Posted on 02/11/2012 2:07:27 AM PST by U-238
After a decades-long streak of troubled weapon acquisitions, the Air Force is looking to get off on the right foot as it seeks to buy a new intercontinental stealth bomber.
The Pentagons new budget proposal gives the Air Force the green light to begin designing a new bomber with a target date for starting production in the mid-2020s. The goal is to acquire up to 100 new aircraft at a cost of about $55 billion.
But skeptics already are casting doubts on the plan. They consistently point to the B-2 batwing stealth bomber as a cautionary tale. The Pentagon spent hundreds of billions of dollars on that program only to end up with 21 aircraft, each with a $2 billion price tag. That is the reason, critics contend, why the Cold War era B-52 bomber conceived in 1946 is still flying and is projected to stay in operation until 2040.
The Air Force has learned tough lessons from past programs and is not about to repeat the mistakes, said Gen. Norton Schwartz, Air Force chief of staff. We are not going to do the B-2 again. That is not in the cards, he said Feb. 9 following a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
The downfall of the B-2, experts have said, was its cost and overstated design. Also, because the Northrop Grumman production line was shut down early in the production, the price per unit soared as the cost was spread over 21 aircraft, instead of 132, as originally planned.
Schwartz said the new bomber should be less ambitious. We are going to make our best effort to not overdesign an airplane, he said. We are not intent on delivering a capability that is extravagant.
(Excerpt) Read more at nationaldefensemagazine.org ...
Do a pre-sweep with air superiority fighters? I don’t think it would be wise to send in bombers without a sweep first, unless they were lightning quick, even then, you’re better off to gain air superiority before delivering to the ground.
With the new nuke treaty with the Russians we just signed (not a good move either) one interesting part is how bombers count as only one weapon, while they might carry 20 or so. I am wondering if the treaty would then make past agreements regarding hardpoints moot if the bomber is just included in the total.
Maybe the B-1 might be re-nuked if we needed the numbers? (although it could only carry gravity bombs today)
But I am SURE Obama would not allow even that. (traitor)
Given the extreme downsizing of the mil budget today, by the time the plans are finalized, their budget will be so small that producing a solitary Sopwith Camel might be considered too expensive ...
As a former AF officer, I’d love the Service to get a new stategic bomber. Unfortunately, I think there is a slim to none chance of that happening. And that includes new fighters too. I fully expect the F-35 to meet the same fate as the B-2 & F-22; that is a long, expensive development process following by procure of a mere fraction of the planned units. Even if a Republican is elected, I wouldn’t hold my breath. Likely it will stay in development purgatory just so POTUS can look tough on defense.
The reason? The cost of entitlement (and the deficit) will suck up every spare penny for Defense. Our legitimate defense needs will be starved to pay for our exploding human services client base. We already borrow 40+ cents for every dollar the Government spends—and that is with interest rates near zero.
Eventually 10Y UST rates will go back to something normal (5%+) and then all Hell will break loose.
BECAUSE it has the Electronic Warfare suite to totally suppress all (or nearly all) RF in an area the size of New England....
“Eventually 10Y UST rates will go back to something normal (5%+) and then all Hell will break loose.”
Only if prices in other sectors of the economy are not lowered.
What?
That's right - the problem isn't in acquisition it is how the AF handles its assignment process.
When you look at projects where the manpower pukes are excluded the acquisition process runs fairly smoothly. This is why the “black” projects seem to do so well - they, for security reasons, - cannot tolerate having between 15 and 25 percent of their personnel reassigned every 12 months to make them “promotable”. The one Vietnam “white” program that didn't have massive manpower moves was the C-141. If I remember correctly it was on time, at budget, with the required capabilities on its roll out. There a multiple programs in the AF that cannot make any, much less all, of those claims in spite of being “operational” for a decade, or more.
Again, Why?
The hardest thing to do as an AF Officer (I did 20 years commissioned service) is to NOT put your personal mark on your duty/additional duty. For example, I took the base's worse report writing additional duty section to the best by simply enforcing the squadron's procedures. My commander was horrified that I didn't invent a new program!
When you start talking about acquisition efforts instead of paperwork efforts every little change/correction made after a certain point causes ripples up and down the production line. The more people in charge the more minor changes, the more time and money spent, the more personnel changes, the more minor changes, ... well, you should get the picture now.
Is there a way out? IMHO there is a historically proven viable alternative. It was even “invented” in the US.
Look at the YB-17 program. The YB-17 was a service test aircraft built in small numbers (a single squadron) to advance the state of the art for bomber aircraft. Almost everyone involved in the 8AF European bomber war a few years later flew in that squadron as they proved the technology and developed supporting tactics. Why such a small sample size - the costs were extreme (we were in the Great Depression) and the technological jumps were massive (from cloth covered, slow, open cockpits to aluminum bodies, contemporary fighter speeds, enclosed cockpits). The situation we face today has too many historical parallels to ignore any more.
21 B-2s at two billion apiece would be $42 billion, wouldn’t it? The author says they spent hundreds of billions developing the B-2. That doesn’t add up right.
“You can be somebody, or you can do something.”
Reading this makes me wonder about the efficacy of the Large Penetrating Manned Bomber strategy in this day of drones and orbital weaponry.
Provided the normal cost-plus development nonsense is avoided, stealthy drones could easily flood a battlespace, with manned platforms nearby to act as follow-up. Drones, if used in a multi-role capacity as anti-radiation and ground suppression could open up the way for the heavy stuff.
Orbital weapons are hardly discussed. There are a number of kinetic energy weapons which are quite literally unstoppable and extremely effective even against hardened targets. A $55 billion bomber acquisition would be better spent on LEO booster development and kinetic weaponry designed for orbital use, as well as other orbital weaponry.
It’s time to take the high ground.
“I very much doubt that. The BUFF hasnt flown in combat against modern threatsnot even an SA-10. Its actual performance against some of the latest threats may be known, but I wouldnt bet my life on the EW package.”
You can believe it; the EW suite has been kept up-to-date — and oh BTW, the B-52 had not yet flown against any of the “latest threats” in 1972, right before they went in and pulverized the most heavily defended area in the world, Hanoi, and that was done at 30,000 feet. Are you really sure that U.S. aircraft haven’t already practiced flying against the SA-10? Don’t be.
B-52’s got murdered going into Hanoi.
At least 10% losses by U.S. numbers.
“Orbital weapons are hardly discussed. There are a number of kinetic energy weapons which are quite literally unstoppable and extremely effective even against hardened targets.”
Great weapons. Here’s the problem: 1) Cost benefit - they are too expensive when compared to the target they are to destroy. And most problematic — go ahead and tell the enemy (or don’t and then see what happens) that the thing coming at them at Mach Umpteen is a kinetic weapon and not a nuclear one. If it is headed to any country which possesses nuclear weapons,you risk their retaliation on the U.S., because they can’t wait to see if it is “kinetic.”
“hundreds of billions of dollars on that program only to end up with 21 aircraft, each with a $2 billion price tag”
Must have been using Military Math. ($2B x 21 = $42B, not “hundreds of billions of dollars”)
“B-52s got murdered going into Hanoi.
At least 10% losses by U.S. numbers.”
You don’t know what you are talking about. During Linebacker 2 over Christmas 1972, we lost a total of 15 B-52s, compared to 729 sorties flown from Guam, a loss rate of 2%. And that was needlessly high, caused by flying into Hanoi in the same predictable pattern, over and over. In fact there was an under-reported near-mutiny by B-52 crews that caused the misguided strategy to change.
After a few days of the B-52 campaign, the North Vietnamese stopped firing SAM missiles — they had completely depleted their stock and had in fact fired the SAMs in a pure ballistic fashion at the end. The AAA sites were quiet. The NVN came back to the negotiating table because they were completely defenseless at that point.
I briefed and debriefed crews at the ARCLITE center on Guam.
B-52’s did get murdered going into Hanoi for the reasons you stated. Air crews were refusing to fly because they were getting murdered.
15 shot down, 5 heavily damaged (1 crashed in Laos) out of 207 planes (and crews) is pretty close to 10% in my book.
You think the crews felt any better because it was only 2% losses calc’d on a ‘mission count’?
LOL!
“I briefed and debriefed crews at the ARCLITE center on Guam.”
Sorry, that should have read: “ARCLIGHT”.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.