The framers -clearly- wanted a more powerful central government than existed under the Articles.
From Letters and Other Writings of James Madison,. New York: R. Worthington, 1884. 287-290.
To General Washington
New York, April 16th, 1787
Dear Sir,
--I have been honored with your letter of the 31 March, and find, with much pleasure, that your views of the reform which ought to be pursued by the Convention give a sanction to those I entertained. Temporizing applications will dishonor the councils which propose them, and may foment the internal malignity of the disease, at the same time that they produce an ostensible palliation of it. Radical attempts, although unsuccessful, will at least justify the authors of them.
Having been lately led to revolve the subject which is to undergo the discussion of the Convention, and formed some outlines of a new system, I take the liberty of submitting them without apology to your eye.
Conceiving that an individual independence of the States is utterly irreconcilable with their aggregate sovereignty, and that a consolidation of the whole into one simple republic would be as inexpedient as it is unattainable, I have sought for middle ground, which may at once support a due supremacy of the national authority, and not exclude the local authorities wherever they can be subordinately useful.
I would propose as the groundwork, that a change be made in the principle of representation. According to the present form of the Union, in which the intervention of the States is in all great cases necessary to effectuate the measures of Congress, an equality of suffrage does not destroy the inequality of importance in the several members. No one will deny that Virginia and Massachusetts have more weight and influence, both within and without Congress, than Delaware or Rhode Island. Under a system which would operate in many essential points without the intervention of the State legislatures, the case would be materially altered. A vote in the national Councils from Delaware would then have the same effect and value as one from the largest State in the Union. I am ready to believe that such a change would not be attended with much difficulty. A majority of the States, and those of greatest influence, will regard it as favorable to them. To the northern States it will be recommended by their present populousness; to the Southern, by their expected advantage in this respect. The lesser States must in every event yield to the predominant will. But the consideration which particularly urges a change in the representation is, that it will obviate the principal objections of the larger States to the necessary concessions of power.
I would propose next, that in addition to the present federal powers, the national Government should be armed with positive and complete authority in all cases which require uniformity; such as the regulation of trade, including the right of taxing both exports and imports, the fixing the terms and forms of naturalization, &c., &c.
Over and above this positive power, a negative in all cases whatsoever on the Legislative acts of the States, as heretofore exercised by the Kingly prerogative, appears to me to be absolutely necessary, and to be the least possible encroachment on the State jurisdictions. Without this defensive power, every positive power that can be given on paper will be evaded or defeated. The States will continue to invade the National jurisdiction, to violate treaties, and the law of nations, and to harass each other with rival and spiteful measures dictated by mistaken views of interest. . . .
The national supremacy ought also to be extended, as I conceive, to the Judiciary departments. If those who are to expound and apply the laws are connected by their interests and their oaths with the particular States wholly, and not with the Union, the participation of the Union in the making of the laws may be possibly rendered unavailing. It seems at least necessary that the oaths of the Judges should include a fidelity to the general as well as local Constitution, and that an appeal should lie to some National tribunal in all cases to which foreigners or inhabitants or other States may be parties. The admiralty jurisdiction seems to fall entirely within the purview of the National Government.
The National supremacy in the Executive departments is liable to some difficulty, unless the officers administering them could be made appointable by the Supreme Government. The Militia ought certainly to be placed, in some form or other, under the authority which is entrusted with the general protection and defense.
A Government composed of such extensive powers should be well organized and balanced. The legislative department might be divided into two branches; one of them chosen every. . .years, by the people at large, or by the Legislatures; the other to consist of fewer members, to hold their places for a longer term, and to go out in such rotation as always to leave in office a large majority of old members. Perhaps the negative on the laws might be most conveniently exercised by this branch. As a further check, a Council of revision, including the great ministerial officers, might be superadded.
A National Executive must also be provided. I have scarcely ventured, as yet, to form my own opinion either of the manner in which it ought to be constituted, or of the authorities with which it ought to be clothed. An article should be inserted expressly guaranteeing the tranquility of the States against internal as well as external dangers.
In like manner the right of coercion should be expressly declared. With the resources of commerce in hand, the National administration might always find means of exerting it either by sea or land. But the difficulty and awkwardness of operating by force on the collective will of a State render it particularly desirable that the necessity of it might be precluded. Perhaps the negative on the laws might create such a mutuality of dependence between the general and particular authorities as to answer this purpose. Or, perhaps, some defined objects of taxation might be submitted, along with commerce, to the general authority.
To give a new system its proper validity and energy, a ratification must be obtained from the people, and not merely from the ordination of the Legislatures. This will be the more essential, as inroads on the existing Constitutions of the States will be unavoidable."
Your premise is wrong.
Walt
I can't comment intelligently on that one Maidson letter without knowing its full context. However, one letter does not argue for unanimity of opinion on the matter during the founding period. Strong, even bitter differences of opinion existed throughout the period as regards state sovereignty vs. an all-powerful central government — or, to be more precise in describing the choice as they saw it, between preserving the newly independent states and fear of the establishment of a monarchy.
By all means, it's true that the members of the Constitutional Convention wanted to replace the weak Articles of Confederation with a stronger federal system. However, federalism meant something quite different to them than it does to us, today. Heck, it meant something different to the small vs. large states, to the northern vs. southern states, and to agrarians like Thomas Jefferson vs. urban businessmen and financiers like Alexander Hamilton. Their split on these very issues was the genesis of the American two-party system.
At one point early in the Constitutional Convention, Hamilton delivered a speech that seemed to argue for dissolution of the states entirely, and for the creation of a single central government with a monarchist slant. (Hamilton was an admirer of the British system of government.) The speech was most definitely not well-received by his fellow delegates. He left the convention and only returned months later.
In contrast, Jefferson despised the British and admired the French. He was in France at the time of the Convention. But we know from all of his writings during the period that, while he agreed with a strengthening of the federal system, he was opposed to a very strong, dominant central government. (When he finally became president, he didn't govern the way he had always written of his political beliefs, by the way.)
Over time, those who agreed with the Hamiltonian view (including Washington and Adams) became known as Federalists, and those who agreed with the Jeffersonian view became known as Democratic-Republicans. The seeds of the civil war were planted during the founding period, not just in their failure to deal with the slavery question, but also in this federalist vs. states rights question that only came to a head when South Carolina seceded.
She and the other southern states did so precisely because the states believed the Constitution did not bind them in a perpetual union. The Constitution is silent on the matter. (It would never have been ratified otherwise.) Solely as regards their right to secede, I believe the southern states were correct. Lincoln and many in the north obviously had a different view. That was the core issue of the Civil War, not slavery. Emancipation was a byproduct of Lincoln's fight to impose permanent union on the states.