Posted on 05/04/2012 7:25:23 AM PDT by Menehune56
Those conservatives who argue against "birthright citizenship" have just been thrown under the same bus as the "birthers" -- whether or not they like it, or the GOP admits it.
The mainstream media, longtime foes against reform of the anchor baby practice, have been happy to help. And instead of quietly watching while a sizeable portion of the Republican party is run over, as in the case of the "birthers," we now have the GOP establishment lending the media a hand in brushing aside many immigration reform advocates -- by pushing the selection of Senator Marco Rubio for the VP nomination.
(Excerpt) Read more at americanthinker.com ...
I'm curious now. If neither parent has to a be a citizen, then any child born in the U.S. can be POTUS? Are you saying there is no other barrier to eligibility today other than age? Please explain.
Evven the English statutory and common-law recognized the only person who was a natural born citizen without naturalization was the person born in England with both parents as English subjects maintaining faith with the Sovereign.
It is not possible to make a public law to convey natural born citiazenship. A person is either born a natural born citizen without the act of a public law, or a person who is not a natural born citizen is made to have some or all of the rights of a natural born citizen at birth or after the birth. The legal principle of ius soli or jus soli is the use of a public law to make a person naturalized at birth like an actual natural born citizen, just as a person may be naturalized by public law at some dte after the birth of the person.
There was no need to legislate a public law to define a natural born citizen, because doing so would perforce result in every person being naturalized at birth or after birth, because no one would qualify any longer as a natural born citizen. A person cannot be a natural born citizen if and when a public law is required to make them a natural born citizen.
“All of which was refuted by reference to the 17th Century and 18th Century English statutory laws which naturalized at birth the children of aliens born in England and deemed them to be subjects made as if they were natural born subjects in most rights. The majority opinion in WKA erroneously omitted these case law precedents in its consideration and commentary. Consequently, the other cases citing WKA are compromised by the same error of omission and lack of consideration in their respective opinions as well.”
“Evven the English statutory and common-law recognized the only person who was a natural born citizen without naturalization was the person born in England with both parents as English subjects maintaining faith with the Sovereign.”
Fine. Back it up. Because the US Supreme Court DID back up what they wrote with numerous citations. And the dissent made no attempt to refute their argument.
One does not naturalize at birth anything. That is why naturalized citizens are citizens who were NOT born US citizens.
In Udny v. Udny, (1869) L.R. 1 H.L. Sc. 441, the point decided was one of inheritance, depending upon the question whether the domicil of the father was in England or in Scotland, he being in either alternative a British subject. Lord Chancellor Hatherley said: “The question of naturalization and of allegiance is distinct from that of domicil.” P. 452. Lord Westbury, in the passage relied on by the counsel for the United States, began by saying:
The law of England, and of almost all civilized countries, ascribes to each individual at his birth two distinct legal states or conditions: one, by virtue of which he becomes the subject of some particular country, binding him by the tie of natural allegiance, and which may be called his political status; another by virtue of which he has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some particular country, and as such is possessed of certain municipal rights, and subject to certain obligations, which latter character is the civil status or condition of the individual, and may be quite different from his political status.
And then, while maintaining that the civil status is universally governed by the single principle of domicil, domicilium, the criterion established by international law for the purpose of determining civil status, and the basis on which
the personal rights of the party, that is to say, the law which determines his majority or minority, his marriage, succession, testacy or intestacy, [p657] must depend,
he yet distinctly recognized that a man’s political status, his country, patria, and his “nationality, that is, natural allegiance,” “may depend on different laws in different countries.” Pp. 457, 460. He evidently used the word “citizen” not as equivalent to “subject,” but rather to “inhabitant,” and had no thought of impeaching the established rule that all persons born under British dominion are natural-born subjects.
Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, in the same year, reviewing the whole matter, said:
By the common law of England, every person born within the dominions of the Crown, no matter whether of English or of foreign parents, and, in the latter case, whether the parents were settled or merely temporarily sojourning, in the country, was an English subject, save only the children of foreign ambassadors (who were excepted because their fathers carried their own nationality with them), or a child born to a foreigner during the hostile occupation of any part of the territories of England. No effect appears to have been given to descent as a source of nationality.
Cockburn on Nationality, 7.
Mr. Dicey, in his careful and thoughtful Digest of the Law of England with reference to the Conflict of Laws, published in 1896, states the following propositions, his principal rules being printed below in italics:
“British subject” means any person who owes permanent allegiance to the Crown. “Permanent” allegiance is used to distinguish the allegiance of a British subject from the allegiance of an alien who, because he is within the British dominions, owes “temporary” allegiance to the Crown. “Natural-born British subject” means a British subject who has become a British subject at the moment of his birth.” “Subject to the exceptions hereinafter mentioned, any person who (whatever the nationality of his parents) is born within the British dominions is a natural-born British subject. This rule contains the leading principle of English law on the subject of British nationality.
The exceptions afterwards mentioned by Mr. Dicey are only these two:
1. Any person who (his father being an alien enemy) is born in a part of the British dominions, which at the time of such [p658] person’s birth is in hostile occupation, is an alien.
2. Any person whose father (being an alien) is at the time of such person’s birth an ambassador or other diplomatic agent accredited to the Crown by the Sovereign of a foreign State is (though born within the British dominions) an alien.
And he adds:
The exceptional and unimportant instances in which birth within the British dominions does not of itself confer British nationality are due to the fact that, though at common law nationality or allegiance in substance depended on the place of a person’s birth, it in theory, at least, depended not upon the locality of a man’s birth, but upon his being born within the jurisdiction and allegiance of the King of England, and it might occasionally happen that a person was born within the dominions without being born within the allegiance, or, in other words, under the protection and control of, the Crown.
Dicey Conflict of Laws, pp. 173-177, 741.
It thus clearly appears that, by the law of England for the last three centuries, beginning before the settlement of this country and continuing to the present day, aliens, while residing in the dominions possessed by the Crown of England, were within the allegiance, the obedience, the faith or loyalty, the protection, the power, the jurisdiction of the English Sovereign, and therefore every child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of a foreign State or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where the child was born.
III. The same rule was in force in all the English Colonies upon this continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the Constitution as originally established.
In the early case of The Charming Betsy, (1804) it appears to have been assumed by this court that all persons born in the United States were citizens of the United States, Chief Justice Marshall saying:
Whether a person born within the United States, or becoming a citizen according to the established laws of the country, can divest himself absolutely of [p659] that character otherwise than in such manner as may be prescribed by law is a question which it is not necessary at present to decide.
2 Cranch 64, 119.
In Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor (1833), 3 Pet. 99, in which the plaintiff was born in the city of New York about the time of the Declaration of Independence, the justices of this court (while differing in opinion upon other points) all agreed that the law of England as to citizenship by birth was the law of the English Colonies in America. Mr. Justice Thompson, speaking for the majority of the court, said:
It is universally admitted, both in the English courts and in those of our own country, that all persons born within the Colonies of North America, whilst subject to the Crown of Great Britain, are natural-born British subjects.
3 Pet. 120. Mr. Justice Johnson said: “He was entitled to inherit as a citizen born of the State of New York.” 3 Pet. 136. Mr. Justice Story stated the reasons upon this point more at large, referring to Calvin’s Case, Blackstone’s Commentaries, and Doe v. Jones, above cited, and saying:
Allegiance is nothing more than the tie or duty of obedience of a subject to the sovereign under whose protection he is, and allegiance by birth is that which arises from being born within the dominions and under the protection of a particular sovereign. Two things usually concur to create citizenship: first, birth locally within the dominions of the sovereign, and secondly, birth within the protection and obedience, or, in other words, within the allegiance of the sovereign. That is, the party must be born within a place where the sovereign is at the time in full possession and exercise of his power, and the party must also, at his birth, derive protection from, and consequently owe obedience or allegiance to, the sovereign, as such, de facto. There are some exceptions which are founded upon peculiar reasons, and which, indeed, illustrate and confirm the general doctrine. Thus, a person who is born on the ocean is a subject of the prince to whom his parents then owe allegiance; for he is still deemed under the protection of his sovereign, and born in a place where he has dominion in common with all other sovereigns. So the children of an ambassador are held to be [p660] subjects of the prince whom he represents, although born under the actual protection and in the dominions of a foreign prince.
3 Pet. 155. “The children of enemies, born in a place within the dominions of another sovereign, then occupied by them by conquest, are still aliens.” 3 Pet. 156.
Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children, even of aliens, born in a country while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth.
3 Pet. 164.
In Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242, decided (as appears by the records of this court) on the same day as the last case, it was held that a woman born in South Carolina before the Declaration of Independence, married to an English officer in Charleston during its occupation by the British forces in the Revolutionary War, and accompanying her husband on his return to England, and there remaining until her death, was a British subject within the meaning of the Treaty of Peace of 1783, so that her title to land in South Carolina, by descent cast before that treaty, was protected thereby. It was of such a case that Mr. Justice Story, delivering the opinion of the court, said:
The incapacities of femes covert, provided by the common law, apply to their civil rights, and are for their protection and interest. But they do not reach their political rights, nor prevent their acquiring or losing a national character. Those political rights do not stand upon the mere doctrines of municipal law, applicable to ordinary transactions, but stand upon the more general principles of the law of nations.
3 Pet. 248. This last sentence was relied on by the counsel for the United States as showing that the question whether a person is a citizen of a particular country is to be determined not by the law of that country, but by the principles of international law. But Mr. Justice Story certainly did not mean to suggest that, independently of treaty, there was any principle of international law which could defeat the operation of the established rule of citizenship by birth within the United States; for he referred (p. 245) to the contemporaneous opinions in Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor, [p661] above cited, in which this rule had been distinctly recognized, and in which he had said (p. 162) that “each government had a right to decide for itself who should be admitted or deemed citizens,” and, in his Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, published in 1834, he said that, in respect to residence in different countries or sovereignties, “there are certain principles which have been generally recognized by tribunals administering public law” [adding, in later editions “or the law of nations”] “as of unquestionable authority,” and stated, as the first of those principles, “Persons who are born in a country are generally deemed citizens and subjects of that country.” Story, Conflict of Laws, § 48.
The English statute of 11 & 12 Will. III (1700). c. 6, entitled
An act to enable His Majesty’s natural-born subjects to inherit the estate of their ancestors, either lineal or collateral, notwithstanding their father or mother were aliens,
enacted that “all and every person or persons, being the King’s natural-born subject or subjects, within any of the King’s realms or dominions,” might and should thereafter lawfully inherit and make their titles by descent to any lands
from any of their ancestors, lineal or collateral, although the father and mother, or father or mother, or other ancestor, of such person or persons, by, from, through or under whom
title should be made or derived, had been or should be “born out of the King’s allegiance, and out of is Majesty’s realms and dominions,” as fully and effectually, as if such parents or ancestors “had been naturalized or natural-born subject or subjects within the King’s dominions.” 7 Statutes of the Realm, 90. It may be observed that, throughout that statute, persons born within the realm, although children of alien parents, were called “natural-born subjects.” As that statute included persons born “within any of the King’s realms or dominions,” it, of course, extended to the Colonies, and, not having been repealed in Maryland, was in force there. In McCreery v. Somerville, (1824) 9 Wheat. 354, which concerned the title to land in the State of Maryland, it was assumed that children born in that State of an alien who was still living, and who had not been naturalized, were “native-born citizens of the [p662] United States,” and, without such assumption, the case would not have presented the question decided by the court, which, as stated by Mr. Justice Story in delivering the opinion, was
whether the statute applies to the case of a living alien ancestor, so as to create a title by heirship where none would exist by the common law if the ancestor were a natural-born subject.
9 Wheat. 356.
Again, in Levy v. McCartee (1832), 6 Pet. 102, 112, 113, 115, which concerned a descent cast since the American Revolution, in the State of New York, where the statute of 11 & 12 Will. III had been repealed, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Story, held that the case must rest for its decision exclusively upon the principles of the common law, and treated it as unquestionable that, by that law, a child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject, quoting the statement of Lord Coke in Co.Lit. 8a, that,
if an alien cometh into England and hath issue two sons, these two sons are indigenae, subjects born, because they are born within the realm,
and saying that such a child “was a native-born subject, according to the principles of the common law stated by this court in McCreery v. Somervlle, 9 Wheat. 354.”
In Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1857) 19 How. 393, Mr. Justice Curtis said:
The first section of the second article of the Constitution uses the language, “a natural-born citizen.” It thus assumes that citizenship may be acquired by birth. Undoubtedly, this language of the Constitution was used in reference to that principle of public law, well understood in this country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, which referred citizenship to the place of birth.
19 How. 576. And, to this extent, no different opinion was expressed or intimated by any of the other judges.
In United States v. Rhodes (1866), Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting in the Circuit Court, said:
All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England. . . . We find no warrant for the opinion [p663] that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution.
1 Abbott (U.S.) 28, 40, 41.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, speaking by Mr. Justice (afterwards Chief Justice) Sewall, early held that the determination of the question whether a man was a citizen or an alien was “to be governed altogether by the principles of the common law,” and that it was established, with few exceptions,
that a man born within the jurisdiction of the common law is a citizen of the country wherein he is born. By this circumstance of his birth, he is subjected to the duty of allegiance which is claimed and enforced by the sovereign of his native land, and becomes reciprocally entitled to the protection of that sovereign, and to the other rights and advantages which are included in the term “citizenship.”
Garder v. Ward (1805), 2 Mass. 244, note. And again:
The doctrine of the common law is that every man born within its jurisdiction is a subject of the sovereign of the country where he is born, and allegiance is not personal to the sovereign in the extent that has been contended for; it is due to him in his political capacity of sovereign of the territory where the person owing the allegiance as born.
Kilham v. Ward (1806), 2 Mass. 236, 265. It may here be observed that, in a recent English case, Lord Coleridge expressed the opinion of the Queen’s Bench Division that the statutes of 4 Geo. II, (1731) c. 1, and 13 Geo. III (1773), c. 21, (hereinafter referred to) “clearly recognize that to the King in his politic, and not in his personal, capacity is the allegiance of his subjects due.” Isaacson v. Durant, 17 Q.B.D. 54, 65.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, speaking by Mr; Justice Gaston, said:
Before our Revolution, all free persons born within the dominions of the King of Great Britain, whatever their color or complexion, were native-born British subjects; those born out of his allegiance were aliens. . . . Upon the Revolution, no other change took place in the law of North Carolina than was consequent upon the transition from a colony dependent on an European King to a free and sovereign [p664] State; . . . British subjects in North Carolina became North Carolina freemen; . . . and all free persons born within the State are born citizens of the State. . . . The term “citizen,” as understood in our law, is precisely analogous to the term “subject” in the common law, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the change of government. The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective body of the people, and he who before as a “subject of the king” is now “a citizen of the State.”
State v. Manuel (1838), 4 Dev. & Bat. 20, 24-26.
That all children born within the dominion of the United States of foreign parents holding no diplomatic office became citizens at the time of their birth does not appear to have been contested or doubted until more than fifty years after the adoption of the Constitution, when the matter was elaborately argued in the Court of Chancery of New York and decided upon full consideration by Vice Chancellor Sandford in favor of their citizenship. Lynch v. Clark, (1844) 1 Sandf.Ch. 583.
The same doctrine was repeatedly affirmed in the executive departments, as, for instance, by Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, in 1854, 2 Whart.Int.Dig. (2d ed.) p. 394; by Attorney General Black in 1859, 9 Opinions, 373, and by Attorney General Bates in 1862, 10 Opinions, 328, 382, 394, 396.
Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, speaking of the “general division of the inhabitants of every country under the comprehensive title of aliens and natives,” says:
Natives are all persons born within the jurisdiction and allegiance of the United States. This is the rule of the common law, without any regard or reference to the political condition or allegiance of their parents, with the exception of the children of ambassadors, who are in theory born within the allegiance of the foreign power they represent. . . . To create allegiance by birth, the party must be born not only within the territory, but within the ligeance of the government. If a portion of the country be taken and held by conquest in war, the conqueror acquires the rights of the conquered as to its dominion and government, and children born in the armies of a State, while [p665] abroad and occupying a foreign country, are deemed to be born in the allegiance of the sovereign to whom the army belongs. It is equally the doctrine of the English common law that, during such hostile occupation of a territory, and the parents be adhering to the enemy as subjects de facto, their children, born under such a temporary dominion, are not born under the ligeance of the conquered.
2 Kent Com. (6th ed.) 39, 42. And he elsewhere says:
And if, at common law, all human beings born within the ligeance of the King, and under the King’s obedience, were natural-born subjects, and not aliens, I do not perceive why this doctrine does not apply to these United States, in all cases in which there is no express constitutional or statute declaration to the contrary. . . . Subject and citizen are, in a degree, convertible terms as applied to natives, and though the term citizen seems to be appropriate to republican freemen, yet we are, equally with the inhabitants of all other countries, subjects, for we are equally bound by allegiance and subjection to the government and law of the land.
2 Kent Com. 258, note.
“Vattel has often been cited in court cases and by the Founders in the 18th and 19th Centuries.”
Please show where Vattel is used as an authority on US citizenship.
Because Vattel said citizenship followed the parent, as it still does in Swiss law. US law has NOT followed Vattel.
Exactly!
I should apologize for not providing proper context.
I wasn't posting to you because of what you quoted. I posted to you because you did "offer words." You said:
"I have discovered that you cannot reason with people who have an agenda and these birthers certainly have an agenda. For the life of them they cannot see that they are adding things to the Constitution and the law that isn’t there and never was there."When you say "...and never was there," you are referring to original intent. This entire debate is about original intent. That's why people are scouring through the books that the Framers are known to have read, such as Vattel, Locke, Burke, and others.
As far as I know Paine had no direct input into the Constitution.
Neither did John Adams or Thomas Jefferson, but their letters and actions later in life are used to define original intent elsewhere in the Constitution (see Jefferson's "wall of separation between church and state" as an example). Why refer to the words of these Founders as legitimate sources, but not Paine who was actively writing on the matter at the time?
What Paine wrote about the original intent of the natural-born clause is clear: foreigners and half-foreigners were excluded from the presidency. In opposition to the definition of "foreigner" or "half a foreigner," Paine says that only someone with "a full natural connection with the country" can be president. That's as plain-meaning as it gets, and was the common understanding of the clause at the time. "Half a foreigner" was a person with one citizen parent and one non-citizen parent. A "full natural" person had two citizen parents.
You accuse others of "adding things to the Constitution and the law that isn't there." I'm asking you why you are blind to the contemporary facts that are there?
-PJ
Yes, basically a naturalization at birth.
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So nationalization is part of the naturalization process Congress is authorized to perform.
Not Constitutionally, no. Congress has NO authority to create types of citizenship whatsoever.
The naturalization rule was to make sure the states didn't have different rules concerning the criteria for becoming a citizen...and that's it.
The general government made the rule, and the STATES followed it.
-----
BTW, I was only repeating what he said about it not pertaining to foreigners. I didn't say I thought they had the authority to be doing it. LOL!
Congress has NO authority to create types of citizenship whatsoever.
I would agree with that, but Congress does have the authority to grant U.S. citizenship through the rules of naturalization which, to me, is what USC 8 does.
As far as I understand it nobody is being granted natural born citizenship, or deemed to be a natural born citizen, in USC 8.
You say, “I’m asking you why you are blind to the contemporary facts that are there?”
I say: Why are you blind to the quotations I put in my post? Many congressmen and senators discussed this very issue before implementing the 14th Amendment but you refuse to take it seriously. Why are you blind to the fact that no present day politician, conservative commentator, or judge will do what you want them to, i.e., acknowledge that you need citizen parents to be NBC? That ain’t gonna happen pal and you just dont get it. Why are you blind to the fact that Chester Arther was in the same situation and no action was taken? There is more than ample evidence that your definition of NBC is off the wall, cannot be proven by anyone. Do you expect me to believe that you can read the minds of the framers of the Constitution? You and all your ilk instead of PROVING the 2 citizen parent rule, attack, misquote and try to dazzle people with fanciful dreams. Several people in this thread and many more in other threads presented ample evidence to prove that 2 citizen parents are not required. You have presented nothing of substance. You mention names like Paine, Jefferson and Adams like that means something. Jefferson had nothing to say about citizenship and neither did Adams as far as I’m concerned. Both these men had great respect for England and it’s laws; they just didn’t like the unjust taxes and other issues. You make Vattel out to be some hero yet England and the rest of Europe ignored his wild ideas on citizenship. France doesn’t even subscribe to it. You people should do something constructive about voting Obama out, not beating this dead horse. If it isn’t written down it doesn’t exist and EVERYONE knows 2 citizen parents is nowhere to be found in the Constitution or U.S. law. Once again get a judge to go your way.
Oh, and one more thing. NO ONE answered my original question which was: If I decide to run for president how do I prove that my parents are citizens? What is the process? Won’t someone step up the plate and take a swing at it?
You could do it the same way Obama voted for in 2005; present a bona fide birth certificate. Too bad he won’t do that now for himself or his parents.
“Plaintiff STRUNK cannot wish into existence an interpretation that he chooses for the natural born citizen clause. There is no arguable legal basis for the proposition that both parents of the President must have been born on U.S. soil.”
http://www.scribd.com/doc/92326856/NY-2012-04-11-Strunk-v-NYBOE-Et-Al-Decision-and-Order
Naturalization pertains to the act of naturalizing, but 'nationalization' pertains to a jurisdictional ability. Congress has the ability to make the rule, but it DOESN'T have the jurisdiction to directly make this rule effective. The action of making aliens into citizens belong to the States.
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but Congress does have the authority to grant U.S. citizenship through the rules of naturalization
Using the established Constitutional Intent, yes. The problem is they were NEVER given the ability to totally by pass the criteria for residency, NOR the ability to by pass the parent in order to naturalize the child.
In order for an immigrant to become a citizen, they had to live in a State for so many years, stay out of trouble with the law...I think I even remember them having to have witnesses for their character, too.
It WASN'T run-over-the-border-and-squirt-out-your-very-own-US-citizen kind of thing.
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As far as I understand it nobody is being granted natural born citizenship, or deemed to be a natural born citizen, in USC 8.
You're right, they aren't.
My beef is they don't have the legitimate, Constitutional authority to create naturalized at birth citizens.....PERIOD!
Pinging for your [possible] interest.
LOL!
If born in the country, is as much a citizen as the natural-born child of a citizen…”
There are 2 types of 'citizens' in that sentence.
“One does not naturalize at birth anything. That is why naturalized citizens are citizens who were NOT born US citizens.”
During the reign of Queen Elizabeth I a Royal Decree that person who were heretofore aliens residing in England for at least twenty years and more and fulfilling various other requirements were to be “reputed natural subjects of the realm,” even though they were or were not born in England as the children of English or alien parents. In other words, whether by order of the Sovereign or by act of the Parliament, a person was subject made to have the same or nearly the rights of another person who was actually a natural born subject by virtue being subject born than being subject made. This ambiguity and imprecision in using the term, “natural born citizen,” often came to be implied by subsequent commentators,. This inconsistency and later implied meaning has ever since confused readers, but it is nonetheless a fact that persons who are or are potentially not under the liegance, allegiance, or may have divided allegiance at birth or after birth have been deemed to be the same in rights as a person who actually is the natural born child of two English parents in England.
“That all Persons born, or who hereafter shall be born, out of the Ligeance of the Crown of England, or of Great Britain, whose Fathers were or shall be, by virtue of a Statute made in the Fourth Year of King George the Second, to explain a Clause in an Act made in the Seventh Year of the Reign of Her Majesty Queen Anne, for naturalizing Foreign Protestants, which relates to the natural-born Subjects of the Crown of England, or of Great Britain, intitled to all the Rights and Privileges of natural-born Subjects of the Crown of England or of Great Britain, shall and may be adjudged and taken to be, and are hereby declared and enacted to be, natural-born Subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, to all Intents, Constructions, and Purposes whatsoever, as if he and they had been and were born in this Kingdom: ... (British Nationality Act of 1772)”
“That all Children born out of the Ligeance of the Crown of England, or of Great Britain, or which shall hereafter be born out of such Ligeance, whose Fathers were or shall be natural-born Subjects of the Crown of England, or of Great Britain, at the Time of the Birth of such Children respectively, shall and may, by virtue of the said recited Clause in the said Act of the seventh Year of the Reign of her said late Majesty, and of this present Act (7 Ann. c. 5. s. 3.), be adjudged and taken to be, and all such Children are hereby declared to be natural-born Subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, to all Intents, Constructions and Purposes whatsoever. (British Nationality Act of 1730)”
Denization by the Sovereign and naturalization by the Parliament, from the time of Elizabeth I, took persons who were otherwise aliens and treated them as if they were “natural born subjects” even though they were subjects made and not subjects born the children of English parents in England. This practice of deeming the children of alien parents born on domestic soil as if they were subjects or citizens at birth is simply a continuation of the centuries old custom and law of denization or naturalization at birth or after birth and then treating the otherwise alien born as if they were natural born.
Thusly a natural born citizen is a person who requires no public law, Royal decree, executive order, or other act of man-made custom or law to terminate any conflicting claims for allegiance and thereby come into existence as a citizen at birth.
A person who is made a citizen at birth by the act of a public law is a statutory citizen and not a natural born citizen, because this person's citizenship is dependent upon the action of the public law and not upon inheritance of the parent's citizenship and the undivided allegiance resulting from being born within the domestic jurisdiction.
Your question was answered, but you just dishonestly denied the answer.
The father for purposes of determining citizenship is typically going to be the legal father, and not necessarily the birth father.
Hawaii Revised Statutes
§338-12 Evidentiary character of certificates. Certificates filed within thirty days after the time prescribed therefor shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Data pertaining to the father of a child is prima facie evidence if:
(1) The alleged father is:
(A) The husband of the mother; or
(B) The acknowledged father of the child; or
(2) The father and child relationship has been established under chapter 584. Data pertaining to the alleged father acknowledging paternity of the child is admissible as evidence of paternity in any family court proceeding, including proceedings under chapter 584. [L 1949, c 327, §16; RL 1955, §57-15; HRS §338-12; am L 1975, c 66, §2(2); am L 1994, c 23, §1]
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