Posted on 08/20/2003 2:43:26 PM PDT by angkor
With regard to today's refusal to hear the case against Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore, the court has at least delayed a legal decision about defacing its own hallowed halls.
It is likely well-known to the justices that the East Pediment of the Supreme Court showcases the image of Moses bearing the two tablets upon which the 10 Commandments are enscribed. In fact, Moses is front and center and indeed the largest figure in the entire sculpture.
Ironically, the Chief Justice's offices are immediately behind this portico.
Moses center stage on the USSC East Pediment, brandishing his illegal "Ten Commandments."
The sculpture, "Justice the Guardian of Liberty" by Herman McNeil contains the following elements (in McNeil's own words):
Law as an element of civilization was normally and naturally derived or inherited in this country from former civilizations. The “Eastern Pediment” of the Supreme Court Building suggests therefore the treatment of such fundamental laws and precepts as are derived from the East. Moses, Confucius and Solon are chosen as representing three great civilizations and form the central group of this Pediment. Flanking this central group— left — is the symbolical figure bearing the means of enforcing the law. On the right a group tempering justice with mercy, allegorically treated. The “Youth” is brought into both these groups to suggest the “Carrying on” of civilization through the knowledge imbibed of right and wrong. The next two figures with shields; Left — The settlement of disputes between states through enlightened judgment. Right — Maritime and other large functions of the Supreme Court in protection of the United States. The last figures: Left — Study and pondering of judgments. Right — A tribute to the fundamental and supreme character of this Court. Finale — The fable of the Tortoise and the Hare.
Ask the Supreme Court. They're all prominently featured, next to the 10 Commandments, in the Court's chambers.
On a lighter note, one of my favorite people, a Jewish woman who was a very close friend of my family for more than fifty years always told me that the funniest thing she had ever seen was the incident in a Mel Brooks movie when Moses comes down from Mt. Sinai. Moses says, "I have brought you the Fifteen Commandments." Then one of the tablets falls and shatters and he says: "... I mean the Ten Commandments."
Help me out here, what is the specific law that denies Judge Moore his personal religious freedom of expression?
What specific law causes Judge Moore to give up his own right to freely his express his religion when he enters state property?
Exactly. This is all about Roy Moore.
LOL!! Egg-zactly!!!
He is not just some citizen reading a bible in the building, he is the 'State' for all practical purposes in that building. Much as a teacher is not as free in a classroom as on a sidewalk to expouse religious beliefs, Judge Moore is not just some Alabama citizen trying to express his rights. He is the head Judicial officer in that State and is choosing to decorate the main judicial building in his religion to the exclusion of others.
Please look beyond whether you personally agree with Moore. The right you are fighting for is for any Judge, Police Chief, etc. to make their buildings (not their offices) religiously oriented.
And yet, where is it physically written that teachers surrender their right to freely express their religious beliefs once they enter certain government property?
Gotta read the court decision, grasshopper. Google for "Glassroth v. Moore":
Others have requested that the Chief Justice add additional items to the rotunda, requests that the Chief Justice has denied because the proposed items did not comport with the moral foundation of law theme. Alabama State Representative Alvin Holmes requested the inclusion of a monument containing Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" speech, a request that the Chief Justice denied. In denying this request, the Chief Justice stated, "The placement of a speech of any man alongside the revealed law of God would tend in consequence to diminish the very purpose of the Ten Commandments monument." Additionally, an atheist group's request to display a sculpture of an atheist symbol--an atom--was denied by the Chief Justice as inconsistent with the rotunda's theme.
A little more, just for the heck of it...
Chief Justice Moore contends that the plaintiffs, and even the United States Supreme Court, have failed to give an appropriate definition of religion; he maintains that an Establishment Clause challenge cannot be resolved with fidelity to the original intent of the framers without adopting a definition of the word "religion" that comports with his understanding of the Establishment Clause.By the Chief Justice's definition, as stated at trial in reference to his law review article, "religion" means nothing more than "the duties we owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging those duties." Hon. Roy S. Moore, Religion in the Public Square, 29 Cumb. L. Rev. 347, 352 (1998/1999). Relying on this definition, the Chief Justice views the Establishment Clause as simply preventing government from establishing the duties one owes to God and the manner of discharging those duties. This understanding, according, to his testimony at trial, "is derived from the Judeo-Christian view of the sovereignty of God, not the Buddhist view of God or the Hindu view of God, or the Taoist view of God, or the secular humanist view of God." Similarly, the Chief Justice has written that, "By leaving religion [seemingly] undefined, the [Supreme] Court has opened the door to the erroneous assumption that, under the Establishment Clause, religion could include Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, and whatever might occupy in man's life a place parallel to that filled by God ... In such a case, God and religion are: no longer distinguished in meaning, permitting the First Amendment to be used to exclude the very object it was meant to protect, namely the sovereignty of God over civil government."
In short, his definition of religion would permit the First Amendment to do what he believes it was intended to do: "to protect ... the sovereignty of God over civil government," id., and sovereignty of the Judeo-Christian God only.
While the court agrees with the Chief Justice that an understanding of "religion" for First Amendment purposes must constitute more than just the acknowledgment of God, it is not inclined to agree with his semantic distinction between "faith" and "religion." In Webster's Third New International Dictionary 816 (1976), "faith" is defined as "1(a): the act or state of wholeheartedly and steadfastly believing in the existence, power, and benevolence of a supreme being ...; belief and trust in and loyalty to God; (b) (1): an act or attitude of intellectual assent to the traditional doctrines of one's religion; orthodox religious belief." In that dictionary, id. at 1918, "religion" is defined as "1: the personal commitment to and serving of God or a god with worshipful devotion, conduct in accord with divine commands especially as founded in accepted sacred writings or declared by authoritative teachers, a way of life recognized as incumbent on true believers, and typically the relation of oneself to an organized body of believers."
Under these definitions, Muslims, for example, would call Islam both their "faith" (they believe in the existence of a supreme being) and their "religion" (they have a personal commitment to a God). Under the Chief Justice's understanding and definition of religion, however, Islam is not a "religion," even though it clearly prescribes duties owed to the Creator and the manner of discharging those duties, but it is a "faith." Islam is not a religion under the Chief Justice's views because Muslims do not worship the Judeo-Christian God. While Muslims have a personal commitment to a God, they do not have a personal commitment to the God of the founders; or, using the Chief Justice's definition of religion, Muslims owe duties to their creator and have ways of discharging those duties, but they do not owe the same duties to their creator nor do they have the same manner of discharging those duties as the founders. The court cannot accept a definition of religion that would lead to such a conclusion.
Indeed, the Chief Justice's definition of religion proves, if anything, that it is unwise, and even dangerous, to put forth, as a matter of law, one definition of religion under the First Amendment.
The court, for several reasons, rejects the Chief Justice's invitation to define the term "religion." First and foremost, to adopt the Chief Justice's definition of religion would be to reject explicitly the precedent established by a number of Supreme Court cases, from Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 91 L. Ed. 711, 67 S. Ct. 504 (1947), to Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, U.S. 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002), which would have been decided differently under the Chief Justice's proposed definition. Without cataloguing the many cases that would be resolved differently given the Chief Justice's definition of religion, the court will discuss a number of examples to illustrate this point.
Under the Chief Justice's definition of religion, religious display cases, such as County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989), would be decided differently. In Allegheny, the court found unconstitutional the display of a creche in a government building, id. at 579, 109 S. Ct. at 3093, an outcome that would certainly change if the Establishment Clause prohibited no more than an Establishment of "the duties we owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging those duties." School prayer cases, too, such as Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985), or Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000), would be resolved differently. In Wallace, the Court found unconstitutional a statute designed to return voluntary prayer to schools, 472 U.S. at 61, 105 S. Ct. at 2492; in Santa Fe, the Court found unconstitutional a policy of student-led prayer before football games, 530 U.S. at 317, 120 S. Ct. at 2283. Again, under the Chief Justice's limited definition of religion, both of these cases would have been decided differently as voluntary prayers cannot establish "the duties we owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging those duties."
By adopting the Chief Justice's definition, then, the court would not only be deciding this case, but would be implicitly overruling a number of Supreme Court cases. This it cannot do: the court is strictly bound by Supreme Court precedent; only that Court has the ability to overturn its previous decisions. See, e.g., Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Under our form of government and long established law and custom, the Supreme Court is the ultimate authority on the interpretation of our Constitution and laws; its interpretations may not be disregarded. ... If the Supreme Court errs, no other court may correct it."), aff'd,472 U.S. 38, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985); see also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375, 70 L. Ed. 2d 556, 102 S. Ct. 703, 706 (1982) ("But unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be."). Under current Supreme Court precedent, this court simply must decide on which side of the Establishment Clause "barrier," Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614, 91 S. Ct. at 2112, the Chief Justice's installation of the monument falls. It need not, and in fact cannot, accept the Chief Justice's definition of the word "religion" because, by doing so, the court would implicitly overrule a number of Supreme Court decisions.
Second, the court cannot accept the Chief Justice's proposed definition of the word "religion" because it is, simply put, incorrect and religiously offensive. The court cannot accept a definition of religion that does not acknowledge Buddhism or Islam as a religion under the First Amendment, and would in fact directly violate Supreme Court precedent by doing so. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 590, 109 S. Ct. at 3099 ("Perhaps in the early days of the Republic these words were understood to protect only the diversity within Christianity, but today they are recognized as guaranteeing religious liberty and equality to 'the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism.'") (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S. at 52, 105 S. Ct. at 2487)
If you are referring to the Glassroth decision, no such written statute was cited, only other earlier court rulings.
So I'll ask you again, what specific written law compels a judge or a teacher to forfeit their own personal rights of religious expression when they enter certain government property?
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