Posted on 11/06/2003 7:31:54 PM PST by republicanwizard
Astounding Triumph of Republicanism.
THE NORTH RISING IN INDIGNATION AT THE MENACES OF THE SOUTH
Abraham Lincoln Probably Elected President by a Majority of the Entire Popular Vote
Forty Thousand Majority for the Republican Ticket in New-York
One Hundred Thousand Majority in Pennsylvania
Seventy Thousand Majority in Massachusetts
Corresponding Gains in the Western and North-Western States
Preponderance of John Bell and Conservatism at the South
Results of the Contest upon Congressional and Local Tickets
The canvass for the Presidency of the United States terminated last evening, in all the States of the Union, under the revised regulation of Congress, passed in 1845, and the result, by the vote of New-York, is placed beyond question at once. It elects ABRAHAM LINCOLN of Illinois, President, and HANNIBAL HAMLIN of Maine, Vice-President of the United States, for four years, from the 4th March next, directly by the People.
The election, so far as the City and State of New-York are concerned, will probably stand, hereafter as one of the most remarkable in the political contests of the country; marked, as it is, by far the heaviest popular vote ever cast in the City, and by the sweeping, and almost uniform, Republican majorities in the country.
RELATED HEADLINES
ELECTION DAY IN THE CITY: All Quiet and Orderly At the Polls: Progress of the Voting in the Several Wards: The City After Nightfall: How the News Was Received: Unbounded Enthusiasm of the Republicans and Bell-Everett Headquarters: The Times Office Beseiged: Midnight Display of Wide-Awakes: Bonfires and Illuminations
(Excerpt) Read more at nytimes.com ...
It's funny how often the neo-confederates have to preface their rant with comments like, "I don't favor a return to slavery, but..."
Walt
The framers -clearly- wanted a more powerful central government than existed under the Articles.
From Letters and Other Writings of James Madison,. New York: R. Worthington, 1884. 287-290.
To General Washington
New York, April 16th, 1787
Dear Sir,
--I have been honored with your letter of the 31 March, and find, with much pleasure, that your views of the reform which ought to be pursued by the Convention give a sanction to those I entertained. Temporizing applications will dishonor the councils which propose them, and may foment the internal malignity of the disease, at the same time that they produce an ostensible palliation of it. Radical attempts, although unsuccessful, will at least justify the authors of them.
Having been lately led to revolve the subject which is to undergo the discussion of the Convention, and formed some outlines of a new system, I take the liberty of submitting them without apology to your eye.
Conceiving that an individual independence of the States is utterly irreconcilable with their aggregate sovereignty, and that a consolidation of the whole into one simple republic would be as inexpedient as it is unattainable, I have sought for middle ground, which may at once support a due supremacy of the national authority, and not exclude the local authorities wherever they can be subordinately useful.
I would propose as the groundwork, that a change be made in the principle of representation. According to the present form of the Union, in which the intervention of the States is in all great cases necessary to effectuate the measures of Congress, an equality of suffrage does not destroy the inequality of importance in the several members. No one will deny that Virginia and Massachusetts have more weight and influence, both within and without Congress, than Delaware or Rhode Island. Under a system which would operate in many essential points without the intervention of the State legislatures, the case would be materially altered. A vote in the national Councils from Delaware would then have the same effect and value as one from the largest State in the Union. I am ready to believe that such a change would not be attended with much difficulty. A majority of the States, and those of greatest influence, will regard it as favorable to them. To the northern States it will be recommended by their present populousness; to the Southern, by their expected advantage in this respect. The lesser States must in every event yield to the predominant will. But the consideration which particularly urges a change in the representation is, that it will obviate the principal objections of the larger States to the necessary concessions of power.
I would propose next, that in addition to the present federal powers, the national Government should be armed with positive and complete authority in all cases which require uniformity; such as the regulation of trade, including the right of taxing both exports and imports, the fixing the terms and forms of naturalization, &c., &c.
Over and above this positive power, a negative in all cases whatsoever on the Legislative acts of the States, as heretofore exercised by the Kingly prerogative, appears to me to be absolutely necessary, and to be the least possible encroachment on the State jurisdictions. Without this defensive power, every positive power that can be given on paper will be evaded or defeated. The States will continue to invade the National jurisdiction, to violate treaties, and the law of nations, and to harass each other with rival and spiteful measures dictated by mistaken views of interest. . . .
The national supremacy ought also to be extended, as I conceive, to the Judiciary departments. If those who are to expound and apply the laws are connected by their interests and their oaths with the particular States wholly, and not with the Union, the participation of the Union in the making of the laws may be possibly rendered unavailing. It seems at least necessary that the oaths of the Judges should include a fidelity to the general as well as local Constitution, and that an appeal should lie to some National tribunal in all cases to which foreigners or inhabitants or other States may be parties. The admiralty jurisdiction seems to fall entirely within the purview of the National Government.
The National supremacy in the Executive departments is liable to some difficulty, unless the officers administering them could be made appointable by the Supreme Government. The Militia ought certainly to be placed, in some form or other, under the authority which is entrusted with the general protection and defense.
A Government composed of such extensive powers should be well organized and balanced. The legislative department might be divided into two branches; one of them chosen every. . .years, by the people at large, or by the Legislatures; the other to consist of fewer members, to hold their places for a longer term, and to go out in such rotation as always to leave in office a large majority of old members. Perhaps the negative on the laws might be most conveniently exercised by this branch. As a further check, a Council of revision, including the great ministerial officers, might be superadded.
A National Executive must also be provided. I have scarcely ventured, as yet, to form my own opinion either of the manner in which it ought to be constituted, or of the authorities with which it ought to be clothed. An article should be inserted expressly guaranteeing the tranquility of the States against internal as well as external dangers.
In like manner the right of coercion should be expressly declared. With the resources of commerce in hand, the National administration might always find means of exerting it either by sea or land. But the difficulty and awkwardness of operating by force on the collective will of a State render it particularly desirable that the necessity of it might be precluded. Perhaps the negative on the laws might create such a mutuality of dependence between the general and particular authorities as to answer this purpose. Or, perhaps, some defined objects of taxation might be submitted, along with commerce, to the general authority.
To give a new system its proper validity and energy, a ratification must be obtained from the people, and not merely from the ordination of the Legislatures. This will be the more essential, as inroads on the existing Constitutions of the States will be unavoidable."
Your premise is wrong.
Walt
That is simply incorrect. President Lincoln used the power of the executive branch that the framers placed there. The reason this -appears- startling or new is because the executive had never had to extend itself in this way.
Consider what Jackson proposed to do during the nullification crisis -- take the federal army to South Carolina. How was this different from what President Lincoln did?
The executive always had the power President Lincoln used.
Walt
Nope.
Ah, ignorance is bliss.
According to the Militia Act of May 2, 1792, as amended Feb 28, 1795, Sec. 2:
"And it be further enacted, That whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed or the execution thereof obstructed, in any state, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by this act, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the militia of such state to suppress such combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed. And if the militia of a state, where such combinations may happen, shall refuse, or be insufficient to suppress the same, it shall be lawful for the President, if the legislatures of the United States be not in session, to call forth and employ such numbers of the militia of any other state or states most convenient thereto, as may be necessary, and the use of militia, so to be called forth, may be continued, if necessary, until the expiration of thirty days after the commencement of the ensuing session."
President Lincoln had all the authority he needed under law.
Now this is from the majority opinion in the Prize Cases.
"The Constitution confers on the President the whole Executive power. He is bound to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He is Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States. He has no power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign nation or a domestic State. But by the Acts of Congress of February 28th, 1795, and 3d of March, 1807, he is authorized to called out the militia and use the military and naval forces of the United States in case of invasion by foreign nations, and to suppress insurrection against the government of a State or of the United States."
The 9th and 10th amendments don't come into play either.
Walt
Of course, you cannot bend something that is inflexible (without breaking it, your rediculous symantics aside).
Well, I guess that makes the United States Air Force illegal.
Flexibility is the genius of the Constitution.
Walt
I can't comment intelligently on that one Maidson letter without knowing its full context. However, one letter does not argue for unanimity of opinion on the matter during the founding period. Strong, even bitter differences of opinion existed throughout the period as regards state sovereignty vs. an all-powerful central government — or, to be more precise in describing the choice as they saw it, between preserving the newly independent states and fear of the establishment of a monarchy.
By all means, it's true that the members of the Constitutional Convention wanted to replace the weak Articles of Confederation with a stronger federal system. However, federalism meant something quite different to them than it does to us, today. Heck, it meant something different to the small vs. large states, to the northern vs. southern states, and to agrarians like Thomas Jefferson vs. urban businessmen and financiers like Alexander Hamilton. Their split on these very issues was the genesis of the American two-party system.
At one point early in the Constitutional Convention, Hamilton delivered a speech that seemed to argue for dissolution of the states entirely, and for the creation of a single central government with a monarchist slant. (Hamilton was an admirer of the British system of government.) The speech was most definitely not well-received by his fellow delegates. He left the convention and only returned months later.
In contrast, Jefferson despised the British and admired the French. He was in France at the time of the Convention. But we know from all of his writings during the period that, while he agreed with a strengthening of the federal system, he was opposed to a very strong, dominant central government. (When he finally became president, he didn't govern the way he had always written of his political beliefs, by the way.)
Over time, those who agreed with the Hamiltonian view (including Washington and Adams) became known as Federalists, and those who agreed with the Jeffersonian view became known as Democratic-Republicans. The seeds of the civil war were planted during the founding period, not just in their failure to deal with the slavery question, but also in this federalist vs. states rights question that only came to a head when South Carolina seceded.
She and the other southern states did so precisely because the states believed the Constitution did not bind them in a perpetual union. The Constitution is silent on the matter. (It would never have been ratified otherwise.) Solely as regards their right to secede, I believe the southern states were correct. Lincoln and many in the north obviously had a different view. That was the core issue of the Civil War, not slavery. Emancipation was a byproduct of Lincoln's fight to impose permanent union on the states.
If "state's rights" is silent or indifferent or supportive where slavery is concerned, it's a sign that there is something wrong or lacking with that school of thought. That moral deficiency in Jeffersonian republicanism or Jacksonian democracy means that we can't look on Lincoln or the abolitionists in the negative light that nineteenth century Southerners did. Republicans and abolitionists did bring something of value to the debate, which would be impoverished if its highest principle was the absolute sovereignty and divine right of state governments. Moreover, the practical difficulties and constitutional doubtfulness of nullification and secession were apparent to many people at the time, and those who pursued such ideas to the point of revolution and war are hardly reliable guides for citizenship or statesmanship.
Some people seem to have bought into the "Jeffersonians good, everything else bad" way of thinking, but it's too simplistic a picture. Federalists, Whigs, and Republicans asked Jeffersonians important questions that pointed up deficiencies or gaps in "state's rights" thinking. They understood things about the nature union and constitution that Jeffersonians didn't. The reverse is true as well, Jeffersonians brought up things that Hamiltonians would rather ignore. So I don't think there are any simple answers. All the more so, since Jeffersonians like Madison and Monroe ended up closer to Washington or Adams than to radicals like Taylor or Randolph. In the end, though, it does look to me like secessionists had the wrong goals and pursued them by rash and reckless means.
Does that mean that we pit Lincoln against the founders and choose him over them? No, first of all, as is pointed out here every week, Lincoln doesn't correspond to modern ideas on racial equality, either. There's room to criticize him on that ground and others. He is not immune from criticism or reproach. We are going to be hearing for a long time that because Lincoln wasn't committed to racial equality, his principled stands against the expansion of slavery and unilateral secession count for nothing. But it's not clear why Calhoun's or Taylor's support for slavery should be irrelevant to our assessment of their own views about secession and nullification.
It is clear that Lincoln wasn't so far different in his views of union and liberty from Washington or Adams or Hamilton or Madison, though. It's Jefferson whose views differed, and Calhoun whose views differed even more from the Founders. You may want to talk about Lincoln as a deviation or deformation of an older tradition, but the tradition of Calhoun is itself a corruption and a turning away from what the Founders intended. Lincoln brought some change, but it was more evolutionary, and more in accord with the views of our first Presidents than many claim. It's not true that the modern welfare state was born with Lincoln.
Differences about racial equality don't mean that we have to permanently ban Jefferson, or Washington, or Lincoln. We are adult enough to recognize their virtues and sterling qualities, which on balance were greater than our own. But it does mean that one can't naively raise the banner of Taylor or Calhoun, nullification, secession and state's rights without people asking serious questions, making reproaches, or ignoring one's stand. Chivalry and honesty mean that we can and should honor the courage of Confederate soldiers and understand that in their own minds their fight was justified, but the same honesty makes it hard to see the cause of radical Southern political leaders as our cause or as the cause of liberty.
The Confederacy wanted to win foreign support. Therefore it had to choose leaders who would appear sane, moderate, and responsible. Radical "Fire-eaters" like Rhett and Yancey had much power and influence, but those who were chosen to head the Confederacy, Davis and Stephens, would at least have to appear to be reluctant secessionists. Perhaps they were. But two further caveats are necessary. 1) Few politicians would give up their seats until their state had seceeded. Therefore, they'd have to at least appear to be committed to working out a compromise up to the last moment. They'd have to have clean hands, in case secession didn't come through. 2) The real debate in the cotton states wasn't between secession and union but between independent secession and cooperative action between the slave states. Was South Carolina or Mississippi going to go it alone, or were they going to form a league or union or new nation with other seceeding states. Many who were hesitant about seceeding wanted to see if other states would join theirs. Some may even have been working behind the scenes to make sure that if secession came it would be successful.
Northern unionists didn't understand this. They took such hesitation about secession for real commitment to the union and saw hope for preserving the nation in it. Hesitation -- indeed opposition to secession -- was more real in the Upper South, at least up until Sumter, but was likewise overrated by Northerners. It wouldn't survive the outbreak of hostilities. In the North, what we read now as a debate about letting rebel states go or holding them in by force was often a debate about whether to make concessions to the slave states. That was the real question for many concerned. Many unionists wanted to stand firm and resist concessions, rather than to fight and conquer or to simply let go and let the country fall apart. Events overtook this debate. Before Sumter war was one cloudy possibility among others, after it, there appeared to be no alternative to fighting. Just as Northerners read Southern hesitancy as implying more unionist sentiment than it did, so Southerners read the Northern position as implying more acceptance of secession and unwillingness to fight than was the case.
But also, reluctance is one of the great elements of political persuasion, especially in 19th century American politics. If Caesar wants the crown, he is a tyrant. If Augustus has it thrust upon him by the Senate and people, he can't resist it. Washington became President in part because he didn't want it, and since then statesmen always took care not to appear to want office or power too much. Every candidate had to maintain that his party's nomination came to him unsought and unsolicited. That's why nominees didn't even go to the conventions in those days. Jefferson Davis was not a secessionist militant, but that didn't mean he was devoted to preserving the Union. Whether he appeared to hold back because of loyalty, prudence, caution or concealed ambition would be hard to resolve.
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