory:
1. Priority will be given to residents of low-lying areas.

PART VI: STAGING AREAS / LAST RESORT REFUGE
A. Staging Areas
The definition of a staging area is a central location, easily accessible to those ambulatory people who are in need of transportation to a shelter.
1. Residents who have no means of transportation will be directed to the staging areas.
2. Transportation vehicles will be pre-positioned to transport residents to shelters.
3. Once the evacuation routes are closed, the staging areas will become Last Resort Refuges.
4. After the storm has passed and the evacuation order is rescinded, transportation will be provided to return people dropped off at shelters to the staging area.
B. Last Resort Refuge The definition of Last Resort Refuge is a place for persons to be protected from the high winds and heavy rains from the storm. Unlike a shelter, there may be little or no water or food and possibly no utilities. A Last Resort Refuge is intended to provide best available survival protection for the duration of the hurricane only.
1. Once evacuation routes are closed, people who were unable to evacuate the risk area
(on school and city buses) will be directed to last resort refuge and /or staging areas.
2. When it is determined that weather conditions permit, rescue teams will be sent into areas designated for Last Resort Refuge to transport evacuees to designated shelters.

g. Last resort refuge inside the risk area will be the responsibility of the local parish government.

Of course, we all know this is Bush's fault.

This is what I was able to establish from various news reports and National Guard News releases. (It is unclear whether the Governor ever did declare an emergency or whether the President declared it and then legalized federal involvement through a subsequent declaration of an “Incident of National Significance”.I have seen one article where an emergency was declared on Friday. Another ehere the President requested a declaration by memo to the Gov. This was followed up with the urging phone call on Saturday and his declaration. Muddy.)

(1) It was well known that NO emergency plans were inadequate. There was an AP report from September 19, 2004 by Kevin McGill titled "Ivan exposes flaws in N.O.'s disaster plans." The Times Picayune also did an expose. The American Red Cross informed the mayor that they would no longer be setting up shelters within the city for hurricanes over category-2. They informed the mayor that is was just too dangerous and that his city was ill-prepared to handle the crisis.

(2) The Governor knew of the possibility of a CAT 5 hitting head-on in NO five days prior to the event. (Hit Florida Aug. 25-26)

(3) Friday, President Bush sends a memo to the Gov. suggesting she declare a state of emergency. President Bush called Governor on Saturday urging her to declare a state of emergency and issue evacuation orders.

(4) President Bush declared a state of emergency on Saturday. FEMA aid was authorized http://www.fema.gov/news/dfrn.fema?id=4489

(5) Once a state of emergency is declared, the Governor can request federal resources, including the federalization and deployment of the National Gurad from surrounding states. It is not clear that she did either before this storm.

(6) Max Mayfield, director of the NHC called the Mayor Saturday evening to make sure he knew the severity of the threat.

(7) Mayor Nagin declared a state of emergency and ordered evacuation of NO on Sunday.

(8) There was an evacuation plan in place to evacuate the poor involving school buses, but it was not followed

(9) Two hundred Louisiana troops assisted civilian authorities by conducting security and screening missions at the Superdome

(10) The hurricane hit on Monday morning

(11) The levees broke on Tuesday by Wednesday, 80% of NO is flooded

(12) Tuesday, about 2,800 Louisiana National Guard were deployed for security, but not used for law enforcement. An estimated 7,500 National Guard troops from Alabama, Florida, Louisiana and Mississippi were on hurricane duty in their Gulf states. National Guard units and members in 17 more states were on standby, ready to provide assistance as required in the wake of extensive damage

(13) Wednesday, President Bush directed Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff to chair a Cabinet-level task force to coordinate all Federal assistance and recovery efforts in response to the catastrophic effects caused by Hurricane Katrina. The U.S. Northern Command Joint Task Force Katrina is coordinating search and rescue, medical help and supplies from Mississippi. At this time, more than 11,000 Army and Air National Guard members and 7,200 active-duty troops, mostly Navy, are supporting hurricane relief operations along the Gulf Coast. 10,000 National Guard units from neigboring states are ordered to be deployed within the following 48 hours. Evacuation of Superdome begins. The head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency told Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff that 1,000 additional staff people are needed within 48 hours and 2,000 within a week. President Bush tours disaster sites.

(14) By Thursday 8 a.m The President makes a declaration of an “Incident of National Significance” activating the National Response Plan and the Interagency Incident Management Group Including out of state units, the Guard presence in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida has jumped to 15,000 troops. An estimated 1,400 National Guard military police has arrived in NO. Governor issues orders to shoot to kill looters. The Guard is not enforcing martial law. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits active-duty forces from conducting law enforcement operations, but does not cover National Guard members operating under their state governors’ control. Six hundred 25,000-pound sandbags were delivered to the Gulf Coast on Sept. 1, with another 200 expected on Friday as part of the effort to repair broken levees. To date, the U.S. Coast Guard has rescued more than 3,000 people off rooftops and from flooded neighborhoods. New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin orders 1,500 police to leave their search-and-rescue missions and return to the streets to stop looting. Meanwhile, by unanimous consent of those present, the Senate has approved $10.5 billion in aid for the hurricane victims. The House passed Friday

(15) Friday, There are now 35,000 National Guard troops on the ground. The 82nd Airborne is also on the ground in NO. More than 400 members of the Army Corps of Engineers are working to repair the levee system in New Orleans and removing floodwaters from the city. Mayor Nagin gives an angry speech, and wants people to flood the offices of the president and the governor with letters calling for help. Convention Center refugees grow angry.

(16) Saturday airlifts, final evacuation of Superdome and Convention Center. President George W. Bush orders 7,000 active-duty military personnel to the Gulf Coast to join the 4,000 already there. They should arrive within 72 hours. To date, the Coast Guard has rescued 9,500 people in areas ravaged by Katrina. A $62 million National Emergency Grant to provide temporary employment is announced.
The L.A. Governor still hasn't officially declared a state of emergency.

Why is getting the facts straight important? Because the MSM is widely circulating false information that is whipping up furious and widespread public anger at the President and the "lack of federal response." Leftists are using this event to fan their hatred. That is wrong and should be nipped in the bud before it spreads, particularly those tactics fanning race anger. It is also important to understand where the break down points and bottlenecks occurred so that they can be fixed to present the repetition of failings in the future.

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