Posted on 08/14/2006 12:37:21 PM PDT by DannyTN
While the damage caused Israels military reputation tops Western assessments of the Lebanon war, DEBKAfiles Iranian sources report an entirely different perception taking hold in ruling circles in Tehran.
After UN Security Council resolution 1701 calling for a truce was carried Friday, Aug. 11, the heads of the regime received two separate evaluations of the situation in Lebanon one from Irans foreign ministry and one from its supreme national security council. Both were bleak: their compilers were concerned that Iran had been manipulatively robbed of its primary deterrent asset ahead of a probable nuclear confrontation with the United States and Israel.
While the foreign ministry report highlighted the negative aspects of the UN resolution, the councils document complained that Hizballah squandered thousands of rockets either by firing them into Israel or having them destroyed by the Israeli air force.
The writer of this report is furious over the waste of Irans most important military investment in Lebanon merely for the sake of a conflict with Israeli over two kidnapped soldiers.
It took Iran two decades to build up Hizballahs rocket inventory.
DEBKAfiles sources estimate that Hizballahs adventure wiped out most of the vast sum of $4-6 bn the Iranian treasury sunk into building its military strength. The organization was meant to be strong and effective enough to provide Iran with a formidable deterrent to Israel embarking on a military operation to destroy the Islamic regimes nuclear infrastructure.
To this end, Tehran bought the Israeli military doctrine of preferring to fight its wars on enemy soil. In the mid-1980s, Iran decided to act on this doctrine by coupling its nuclear development program with Israels encirclement and the weakening its deterrence strength. The Jewish state was identified at the time as the only country likely to take vigorous action to spike Irans nuclear aspirations.
The ayatollahs accordingly promoted Hizballahs rise as a socio-political force in Lebanon, at the same time building up its military might and capabilities for inflicting damage of strategic dimensions to Israels infrastructure.
That effort was accelerated after Israeli forces withdrew from the Lebanese security zone in May 2000. A bunker network and chain of fortified positions were constructed, containing war rooms equipped with the finest western hi-tech gadgetry, including night vision gear, computers and electronics, as well as protective devices against bacteriological and chemical warfare.
This fortified network was designed for assault and defense alike.
Short- medium- and long-range rockets gave the hard edge to Hizballahs ablity to conduct a destructive war against Israel and its civilians when the time was right for Tehran.
Therefore, Irans rulers are hopping mad and deeply anxious over news of the huge damage sustained by Hizballahs rocket inventory, which was proudly touted before the war as numbering 13,000 pieces.
Hizballah fighters, they are informed, managed to fire only a small number of Khaibar-1 rockets, most of which hit Haifa and Afula, while nearly 100 were destroyed or disabled by Israeli air strikes.
The long-range Zelzal-1 and Zelzal-2, designed for hitting Tel Aviv and the nuclear reactor at Dimona have been degraded even more. Iran sent over to Lebanon 50 of those missiles. The keys to the Zelzal stores stayed in the hands of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards officers who were in command of Hizballah. Nasrallah and his officers had no access to these stores.
But Tehran has learned that Israel was able to destroy most of the 22 Zelzal launchers provided.
That is not the end of the catalogue of misfortunes for the Islamic rulers of Iran.
1. The UN Security Council embodied in resolution 1701 a chapter requiring Hizballah to disarm in the face of a stern warning issued by supreme ruler Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in person in the early days of the war. Revolutionary Guards commanders went so far as to boast: No one alive is capable of disarming Hizballah.
The disarming of Hizballah would therefore be a bad knock to the supreme rulers authority and prestige as well as a disastrous blow for the deterrent force so painstakingly and expensively fashioned as a second front line to protect the Islamic republic from a safe distance.
2. Hizballahs ejection from South Lebanon, if accomplished in the aftermath of the ceasefire, would moreover deprive Tehran of the sword hanging over Israels head of instantaneous attack.
For the sake of partial damage control, Tehran handed Nasrallah a set of new instructions Sunday, Aug. 13:
First, to find a way of evading the ceasefire and keeping up war operations against Israeli forces.
Second, to reject the proposal to disarm before the Lebanese government meets on this Monday afternoon. In fact, that meeting was called off after Hassan Nasrallah sent a message to the Lebanese ministers flatly refusing to have Hizballah give up its weapons in the south. He also turned down a compromise proposal handed him later, whereby the Lebanese armys first mission after deploying in the south would be to help Hizballah evacuate its fighters with their arms to positions north of the Litani River.
The strategy evolving in Tehran since the ceasefire went into effect Monday morning requires Hizballah to employ a range of stratagems not only to prevent the truce from stabilizing but to stop the Lebanese army from deploying n the south and, above all, the entry of an effective international force.
Furthermore, Hizballah is instructed to stretch the military crisis into the next three of four months, synchronously with the timetable for a UN Security Council sanctions-wielding session on Iran.
According to exclusive reports reaching DEBKAfiles sources, the Iranian government believes that Israel and the United States are preparing a military operation for the coming October and November to strike Irans nuclear installations. It is therefore vital to keep the two armies fully occupied with other pursuits.
Iranian leaders conviction that the Lebanon war was staged to bamboozle them rests on certain perceptions:
As seen from Tehran, Israel looked as though it was carrying out a warming-up exercise in preparation for its main action against Irans nuclear program. The Israeli army was able to explore, discover and correct its weak points, understand what was lacking and apply the necessary remedial measures. They therefore expect the IDF to emerge from the war having produced novel methods of warfare.
They also have no doubt that the United States will replenish Israels war chest with a substantial aid program of new and improved weaponry.
From the Iranian viewpoint, Israel succeeded in seriously degrading Hizballahs capabilities. It was also able to throw the Lebanese Shiite militia to the wolves; the West is now in a position to force Nasrallah and his men to quit southern Lebanon and disarm. The West shut its eyes when he flouted the Resolution 1559 order for the disarmament of all Lebanese militias. But that game is over. The Americans will use Resolution 1701 as an effect weapon to squeeze Iran, denied of its second-front deterrence, on its nuclear program.
Tehran hopes to pre-empt the American move by torpedoing the Lebanon ceasefire and preventing the termination of hostilities at all costs.
If this is what the Iranians are doing in Southern Lebanon, can you imagine the type of bunker system the nut-job from Tehran has constructed within Iran ? Also news here about possible Hezbollha Chemical and Biological WMD defenses. Obviously they suspected that either Israel would use them or that they would need protection from their own.
Good response. But I guess here's what I had in mind.
The Geneva convention only constrains the actions of the NATIONS who are signatories to it. If we are at war with one of those signatories, both sides are bound by it, and it guarantees better treatment of uniformed POW's from both combatant countries.
Increasingly we find ourselves in conflict with groups which do not recognize the constraints of the Geneva convention, groups that don't even represent a national entity. Our POWs are not treated according to the Geneva convention, because their captors are NOT bound by it. WE, on the other hand, for some unexplainable reason, are expected by the rest of the world to abide by it against such an enemy.
I want something new, not necessarily scrapping the Geneva convention, but amending it to be relevant to 21st century asymmetrical conflict - something that requires an explicit agreement between ANY warring parties to agree to be bound certain "rules of war" which are already outlined pretty well in the Geneva convention.
Not this "The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of the Governments represented at the Diplomatic Conference held at Geneva from April 21 to August 12, 1949, for the purpose of establishing a Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, have agreed as follows:" crap.
I want something that specifically requires ANY warring parties, including "insurgents" not representing a national government to explicitly embrace the agreement, or to forfeit it's protections. The UN could oversee the establishment or rejection of such an agreement as part of it's discussion of the conflict in the Security Council.
With such an amendment, we would not necessarily abandon our own humanity in our conduct of war; but neither would we be held responsible for adhering to a set of rules of war that the enemy has refused to abide by. No more, "it's OK for the enemy to cut off your head on Al Jazeera, but if you put a pair of panties on his head, you're gonna go to prison" stuff.
This one needs more care. You could make the case that Hezbullah wasn't hiding behind their own civilization but rather Lebanon's. Is the civilian population willing supporters of terrorists such as the Palestinians or are they a people held hostage like Iraq and Lebanon?
You're darn right it needs more care. Were the civilians in the villages that had been turned into Hezbollah strongholds captives, innocents who had their towns taken over by thugs, or were they a willing, welcoming civilian infrastructure that supported Hezbollah's presence?
My initial reaction when things started was the former, but now I'm not so sure.
We learned, among other things, that many of the southern Lebanese considered Hezbollah to be their Great Liberators after the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon some years back. They saw Hezbollah as their first line of defense in case the Israelis invaded again.
Now, we look at it a little differently, and try to make the point that "if you didn't have terrorists living among your southern Lebanese population centers using them as a base to attack your neighbor Israel, then you wouldn't need to worry about the Israelis invading you". Now, it seems that the Christian villages on the southern border understand that, but the muslim villages don't. So they willingly let Hezbollah live in their midst and they rent out their houses to Hezbollah to store rockets.
Those people are not hostages. If they didn't want to live with Hezbollah, they could move north. Even if Hezbollah prevented them from leaving their villages during the recent conflict, they could have left before all this started. I know if my neighborhood was taken over by thugs, I'd move. They made their choice.
You are drifting to the dark side. Against Hezbullah fighters or all populations whose leadership supports Hezbullah?
I knew that "genocide" comment would get a response from somebody! And Lord forgive me, my mind has been going into some pretty dark places lately.
I mean, against all Hezbullah fighters. Make every attempt to warn "innocent" civilians to leave in order to avoid collateral damage. Accept the fact that if you are fighting an entity that is not a signatory to the Geneva convention, they may try to use unwilling "human shields", and any blame for any misfortune that befalls these innocents is blood on the hands of those who held them hostage and hid behind them, not yours. And then, with a clear conscience, unleash Hell upon the enemy. Destroy them as completely as possible using methods that will kill them and not expose your troops to harm. As I said in my last post, fuel-air explosives.
You know, this all reminds me of an old Bill Cosby skit from back in his stand-up comic days, where he asked the question "What if the American Revolution was run according to football rules?"
"At the beginning of the game, the ref tosses the coin and says 'home team wins the toss and chooses to defend'
"Visiting team will be required to wear bright red uniforms and march in straight lines out in the open. Home team can dress in dark clothing and hide behind rocks and trees and shoot at the visiting team".
It was funny then, but it's not when we let the enemy dictate the rules of the conflict in real life, today.
Technically, I think that's what we have now. But that brings up two points.
First, what do we do when signatories don't abide by it? I mean Hizbullah agreed to the cease fire which effectively calls for there disarmament in Lebanon, yet they already have announced their intention not to abide by it. Even if they signed the Geneva convention, they are unlikely to abide by it. What then?
It's a gentlemen's agreement that has no teeth, and not all signatories are gentlemen. It does shape world opinion of which side is good and bad, so it probably plays a role in military aid, but how many countries are willing to jump into a war on behalf of side A because side B fouled?
Second what are appropriate combat methodologies when confronting non-signatories?
As you point out, the world opinion is still that we should abide by it. The combatants that we have restrained in Guantanamo aren't under the Geneva convention's protection, but we mostly adhere to it anyway, because we are a civilized people.
There are some things we don't want to do in war, like genocide, because of our own beliefs, regardless of whether the other side does them or not. We don't intentionally target non-combatants. We don't use rape and torture as a means of terrorizing the enemy.
But what about torture to extract military information? We usually don't, because we don't want our own people tortured. But against an enemy that will torture our own regardless, should we not use such means as a tool of war? I don't know. It has pros and cons.
Again, the country that won't is considered to be a more peaceful country and more likely to win world support. The very use of such methods, leads to greater acceptance and use of such methods. Do we avoid it completely, so we don't have to draw the line? Those are tough issues that need to be fleshed out.
I'd have to disagree, Danny, we have nothing like that now. I don't know of a single circumstance in which guerilla fighters have ever agreed to abide by sort of rules proposed by a more powerful opponent. That's the very antithesis of guerilla warfare.
First, what do we do when signatories don't abide by it? I mean Hizbullah agreed to the cease fire which effectively calls for there disarmament in Lebanon, yet they already have announced their intention not to abide by it. Even if they signed the Geneva convention, they are unlikely to abide by it. What then?
Hezbollah is not now, has never been, and will never be an honest broker. You must remember, I advocated its' total annihilation, because they advocate Israel's total annihilation. I'm not Jewish, but after 9/11 I definitely chose sides, and I'm quite openly partisan on behalf of Israel.
We have no real precedent, where a signatory to the Geneva convention has openly violated it in a conflict against another signatory. I want to point out what happened to the German and Japanese high command after the post-WW2 war trials, but those predate the Geneva convention, so I can only speculate on the question. And what I'd guess is that there would be "Victor's Justice" with war trials against those who, by violating an agreement they were party to, had committed war crimes.
Second what are appropriate combat methodologies when confronting non-signatories?
It would depend on their conduct of the conflict. Traditionally, armed combatants captured out of uniform were shot as spies. Combatants dressed as civilians were not regarded the same rights as a soldier, they were subject to summary execution if captured.
Under the system I was proposing a non-national combatant group would gain the same protections and obligations as a soldier in a legitimate national armed force. It would secure protections for captured insurgents, and as such, would seem to be a pretty good deal to all those pesky little "liberation" movements out there.
If they chose not to take advantage of the opportunity, they would essentially be declaring it to be a "no rules" conflict. And Israel, for example, could take off the kid gloves and play by the "no rules" rules too. (But first they need to replace Olmert).
So you're saying the difference between your plan and the current Geneva convention is that "non-national combatant groups" could sign. Are you sure they couldn't now?
"If they chose not to take advantage of the opportunity, they would essentially be declaring it to be a "no rules" conflict. And Israel, for example, could take off the kid gloves and play by the "no rules" rules too. (But first they need to replace Olmert)."
It is essentially that now. Hezbullah is not covered by the Geneva Convention. There are no formal rules that Israel must obide by in fighting Hezbullah. But the civilized world still expects civilized behavior. Israel can't go in and commit genocide against Lebanon, because Hezbullah operates on their territory, even though Hezbullah is not covered by the Geneva Convention.
There are about 150 signatories to the 4th Geneva Convention accords, and they are all soveriegn countries. Non-soveriegn insurgents are outside its' scope.
There were some new protocols added in 1977 to deal with anti-colonial wars, but less than half of the signatories signed up for those. Most sovereign countries don't want to be constrained by the rules of war when it comes to rebels.
It is essentially that now. Hezbullah is not covered by the Geneva Convention.
Right. Neither are the detainees at Gitmo. But the Federal courts recently ruled that they must be treated as if they are. This is a very fluid issue.
There are no formal rules that Israel must obide by in fighting Hezbullah.
Technically correct. However, this seems to be a major world secret. Only a few weeks ago, the world press was wailing and gnashing their teeth because of what they called Israel's "disproportionate response".
If ya get enough people making up new rules and people listen, before long everybody thinks it's a real rule. And of course, any new rule that goes to the detriment of western civilization is automatically supported by all the little piss-ant dictatorships in the UN.
But the civilized world still expects civilized behavior. Israel can't go in and commit genocide against Lebanon, because Hezbullah operates on their territory, even though Hezbullah is not covered by the Geneva Convention.
No, I wasn't suggesting that. I suggested they wipe out Hezbollah, not Lebanon. However, that would conceivably include Lebanese members of Hezbollah, and their infrastructure related to their fighting capability.
Lebanon is either a soveriegn country or it's not. And right now it's not, it can't control it's own territory, and has ceded the right to use military force against another country to Hezbollah.
Now, if the reason for that is military weakness on the part of the Lebanese, they would welcome Israel coming in and liberating their country from the bandits who control the south.
But I think that "poor Lebanon is a victim" stuff has proved itself to be folly. I think that to a very great degree, Hezbollah IS Lebanon. If the Lebanese army takes sides with Hezbollah against the Israelis, well, it's just a war between Israel and Lebanon.
I never got clear on exactly what the courts ruling meant. But an explanation from Cornell University on the Supreme Court ruling, follows. I understand this to mean first, that there must be a proper judicial process to determine the status or the detainees and that they are under the convention's protection until that judicial process determins they are not. In other words, the military can detain them but can't determine their status relative to the Geneva convention unilaterally, a court must do that. And secondly, that the tribunals as proposed by the Bush administration lacked certain rights of redress that wouldn't have fit under either scenario, that of a Geneva POW or under U.S. Military law for a tribunal for a non-Geneva POW.
"that Hamdan is entitled to that Conventions full protections until adjudged, under it, not to be a prisoner of war; and that, whether or not Hamdan is properly classified a prisoner of war, the commission convened to try him was established in violation of both the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U. S. C. §801 et seq., and Common Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention because it had the power to convict based on evidence the accused would never see or hear."
A MilAnalyst on Fox mentioned two salient points late last week. I wonder if you could comment?
1) The Merkava tank was highly susceptible to Soviet and Chinese anti-tank missiles and the Hezzies took great advantage of that. The MilAnalyst said the Israelis noticed it too and will take steps fast.
2) The fixed positions of the Hezzies is both a blessing and a curse as they would have to defend those positions which are not mobile. A "sprint" as in Desert Storm would have put Israel at the Litani within days and the Hezzies screwed within these fortifications. Comments?
Thanks,
F
Perhaps you could confirm or disprove for me the idea that Israel (under Olmert's advisors) avoided a trap for its tanks. It could have lost a lot more to the Kornet and Saxhorn anti-tank missiles if it had rushed into Lebanon in a blitz as it had in the past.
Perhaps the whole deliberate provocation, the kidnapped soldiers and the rocket bombardment, was aimed to that end--to defeat the IDF armor in horrible killing fields. Israeli intel must have known of the advanced anti-tank weapons in possession of Hezbollah.
Danny - Thanks for the info re: Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld. I hadn't read that before. It's always helpful when you are able to read the actual decision, rather than depending on some talking head's summary of it.
That was the first time I had read the decision too, rather than just the freeper discussions. Scalia's and Thomas's dissents are scathing. I haven't yet read the third.
It sounds to me like the court decided that since Article 2 covered conflicts between signatory nations and conflicts between non-signatory nations that article 3's mention of "non-international conflicts" must be everything else which the appeals court and Thomas's dissent dissagree with.
Still article 3 simply requires a properly constituted court. And a military tribunals according to Thomas are properly constituted.
The Supremes seemed to take the position that because the military tribunal "might" not let the decendants see all the evidence against them for security reasons, that it's not a proper court. Which is an unreasonble position.
bttt
Thanks, dude! Very good info for me to assimilate.
Frank
From Strategypage:
The Real Winner in Lebanon
August 16, 2006: The success of the ceasefire in Lebanon hinges on a condition that Lebanon and Hizbollah both insist will not happen. Hizbollah is supposed to disarm, but says bluntly that it will not do so. The Lebanese government says it will not force Hizbollah to disarm. So what's going to happen? It appears that Israel is going to hold the UN responsible for carrying out its peace deal, and disarm Hizbollah. To that end, Israel will withdraw its troops from Lebanon, and leave it to UN peacekeepers to do what they are obliged to do. But here's the catch, not enough nations are stepping forward to supply the initial 3,500 UN forces, much less the eventual 15,000 UN force. However, it is likely that, eventually, enough nations will supply troops. But many of those contingents may not be willing to fight Hizbollah. Israel says it will not completely withdraw from Lebanon until the UN force is in place.
The Israeli strategy appears to be to allow the UN deal to self-destruct. If the UN peacekeepers can disarm Hizbollah, fine. If not, Israeli ground troops will come back in and clear everyone out of southern Lebanon. At that point, it will be obvious that no one else is willing, or able, to deal with the outlaw "state-within-a-state" that Hizbollah represents. Hizbollah will still exist after being thrown out of southern Lebanon, and it will be up to the majority of Lebanese, and the rest of the Arab world, to deal with Hizbollah and radical Shias.
Hizbollah suffered a defeat. Their rocket attacks on Israel, while appearing spectacular (nearly 4,000 rockets launched), were unimpressive (39 Israelis killed, half of them Arabs). On the ground, Hizbollah lost nearly 600 of its own personnel, and billions of dollars worth of assets and weapons. Israeli losses were far less.
While Hizbollah can declare this a victory, because it fought Israel without being destroyed, this is no more a victory than that of any other Arab force that has faced Israeli troops and failed. Arabs have been trying to destroy Israel for over half a century, and Hizbollah is the latest to fail. But Hizbollah did more than fail, it scared most Moslems in the Middle East, because it demonstrated the power and violence of the Shia Arab minority. Sunni Arabs, and most Arabs are Sunnis, are very much afraid of Shia Moslems, mainly because most Iranians are Shia, not Arab, and intent on dominating the region, like Iran has done so many times in the past. Hizbollah's recent outburst made it clear that Iran, which subsidizes and arms Hizbollah, has armed power that reaches the Mediterranean. This scares Sunni Arabs because a Shia minority also continues to rule Syria (where most of the people are Sunni). The Shia majority in Iraq, which have not dominated Iraq for over three centuries, is now back in control.
Hizbollah did enjoy a victory in its recent war, but it was over Sunni Arabs, not Israel.
I agree with that post.
I don't know if it's really a strategy for Israel, or it's just the way the events have unfolded, but they have little choice at this point, but to insist that all parties hold up their end of the bargain. And insist they should.
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