Remarks by the President... [Re: Immigration]

Office of the Press Secretary ____________________________________________________________________________________________ For Immediate Release June 25, 2009

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT AFTER MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TO DISCUSS IMMIGRATION

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, everybody. We have just finished what I consider to be a very productive meeting on one of the most critical issues that I think this nation faces, and that is an immigration system that is broken and needs fixing.

We have members of Congress from both chambers, from parties, who have participated in the meeting and shared a range of ideas. I think the consensus is that despite our inability to get this passed over the last several years, the American people still want to see a solution in which we are tightening up our borders, or cracking down on employers who are using illegal workers in order to drive down wages -- and oftentimes mistreat those workers. And we need a effective way to recognize and legalize the status of undocumented workers who are here.

Now, this is -- there is not by any means consensus across the table. As you can see, we've got a pretty diverse spectrum of folks here. But what I'm encouraged by is that after all the overheated rhetoric and the occasional demagoguery on all sides around this issue, we've got a responsible set of leaders sitting around the table who want to actively get something done and not put it off until a year, two years, three years, five years from now, but to start working on this thing right now.

My administration is fully behind an effort to achieve comprehensive immigration reform. I have asked my Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Janet Napolitano, to lead up a group that is going to be working with a leadership group from both the House and the Senate to start systematically working through these issues from the congressional leaders and those with the relevant jurisdiction. What we've heard is through a process of regular order, they would like to work through these issues both in the House and in the Senate.

In the meantime, administratively there are a couple of things that our administration has already begun to do. The FBI has cleared much of the backlog of immigration background checks that was really holding up the legal immigration process. DHS is already in the process of cracking down on unscrupulous employers, and, in collaboration with the Department of Labor, working to protect those workers from exploitation.

The Department of Homeland Security has also been making good progress in speeding up the processing of citizenship petitions, which has been far too slow for far too long -- and that, by the way, is an area of great consensus, cuts across Democratic and Republican parties, the notion that we've got to make our legal system of immigration much more efficient and effective and customer-friendly than it currently is.

Today I'm pleased to announce a new collaboration between my Chief Information Officer, my Chief Performance Officer, my Chief Technologies Officer and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Office to make the agency much more efficient, much more transparent, much more user-friendly than it has been in the past.

In the next 90 days, USCIS will launch a vastly improved Web site that will, for the first time ever, allow applicants to get updates on their status of their applications via e-mail and text message and online. And anybody who's dealt with families who are trying to deal with -- navigate the immigration system, this is going to save them huge amounts of time standing in line, waiting around, making phone calls, being put on hold. It's an example of some things that we can do administratively even as we're working through difficult issues surrounding comprehensive immigration.

And the idea is very simple here: We're going to leverage cutting-edge technology to reduce the unnecessary paperwork, backlogs, and the lack of transparency that's caused so many people so much heartache.

Now, we all know that comprehensive immigration reform is difficult. We know it's a sensitive and politically volatile issue. One of the things that was said around the table is the American people still don't have enough confidence that Congress and any administration is going to get serious about border security, and so they're concerned that any immigration reform simply will be a short-term legalization of undocumented workers with no long-term solution with respect to future flows of illegal immigration.

What's also been acknowledged is that the 12 million or so undocumented workers are here -- who are not paying taxes in the ways that we'd like them to be paying taxes, who are living in the shadows, that that is a group that we have to deal with in a practical, common-sense way. And I think the American people are ready for us to do so. But it's going to require some heavy lifting, it's going to require a victory of practicality and common sense and good policymaking over short-term politics. That's what I'm committed to doing as President.

I want to especially commend John McCain, who's with me today, because along with folks like Lindsey Graham, he has already paid a significant political cost for doing the right thing. I stand with him, I stand with Nydia Velázquez and others who have taken leadership on this issue. I am confident that if we enter into this with the notion that this is a nation of laws that have to be observed and this is a nation of immigrants, then we're going to create a stronger nation for our children and our grandchildren.

So thank you all for participating. I'm looking forward to us getting busy and getting to work. All right? Thank you.

Oh, and by the way, I hope everybody has got their Hawaiian shirts -- (laughter) -- and their mumus for our luau tonight.

Note: The following text is a quote:

http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s111-1261

Congress > Legislation > 2009-2010 (111th Congress) > S. 1261
Text of S. 1261: PASS ID Act
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This version: Introduced in Senate. This is the original text of the bill as it was written by its sponsor and submitted to the Senate for consideration. This is the latest version of the bill available on this website.

S 1261 IS
111th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1261
To repeal title II of the REAL ID Act of 2005 and amend title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to better protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personally identifiable information collected by States when issuing driver’s licenses and identification documents, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 15, 2009
Mr. AKAKA (for himself, Mr. VOINOVICH, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. TESTER, Mr. BAUCUS, and Mr. CARPER) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
A BILL
To repeal title II of the REAL ID Act of 2005 and amend title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to better protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personally identifiable information collected by States when issuing driver’s licenses and identification documents, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘Providing for Additional Security in States’ Identification Act of 2009’ or the ‘PASS ID Act’.
SEC. 2. REPEAL.
Title II of the REAL ID Act of 2005 (Division B of Public Law 109-13) is repealed.
SEC. 3. IDENTIFICATION SECURITY.
(a) In General- Title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
‘Subtitle E—Improved Security for Driver’s Licenses and Personal Identification Cards
‘SEC. 241. DEFINITIONS.
‘In this subtitle:
‘(1) Driver’S LICENSE- The term ‘driver’s license’ means a motor vehicle operator’s license, as defined in section 30301 of title 49, United States Code.
‘(2) IDENTIFICATION CARD- The term ‘identification card’ means a personal identification card, as defined in section 1028(d) of title 18, United States Code, issued by a State.
‘(3) MATERIALLY COMPLIANT- A State is ‘materially compliant’ if the State has certified to the Secretary that the State has commenced issuing driver’s licenses and identification cards that are compliant with the requirements of this subtitle.
‘(4) OFFICIAL PURPOSE- The term ‘official purpose’ means—
‘(A) accessing Federal facilities that contain mission functions critical to homeland security, national security, or defense;
‘(B) accessing nuclear power plants; or
‘(C) boarding federally regulated commercial aircraft.
‘(5) SECRETARY- The term ‘Secretary’ means the Secretary of Homeland Security.
‘(6) STATE- The term ‘State’ means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
‘SEC. 242. MINIMUM DOCUMENT REQUIREMENTS AND ISSUANCE STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL RECOGNITION.
‘(a) Minimum Standards for Federal Use-
‘(1) IN GENERAL- Beginning 1 year after the date on which final regulations are issued to implement this subtitle, pursuant to section 5 of the PASS ID Act—
‘(A) a Federal agency may not accept, for any official purpose, a driver’s license or identification card issued by a State to any person unless the State is materially compliant; and
‘(B) no person shall be denied boarding a commercial aircraft solely on the basis of failure to present a driver’s license or identification card issued pursuant to this subtitle.
‘(2) AGENCY ACCEPTANCE- Beginning 6 years after the date on which final regulations are issued to implement this subtitle, pursuant to section 5 of the PASS ID Act, a Federal agency may not accept, for any official purpose, a driver’s license or identification card unless the license or card complies with subsection (b).
‘(3) STATE CERTIFICATIONS- The Secretary shall determine whether a State is meeting the requirements of this section based on certifications made by the State to the Secretary. Such certifications shall be made at such times and in such manner as the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, may prescribe by regulation.
‘(4) CERTIFICATION OF OTHER IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS- The Secretary may certify any driver’s license or identification card, including an Enhanced Driver’s License designated by the Secretary under section 7209 of the 9/11 Commission Implementation Act of 2004, as compliant with the requirements of this subtitle if the Secretary, after review, determines such license or card meets the requirements of this subtitle.
‘(b) Minimum Document Requirements- To meet the requirements of this section, a State shall include, at a minimum, the following information and features on each driver’s license and identification card issued to a person by the State:
‘(1) The person’s legal name.
‘(2) The person’s date of birth.
‘(3) The person’s gender.
‘(4) The person’s driver’s license or identification card number.
‘(5) A digital photograph of the person.
‘(6) The person’s address of principal residence, except—
‘(A) as provided for under section 827 of the Violence Against Women Act (Public Law 109-162); or
‘(B) for any individual who a State determines should be exempted from the requirement under this paragraph to protect the safety or security of the applicant.
‘(7) The person’s signature.
‘(8) A combination of security features designed to protect the physical integrity of the document, including the prevention of tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication of the document for fraudulent purposes.
‘(9) A common machine-readable technology, containing the data elements available on the face of a driver’s license or identification card. A person’s social security number may not be included in these data elements.
‘(10) A unique symbol designated by the Secretary to indicate compliance with the requirements under this section.
‘(c) Minimum Issuance Standards-
‘(1) IN GENERAL- To meet the requirements of this section, for all driver’s licenses and identification cards issued under this subtitle at least 1 year after the date on which final regulations are issued to implement this subtitle, pursuant to section 5 of the PASS ID Act, a State shall require, at a minimum, presentation and validation of the following information before issuing a driver’s license or identification card to a person:
‘(A) A photo identity document, except that a non-photo identity document is acceptable if it includes both the person’s full name and date of birth.
‘(B) Documentation showing the person’s date of birth.
‘(C) Proof of the person’s social security account number or verification that the person is not eligible for a social security account number.
‘(D) Documentation showing the person’s name and address of principal residence.
‘(2) SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS-
‘(A) IN GENERAL- To meet the requirements of this section, a State shall comply with the minimum standards of this paragraph.
‘(B) EVIDENCE OF LAWFUL STATUS- Before issuing a driver’s license or identification card to a person, a State shall verify that the person—
‘(i) is a citizen or national of the United States;
‘(ii) has been granted lawful permanent residence in the United States;
‘(iii) has been granted asylum or withholding of removal, or has been admitted into the United States as a refugee;
‘(iv) has been granted temporary residence in the United States;
‘(v) has been paroled into the United States under section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)), subject to such exceptions as the Secretary, in the Secretary’s unreviewable discretion, may prescribe for aliens paroled into the United States for prosecution or other categories of paroled aliens;
‘(vi) is a lawful nonimmigrant in the United States;
‘(vii) has a pending application for asylum or withholding of removal and has been granted employment authorization;
‘(viii) has been granted temporary protected status in the United States or has a pending application for temporary protective status and has been granted employment authorization;
‘(ix) has been granted deferred action status;
‘(x) has a pending application for adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States or conditional permanent resident status in the United States;
‘(xi) has otherwise been granted employment authorization in the United States; or
‘(xii) is otherwise an alien lawfully present in the United States, as determined by the Secretary in the Secretary’s unreviewable discretion.
‘(C) TEMPORARY DRIVER’S LICENSES AND IDENTIFICATION CARDS-
‘(i) IN GENERAL- If a person presents evidence under any of clauses (iv) through (xii) of subparagraph (B), the State may only issue a temporary driver’s license or temporary identification card to the person that is valid for a time period ending not later than the expiration date of the applicant’s authorized stay in the United States or, if there is no such expiration date, for a period not to exceed 1 year. The Secretary may, in the Secretary’s unreviewable discretion, authorize the issuance of temporary driver’s licenses or temporary identification cards, for periods longer than 1 year, to employees of international organizations and to other nonimmigrant aliens who are authorized to remain in the United States for an indefinite period.
‘(ii) DISPLAY OF EXPIRATION DATE- A temporary driver’s license or temporary identification card issued pursuant to this subparagraph shall clearly state the date on which it expires.
‘(iii) RENEWAL- A temporary driver’s license or temporary identification card issued pursuant to this subparagraph may be renewed only upon verification of the applicant’s current lawful status.
‘(3) VALIDATION OF DOCUMENTS- To meet the requirements of this section, a State—
‘(A) shall not accept any foreign document, other than an official passport, to satisfy a requirement of paragraph (1) or (2); and
‘(B) not later than 1 year after the date on which final regulations are issued to implement this subtitle, pursuant to section 5 of the PASS ID Act, shall enter into a memorandum of understanding with the Secretary to routinely utilize the automated system known as Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements established under section 121 of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-603), to verify the legal presence status of a person, other than a United States citizen or national, who is applying for a driver’s license or identification card.
‘(d) Other Requirements- To meet the requirements of this section, a State shall adopt the following practices in the issuance of driver’s licenses and identification cards:
‘(1)(A) Employ technology to capture digital images of identity source documents so that the images can be retained in electronic storage in a transferrable format for at least as long as the applicable driver’s license or identification card is valid; or
‘(B) retain paper copies of source documents for at least as long as the applicable driver’s license or identification card is valid.
‘(2) Subject each person who submits an application for a driver’s license or identification card to mandatory facial image capture.
‘(3) Establish an effective procedure to confirm or verify a renewing applicant’s information.
‘(4) Confirm with the Social Security Administration a social security account number presented by a person using the full social security account number. In the event that a social security account number is already registered to or associated with another person to which any State has issued a driver’s license or identification card, the State may use any appropriate procedures to resolve nonmatches.
‘(5) Establish an effective procedure to confirm that a person submitting an application for a driver’s license or identification card is terminating or has terminated any driver’s license or identification card issued pursuant to this section to such person by a State.
‘(6) Provide for the physical security of locations where driver’s licenses and identification cards are produced and the security of document materials and papers from which driver’s licenses and identification cards are produced.
‘(7) Establish appropriate administrative and physical safeguards to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personally identifiable information collected and maintained at locations at which driver’s licenses or identification documents are produced or stored, including—
‘(A) procedures to prevent the unauthorized access to, or use of, personally identifiable information;
‘(B) public notice of security and privacy policies, including the use, storage, access to, and sharing of personally identifiable information;
‘(C) the establishment of a process through which individuals may access, amend, and correct, as determined appropriate by the State, their own personally identifiable information.
‘(8) Subject all persons authorized to manufacture or produce driver’s licenses and identification cards to appropriate security clearance requirements.
‘(9) Establish fraudulent document recognition and document validation training programs for appropriate employees engaged in the issuance of driver’s licenses and identification cards.
‘(10) Limit the period of validity of all driver’s licenses and identification cards that are not temporary to a period that does not exceed 8 years.
‘(e) Exceptions Process-
‘(1) IN GENERAL- States shall establish an exceptions process to reasonably accommodate persons who, for extraordinary reasons beyond their control, are unable to present the necessary documents listed in subsection (c)(1).
‘(2) ALTERNATIVE DOCUMENTS- Alternative documents accepted under an exceptions process established pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be used to demonstrate lawful presence under subsection (c)(2) unless such documents establish that the person is a citizen or national of the United States.
‘(3) REPORT- States shall include a report on the use of exceptions made under this subsection, which shall not include any personally identifiable information, as a component of the certification required under subsection (a)(3).
‘(f) Use of Federal Systems- States shall not be required to pay fees or other costs associated with the use of the automated systems known as Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements and Social Security On-Line Verification, or any other Federal electronic system, in connection with the issuance of driver’s licenses or identification cards, in accordance with this subtitle.
‘(g) Rule of Construction- Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a State from issuing driver’s licenses and identification cards that do not comply with the requirements of this section.
‘SEC. 243. USE OF FALSE DRIVER’S LICENSE AT AIRPORTS.
‘(a) In General- The Secretary shall enter, into the appropriate aviation security screening database, appropriate information regarding any person convicted of using a false driver’s license at an airport.
‘(b) Definitions- In this section:
‘(1) AIRPORT- The term ‘airport’ has the meaning given such term under section 40102 of title 49, United States Code.
‘(2) FALSE- The term ‘false’ has the meaning given such term under section 1028(d) of title 18, United States Code.
‘SEC. 244. GRANTS TO STATES.
‘(a) Establishment-
‘(1) IN GENERAL- There is established a State Driver’s License Enhancement Grant Program to award grants to assist States in conforming to the minimum standards set forth in this subtitle.
‘(2) DISTRIBUTION OF GRANTS- The Secretary, through the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall distribute grants awarded under this section to States that submit an application as follows:
‘(A) PROPORTIONAL ALLOCATION- Not less than 2/3 of the amounts appropriated for grants under this section shall be allocated to each State in the ratio that—
‘(i) the number of driver’s licenses and identification cards issued by such State in the most recently ended calendar year; bears to
‘(ii) the number of driver’s licenses and identifications cards issued by all States in the most recently ended calendar year.
‘(B) REMAINING ALLOCATION- The Secretary may allocate to States any amounts appropriated for grants under this section that are not allocated under subparagraph (A) in such manner as, in the Secretary’s discretion, will most effectively assist in achieving the goals of this subtitle.
‘(C) MINIMUM ALLOCATION- In allocating funds under this section, the Secretary shall ensure that for each fiscal year—
‘(i) except as provided under clause (ii), each State receives not less than an amount equal to 0.35 percent of the total funds appropriated for grants under this section for that fiscal year; and
‘(ii) American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and the Virgin Islands each receive not less than an amount equal to 0.08 percent of the total funds appropriated for grants under this section for that fiscal year.
‘(b) Authorization of Appropriations- There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary, for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2015, such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.
‘SEC. 245. STATE-TO-STATE ONE DRIVER, ONE LICENSE DEMONSTRATION PROJECT.
‘(a) Establishment- The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall establish a State-to-State 1 driver, 1 license demonstration project.
‘(b) Purpose- The demonstration project established under this section shall include an evaluation of the feasibility of establishing an electronic system to verify that an applicant for a driver’s license or identification card issued in accordance with this subtitle does not retain a driver’s license or identification card issued in accordance with this subtitle by another State.
‘(c) Requirements- The demonstration project shall include a review of—
‘(1) the costs affiliated with establishing and maintaining an electronic records system;
‘(2) the security and privacy measures necessary to protect the integrity and physical security of driver’s licenses; and
‘(3) the appropriate governance structure to ensure effective management of the electronic records system, including preventing the unauthorized use of information in the system, and ensuring the security and confidentiality of personally identifiable information.
‘(d) Savings Provision- Nothing in this section may be construed to—
‘(1) authorize the creation of a national database of driver’s license information; or
‘(2) authorize States direct access to the motor vehicle database of another State.
‘(e) Authorization of Appropriations- There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2012 such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.
‘SEC. 246. AUTHORITY.
‘(a) Participation of Secretary of Transportation and States- All authority to issue regulations, set standards, and issue grants under this subtitle shall be carried out by the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and the States.
‘(b) Extensions of Deadlines- The Secretary may grant to a State an extension of time to meet the requirements of section 242(a)(1) if the State provides adequate justification for noncompliance.
‘SEC. 247. LIMITATION ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
‘Nothing in this subtitle may be construed to—
‘(1) affect the authorities or responsibilities of the Secretary of Transportation or the States under chapter 303 of title 49, United States Code; or
‘(2) preempt State privacy laws that are more protective of personal privacy than the requirements of this subtitle or the standards or regulations promulgated to implement this subtitle, provided that such State laws are consistent with this subtitle and the regulations prescribed pursuant to this subtitle.’.
(b) Technical Amendment- Section 1(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 235 the following:
‘Subtitle E—Improved Security for Driver’s Licenses and Personal Identification Cards
‘Sec. 241. Definitions.
‘Sec. 242. Minimum document requirements and issuance standards for Federal recognition.
‘Sec. 243. Use of false driver’s license at airports.
‘Sec. 244. Grants to States.
‘Sec. 245. State-to-State one driver, one license demonstration project.
‘Sec. 246. Authority.
‘Sec. 247. Limitation on statutory construction.’.
SEC. 4. USE OF DRIVER’S LICENSE OR IDENTIFICATION CARD DATA BY PRIVATE ENTITIES.
Chapter 123 of title 18, United States Code is amended—
(1) in section 2722, by adding at the end the following:
‘(c) Copying Information From Drivers Licenses or Identification Cards- It shall be unlawful for any person, knowingly and without lawful authority—
‘(1) to scan the information contained in the machine readable component of a driver’s license or identification card; or
‘(2)(A) to resell, share or trade that information with any other third parties;
‘(B) track the use of a driver’s license or identification card; or
‘(C) store the information collected.’;
(2) in section 2724(a), by inserting ‘driver’s license, or identification card,’ after ‘motor vehicle record,’;
(3) in section 2725—
(A) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (6), and adding ‘and’ at the end;
(B) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (7);
(C) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (3), and striking ‘and’ at the end;
(D) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (2), and striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon;
(E) by redesignating paragraph (1) as paragraph (5);
(F) by inserting before paragraph (2), as redesignated, the following:
‘(1) ‘driver’s license’ means a motor vehicle operator’s license, as defined in section 30301 of title 49, United States Code;’; and
(G) by inserting after paragraph (3), as redesignated, the following:
‘(4) ‘identification card’ means a personal identification card, as defined in section 1028(d) of title 18, United States Code, issued by a State.’.
SEC. 5. RULEMAKING.
(a) In General- Not later than 9 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, after providing notice and an opportunity for public comment shall issue final regulations to implement subtitle E of title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by section 3.
(b) Content- The regulations issued pursuant to subsection (a)—
(1) shall include procedures and requirements that—
(A) protect the privacy rights of individuals who apply for and hold a driver’s license or personal identification card;
(B) protect the constitutional rights and civil liberties of individuals who apply for and hold a driver’s licenses or personal identification card;
(2) shall include procedures to protect any personally identifiable information electronically transmitted;
(3) shall establish a process through which individuals may access, amend, and correct, as determined appropriate by the Secretary, their own personally identifiable information in any Federal databases used in complying with this Act;
(4) may not require a single design or numbering system to which driver’s licenses or personal identification cards issued by all States shall conform; and
(5) shall only apply to driver’s licenses or identification cards issued pursuant to subtitle E of title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by section 3.
SEC. 6. SAVINGS PROVISION.
(a) Effect of Repeal- Nothing in section 2 shall affect the amendment or the repeal set forth in sections 203(a) and 206 of the REAL ID Act of 2005.
(b) Effect of Completed Administrative Actions- Completed personnel actions, agreements, grants, and contracts undertaken by an agency—
(1) shall not be affected by any provision of this Act, or any amendment made by this Act; and
(2) shall continue in effect according to their terms until amended, modified, superseded, terminated, set aside, or revoked by an officer of the United States, by a court of competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law.

Note: The following text is a quote:

http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1247749178990.shtm

estimony of Secretary Napolitano before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Identification Security” (Oral Testimony) given July 15, 2009

Release Date: July 16, 2009
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Secretary Janet Napolitano: Pass ID is a bill that I support. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) worked with governors and other stakeholders to provide technical assistance in its drafting and—so the approach that Pass ID takes to fix REAL ID is one that I support. I think it makes sense. This is an important piece of national security legislation that is designed to help fulfill the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation that the Federal Government set security standards for driver’s licenses.
As has already been commented upon, the first attempt to do this—the REAL ID Act—was a start that badly needs to be fixed. Pass ID is a fix for REAL ID. The states agree that REAL ID is too rigid and needlessly expensive in mandating how states meet their security goals.
As you noted, Chairman [Senator Joe] Lieberman, 13 states—I think Missouri being the most recent last night—had actually enacted legislation barring themselves from implementing REAL ID. And 13 other states have passed resolutions opposing REAL ID.
We cannot have national standards for drivers’ licenses when the states, themselves, refuse to participate. Now, the practical problem with REAL ID is one of timeliness, and that sets the urgency for Pass ID. Because, under REAL ID—as of December 31st of this year—states are required to attest that they are implementing REAL ID for their driver’s licenses so that they can be accepted for things like boarding a plane.
By Dec. 31 of this year no state will have issued a REAL ID compliant identification document. No state will have a REAL ID compliant document.
Chairman Lieberman: So—if I may interrupt you—that means that assuming nothing else happens in between—that it is—under the law, the driver’s licenses issued by the states would not be accepted by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to gain passage.
Secretary Napolitano: That’s correct, Mr. Chairman—not without additional screening by TSA—and one can only contemplate—just the inconvenience in airline travel that could occur if everyone has to undergo additional screening because they don’t have a REAL ID compliant driver’s license.
Chairman Lieberman: In other words, the kind of secondary screening that goes on now—if for some reason you forget your license or something—that would have to happen to everybody.
Secretary Napolitano: That’s right, Senator.
Chairman Lieberman: Thank you.
Secretary Napolitano: And—so that sets the urgency for REAL ID—and why I’m so appreciative—or Pass ID, excuse me—why I’m so appreciative that the Committee has scheduled this hearing today and is moving forward. I am very pleased to be sitting next to Jim Douglas—my good friend—the Republican Governor of Vermont. He is the incoming chair of the National Governor’s Association. Later, you will hear from Sheriff Lee Baca of Los Angeles on why law enforcement supports Pass ID.
Now we get to the fundamental reason why we have these laws in the first place. We go back to the 9/11 Commission report. We need secure identification to thwart potential terrorists; law enforcement needs to have confidence that an ID holder is who he or she claims to be; and—as the 9/11 Commission report said—to terrorists, travel documents are just as important as weapons.
States vary widely in the standards they employ. Now the system is too open to fraud. National standards are necessary, but national standards are embodied both in REAL ID and in Pass ID. Secure identification certainly won’t thwart every planned terrorist attack, but it can present an obstacle and give another counter terrorism tool to law enforcement that we need. Now—as has been mentioned—there are lots of similarities between REAL ID and Pass ID. The main similarities between the two are the physical requirements for physical security of driver’s license production.
The premises must be secure. A background check on employees must be conducted. There must be fraudulent document training given to all employees involved in the process.
Requirement to show Pass IDs: At the end of the implementation period, non-compliant identifications would no longer be automatically accepted to board planes, enter nuclear plants, government buildings and the like.
Document validation: Both laws would require states to validate the legitimacy of the underlying source documents such as birth certificates or licenses from other states.
Further, under Pass ID, a requirement for electronic verification of Social Security Number and lawful status remains. Now, the differences: Why is this easier to implement from the state perspective?
First, Pass ID eliminates the blanket requirement to use untested technologies for electronic verification of any and all source documents. States still have to validate documents, but they can pursue different ways to reach that standard.
Second, they are required to electronically verify Social Security and lawful presence through the S-Solve and SAVE [Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements] databases; but, unlike REAL ID, under Pass ID, they are exempted for paying the fee for doing those checks.
Third, there is greater flexibility under Pass ID. in terms of how you re-enroll existing driver’s license holders, because under REAL ID you’ve got to re-enroll everybody under the age of 50 three years earlier than everybody else. Under Pass ID we give the states flexibility on how to do the re-enrollment so long as everything is complete by 2016—which actually is one year earlier than the final completion date for REAL ID.
And, lastly—in terms of differences as has been noted by Senator Akaka—unlike REAL ID, Pass ID actually contains within it specific assurances that states and privacy advocates have sought for the protection of the information that is garnered in the process. So these differences—which are designed to make the goal of REAL ID a reachable goal and designed to move us toward reaching the goal of the 9/11 Commission report—these differences contained within Pass ID make it a bill that—if passed and implemented before Dec. 31 of this year—will fix a bill that was flawed from the outset.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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This page was last reviewed/modified on July 16, 2009.

Note: The following text is a quote:

http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1247674758513.shtm

Testimony of Secretary Napolitano before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Identification Security: Reevaluating the Real ID Act” (Written Testimony)

Release Date: July 15, 2009
Dirksen Senate Office Building
(Remarks as Prepared)
Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and members of the Committee: Thank you for your leadership on homeland security issues, and thank you for holding this important hearing today on how the passage of the Providing Additional Security in States’ Identification Act of 2009, also called PASS ID, will enhance our Nation’s security. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provided technical assistance to PASS ID’s Senate sponsors in drafting this bill, and we look forward to continue working with Congress on the bill as it moves through the legislative process. I urge this Committee to mark up PASS ID promptly so it can be considered by both houses of Congress and signed into law this calendar year.
PASS ID is a critical piece of national security legislation that will fix the REAL ID Act of 2005 and institute strong security standards for government-issued identification. PASS ID will fulfill a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, that the federal government set standards for identification such as driver’s licenses and nondriver identification cards – and this bill will do so in a way that states will implement, rather than disregard. PASS ID will enact the same strong security standards set out by REAL ID as quickly as REAL ID but, critically, this bill provides a workable way to get there.
We must work to keep terrorists and other criminals from obtaining false identification – nd in order to do that, we need to have consistent, strong standards for identification ocuments that all states can implement. The 9/11 Commission was clear about this. But the EAL ID Act is unlikely to be implemented by the states as Congress intended, and a new pproach is needed if we are to accomplish the law’s goals.
As a former Governor and former chair of the National Governors Association, I can attest that the states strongly support the goals of the REAL ID Act, but many feel that they didn’t have an adequate opportunity to help shape the law, and find it fundamentally flawed. Indeed, 12 states have so far passed legislation outright rejecting it, two states have passed legislation refusing to implement it without significant conditions being met, 11 states have passed resolutions opposing it, and many other states are refusing to implement it.1 PASS ID was built with the states, maintaining strong security standards and introducing enough changes in implementing those same standards as to provide states a system in which they will participate. This, unlike the status quo, will yield the progress we need on secure identification.
PASS ID’s Senate sponsors – Senators Akaka, Voinovich, Baucus, Carper, Leahy and Tester – along with the Department of Homeland Security and the National Governors Association (NGA), collaborated with state and local governments and law enforcement to draft a bill to fix REAL ID and institute strong standards for secure identification. PASS ID enjoys the support of Democrats and Republicans in Congress, Governors and state legislators throughout the country, and state, local and federal law enforcement groups. Governor Jim Douglas of Vermont, the incoming Chair of the NGA, and Sheriff Lee Baca from Los Angeles County are here to discuss the reasons why PASS ID has won support from the states and the law enforcement community.
The need for Congress to fix REAL ID is urgent. If Congress fails to enact new legislation, we will continue to have a law on the books that does not meet the security needs of our Nation. We cannot leave an important recommendation of the 9/11 Commission unfulfilled.
There is another urgent reason for acting quickly. As it currently stands, the next stage of REAL ID implementation – scheduled for the end of 2009 – would result in major complications for the residents of 12 states with anti-REAL ID laws, as well as for residents of other states that could refuse to implement REAL ID. The more than 40 million people living in those 12 states would be unable to use their driver’s licenses for official purposes such as boarding an airplane, even though no state will have issued a REAL ID-compliant document by that time.
In order to solve the problems of REAL ID, it is imperative that this Committee, and Congress as a whole, heed the call of Governors and law enforcement to enact the PASS ID Act promptly.
Why We Need Secure Identification
The ability to obtain fraudulent identification documents presents an opportunity for terrorists and other violent criminals to board airplanes, rent cars, open bank accounts, or conduct other activities without being detected. Law enforcement must be able to rely on government-issued identification documents. An officer must be able to know that the bearer of a government-issued ID is who he or she claims to be, and must have the ability to identify a fraudulent ID quickly.
We need nationwide standards because states vary widely in how they issue driver’s licenses and non-driver’s license identification cards produced by states’ motor vehicle departments, the two types of identification to which both REAL ID and PASS ID apply. (For shorthand, when I refer to “driver’s licenses” in this testimony, I mean both of those types of identification.) Nationwide security standards for IDs would give law enforcement officials the assurance that all IDs meet a high threshold of security. While fraudulent IDs play a major role in identity theft, illegal employment, and border crime, the most immediate reason we need to secure government-issued IDs is to thwart potential terrorists.
As you know, the ability of terrorists to obtain government-issued IDs played a significant role in the events leading to the attacks of September 11, 2001. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, “All but one of the 9/11 hijackers acquired some form of U.S. identification document, some by fraud.”2 Preventing terrorists from obtaining these documents is critical to securing America against terrorism. As the 9/11 Commission noted, “For terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons.”3
The 9/11 Commission recommended that the federal government work with other layers of government to solidify the security of government-issued IDs:
Secure identification should begin in the United States. The federal government should set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification, such as drivers licenses. Fraud in identification documents is no longer just a problem of theft. At many entry points to vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, sources of identification are the last opportunity to ensure that people are who they say they are and to check whether they are terrorists.4
Improving government-issued IDs alone will not thwart every planned terrorist attack, but it presents an important obstacle to any potential terrorist operating in the United States and could aid law enforcement in stopping terrorist plots. Securing IDs is a common-sense national security imperative. The 9/11 Commission spelled out the need for the federal government and the states to take action together on this issue – a process that has been unduly hampered by the REAL ID Act.
Problems with the REAL ID Act
From the perspective of DHS, the major problem with REAL ID is that it is producing very little progress in terms of securing driver’s licenses, and it is not getting us to where we need to be. Simply put, REAL ID is unrealistic. It presents major concerns to the states on a number of fronts, and when 12 states have so far outlawed themselves implementing REAL ID, there will never be effective national standards for identification until REAL ID is fixed.
Inflexible electronic verification requirements
A necessary part of increasing ID security is setting strong standards that states would need to meet in verifying the underlying documents a person presents when applying for a driver’s license (for example, a birth certificate or driver’s license from another state). REAL ID would require states to adopt new technologies in order to verify all those “identity source” documents electronically, including documents issued by other states.
This mandate is too rigid. Many of the required databases are simply not ready – and this requirement provides states little leeway to try to adopt more efficient and effective methods for data verification. Under REAL ID, the states would need to spend an estimated $1.5 billion to electronically verify applicants’ information and to upgrade their systems. States have bristled at being required to absorb this expense when they could take equally effective measures at less cost.
Inflexible re-enrollment system
Similarly, the process by which current driver’s license holders renew their driver’s licenses, presenting their source documents to enroll secure ID, is a critical part of any ID security initiative. But REAL ID issues inflexible mandates to the states on this score.
Current regulations impose a specific schedule for the states to re-enroll their 245 million driver’s license holders. Under REAL ID, re-enrollment would need to be completed in a six-year window, from May 11, 2011 until December 1, 2017. The rule then requires that those under the age of 50 – about 60 percent of all license holders – reenroll in the first three years of that window, by December 1, 2014.5
So long as the Nation reaches the same goal, states should be allowed to find the most efficient and effective ways of expeditiously bringing their residents into a secure ID program based on their own renewal cycles and operations, rather than being forced to follow a rigid age-based plan. PASS ID, if enacted this year, would have states complete issuance by 2016, one year earlier than the current REAL ID schedule, but states retain the authority to meet that deadline as they see fit.
Higher costs than necessary
REAL ID would require an estimated $3.96 billion for states to implement, yet minimal funds have been appropriated to the states for this purpose. When REAL ID passed in 2005, the states balked at accepting a mandate they had played no part in creating. Today, this hefty burden is made even more onerous by the economic conditions that are constricting state budgets.
Enhancing ID security by setting nationwide standards will be more expensive than the current system – there’s no question about it. But in specifically requiring how states meet security standards, rather than having states meet standards in the ways they deem most effective and efficient, REAL ID makes strong security standards more costly than they need to be. Mandating electronic verification or a specific re-enrollment schedule are examples of this.
No incentive to innovate
As is clear, the rigid mandates in the REAL ID Act provide states with little leeway to devise new or better systems to achieve the same security standards. Ideally, states would not merely meet security standards, but also exceed them, and accomplish this in new and better ways. States are laboratories for innovation in government and are best positioned to implement policies according to their operational considerations. Provided the states are on the path to meeting the same strong ID security standards, the federal government should allow flexibility in the means they choose to get there.
Inadequate privacy protections
Several provisions of REAL ID have raised substantial privacy concerns among citizens and state lawmakers. Specifically, REAL ID calls for states to provide electronic access to information contained in their motor vehicle databases to all other states. It is completely unclear how the law envisions this access to be used, much less monitored and managed to ensure privacy protections. Uncertainty about this provision has led to assumptions that REAL ID allows officials of any state to view an applicant’s personally identifiable information as part of a national system.
REAL ID lacks sufficient rules regarding who could access, share, or even sell personal information contained in the machine-readable barcode on a REAL ID-compliant document. The current law also lacks protections or procedures for individuals who want to change their data or correct erroneous data in records databases.
Costs of inaction
It is essential for Congress to act promptly to address concerns raised by REAL ID because not changing the law could result in major complications, especially for the residents of the 12 states with anti-REAL ID laws on the books. Due to the concerns raised by states during the REAL ID rulemaking process, the Department has allowed for various extensions related to compliance. On March 1, 2007, the Department announced it would grant extensions to all states requesting extensions, not to exceed December 31, 2009. The Department has also announced that a second extension is available, but only to those states that have met certain benchmarks by December 31. These benchmarks include a certification by the state that it will comply with REAL ID.
Clearly, this is very problematic for states with anti-REAL ID laws and resolutions. In the 12 states with laws against REAL ID, the December 31 deadline means that residents of these states – who number more than 40 million – will not be able to use their driver’s licenses for official purposes, such as boarding aircraft. The residents of Georgia and Virginia may also be affected by their states’ less-conclusive anti-REAL ID laws. Eleven other states have passed legislative resolutions opposing REAL ID and could be affected. Together, all these states have 111 million residents, including more than 84 million adults, who could be affected by this deadline.
All in all, half the states have taken some kind of legislative stand against REAL ID and more have expressed serious reservations. Due to the significant budget problems facing all states, it is highly likely other states will also refuse to implement REAL ID.
And, under REAL ID, residents of states that have indicated they will comply will be allowed to use their driver’s licenses for boarding aircraft and other official purposes, despite the fact that their licenses may be no more secure than those issued by states that have refused to comply. This is because no state – including those without anti-REAL ID laws – will issue REAL IDs by the end of the year. Which driver’s licenses are accepted and which are not would be based on a promise of future action, rather than on actual security differences between those driver’s licenses. Such a situation would not advance our security, and underscores the need of Congress to act quickly.
The bottom line is that because of the states’ objections to REAL ID, today – four years since its passage, five years after the 9/11 Commission Report, and nearly eight years after 9/11 – the United States has not realized secure identification. There has got to be a better way – and that is why I support the approach in PASS ID.
PASS ID: A Workable Model for Security Standards
The PASS ID Act establishes the ID security standards the Nation needs while fixing the problems of the REAL ID Act. A few individuals have responded to criticism of REAL ID by suggesting that any change in the law would weaken the standards it established. Such a criticism is just wrong. Strong security standards for driver’s licenses remain the same in the two laws. The two laws are different only in that PASS ID is more nimble and provides a feasible way to achieve ID security. The changes PASS ID makes in directing how security standards are to be implemented are enough to bring the states on board and leave behind a status quo where the Nation has not made sufficient progress on secure identification.
Key similarities in PASS ID: Strong security standards called for by the 9/11 Commission
PASS ID will implement the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission that the federal government provide standards for the issuance of secure identification documents. PASS ID would provide standards in fulfilling that recommendation that are just as strong as those in REAL ID.
Document verification – PASS ID would maintain strong standards for ensuring the authenticity of identity source documents applicants show to obtain a driver’s license. States would be required to have sufficient processes in place to determine the authenticity of documents, including birth certificates or IDs issued by other states. PASS ID would require electronic verification through two federal databases that are used today – SSOLV for social security numbers and SAVE for immigration status.
Physical security of ID production – PASS ID would require states to ensure the physical security of the means of driver’s license production, and to conduct background checks on employees who deal with driver’s license issuance, in order to reduce the chance of malfeasance and fraud. PASS ID would also require all such employees to be trained in fraudulent document detection. These standards remain unchanged from REAL ID.
Photographs of ID applicants – PASS ID would necessitate that states capture photographs of individuals who apply for a PASS ID-compliant driver’s license, including those who are denied, clarifying a provision of REAL ID that states had said was unclear.
Requirements to show PASS IDs – As under REAL ID, non-secure driver’s licenses would no longer be accepted at the end of the PASS ID implementation period in order to enter nuclear power plants; federal facilities dealing with national security, homeland security, or defense; and to board airplanes.6 PASS ID would not extend to federal locations where REAL ID could potentially have been applied but are openly accessible to the public, such as national parks.
All in all, PASS ID would match the security provided in REAL ID, while providing the states with more flexibility to innovate and meet the standards.
Key differences in PASS ID: Fixes problems in implementation, cost, and privacy.
In addition to providing for security standards matching those of REAL ID, PASS ID provides a framework that is more workable from the state perspective.
Document verification – PASS ID would require states to have adequate means of validating the underlying documents of a state-issued driver’s license. But unlike REAL ID, PASS ID would provide options to the states to make these determinations. While REAL ID mandates electronic verification for all source document information, PASS ID would maintain a focus on ensuring the authenticity of identity source documents that applicants present, allowing states to adopt cost-effective ways to achieve or exceed that threshold. This provision eliminates the need for every state to adopt expensive and unnecessary technologies. DHS will continue to work with interested states in developing voluntary electronic verification capabilities, through a demonstration project that will help determine whether state-to-state electronic verification can become accurate and workable, and do so with the necessary privacy and security protections built in. Again, the flexibility of PASS ID allows us to proceed with national standards.
Lower potential costs – Greater flexibility in several areas would substantially lower the potential cost to the states for implementing the program. These changes produce cost estimates for PASS ID significantly less than those for REAL ID, though the exact cost would depend on the particular systems states decide to adopt. The bill would also codify the current Driver’s License Security Grant Program and specify that the funding is meant for PASS ID compliance, with $50 million requested in the FY 2010 President’s Budget Request.
Faster implementation and flexibility – PASS ID could take effect faster than the current REAL ID schedule. States would have one year after the issuance of final DHS regulations to begin issuing compliant documents, and would have five years from that date to enroll driver’s license holders as they see fit. The REAL ID deadline for completing issuance of compliant driver’s licenses is December 2017. If Congress enacts the PASS ID Act as it is currently written by October 2009, states could complete enrollment by July 2016, a full one year and five months ahead of the REAL ID timetable. This is part of why taking action on PASS ID is urgent.
Privacy protections – PASS ID would not require states to provide direct access to each other’s driver’s license databases; in fact, the bill contains protections against creating any national identity database containing all driver’s license information and requires states to adopt adequate procedures to prevent unauthorized access to or sharing of personally identifiable information. PASS ID would also require public notice of privacy policies enacted under the law. The bill would establish a redress process for individuals who believe their personal information should be amended in records systems. Moreover, it would restrict private entities from selling or trading the personal information contained in the barcode of a PASS ID-compliant driver’s license, and would prohibit private entities from scanning that portion unless it was specifically to support federal, state or local laws (such as purchasing a controlled substance or a weapon).
I want to emphasize that PASS ID accommodates any states that have already taken steps toward secure IDs under REAL ID. Despite the many problems of REAL ID, some states have made significant progress in the past four years on a number of fronts, including digitizing their records. PASS ID would not penalize these states and would allow states to keep either electronic or paper copies of their records. The states that have begun the process of digitization are already ahead of the game – digital records will certainly prove their worth in the long run. PASS ID is specifically designed not to penalize any states that made security advances under current law, but rather to allow states that have laws refusing to implement REAL ID to come back to the table.
All in all, PASS ID is the fix for REAL ID that the Nation needs: one that keeps strong security standards that are critical to our safety, but provides workable ways to achieve those standards. The states have embraced the changes included in PASS ID, which provides the Nation the opportunity to make real progress on ID security.
Conclusion
As the 9/11 Commission expressed clearly and specifically, the need to advance ID security across the Nation is urgent. Today, nearly five years after that Commission recommended that ID security reforms begin in the United States, we have made little progress. The REAL ID Act, though well-intentioned, has caused a stalemate on an issue where we cannot afford to wait any longer.
It’s time to break this impasse – and the approach taken under the PASS ID Act does just that. PASS ID improves upon REAL ID by maintaining high security standards while providing greater flexibility, reducing cost, accelerating implementation, protecting privacy, and promoting collaboration between the federal government and the states.
This is why PASS ID has a bipartisan and geographically diverse group of sponsors, has won support from the bipartisan National Governors Association, and has received the endorsement of the National Sheriffs Association, the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, and the Major Cities Chiefs Association. With the right legislation, working in partnership with law enforcement and the states, we can and will make progress on this important security issue.
Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and members of the Committee: I urge you to join the Department of Homeland Security and our partners to support the approach taken under PASS ID. The time to act is now, given the deadlines involved, and we will continue working with you to address the specific language of the bill as it moves forward. Thank you for your continued partnership and for the opportunity to testify today. I can now answer any questions you have.
Endnotes
Those states with laws prohibiting compliance with REAL ID are Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, and Washington. Georgia and Virginia have more conditional laws prohibiting themselves from complying with REAL ID. Missouri’s legislature has passed a bill prohibiting REAL ID implementation that is before the governor at the time of this testimony’s submission. Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, and South Dakota have passed concurrent or joint legislative resolutions in opposition to REAL ID. Pennsylvania’s two legislative chambers have passed separate resolutions opposing it. The Michigan House has also passed a resolution against REAL ID.
9/11 Commission Report, p. 390
9/11 Commission Report, p. 384.
9/11 Commission Report, p. 390.
Neither REAL ID nor PASS ID would require an individual to re-enroll if he or she does not want a compliant driver’s license or non-driver’s license ID, but that person would not be able to use a noncompliant driver’s license or other non-compliant ID for official purposes.
Under PASS ID – the same as under REAL ID – a traveler who does not have a qualifying government issued ID will be subject to greater scrutiny as Transportation Security Officers (TSO) determine his or her identity and confirm that the passenger is not on the Terrorist Screening Center’s watchlist. TSOs deal every day with travelers who have lost their identification or been victims of theft while on a trip. TSOs make an appropriate decision based on an assessment of available identification that a passenger may carry, or information that the passenger can provide.
This page was last reviewed/modified on July 15, 2009.

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