Why The War Was Not About Slavery

Conventional wisdom of the moment tells us that the great war of 1861—1865 was “about” slavery or was “caused by” slavery. I submit that this is not a historical judgment but a political slogan. What a war is about has many answers according to the varied perspectives of different participants and of those who come after. To limit so vast an event as that war to one cause is to show contempt for the complexities of history as a quest for the understanding of human action.

Two generations ago, most perceptive historians, much more learned than the current crop, said that the war was “about” economics and was “caused by” economic rivalry. The war has not changed one bit since then. The perspective has changed. It can change again as long as people have the freedom to think about the past. History is not a mathematical calculation or scientific experiment but a vast drama of which there is always more to be learned.

I was much struck by Barbara Marthal’s insistence in her Stone Mountain talk on the importance of stories in understanding history. I entirely concur. History is the experience of human beings. History is a story and a story is somebody’s story. It tells us about who people are. History is not a political ideological slogan like “about slavery.” Ideological slogans are accusations and instruments of conflict and domination. Stories are instruments of understanding and peace.

Let’s consider the war and slavery. Again and again I encounter people who say that the South Carolina secession ordinance mentions the defense of slavery and that one fact proves beyond argument that the war was caused by slavery. The first States to secede did mention a threat to slavery as a motive for secession. They also mentioned decades of economic exploitation.

Right, a similar quote was claimed by CSA Col. Baldwin post-war from his meeting with Lincoln in April 1861. But neither quote is verified and both are at odds with what we know of the time, most especially the fact that only a tiny fraction of Federal revenues came directly from Confederate ports.

Baldwin's sworn testimony was verified by others in Virginia to whom he told exactly the same things shortly after meeting with Lincoln. With respect to the one hour long meeting Lincoln had with the 30 members of the Baltimore Young Men's Christian Associations, have you found any reports that members of that delegation disavowed what the Baltimore Sun and The Daily Exchange of Baltimore said of the meeting were not true or that Baldwin's testimony was false? No? We are supposed to believe you instead?

I recognize that Baldwin's testimony and two reports of the meeting with the Baltimore YMCA group lay bare in Lincoln's own words why Lincoln didn't want peace.

Certainly a small fraction of Federal revenue "came directly from Confederate ports." Imports were often stored in the large warehouses in the New York City area, and revenue was collected in New York when a sale of an item occurred and the item removed from a warehouse. That says nothing about where the item was shipped to.

Thomas Prentice Kettell, in his 1860 book, "Southern Wealth and Northern Profits," estimates on page 74 that based on annual reports of the Secretary of the Treasury on import consumption in the different regions of the US that $106 million of the 1859 total import of $318 million was consumed by the South. In addition to that, he estimates, based on earlier figures for how much the South spent on Northern manufactured goods, that the South bought $240 million worth of those Northern goods in 1859.

So, if the South started importing those foreign goods directly into their ports (i.e., Southern ports where the tariff was considerably less than the tariff in New York), Lincoln's tariff revenue could fall by as much as a third and maybe more if imports into Southern ports were smuggled into the North to avoid the Northern tariff. No wonder Lincoln was concerned about revenue. But you seem convinced that Lincoln somehow wasn't concerned about that potential loss in federal revenue. If so, would you please explain how you reach that conclusion.

You say: both are at odds with what we know of the time

Would you please provide some background on "what we know of the time" that conflicts with what Lincoln is reported to have said?

rockrr, I am sorry that you apparently don't want to see references to what Lincoln reportedly said about revenue because you have seen them before on other threads. Much of the discussion on this present thread dealt with revenue, but I was the only person who brought up Lincoln's famous words about it. Lincoln's words appear to me to be very germane in explaining why Lincoln did what he did. Some on these threads scoff at reports of what Lincoln reportedly said and may never be convinced of their legitimacy. That is their right.

[me] Some of us know that the Mayor or Governor (don’t remember which) back in January 1861 offered to provide Anderson with food for his troops at Fort Sumter. Anderson refused the offer, preferring instead to buy food in Charleston. The Confederates let Anderson do that until April 7....Some “bread to the starving garrison” that was.

[You] Really? So - according to you - Ft Sumter didn’t need supplies? Pity Fort Sumter didn’t bother to inform Washington, which sent two expeditions to deliver supplies!

From "Days of Defiance" by Maury Klein, page 246-247:

Food posed another obvious yet subtle problem. The truce allowed the garrison to procure supplies in the Charleston markets as they had always done. In January Pickens had sent to Sumter a supply of fresh meet and vegetables, telling Anderson he would provide more every day on order from the major. The excited troops carried the food directly to the kitchen only to be told by Anderson to return everything to the boat. In a polite note he told Pickens that he could accept nothing that was not purchased by his own men in the usual way. The men mourned their loss but made no complaint.

A few days later Anderson wrote the contractor who had always supplies him with beef to renew his shipments, but no meat came. Anderson suspected that the contractor feared reprisals if he sold to the Yankees, but the explanation proved even simpler. The contractor had not been paid for seven months and hesitated to ship more meat. Once money reached his hands, the shipment of beef resumed. Still supplies remained tight.

Was there a problem with accessing enough money from the federal government to feed the soldiers, the women in the fort, and the various civilian workers that remained in the fort? The federal government was having severe budget problems at this time. Seeing his shrinking food supply, Anderson asked Pickens if he could remove the 42 women and children from the fort. The women and children had been taken Fort Sumter in a ship that Anderson's men had kidnapped by overpowering the ship captain and putting him in the hold. The captain didn't want to take them to Fort Sumter, a voyage forbidden by the SC government.

It is possible that the Confederate government might have put some restrictions of food going to the fort, particularly when the food began to be running out, and the government realized they might starve the soldiers out of the fort. But on April 1, 1861, a large quantity of food was purchased in Charleston by Anderson's Captain Foster for his "employees" (the civilian workers who remained in the fort). The food was consumed by the civilian workers. Why wasn't there federal money enough to get food for the soldiers too? Was the government still having not enough income to meet the government's expenses? Anyway, for whatever reason, the food supplies for the soldiers continued to dwindle.

On April 7, Anderson sends a note to Washington saying, "You will see by the inclosed letter, just received from Brigadier-General Beauregard that we shall not get any more supplies from the city of Charleston." The Confederates knew the warships and troops were coming from the North.

“But on April 1, 1861, a large quantity of food was purchased in Charleston by Anderson’s Captain Foster for his “employees” (the civilian workers who remained in the fort). The food was consumed by the civilian workers. Why wasn’t there federal money enough to get food for the soldiers too?”

Odd that NO ONE in the fort knew they had enough food! Odd that NO ONE in Washington DC knew they had enough food! Odd that the commander of the fort didn’t know they had enough food!

Every once in a while, one needs to put 5 seconds of thought into something before swallowing it hook, line and sinker!

Is it possible that the fort had enough food, but the commander of the fort and his subordinated did not KNOW they had food?

“It is possible that the Confederate government might have put some restrictions of food going to the fort, particularly when the food began to be running out, and the government realized they might starve the soldiers out of the fort.”

You think? Maybe? Do you believe, for one moment, that Anderson WANTED to starve? That he was just too proud to accept food? AND THAT NO ONE KNEW THE FOOD WAS AVAILABLE? Why did he write Washington in the beginning of March that he had a 4-6 week supply of food?

Do you think President Buchanan was kept in the dark about the food sitting at Ft Sumter? Do you think Anderson lied to Lincoln?

All of this HOGWASH to prevent admitting the South WANTED the war. Why did they WANT the war to start?

“But whatever luxury Davis may have once had was evaporated last week when the state secession convention in Virginia decisively voted against secession, which all but killed the idea that Virginia and the seven other slave-holding border states might of their own free will and volition peaceably choose to join the Confederacy. This left the nascent nation comprised of seven states, populated by five million people, not very rich, not very powerful and not especially unified.

One week after Virginia’s decision, the possibility that the Confederacy had already peaked was prompting a fear that some southerners might start remorsefully seeking reconstruction with the North. Resolving the Fort Sumter stand-off would be the antidote to that infection. “The country is sinking into a fatal apathy, and even the patriotism of the people is oozing out under this do-nothing policy,’’ said the Mobile Mercury. “If something decisive is not done pretty soon, either evacuation or expulsion, the whole country will become so disgusted with the sham of southern independence that the first chance the people get at a popular election they will turn the whole movement topsy-turvy.’’

The Charleston Mercury forcefully agreed. “Border southern states will never join us until we have indicated our power to free ourselves — until we have proven that a garrison of seventy men cannot hold the portal of our commerce. Let us be ready for war. The fate of the southern Confederacy hangs by the ensign halyards of Fort Sumter.’’

Speaking to Davis at a cabinet meeting in Montgomery, J.G. Gilchrist, one of the secession leaders in Alabama, made the point most sharply of all. “South Carolina has the power of putting us beyond the reach of reconstruction by taking Fort Sumter. … Unless you sprinkle blood in the face of the people of Alabama, they will be back in the old union in less than ten days.’’

Davis could not have relished the prospect of war — he knew the South’s deficiencies in manpower, arms, wealth — but neither was he surprised to find its grievous image at his council table. Five times in his inaugural address he made reference to its gathering threat, and surely his own military background as a graduate of West Point, as commander during the Mexican war and as secretary of war commended him to the men who selected him for this position. The possibility of this moment was implied with the post. Lying supine upon a couch, smoking cigars to relieve a throbbing headache, Davis reached his decision. He ordered Leroy Walker, his secretary of war, to send General Beauregard this telegram: “You must immediately demand Sumter’s evacuation. If Anderson does not obey, proceed, in such manner as you may determine, to reduce it.’’ Beauregard sent three aides — Col. James Chesnut, Col. James A. Chisholm and Capt. Stephen D. Lee — to deliver the message.

Anderson had been told by President Buchanan in December that he should not feel obliged to “make a vain and useless sacrifice’’ of his men “on a mere point of honor.’’ Receiving Beauregard’s aides at 3:45 on Thursday afternoon, Anderson asked if General Beauregard, having issued this ultimatum, would open his batteries without further notice. Chesnut was puzzled by this question, but on his own authority assured Anderson that this would not happen. Anderson refused the ultimatum, but went on to say, “Gentlemen, if you do not batter the fort to pieces about us, we shall be starved out in a few days.” Chesnut then asked if that had been an official report. No, said Anderson, just information. Once an artillery professor at West Point, Anderson no doubt hoped that the man who had once been his best pupil, a cadet named Pierre Beauregard, would understand.

And he did. Beauregard telegraphed the information back to Secretary Walker in Montgomery. “Do not desire needlessly to bombard Fort Sumter,’’ Walker responded. “If Major Anderson will state the time at which, as indicated by him, he will evacuate, and agree that in the meantime he will not use his guns against us, unless ours should be employed against Fort Sumter, you are authorized thus to avoid the effusion of blood. If this, or its equivalent, be refused, reduce the fort.’’

Chesnut and Lee carried this message back to Sumter at 12:45 on the morning of the 12th. Anderson evaded making a reply for several hours, but finally responded. We will evacuate on April 15, he told the emissaries, assuming that no one fires on the American flag, and assuming I get no further messages from Washington.

But Chesnut knew what Beauregard knew, and what Anderson did not: patrol boats had sighted federal warships outside Charleston harbor not hours away. “We will begin firing in one hour,’’ Chesnut replied.”

From the Official Records, Series I, Volume I, Pages 230-231

Fort Sumter, S. C, April 1, 1861.
Maj. Robert Anderson, First Artillery, Commanding:
Major: In compliance with your request, I have the honor to submit the following list of provisions sold to Capt. J. G. Foster, Corps of Engineers, for the subsistence of the employees in his department at this post, and have expressed the quantities in numbers of rations, viz:
- Five and one-half barrels of pork—one thousand four hundred and sixty-seven rations.
- Twenty barrels of flour—three thousand four hundred and eighty five rations.
- One hundred and eighty pounds hard bread—one hundred and eighty rations.
- Two and one-half bushels of beans—one thousand rations.
- One hundred and seventy-four pounds coffee—one thousand seven hundred and forty rations.
- Seven hundred and seventy-four pounds sugar—five thousand one hundred and sixty rations.
These provisions, which have necessarily been consumed by others, would have added to the time we have already been at this post subsistence for the following number of days, respectively:
- Pork—Sixteen and twenty-seven-ninetieths days.
- Flour and hard bread—Forty and sixty-five-ninetieths days.
- Beans—Eleven and one-ninth days.
- Coffee—Nineteen and one-third days.
- Sugar—Fifty-seven and one-third days.
Or, with what is now on hand, at least thirty-five days of comfortable subsistence for the command, including the laundresses, who were sent away about two months ago.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
NORMAN J. HALL,
Second Lieutenant, First Artillery, A. A. C. S.

I suspect now that that is just a tabulation of a previous purchase.

I did find just now mention that the state authorities would not let them purchase flour in a March 1 document: Link

Thanks for questioning my post.

Sorry Rusty. I didn’t mean to aim that at you directly, but I did intend it for that bogus quote. It pops up constantly and is totally not credible.

What evidence is there that the statements are not credible? Comparable statements were reported by different people about two different meetings with Lincoln, one before Fort Sumter and one after.

Consider the evidence in the import business in New York City as an indicator that federal revenue from tariffs was rapidly decreasing. Lincoln realized this was coming. Give him credit for that.

New York City import businesses, were closing in somewhat of a panic because of the Morrill Tariff (and the war). They wouldn't do that if they thought imports would continue to come in. Fewer imports meant less income for an already cash-strapped federal government. On an inflation adjusted basis imports to the North never regained their levels in 1860 dollars during the entire war even though the tariff rates kept increasing during the war because not enough money was coming in.

Here are reports about New York City port businesses:

From the New York Herald of March 2, 1861: There has been a great deal of flurry in business circles in this city for a few days past, sending off goods to the South purchased before the 1st of March, on which day the new tariff takes effect. The Congress of the Confederated States have adopted a tariff similar to the United States, imposing the same duties on goods coming from the Northern States as we now pay on those imported from Europe. South Carolina wanted to establish free trade, but she could not have her way in that respect; so that in the future the products and manufactures of the North will have to enter the Southern market subject to the same impost as foreign goods. The new tariff adopted by the Congress at Washington [rb note: the Morrill tariff], if it should become law – which it will unless Mr. Buchanan keeps it in his breeches pocket – will surround our commerce with Europe with so many obstructions and difficulties that in conjunction with the disadvantages of the Southern tariff, New York will receive a blow more severe than any it has experienced within fifty years.

The effect of these two tariffs, then, upon our trade with the best, and most reliable part of the country will most disastrously be felt in all the Northern cities. We learn that even now some of the largest houses in the Southern trade in this city, who have not already failed, are preparing to wind up their affairs and abandon business entirely. The result of this as regards the value of property, rents, and real estate, can be readily seen. Within two months from this time it will probably be depreciated from twenty to forty percent.
From the New Orleans Daily Crescent newspaper of May 15, 1861 quoting the New York Day Book newspaper: All New York is failing. The suspensions and failures of the past few days have been fearful, and the war promises to bankrupt every merchant in New York. The retail business is as bad off as the wholesale. Nobody is purchasing anything, and trade is killed.

The following is a comparative statement of the imports of foreign dry goods at the port of New York for the week ending April 27:

For the week.........................1860 ............1861
Entered at the port,.......$1,503,483......$393,061
Thrown on the market, $1,650,790. ....$396,992

The imports of dry goods are very small this week, probably the least reported for many years.

Well may Mr. Lincoln ask, "What will become of my revenue?"

They also quote the Day Book as saying:

[There] "have been over 200 failures in New York since the 22d April, and within the last month not less than 300. Real estate has no sale at any price and rents are comparatively normal. Total bankruptcy stares all in the face, and starvation will become a daily visitor to the abode of the poor."
From Appleton's Cyclopaedia: Business failures in port cities by year:
Year----NYC--Philly---Boston--Baltimore---New Orleans--Charleston
1857----915----280-------258--------58-------------58------------31
1858----406----109-------128--------76-------------45------------20
1859----299----105-------122--------50-------------27------------16
1860----528----144-------172--------82-------------24------------25
1861----990----380-------480-------121-------------33------------11

[me] Worse than the Panic of 1857 for cities to which the Morrill Tariff was applied.

rockrr, the reference to Lincoln's revenue statement was in the paper. The only change was that I put it in red bold to highlight it for you.

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