Posted on 09/06/2003 9:14:08 AM PDT by quidnunc
Abraham Lincoln is thought of by many as not only the greatest American statesman but as a great conservative. He was neither. Understanding this is a necessary condition for any genuinely American conservatism. When Lincoln took office, the American polity was regarded as a compact between sovereign states which had created a central government as their agent, hedging it in by a doctrine of enumerated powers. Since the compact between the states was voluntary, secession was considered an option by public leaders in every section of the Union during the antebellum period. Given this tradition — deeply rooted in the Declaration of Independence — a great statesman in 1860 would have negotiated a settlement with the disaffected states, even if it meant the withdrawal of some from the Union. But Lincoln refused even to accept Confederate commissioners, much less negotiate with them. Most of the Union could have been kept together. Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas voted to remain in the Union even after the Confederacy was formed; they reversed themselves only when Lincoln decided on a war of coercion. A great statesman does not seduce his people into a needless war; he keeps them out of it.
When the Soviet Union dissolved by peaceful secession, it was only 70 years old — the same age as the United States when it dissolved in 1860. Did Gorbachev fail as a statesman because he negotiated a peaceful dissolution of the U.S.S.R.? Likewise, if all states west of the Mississippi were to secede tomorrow, would we praise, as a great statesman, a president who refused to negotiate and launched total war against the civilian population merely to preserve the Union? The number of Southerners who died as a result of Lincoln’s invasion was greater than the total of all Americans killed by Hitler and Tojo. By the end of the war, nearly one half of the white male population of military age was either dead or mutilated. No country in World War II suffered casualties of that magnitude.
Not only would Lincoln not receive Confederate commissioners, he refused, for three crucial months, to call Congress. Alone, he illegally raised money, illegally raised troops, and started the war. To crush Northern opposition, he suspended the writ of habeas corpus for the duration of the war and rounded up some 20,000 political prisoners. (Mussolini arrested some 12,000 but convicted only 1,624.) When the chief justice of the Supreme Court declared the suspension blatantly unconstitutional and ordered the prisoners released, Lincoln ordered his arrest. This American Caesar shut down over 300 newspapers, arrested editors, and smashed presses. He broke up state legislatures; arrested Democratic candidates who urged an armistice; and used the military to elect Republicans (including himself, in 1864, by a margin of around 38,000 popular votes). He illegally created a “state” in West Virginia and imported a large army of foreign mercenaries. B.H. Liddell Hart traces the origin of modern total war to Lincoln’s decision to direct war against the civilian population. Sherman acknowledged that, by the rules of war taught at West Point, he was guilty of war crimes punishable by death. But who was to enforce those rules?
These actions are justified by nationalist historians as the energetic and extraordinary efforts of a great helmsman rising to the painful duty of preserving an indivisible Union. But Lincoln had inherited no such Union from the Framers. Rather, like Bismarck, he created one with a policy of blood and iron. What we call the “Civil War” was in fact America’s French Revolution, and Lincoln was the first Jacobin president. He claimed legitimacy for his actions with a “conservative” rhetoric, rooted in an historically false theory of the Constitution which held that the states had never been sovereign. The Union created the states, he said, not the states the Union. In time, this corrupt and corrupting doctrine would suck nearly every reserved power of the states into the central government. Lincoln seared into the American mind an ideological style of politics which, through a sort of alchemy, transmuted a federative “union” of states into a French revolutionary “nation” launched on an unending global mission of achieving equality. Lincoln’s corrupt constitutionalism and his ideological style of politics have, over time, led to the hollowing out of traditional American society and the obscene concentration of power in the central government that the Constitution was explicitly designed to prevent.
A genuinely American conservatism, then, must adopt the project of preserving and restoring the decentralized federative polity of the Framers rooted in state and local sovereignty. The central government has no constitutional authority to do most of what it does today. The first question posed by an authentic American conservative politics is not whether a policy is good or bad, but what agency (the states or the central government — if either) has the authority to enact it. This is the principle of subsidiarity: that as much as possible should be done by the smallest political unit.
The Democratic and Republican parties are Lincolnian parties. Neither honestly questions the limits of federal authority to do this or that. In 1861, the central government broke free from what Jefferson called “the chains of the Constitution,” and we have, consequently, inherited a fractured historical memory. There are now two Americanisms: pre-Lincolnian and post-Lincolnian. The latter is Jacobinism by other means. Only the former can lay claim to being the primordial American conservatism.
David W. Livingston is a professor of philosophy at Emory University and the author of Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium (University of Chicago Press).
LINCOLN PROCLAMATION OF 4/15/61
Whereas the laws of the United States have been for some time past, and now are opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed, in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the Marshals by law,
Now therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution, and the laws, have thought fit to call forth, and hereby do call forth, the militia of the several States of the Union, to the aggregate number of seventy-five thousand, in order to suppress said combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed. The details, for this object, will be immediately communicated to the State authorities through the War Department.
I appeal to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence of our National Union, and the perpetuity of popular government; and to redress wrongs already long enough endured.
I deem it proper to say that the first service assigned to the forces hereby called forth will probably be to re-possess the forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union; and in every event, the utmost care will be observed, consistently with the objects aforesaid, to avoid any devastation, any destruction of, or interference with, property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens in any part of the country.
And I hereby command the persons composing the combinations aforesaid to disperse, and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within twenty days from this date.
Deeming that the present condition of public affairs presents an extraordinary occasion, I do hereby, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution, convene both Houses of Congress. Senators and Representatives are therefore summoned to assemble at their respective chambers, at 12 o'clock, noon, on Thursday, the fourth day of July, next, then and there to consider and determine, such measures, as, in their wisdom, the public safety, and interest may seem to demand.
In Witness Whereof I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the Seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the city of Washington this fifteenth day of April in the year of our Lord One thousand, Eight hundred and Sixtyone, and of the Independence the United States the Eightyfifth.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN
By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.
PS - If you want to phrase the argument well, clip something from Gladstone and all his Democratic Party admirers during the days that Britain maintained a free trade policy and ran it's economy into second place behind the booming protectionist US.
"what is the Chinese have been doing"?? Exactly what is that supposed to mean? Must by some sort of AFL-CIO coded thug-speak.
Post hoc ergo propter hoc is insufficient as an argument for much of anything. Try again.
If the US had only bought steel at the lowest prices from the days of the Civil War on, it would never have had any steel industry. Now, again, and again, explain just how great that would have been for the country.
It's "Forsan et haec olim meminisse iuvabit," you idiot.
If the US had only bought steel at the lowest prices from the days of the Civil War on, it would never have had any steel industry.
False. The US already had a steel before the civil war therefore your claim cannot be true. In fact it was that steel industry that campaigned for the overtly protective Morrill tariff act.
Yes, and they got it and the steel industry grew into the greatest in the world.
Now, answer my question.
(I know you never will because you literally can't. )
Opinion of Judge Black, November 20, 1860
The Tenth chapter of this volume having been given to the press in advance of formal publication, many inquiries have been received in regard to the text of Judge Black's opinion of November 20, 1860, referred to on pp. 231, 232. The opinion was submitted to the President by Judge Black as Attorney-General. So much of the opinion as includes the points which are specially controverted and criticised is here given — about one-half of the entire document. It is as follows:—
. . . "I come now to the point in your letter which is probably of the greatest practical importance. By the Act of 1807 you may employ such parts of the land and naval forces as you may judge necessary for the purpose of causing the laws to be duly executed, in all cases where it is lawful to use the militia for the same purpose. By the Act of 1795 the militia may be called forth 'whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed, in any State by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of Judicial proceedings, or by the power vested in the marshals.' This imposes upon the President the sole responsibility of deciding whether the exigency has arisen which requires the use of military force, and in proportion to the magnitude of that responsibility will be his care not to overstep the limits of his legal and just authority.
"The laws referred to in the Act of 1795 are manifestly those which are administered by the judges, and executed by the ministerial officers of the courts for the punishment of crime against the United States, for the protection of rights claimed under the Federal Constitution and laws, and for the enforcement of such obligations as come within the cognizance of the Federal Judiciary. To compel obedience to these laws, the courts have authority to punish all who obstruct their regular administration, and the marshals and their deputies have the same powers as sheriffs and their deputies in the several States in executing the laws of the States. These are the ordinary means provided for the execution of the laws; and the whole spirit of our system is opposed to the employment of any other, except in cases of extreme necessity arising out of great and unusual combinations against them. Their agency must continue to be used until their incapacity to cope with the power opposed to them shall be plainly demonstrated. It is only upon clear evidence to that effect that a military force can be called into the field. Even then its operations must be purely defensive. It can suppress only such combinations as are found directly opposing the laws and obstructing the execution thereof. It can do no more than what might and ought to be done by a civil posse, if a civil posse could be raised large enough to meet the same opposition. On such occasions, especially, the military power must be kept in strict subordination to the civil authority, since it is only in aid of the latter that the former can act at all.
"But what if the feeling in any State against the United States should become so universal that the Federal officers themselves (including judges, district attorneys, and marshals) would be reached by the same influences, and resign their places? Of course, the first step would be to appoint others in their stead, if others could be got to serve. But in such an event, it is more than probable that great difficulty would be found in filling the offices. We can easily conceive how it might become altogether impossible. We are therefore obliged to consider what can be done in case we have no courts to issue judicial process, and no ministerial officers to execute it. In that event troops would certainly be out of place, and their use wholly illegal. If they are sent to aid the courts and marshals, there must be courts and marshals to be aided. Without the exercise of those functions which belong exclusively to the civil service, the laws cannot be executed in any event, no matter what may be the physical strength which the Government has at its command. Under such circumstances to send a military force into any State, with orders to act against the people, would be simply making war upon them.
"The existing laws put and keep the Federal Government strictly on the defensive. You can use force only to repel an assault on the public property and aid the Courts in the performance of their duty. If the means given you to collect the revenue and execute the other laws be insufficient for that purpose, Congress may extend and make them more effectual to those ends.
"If one of the States should declare her independence, your action cannot depend on the rightfulness of the cause upon which such declaration is based. Whether the retirement of the State from the Union be the exercise of a right reserved in the Constitution, or a revolutionary movement, it is certain that you have not in either case the authority to recognize her independence or to absolve her from her Federal obligations. Congress, or the other States in Convention assembled, must take such measures as may be necessary and proper. In such an event, I see no course for you but to go straight onward in the path you have hitherto trodden — that is, execute the laws to the extent of the defensive means placed in your hands, and act generally upon the assumption that the present constitutional relations between the States and the Federal Gevernment continue to exist, until a new code of things shall be established either by law or force.
"Whether Congress has the constitutionsal right to make war against one or more States, and require the Executive of the Federal Government to carry it on by means of force to be drawn from the other States, is a question for Congress itself to consider. It must be admitted that no such power is expressly given; nor are there any words in the Constitution which imply it. Among the powers enumerated in Article 1, Section 8, is that 'to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to make rules concerning captures on land and water.' This certainly means nothing more than the power to commence and carry on hostilities against the foreign enemies of the nation. Another clause in the same section gives Congress the power 'to provide for calling forth the militia,' and to use them within the limits of the State. But this power is so restricted by the words which immediately follow that it can be exercised only for one of the following purposes:
1. To execute the laws of the Union; that is, to aid the Federal officers in the performance of their regular duties.2. To suppress insurrections against the State; but this is confined by Article 4, Section 4, to cases in which the State herself shall apply for assistance against her own people.
3. To repel the invasion of a State by enemies who come from abroad to assail her in her own territory.
All these provisions are made to protect the States, not to authorize an attack by one part of the country upon another; to preserve the peace, and not to plunge them into civil war. Our forefathers do not seem to have thought that war was calculated 'to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.' There was undoubtedly a strong and universal conviction among the men who framed and ratified the Constitution, that military force would not only be useless, but pernicious, as a means of holding the States together.
"If it be true that war cannot be declared, nor a system of general hostilities carried on by the Central Government against a State, then it seems to follow that an attempt to do so would be ipso facto an expulsion of such State from the Union. Being treated as an alien and an enemy, she would be compelled to act accordingly. And if Congress shall break up the present Union by unconstitutionally putting strife and enmity and armed hostility between different sections of the country, instead of the domestic tranquillity which the Constitution was meant to insure, will not all the States be absolved from their Federal obligations? Is any portion of the people bound to contribute their money or their blood to carry on a contest like that?
"The right of the General Government to preserve itself in its whole constitutional vigor by repelling a direct and positive aggression upon its property or its officers cannot by denied. But this is a totally different thing from an offensive war to punish the people for the political misdeeds of their State Government, or to enforce an acknowledgment that the Government of the United States is supreme. The States are colleagues of one another, and if some of them shall conquer the rest, and hold them as subjugated provinces, it would totally destroy the whole theory upon which they are now connected.
"If this view of the subject be correct, as I think it is, then the Union must utterly perish at the moment when Congress shall arm one part of the people against another for any purpose beyond that of merely protecting the General Government in the exercise of its proper constitutional functions.
"I am, very respectfully, yours, etc.,
"J. S. BLACK."
http://laws.findlaw.com/us/67/635.html
"THE PRIZE CASES"
U.S. Supreme Court 67 U.S. 635 (1862)
There are certain propositions of law which must necessarily affect the ultimate decision of these cases, and many others, which it will be proper to discuss and decide before we notice the special facts peculiar to each.
They are,
1st. Had the President a right to institute a blockade of ports in possession of persons in armed rebellion against the Government, on the principles of international law, as known and acknowledged among civilized States?
2d. Was the property of persons domiciled or residing within those States a proper subject of capture on the sea as 'enemies' property?'
But by the Acts of Congress of February 28th, 1795, and 3d of March, 1807, he is authorized to called out the militia and use the military and naval forces of the United States in case of invasion by foreign nations, and to suppress insurrection against the government of a State or of the United States.
* * *
He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority. And whether the hostile party be a foreign invader, or States organized in rebellion, it is none the less a war, although the declaration of it be 'unilateral.'
* * *
This greatest of civil wars was not gradually developed by popular commotion, tumultuous assemblies, or local unorganized insurrections. However long may have been its previous conception, it nevertheless sprung forth suddenly from the parent brain, a Minerva in the full panoply of war. The President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name given to it by him or them could change the fact. It is not the less a civil war, with belligerent parties in hostile array, because it may be called an 'insurrection' by one side, and the insurgents be considered as rebels or traitors. It is not necessary that the independence of the revolted province or State be acknowledged in order to constitute it a party belligerent in a war according to the law of nations.
* * *
It presented itself in the form of Lincoln ordering armed forces to supply, reinforceand hold forts and to thereby violate an existing armistice. Lincoln then lied to Congress about the orders that were given, lied about knowledge of the armistice and refused to provide information to Congress about it, lied about an officer sent to Fort Pickens and taken prisoner of war and refused a request of Congress to provide information about that. There is no indication that the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth was presented to the Court either. To do otherwise constituted perpetrating a fraud upon the Court.
The Militia Act of 1795http://www.geocities.com/irby.geo/fed/1795militiaact.html
The 1795 Act For Calling Forth The Militia
* * *
SEC. 2. That whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed, in any state, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by this act, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the militia of such state, or of any other state or states, as may be necessary to suppress such combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed; and the use of militia so to be called forth may be continued, if necessary, until the expiration of thirty days after the commencement of the then next session of Congress.
* * *
SEC. 4. ... and that no officer, non-commissioned officer, or private, of the militia, shall be compelled to serve more than three months after his arrival at the place of rendezvous, in any one year, nor more than in due rotation with every other able-bodied man of the same rank in the battalion to which he belongs.
Once upon a time, Good Father Abraham called up 75,000 militia to suppress all of the armed forces of the Confederate States of America. He honestly expected that these 75,000 militia could finish this task in three months or less.
To be precise, the majority of the people were black, and their views were not even consulted by the southern plutocrats. Therefore they were still members of the Union, then, now, and I hope, forever. The rest of us need you to make a critical mass to lower taxes and roll back government corruption and largesse. In Union we may all be free, in separation, we become subject to Force Majure.
The majority of the black people were slaves and were not citizens of the United States or any of the several states in question. Your argument has great philosophical merit but zero legal merit. We are addressing the legal merits of a question.
DRED SCOTT v. SANDFORD, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citizen?
* * *
The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens' are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the Government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the 'sovereign people,' and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate [60 U.S. 393, 405] and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.
It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political or law-making power; to those who formed the sovereignty and framed the Constitution. The duty of the court is, to interpret the instrument they have framed, with the best lights we can obtain on the subject, and to administer it as we find it, according to its true intent and meaning when it was adopted.
* * *
April 1, 1861
To Captain H.A. Adams
Commanding Naval Forces off Pensacola
Herewith I send you a copy of an order received by me last night. You will see by it that I am directed to land my command at the earliest opportunity. I have therefore to request that you will place at my disposal such boats and other means as will enable me to carry into effect the enclosed order.
Signed: I. Vogdes, Capt. 1st Artly. Comdg.
Captain Adams REFUSED TO OBEY THE ORDER and reported to the Secretary of the Navy as follows:
It would be considered not only a declaration but an act of war; and would be resisted to the utmost.
Both sides are faithfully observing the agreement (armistice) entered into by the United States Government and Mr. Mallory and Colonel Chase, which binds us not to reinforce Fort Pickens unless it shall be attacked or threatened. It binds them not to attack it unless we should attempt to reinforce it.
The Secretary of the Navy issued a CLASSIFIED response to Capt. Adams:
April 6, 1861
Your dispatch of April 1st is received. The Department regrets that you did not comply with the request of Capt. Vogdes. You will immediately on the first favorable opportunity after receipt of this order, afford every facility to Capt. Vogdes to enable him to land the troops under his command, it being the wish and intention of the Navy Department to co-operate with the War Department, in that object.
Signed: Gideon Welles, Secty. of the Navy
April 11, 1861 (USS Supply, official ship's log)
"April 11th at 9 P.M. the Brooklyn got under way and stood in toward the harbor; and during the night landed troops and marines on board, to reinforce Fort Pickens."
FROM THE OFFICIAL RECORDS
O.R. Series 1, Vol. 1, Part 1, Page 378
FORT PICKENS, FLA., April 16, 1861.
To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Department of the East:
SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 14th instant it was reported to me that a small boat had landed at the wharf with a flag of truce, and that the bearer solicited an interview with the commanding officer of the post. I requested Lieutenant Slemmer, of the First Artillery, to accompany me, and repaired to the wharf. On my arrival the gentleman bearing the flag informed me that he was the bearer of a message from General Bragg, and that he was his adjutant-general. He then inquired whether I was the commanding officer of the fort. I replied that I was. He then stated that he was directed by General Bragg to inquire why the armistice in respect to re-enforcing Fort Pickens had been violated by throwing re-enforcements into it. I replied that I had never been a party to any armistice; that I had been sent by the general Government to take command of the post, and had entered under the orders of the General Government. He then addressed himself to Lieutenant Slemmer, and stated that he was directed to inquire of the former commanding officer why the armistice had been violated, to which Lieutenant Slemmer replied that he always obeyed the orders of his superiors. This ended our official interview. After exchanging the usual civilities customary among gentleman previously acquainted, we parted, and Colonel Wood left the post. I would mention that Lieutenant Ingraham, formerly of the Marine corps, was present during the interview as a witness on the part of Colonel Wood, and that Lieutenant Slemmer, at my request, performed the same duty on my part.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
I. VOGDES,
Captain, First Artillery, Commanding Fort Pickens.
O.R. Series 1, Vol. 1, Part 1, Page 440-1
Message of the President of the United States, in answer to a resolution of the Senate requesting information concerning the quasi armistice alluded to in his message of the 4th instant.
JULY 31, 1861.- Read, ordered to lie on the table and be printed.
To the Senate of the United States:
In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 19th instant, requesting information concerning the quasi armistice alluded to in my message of the 4th instant, I transmit a report from the Secretary of War.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
JULY 30, 1861.
NAVY DEPARTMENT,
July 29, 1861.
The Secretary of the Navy, to whom was referred the resolution of the Senate of the 19th instant, requesting the President of the United States to "communicate to the Senate (if not incompatible with the public interest) the character of the quasi armistice to which he refers in his message of the 4th instant, be reason of which the commander of the frigate Sabine refused to transfer the United States troops into Fort Pickens in obedience to his orders; by whom and when such armistice was entered into; and if any, and what, action has been taken by the Government in view of the disobedience of the order of the President aforesaid," has the honor to report that it is believed the communication of the information called for would not, at this time, comport with the public interest.
Respectfully submitted.
GIDEON WELLES.
The PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
============
Why was it there? You make it sound as if it served no particular purpose, was just a government boondoggle, and its evacuation would have been a benefit by saving taxpayer dollars.
The South had lowered tariffs at its ports. If this were not stopped, commerce would have proceeded South unless the North dropped its tariffs. So, we had a war.
South Carolina did not, the legislature set up the convention and approved secession on their own. North Carolina put the matter to the people, who voted against it, and then the legislature seceded anyway. The Texas legislature and the Virginia legislature voted to secede, claiming that the action was pending the approval of a popular referendum, but both states were admitted to the confederate states before those referendum took place.
But that didn't answer the question, did any of the state legislatures have the authority Rawle mentioned to take their state out of the Union? If so, then what gave them that authority and when did they get it?
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