Posted on 06/19/2010 10:08:15 AM PDT by worst-case scenario
This is a guest post by William Semple. Mr. Semple is a drilling engineer and independent drilling consultant with 37 years of experience in the oil and gas industry. He worked for 16 years with a major oil company and has 24 years of experience as a drilling supervisor.
Mississippi Canyon 252 Macondo Well 24th April 2010 at approximately 21:49 hrs
I have summarized the information to try and keep it to the salient facts. The following information is from reliable sources. Most is public record and the remainder is from confidential reviews carried out by other major oil companies. I have interpreted the reports and made some conclusions with caveats where necessary. As such, these are only opinions and no inference of blame can be inferred as a result of these statements.
More detail will emerge when further investigations take place, especially with regard to the last few hours leading up to the explosion. However, I am confident the fundamentals are identified in this article and, most importantly, the crucial lessons learned so none of us repeat the same mistakes.
Much is being made of the water depth as a factor in this disaster. However, many of the mistakes made would have been equally serious in shallow-water drilling or even on land, and lessons learned apply to almost all drilling operations.
(Excerpt) Read more at theoildrum.com ...
While it is a scandal that the Department of the Interior greenlighted this project with waivers, the truly despicable actions appear to have been made by BP, They wrecklessly ignored common safety practices and the advice of their own engineers on the rig. Their criminal negligence led to the death of 11 brave men and the destruction of lives and habitats that watch unfolding. Their assurances that they could handle a blowout were just lies - they have no real idea how to stop this.
The entire economy of Louisiana is being ravaged by the moratorium on drilling. What is the alternative, though? To continue drilling even though we now all know that drillers have no way to stop such leaks?
At the very least, all these rigs should install acoustic BOPs - the type that would have shut down this leak and the subsequent explosion, that BP must use elsewhere, and that they eschewed on the Deep Water Horizon as a cost-cutting.
I don't see the Director of EPA escaping the gurney at Terre Haute if a full and fair investigation is done in this event.
I don’t know about all this but am so looking forward to our trip to Texas in a week and half and the chance to talk to my uncle who has worked in the industry with Baroid, Halliburton, BP and currently HAL for over 35 years onshore and offshore and usually the head Mud Engineer guy and whatever else he does. I *think* his years with BP were offshore LA and down in Venz before Chavez took over everything . . . somewhere South Am and it was dangerous is all I remember as were his days in the Middle East late 70’s early 80’s but nothing like it is NOW.
Did you read the rest of the article Mr Semple wrote? He does a pretty good job on a blow-by-blow analysis.
A community organizer would have a difficult time comprehending it.
Qwackertoo, I would LOVE to read his take on all this. Maybe he also has more info on the repercussions of the Gulf War oil spill in Kuwait. Is the fate of the Kuwaiti marshland going to be the fate of Louisiana? (It wasn’t until this event that I actually realized that Louisiana is 40% marshland.)
A pipe under pressure blows outwards if/when it fails. This one self crimped. You gave no response, I appreciate the referral.
At the very least, all these rigs should install acoustic BOPs - the type that would have shut down this leak and the subsequent explosion, that BP must use elsewhere, and that they eschewed on the Deep Water Horizon as a cost-cutting.
Imo, A BOP is only as good as its readiness to act when called upon. I seem to remember that there were other things that may have attributed to the BOP failure such as a dead battery, a test ram installed rather than the normal ram, potential tool or joint in the BOP where the ram closure would have occurred.
Environmentalist’s forcing wells to be drilled at extreme depths instead of closer to the coast. Better yet, letting oil companies drill on land instead of in the gulf.
the physics behind a pressurized pipe blowing out and self crimping.
Can you explain or describe what you are asking? Where did the crimp occur, etc?
The pressures that they were working on are absolutely incredible.
“They did many unsafe things at the direct and explicit instruction of EPA” I don’t doubt you but what’s your source for that information?
Something else to look into..According to a 2008 lawsuit filed in Louisiana, Cameron and Hydril, a General Electric unit that makes drilling equipment, provided defective blowout preventer equipment resulting in a 2007 leak from an offshore Louisiana well.
BP caused this one all right but none of the oil companies had a plan to deal with a blowout like this. None of them.
It's totally bizarre.
I’ll let you know what I find out from him, I can wait to have a long talk about all of this with him.
That crimp occurred as I understand it when the Deepwater Horizon vessel sank. The vessel had connected to it a 21" riser running some 5,000 feet or so to the top of the BOP. When the vessel sank this riser went to the seabed with the vessel and where it bent over at the BOP is where the crimp occurred. The vessel about 1,300 feet or so away from the BOP if I remember reading correctly. This is just my understanding.
Here is a schematic and the crimp would be on top of the BOP.
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