Oh wait, wrong Reich.
Tokyo regarded the conclusion of the Anglo-Italian accord as reducing the triple anti-Comintern pact to a German-Japanese agreement against Russia. The Foreign office was represented as seriously concerned since the agreement may affect Britain’s Far Eastern policy. Hope was expressed that it would not last. At Hankow the agreement was welcomed, as it was felt that Japan would be weakened and British opposition to her would be strengthened.
Italians were relieved and overjoyed at the prospect of return of peace to the Mediterranean. This feeling was regarded as a good augury for future Anglo-Italian relations. The press, however, emphasized that there would be no weakening of the Rome-Berlin axis. Early negotiations with France were expected.
Prime Minister Chamberlain arrived in the north of Scotland for his visit to the Marquess of Londonderry, advocate of an accord with Germany. London believed negotiations with Berlin would be pushed.
The press then declared that the Rome-Tokyo axis had proved its value by preventing possible Anglo-American joint action in the Far East at the time of the Panay and Ladybird incidents.
Apart from its power to detain the British fleet in the Mediterranean at moments of tension the Rome-Tokyo axis has no interest for Japan and the conclusion of a Mediterranean entente reduces the tripartite anti-Comintern pact to its original meaning as a German-Japanese agreement against Soviet Russia.
The formula under which the Japanese press will conceal its disappointment has not been announced. Recent trends suggest that Japan will profess satisfaction at the increasing realism of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s foreign policy and express hopes that the British Government will soon acquire a clearer understanding of the Far Eastern situation and modify its attitude accordingly.
Yomiuri, purporting to report the Foreign Office views, although these do not appear in any other paper, says that Anglo-Italian friendship will not last because the fundamental issues between the “have” and the “have not” nations remain unsolved.
This comment professes confidence that Italian-Japanese relations will not be affected, but admits that the agreement causes serious concern to Japan since it may affect Great Britain’s Far Eastern policy.
Moreover it is felt that the Rome-London pact will modify the belligerency of the fascist front powers and in a measure become an entering wedge in the Italo-German axis. Consequently it is believed that Italy and Germany may not support Japan so strongly in the future. In this regard the influential daily Ta Kung Pao remarks:
“The Japanese look upon Italy as more important than German. Now Japan has lost her instrument for harassing Great Britain in Europe.”
Apprehension is expressed in some quarters as the result of the prospective general recognition of the conquest of Ethiopia. It is feared that this may eventually lead to the recognition of Manchukuo. Ta Kung Pao echoes the general sentiment that the League of Nations has received a heavy blow, remarking:
“The Italo-British agreement proves that the League system is bankrupt.”
This feeling is important since all treaties depend for their success more on the spirit in which they are concluded and on a desire to abide by them loyally than on their actual written clauses. It cannot be doubted that all Italians are relieved and overjoyed at the prospect of a return of peace to the troubled Mediterranean.
It is the psychological factors in Anglo-Italian relations that perhaps deserve to greatest attention in any judgment about the true value of the agreement signed yesterday. Italy and Britain for the last two years have been animated by mutual distrust and suspicion more than they have been separated by any fundamental causes of hostility.
The Popolo di Roma this morning exaggerates somewhat when it says that all that has happened between Italy and Britain since the outbreak of the Italo-Ethopian trouble was a mere misunderstanding, but it is nearer the truth than those observers who see no possibility of peace between the old-established imperialism of democratic Britain and the rising imperialism of Fascist Italy. The Anglo-Italian agreement in any case certainly has created an atmosphere that is a prerequisite if relations between Italy and Britain are ever to return to where they were before 1935.
With Chancellor Hitler’s Italian visit imminent, the whole Italian press is careful to emphasize that the re-establishment of harmony between Italy and Britain can in no event mean or imply a weakening of the Rome-Berlin axis. The axis, say all Italian newspapers, is and will continue to be the guiding principle of Italian foreign policy. Italy now finds herself in the position of being on friendly terms not only with the other end of the Rome-Berlin axis but also with the chief European exponent of democracy. Italians declared that this does not necessarily lead to the consequence that Italy will be obliged sooner or later to choose between Britain and Germany, but that the situation should be taken advantage of to bring about improved relations also between Britain and Germany.
The Anglo-Italian agreement is expected to lead to interesting developments in the situation between Italy and France. It is now regarded as certain that France will appoint an Ambassador to Rome immediately after the next League of Nations Council meeting next month and that negotiations for an Italo-French agreement similar to the Anglo-Italian one will be opened not much later. Some more optimistic persons believe the French Charge d’Affaires will approach the Italian Government immediately with an offer to negotiate an understanding.
A point about the Anglo-Italian agreement on which the Italian press lays the greatest emphasis is that Britain, by discussing and concluding the understanding with Italy on a footing of equality, has recognized Italy’s new imperial status more effectually than if she had formally recognized the conquest of Ethiopia. As one paper puts it, Britain has renounced the moral protectorate over Italy that she has always claimed since the Italian wars of independence, and this is a thing that fills all Italians with pride – their feelings are similar to those of a young man coming of age.
Two points in the agreement are clarified by Italian papers today.
The first relates to Annex Six, whereby Italy accepts the principle that Italian East African natives should not be compelled to undertake military duties other than local policing and territorial defense. This means, says the Italian press, that Italy accepts the principle that Ethiopian troops should not be used outside Ethiopia – for instance, in Europe – but that the application of this principle depends on its acceptance by all other powers. Some papers make themselves even plainer by saying that the decision as to whether this principle is to be applied or not now is up to France.
The second point relates to the note Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano delivered to the Earl of Perth, Britain’s Ambassador, undertaking to reduce Italian effectives in Libya. As Libya now forms part of Italian metropolitan territory, Italian papers say, this does not mean that the number of army corps stationed there will be decreased, but only that the forces will be reduced from a war to a peace footing.
Some foreign observers and commentators seem to think that Italy has given up more than she has gained in her agreement with Britain. They point out that Italy has undertaken not to derive any benefit from the policy she has followed in the Spanish civil war, that she has renounced all idea of threatening Egypt from Libya and that she has promised to discontinue any propaganda that might threaten the British Empire’s integrity – all in exchange for merely British recognition of the Ethiopian conquest.
This view is not shared in Italian circles. They say Italy declared from the outset that she was looking for neither political, military nor economic advantages in Spain. The idea that Italy made a sacrifice by undertaking to reduce her effectives in Libya and interrupt anti-British propaganda, it is argued here, is based on the assumption that Italy is preparing to make war on Britain. Since she is not, it is added, these two points of the Anglo-Italian agreement are entirely logical and proper and entail no sacrifice for Italy.
Of particular interest is Annex Three of the agreement, dealing with the position of the two countries in Arabia. Italy and Britain agree not to disturb the status quo, which, it is observed here, consists of the prevalence of Italian influence in Yemen and the prevalence of British interest in Saudi Arabia and a sort of British protectorate over the zones of Arabia lying east and south of the present boundaries of Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The two countries agree, moreover, to keep all other powers out of this part of the world, which consequently will henceforth be regarded as a sort of appendage of the Italian and British Empires.
When the present agreement is compared with the so-called gentlemen’s agreement of Jan. 2, 1937 one cannot help being struck by its greater completeness and by the detail with which it goes into all Anglo-Italian questions. The gentlemen’s agreement, apart from some rather vaguely worded generalizations, consisted only in undertakings not to disturb the Mediterranean status quo and a guarantee of free access to and egress from the Mediterranean.
The present agreement instead takes up in detail not only all pending Anglo-Italian questions, but also all questions likely to arise in the future. The thoroughness with which all aspects of Anglo-Italian problems has been examined is evidence of a desire that the present agreement shall serve not as a mere stopgap but as a permanent basis for amicable relations between two powers that are obliged by circumstances and geography to co-exist in the Mediterranean.
Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues simply hope to join up the Italo-German and Anglo-French partnerships into some sort of four-power relationship.
If we can just get enough signatures on enough papers we might be able to prevent a general war.
Reply #2 is the view of the historic agreement in Asia.
The press then declared that the Rome-Tokyo axis had proved its value by preventing possible Anglo-American joint action in the Far East at the time of the Panay and Ladybird incidents.
Or maybe it was Japan’s abject apology to the U.S.
Oh wait, wrong Reich.
The headline is wrong. It should read “(Real Time - 70 Years),” because real time is now, and this happened 70 years ago.
Real time + 70 years is April 2078.
He added: “It has happened now for the first time in history . . . a newspaper front-paging the fact there is no bad news today. While millions of people forgot their worries and went out to be happy, Britain and Italy were shaking hands. . . . All Europe welcomed it. The tension of two dangerous years is relieved.”
I think that one thing we may not share over the abyss of years is the profound dread of war these people had. The trenches of World War I were not a distant memory to them. Peace with Italy at the expense of allowing some Italian adventure against the Ethiopians looked like a good plan, and it's hard to gainsay them.
"It is felt that some such argument would be useful not only to obtain the support of the British people in war, but also to win favorable opinion in the British Dominions, the United States and other neutral countries that might become Great Britain’s allies. "
First, we need to note that every article similar to this one, that you've posted so far, includes a statement along these lines. So, it is a consistent theme.
I am slowly becoming convinced that this idea is absolutely critical to understanding the whole elaborate "Kabuki dance," going on in the years leading up to September 1939.
With perfect 20-20 hindsight, we see now that what Britain and France should have been doing, instead of appeasement, was "push-back," even slapping Hitler around a bit.
Remember, the cost of appeasement was: for over five years, on average nearly a million people a month died world-wide (est. 55 million total) as a result of W.W.II.
Common sense tells us there had to be a better way to control Hitler's aggressive impulses. This quote, I think, suggests possibly why they never did it.
It didn't make the newspapers, but on this date Hitler summoned General Keitel to update his plan for taking over Czechoslovakia. Case Green, a plan for a military surprise attack on the country, had been drawn up in June 1937, but Hitler thought current world opinion precluded such a drastic step. Instead he intended to manufacture an "incident," such as the murder of the German Minister in the course of an anti-German demonstration. (I don't think the German Minister got the memo on this phase of the plan.) German forces would then occupy Czechoslovakia "to restore order" before England or France could do anything prevent it. Once accomplished, Hitler thought the European powers would learn to live with it.
This is the background for the diplomatic efforts to keep the peace in Europe: Hitler wants Czechoslovakia. In order to prevent war the European powers must let him have it.
It’s only fitting that Chamberlain vacation with Lord Londonberry. Though Londonberry publicly stated that he was not a Nazi sympathizer his actions showed that he was at the very least a Hitler Apologist. His contacts with Goering and his own damning words proved to be his undoing when he was arrested when the war broke out based on a rumor that he was a Nazi spy.