World Terrorism: News, History and Research Of A Changing World #4.

Tehran & Damascus Move to Lebanon Lebanon-born Walid Phares is a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Author of the recent book Future Jihad, he was also one of the architects of 2004’s United Nations resolution 1559, which called for the disarming of Hezbollah. NRO editor Kathryn Lopez recently talked to Phares about what’s going on in the Mideast, what happened to the Cedar Revolution, and this war we’re all in.

Kathryn Jean Lopez: What is “Future Jihad”? Are we seeing it in the Mideast now?

Walid Phares: “Future Jihad,” which has already begun, refers to a new and potent form of Islamic terrorism, characterized by a Khumeinist-Baathist axis. These are the two trees of jihadism, so to speak — the Salafism and Wahabism embodied in al Qaeda and the sort of jihadism led by Iran and also including Syria, Hezbollah, and their allies in Lebanon.

The alliance has not been in entire agreement as to strategy. The al Qaeda branch began its “Future Jihad” in the 1990s; its efforts culminated on 9/11 and have continued explosively since then. The international “Salafists” aimed at the U.S. in the past decade in order to strengthen their jihads on various battlefields (Chechnya, India, Sudan, Algeria, Indonesia, Palestine, etc.). “Weaken the resolve of America,” their ideologues said, “and the jihadists would overwhelm all the regional battlefields.”

As I argue in Future Jihad, bin Laden and his colleagues miscalculated on the timing of the massive attack against the U.S. in 2001. While they wounded America, they didn’t kill its will to fight (as was the case, for instance, in the Madrid 3/11 attacks). I have heard many jihadi cadres online, and have seen al Jazeera commentators on television, offering hints of criticism about the timing. They were blaming al Qaeda for shooting its imagined “silver bullet” before insuring a strategic follow up. But bin Laden and Zawahiri believe 9/11 served them well, and has put a global mobilization into motion. Perhaps it has, but the U.S. counter strategy in the Middle East, chaotic as the region currently appears, has unleashed counter jihadi forces. The jury is still out as to the time factor: when these forces will begin to weaken the jihadists depends on our perseverance and the public understanding of the whole conflict.

The other “tree” of jihadism, with its roots in Iran, withheld fire after 9/11. They were content to watch the Salafists fight it out with the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan and Iraq, not to mention within the West, as terror cells were hunted down. Ahmedinejad, Assad, and Nasrallah were analyzing how far the US would go, and how far the Sunnis and Salafis would go as well.

The fall of the Taliban and of the Baath in Iraq, however, changed Iran and Syria’s patient plans. The political changes in the neighborhood, regardless of their immediate instability, were strongly felt in Tehran and Damascus (but unfortunately not in the U.S., judging from the political debate here), and pushed the Khumeinists and the Syrian Baathists to enter the dance, but carefully. Assad opened his borders to the jihadists in an attempt to crumble the U.S. role in Iraq, while Iran articulated al Sadr’s ideology for Iraq’s Shiia majority.

A U.S.-led response came swiftly in 2004 with the voting of UNSCR 1559, smashing Syria’s role in Lebanon and forcing Assad to withdraw his troops by April 2005. In response, the “axis” prepared for a counter attack on the Lebanese battlefield by assassinating a number of the Cedar Revolution leaders, including MP Jebran Tueni. In short, the attacks by Hamas and Hezbollah and the kidnappings of soldiers were the tip of an offensive aimed at drawing attention away from Iran’s nuclear weapons programs and Syria’s assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri. Hezbollah was awaiting its moment for revenge against the Cedar Revolution too.

What we see now is 1) a Syro-Iranian sponsored offensive aimed at all democracies in the region and fought in Lebanon; 2) Israel’s counter offensive (which it seems to have prepared earlier); and 3) an attempt by Hezbollah to take over or crumble the Lebanese government.

Phares: Actually, it would be more accurate to say that the Cedar Revolution was failed. The masses in Lebanon responded courageously in March 2005 by putting 1.5 million people on the streets of Beirut. They did it without “no-fly-zones,” expeditionary forces, or any weapons at all, for that matter, and against the power of three regimes, Iran, Syria, and pro-Syrian Lebanon, in addition to Hezbollah terror. The “revolution” was for a time astoundingly successful; since then it has been horribly failed, and first of all by Lebanon’s politicians themselves. One of their leaders, General Michel Aoun, shifted his allegiances to Syria and signed a document with Hezbollah. Other politicians from the “March 14 Movement” then stopped the demonstrations, leaving them with the support of God knows what. They failed in removing the pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud and brought back a pro-Syrian politician to serve as a speaker of the house, Nabih Berri. Meanwhile, even as they were elected by the faithful Cedar Revolution masses, they engaged in a round table dialogue with Hezbollah, a clear trap set by Hassan Nasrallah: “Let’s talk about the future,” he said — with the implication, of course, that they forget about the Cedar Revolution and the militia’s disarming. While political leaders sat for months, enjoying the photo ops with Hassan Nasrallah, he was preparing his counter offensive, which he unleashed just a few days before the Security Council would discuss the future of Iran’s nuclear programs.

The Lebanese government of Prime Minister Seniora also abandoned the Cedar Revolution. His cabinet neither disarmed Hezbollah nor called on the U.N. to help in implementing UNSCR 1559. This omission is baffling. The government was given so much support by the international community and, more importantly, overwhelming popular support inside Lebanon: 80 percent of the people were hoping the Cedar Revolution-backed government would be the one to resume the liberation of the country. Now Hezbollah has an upper hand and the government is on the defensive.

The U.S. and its allies can be accused of certain shortcomings as well. While the speeches by the U.S. president, congressional leaders from both parties, Tony Blair, and Jacques Chirac were right on target regarding Lebanon, and while the U.S. and its counterparts on the Security Council were diligent in their follow up on the Hariri assassination and on implementing UNSCR 1559, there was no policy or plan to support the popular movement in Lebanon. Incredibly, while billions were spent on the war of ideas in the region, Lebanese NGOs that wanted to resume the struggle of the Cedar Revolution and fighting alone for this purpose were not taken seriously at various levels. Policy planners thought they were dealing with the “Cedar Revolution” when they were meeting Lebanon’s government and Lebanese politicians. The difference between the high level speeches on Lebanon and the laissez-faire approach from lower levels is amazing. Simply put, there was no policy on supporting the Cedar Revolution against the three regimes opposing it and the $400 million received by Hezbollah from Iran.

The Cedar Revolution was basically betrayed by its own politicians and is now essentially without a head. Nevertheless, as long as the international support remains, the Revolution will find its way and will face the dangers. The one and a half million ordinary citizens who braved all the dangers didn’t change their minds about Hezbollah’s terror. The resistance and counter-attack was to be expected. Unfortunately, thus far Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah have outmaneuvered the West and are at the throats of the Cedar Revolution. The international community must revise its plans, and, if it is strongly backed by the U.S. and its allies, including France, the situation can be salvaged. The good seeds are still inside the country.

Volume 3, Issue 2 (January 18, 2006) | Download PDF Version

Zawahiri: Foreshadowing Attacks on Israel and America?

By Michael Scheuer
The last three months have been a busy media season for al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. He has released a number of lengthy statements addressing the earthquake in Pakistan, the perfidy of President Musharraf‘s government, elections in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, and the military situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The core of the two most recent statements, however, seems more ominous. Released on January 6 and 7, 2006, the statements focus on three items: the coming mujahideen victory in Iraq, a new warning to the American people and an updated version of a warning to Americans first issued in 2002.

January 6 Statement

Zawahiri's January 6 video statement—which was produced by al-Qaeda's as-Sahab for Media Production in December 2005—covers a variety of subjects, but hones in on rallying Islamists on the basis of the Bush Administration's recent public discussion of the likelihood of some U.S. troop withdrawals from Iraq in 2006. "I said to you over a year ago," Zawahiri reminds his audience, "that the Americans' departure form Iraq has become a matter of time and nothing else" [1].

"I will congratulate it [the Islamic nation] today on the victory of Islam in Iraq.…Bush the liar was forced to announce in late November [2005] that he would withdraw his troops from Iraq. However, being addicted to lying, his justified his withdrawal by saying that the Iraqi troops have reached a good level and that he would not announce a timetable for withdrawal.

O liar and imposter: You have not stopped making yourself a laughingstock of the world. If your troops—with their aircraft, missiles, tanks, and fleets—are moaning, bleeding, and seeking a way out of Iraq....Bush: You have to admit that you have been defeated in Iraq, that you are being defeated in Afghanistan, and that you will be defeated in Palestine soon, with God's help and strength" [2].

In an interesting and apparently first-time occurrence, al-Qaeda leader in Iraq Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, on January 8, 2006, issued nearly simultaneous statements on the internet that complemented Zarwahiri's. "Since the start of mujahideen operations after the fall of the Baathist regime until today," Zarqawi said of the coming victory in Iraq, "nearly 800 martyr operations aimed at crusader targets and military convoys have been carried out....America has been defeated and it is just a matter of how bad the defeat will end up to be. I am not in a hurry for the Americans to leave, for the mujahideen enjoy slaughtering them….O nation of Islam, America today is drawing its last breath" [3]. Zarqawi also followed Zawahiri's lead on directly threatening Israel, saying that his group's recent "Rocket Expedition" against Israel was done on the "instructions of the sheikh of the mujahideen, Osama bin Laden…." Zarqawi said that the rocket attack "was only the start of a blessed in-depth strike against the Zionist enemy" [4].

In the statement of January 6, 2006, Zawahiri again goes out of his way to warn Americans that another al-Qaeda attack in the United States is inevitable if they do not listen to al-Qaeda's statements and begin to understand that the mujahideen's motivation is based on U.S. actions in the Muslim world. "People of the Crusader Alliance: Do you know the reason for your defeat in Iraq and losses in Afghanistan and Palestine?" Zawahiri asked.

"Simply, the basic reason is that you refuse to admit the truth. You follow illusions….The reality you refuse to admit is that the Islamic nation will not allow you to treat it as you treat slaves and animals. Unless you deal with the Islamic nation on the basis of understanding and respect, you will continue to face one disaster after another. Your disasters will not end unless you leave our homelands, stop stealing our wealth, and stop corrupting leaders in our countries" [5].

January 7 Statement

The January 7, 2006 Zawahiri video appears to be unique in the history of statements by al-Zawahiri and bin Laden. The substance and much of the wording of the message— entitled "The Letter to the Americans: Why We Fight and Resist You"—was originally issued as a letter from Osama bin Laden in the 2002-2003 period. In the January 7 broadcast, however, Zawahiri is—without explanation—identified as the author. Adding to uniqueness of the video is that while a still photograph of al-Zawahiri remains visible throughout the reading of the statement, the text is read in English by Azzam al-Amriki— "Azzam the American"—and English subtitles are also shown on the screen; Azzam previously has issued statements of his own warning Americans of the coming al-Qaeda attack on their country. The use of Azzam speaking English is likely meant to impress the urgency of the warning; in essence al-Qaeda has an American speaking to and warning his own countrymen. This scenario is reminiscent of bin Laden's October 31, 2004 warning to the American people in which he used basic Arabic and very few Koranic quotes or allusions to Islamic history in an effort to make sure he was understood and taken seriously by Americans [6].

Reading the words formerly attributed to bin Laden, Azzam emphatically underscores the warning to Americans issued by Zawahiri is his new January 6 video.

"You [the American people] might argue that none of the above justifies attacking civilians for crimes they did not commit or participate in. But such an argument flies in the face of your constant refrain that your land is the Land of Liberty and you are freedom's standard-bearers in this world. Thus, the American people chose the American government with their own free wills on the basis of their agreement with its policies. Accordingly, the American people have chosen and agreed to America's backing of Israel's rape and occupation of Palestine. Conversely, the American people could, if they wished, reject the policies of their government…For these reasons, it is not possible that the American people are innocent of all the crimes the Americans and Jews have committed against us. Allah has made Qisas [retribution] an observed law. So it is our right to attack whoever attacks us, and destroy the towns and villages of those who destroy ours, and destroy the economy of those who plunder our wealth, and kill the civilians of the country that kills our civilians" [7].

Conclusion

At this point in their conflict with America, Zawahiri and bin Laden primarily aim their statements toward Muslim audiences. While their statements are genuine warnings to Americans, they have long since given up any hope of persuading U.S. leaders of either political party to understand that the motivation of al-Qaeda and its allies pivots off what America does in the Muslim world, and not off American freedoms and liberties. In this context, the January 6 and 7 Zawahiri videos—and al-Zarqawi's supporting statement—are truly meant to warn Americans. Yet, more importantly, they are also meant to remind Muslims that since the 9/11 attacks al-Qaeda has done everything in its power to fulfill the Prophet Muhammad's demand that Muslims thoroughly warn their enemies before attacking them. The use of Azzam al-Amriki speaking in English, and accompanied by English subtitles, is, from al-Qaeda's perspective, irrefutable evidence for Muslims that al-Qaeda has gone more than the extra mile to urge Americans to change their policies before they are again attacked.
Notes

1. Zawahiri Statement, al-Jazeera TV, January 6, 2006.
2. Ibid.
3. Habib Trabelsi, "Zarqawi: America is drawing its last breath," www.middle-east-online.com, January 9, 2006.
4. Ibid., and Ashraf al-Iraqi, "Zarqawi Issues Revealing Statement Titled ‘But Allah Will Suffice You Against Them,'" www.jihadunspun.com, January 9, 2006.
5. Zawahiri Statement, al-Jazeera TV, January 6, 2006.
6. Osama bin Laden, "Statement to the American People," al-Jazeera TV, October 31, 2004.
7. Zawahiri Statement, al-Jazeera TV, January 7, 2006.

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Volume 3, Issue 3 (January 25, 2006) | Download PDF Version

Internet Mujahideen Analyze the Latest Bin Laden Audio Tape

By Stephen Ulph

The rarity of an Osama bin Laden commentary (one year after the last broadcast in December 2004) is stirring a wealth of commentary in the world's media. The focus is on its veracity and on the implications for the West of the truce offer coupled with a threat should it be rejected. Yet for the mujahideen, while many of the concerns are similar, there is also both considerable relief at the re-appearance of bin Laden—his absence from the airwaves was causing some distress on the internet forums—and eulogistic celebration of the genius of the "Artful Arab."

The rarity and brevity of the bin Laden message, and even the low production quality of the tape, justify for the mujahideen a detailed examination of its contents. The promise of an imminent strike on the United States is creating much excitement, but it is the issue of the truce that excites the most extended discussions. For Dr. Muhammad Hafiz, a participant on the al-Saqifa forum (www.alsakifah.org/vb), writing on January 20, the issue of the truce is the main interest. Taking up bin Laden's phrase that "We have no objection to responding to you about a long term truce according to just conditions which we would honor, for we are a Nation whom God has forbidden to use treachery or deceit," Dr. Hafiz underlines the moral superiority that Muslims could thus claim, in that "in war or peace they never engage in treachery."

Interestingly, this argument was disputed, to a chorus of loathing, by one signing himself Ibn Umar al-Hajj, who noted how the 9/11 hijackers had actually breached these conditions by employing deception in using their Saudi passports to gain entry visas, all of which come under Islamic regulations on strict observance of the ahd ("compact") with an enemy. Dr. Hafiz elaborates on the meaning of the truce offer: first, for bin Laden to present himself as "a statesman capable of offering a truce from a position of strength"; second, to pre-empt Bush from pulling American forces out of Iraq without an admission of defeat; third, "to absolve himself before God and the world prior to the coming strike inside America which will shake it to its foundations." In short, it is part of the established warning cycle.

While Western observers may point to bin Laden's inability to declare a truce on operational grounds—given the fact that, contrary to bin Laden's assurances in the tape, Spanish intelligence forces have had to foil recurrent attempts at attacks since the April 2004 Madrid bombings—Ibn Umar cast his doubts in terms of Islamic law. "Does bin Laden represent himself," he asks, "or al-Qaeda, or all Muslims? It is actually the Amir al-Muslimeen [Mulla Umar] who is the only one qualified to offer a truce in the name of the Nation."

For Nusayr Muhyi al-Sunan, writing on the same forum, the point has been reversed: there is no legitimacy problem for bin Laden declaring a truce since he is actually turning down an appeal for a truce made by the United States. As evidence, he points to bin Laden's use of the term ijabatikum ("responding to you") in his statement above: "a response, as is well known, only comes to a previous request." Others still underscore the actual impossibility of a truce, other than as a military tactic. "The Sheikh [bin Laden] cannot alter this path honored by God," writes an analyst and writer signing himself "Hussein bin Mahmud." "For this path is the Qur'an and the Sunna: And fight them until tumult is no more, and religion is all for Allah" (Qur'an VIII, 39). "This a matter of war and deception," he continues, "Bin Laden has never, and will never, offer peace to the infidel." There is a difference, he explains, between peace and a truce: "A truce is conditional upon just conditions," but "since the belief and the policy of the infidel is built only upon tyranny," such justice "can only be [made if it is] in the interest of the Islamic Nation." A truce, therefore, so construed "can only be understood by one who understands the true nature of the struggle."

In fact, bin Laden's genius, according to this analysis, is in cornering the enemy into being unable to respond either way to the tape. Indeed, the threat of an attack, bin Mahmud insists, has already achieved its purpose. It keeps the Americans "living in fear, exhausting themselves and expending resources on [contingency] planning, divided their ranks and damaged their economy." Yet, according to this argument, the Americans cannot afford to ignore the new threat, "which will have the same effect on them!" As to the form of the coming attack: "it will be a light or moderate blow, designed to show them his capability and the seriousness of the issue; an unexpected type of attack, revealing the inventiveness of the soldiers of Islam, following which it will be of a wholly different order" (www.alsakifah.org/vb).

Morale Boost

Both jihadi and Western analysts lay emphasis on the importance of the audio recording for morale boosting purposes. From postings such as the above, however, an important significance of the "four minutes that shook the world" audiotape is not only that bin Laden is alive, but also that the religiously defined strategy toward dominion remains intact. "The secret of the tape," bin Mahmud insists, is as a confirmation of God's words on infidels spending their wealth to impede the jihad: "They will spend it, then it will become an anguish for them, then they will be conquered." (Qur'an VIII, 36). The "anguish," he explains, is that the millions spent by the enemy have been overturned by a "cheaply made, technologically rough tape." In other words, it is an epoch-making demonstration of triumphant asymmetric warfare.

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Volume 3, Issue 4 (January 31, 2006) | Download PDF Version

A Jihadi Course in Military Mapping Symbols

By Stephen Ulph

Khattab's course. Symbols depict the type of military unit.
The Mawsu'at al-I'dad ("Encyclopedia of Preparation") stands out as a prime example of an illustration of the "data mining" capability that the internet provides. As earlier indicated in Terrorism Focus, this work is unique in its form since it constitutes an ever-expanding e-compendium made up of a multitude of data links (Terrorism Focus, Volume II, Issue 7).

Among the titles in the work is a course on codes and ciphers. The Dawrat al-Shahid al-Qa'id al-Maidani Khattab ("The Martyr Field Commander Khattab's Course") is more precisely an exhaustive treatment on the use of symbols in the planning of military operations, specifically with reference to mapping in the field. It is part of a series on military terminology, planning and mapping signals prepared for the web by Abu al-Darda, "the Salafist," and published by al-Markaz al-Islami al-I'lami ("the Islamic Information Center"). There is no indication as to who Khattab is in the title. Nor is any date given, but it is likely that the work ultimately derives from the Afghanistan period when training for open military conflict had more significance. In more up-to-date works, the emphasis is on urban and guerrilla warfare and activities related to covert operations and intelligence gathering.

After presenting the basics on the employment of military symbols, the author illustrates how, from a simple figure, minor additions and adaptations can be made under certain pre-agreed conditions to produce economically drawn symbols to express precise information. "The symbols have to be kept simple and clear," the author states, "since densely packed marks on documents, or an [overly] complicated single sign (such as a combination of symbols and numbers not previously agreed) will prejudice the clarity of the required representation, and possibly cause doubt [as to interpretation]."

The construction of intelligence symbols is presented in a logical progression, and the use of adaptations (size, thickness and type of line) to denote information such as the number or group of numbers (indicating the function or identity of a unit and its affiliation, date, time, caliber of weapons), the size or importance of the unit, its level of readiness, its verified presence, whether the located point is under surveillance, or whether there are doubts as to the quality of the information available. The use of color is categorized to indicate: friendly forces (units, bases, tactical conditions, preparedness), enemy forces (units, bases, tactical conditions, preparedness), areas contaminated by enemy or friendly activity, zones of destruction, minefields or artificial barriers and lines marking off friendly units and zones of artillery fire.

Over the course of the 76-page document, the author carefully tabulates intelligence marks for agreed symbols to denote sizes of military units, from small bands up to detachments, battalions, divisions, corps and brigades. Then he lists symbols denoting the configuration of the military units, marks for weaponry, and marks corresponding to detailed specifications of this weaponry or concentrations of armaments at one point. Following are symbols for communication points and communication methods, barriers and obstacles, crossing points and lines of fire.

The author illustrates, by way of example, the symbols employed for units of the Lebanese army. Yet, it is the section on FEBAs (Forward Edge of the Battle Area) that gives some indication of the ultimate origin of the work or its indebtedness to Western military manuals, since the Arabic terminology used in this section is consistently related to its English-language equivalent. The inclusion of Khattab's course in the Encyclopedia of Preparation is clearly intended as part of an overall course in military training—part of the "Virtual Afghanistan" imperative provided for the internet, and which saw the production of the Mu'askar al-Battar ("Al-Battar Training Camp") periodical that ran for 22 issues until its closure late in 2004.

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Volume 3, Issue 33 (August 22, 2006) | Download PDF Version

London Plot Draws Attention to Potential Female Suicide Bombers

By Farhana Ali
The arrests of at least two women out of the 24 suspects initially held in the recently foiled plot in London highlight the potential threat posed by radical Muslim women (al-Jazeera, August 21). While little is known about the recent female detainees, women have played a central role in providing ideological and logistics support to al-Qaeda and local jihadi terrorists. The role of female suicide bombers is still relatively new and could shift over time, should al-Qaeda and like-minded groups increasingly recruit Muslim women for future attacks.

In the few cases known about Muslim female suicide bombers, most were related by family to the male suspects and terrorist leaders. For example, an Iraqi woman, Sajida al-Rishawi, appeared on Jordanian television in November 2005 confessing her intent to bomb a Western hotel in the capital city of Amman together with her husband (Khaleej Times, November 13, 2005). Having failed to release her explosives belt, her husband pushed her out of the ballroom and detonated his explosives. In recent years, several Palestinian female bombers, including Sana'a Shahada, Iman Asha, Abir Hamdan and Thawiya Hamour, had familial and personal links to male terrorists (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 3, 2003).

Other examples of female suicide operatives include a 19-year old Uzbek girl, Dilnoza Holmudora, who was married to the leader of the Islamic Jihad Movement of Uzbekistan, and two Egyptian women, who shot at a tourist bus in Cairo in April 2005. Both women were in their 20s. One was the fiancée, and the other the sister of the male perpetrators (RCA No. 278, April 20, 2004).

Most recently, the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq issued a communiqué claiming responsibility for a suicide bombing on August 16, executed by a female member of the group's suicide brigade, targeting a combined patrol of U.S. forces and Iraqi National Guards in al-Muqdadiyah (Associated Press, September 28, 2005). According to the message, more than 15 soldiers of the patrol were killed and others injured. Media reports indicate that the woman, wearing an explosives belt, detonated herself on the U.S.-Iraqi patrol near a bus stop, killing seven and wounding 20, including civilians and military members.

Despite the recent participation of Muslim women in attacks, a Muslim woman's primary role in the al-Qaeda family has been to offer moral and ideological support to male jihadis. The wives of male militants demonstrate their support for their husbands, sons, brothers and other fighters through their communiqués and statements in jihadi magazines. Um Muhammad, the wife of the deceased al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, posted a letter last month on a jihadi website urging Muslim men to hold steady in jihad and warned the Iraqi government that the "great death is coming" (Mujahideen Shura Council website, July 2006). In the al-Khansaa magazine, the propaganda arm of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, articles focus on the role of women in jihad. Even on the internet, websites for Muslim women such as http://www.mojahdat.jeeran.com encourage them to support male jihadis in various conflicts worldwide.

In short, women are increasingly being called on for jihad. No longer invisible, Muslim women are able to utilize modern technology, with support from a new generation of male terrorists, to proclaim their voices on the global jihadi landscape.

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Volume 3, Issue 32 (August 15, 2006) | Download PDF Version

Liquid Explosive Training Manuals Easily Attainable on Jihadi Forums

By Abdul Hameed Bakier
In light of the information emerging from the foiled London attack, the terrorists involved in the operation planned on destroying commercial aircraft by mixing together explosive chemical substances while aboard the planes. The chemicals necessary to create such explosions are easily attainable. More concerning, however, is the fact that the technical information on how to create such explosives is accessible on many jihadi forums and websites. The most significant and frequently discussed subjects in the jihadi forums are topics pertinent to military tactics and how to create deadly explosives.

The website of al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (http://www.kataebaqsa.org), for example, carries links to a colossal amount of data on creating explosives, part of a more extensive training document called "The Preparation Encyclopedia—All the Mujahid Needs." The training manual contains whole sections on topics such as:

- Types of explosives, mines, detonators, explosive engineering and electronics;
- Chemical and biological weapons;
- Nuclear weapons;
- How to make rockets;
- How to make silencers;
- Poisons.

The encyclopedia also includes informative topics on U.S. and British weaponry, radar jamming and regular military operations. Furthermore, some training materials are very well prepared with illustrative drawings and actual photos, especially in the explosives section.

Concerning the latest terrorist threat in London, a closer look at the chemicals section and what the terrorists are capable of and willing to do to elicit explosive substances could explain how and why this threat is very serious. In these training manuals, the jihadis are learning how to extract a wide range of explosive components from readily available material. Most of these chemicals are very hazardous, such as: hydrochloric acid, potassium permanganate, potassium cyanide, information on how to extract potassium from goat excrement, red mercury, sodium nitrite, hydrogen peroxide, ammonium nitrite, nitroglycerin and hexamine (which is a very combustible white crystalline sand-like solid or powder), in addition to other acids. In addition, the manual lists the ingredients for many types of explosives and how to mix them, in addition to diagrams that display different ways of packaging and transporting them.

To what extent do jihadis benefit from and try to utilize this knowledge? It is clear how useful these documents are to jihadis since many of them post inquiries in other forums requesting further explanation or information on the manufacturing of specific types of explosives. For example, one forum, called al-Bramj (http://www.bramjnet.com), explains to inquirers, in plain language and thorough details, how to make the highly explosive acetone peroxide as a main explosive charge and how to make a detonator from the same substance. The jihadi who posted the instructions was also aware of the precautionary details necessary when handling or mixing the components.

In the same context, Matiur Rehman, who apparently worked as an explosives instructor in al-Qaeda's camps, is allegedly one of the mentors of two of the suspects who plotted to blow up the jetliners, explaining to them, in detail, how to produce and use the explosive device (ABC News, August 9). If Rehman proves to be the mastermind and mentor of the suspected plotters, it appears that al-Qaeda operatives could be implementing the training found in the jihadi forums. Further corroboration of this hypothesis is the fact that the intended explosives appear to be analogous to those mentioned in the training manuals, and the confiscation, by British authorities, of materials related to the investigation from internet cafes in the United Kingdom.

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[???the reason for all the fake threats?]

Volume 3, Issue 35 (September 12, 2006) | Download PDF Version

Al-Qaeda's Evolving Strategy Five Years after September 11

By Chris Heffelfinger

Five years after September 11, al-Qaeda is, in its own words, "continuing the policy of bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy," drawing the United States into a gradually widening conflict until it is no longer sustainable to continue operations against the mujahideen. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have mentioned this "bleed-to-bankruptcy" plan more than once in recent years. It became an integral part of their long-term strategy following the 9/11 attacks since, after the fall of the Taliban government, they understood that they could no longer operate as they did before, but they could inspire fellow Muslims to take up the cause with little or no direct involvement on their part.

"All that we have to do is to send two mujahideen to the furthest point east to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al-Qaeda, in order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic and political losses without achieving anything of note…this is in addition to our having experience in using guerrilla warfare and the war of attrition to fight tyrannical superpowers, as we, alongside the mujahideen, bled Russia for 10 years, until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat," bin Laden said in a statement issued on November 1, 2004 and printed in al-Jazeera.

This is also consistent with bin Laden and al-Zawahiri's vision, consolidated in the months after 9/11, that they are the vanguard (al-tali'a) of the mujahideen. They serve to awaken the Muslim nation and incite it to action. Al-Qaeda has presented itself consistently in this light, despite the many changes to its mode of operations since September 11.

Al-Qaeda has gone through major phases during the past five years, the first following the unexpected impact of the Twin Towers' collapse. Following al-Qaeda's infamy as a result of the damage that it had inflicted, the organization and its leaders found themselves at the center of the world's attention. As they lost their safe-haven and roughly 80 percent of their fighters in Afghanistan, they needed to rely more and more on setting into motion a global movement that could sustain itself with or without their oversight.

This phase is exemplified in the online literature that stems from al-Qaeda's leadership. In late 2005, al-Zawahiri made statements urging the targeting of oil installations in the Gulf; this call was heard by jihadi strategists and ideologues and was then discussed by the mujahideen and their supporters online, where they posted information on vulnerable facilities and discuss various tactics (Terrorism Focus, December 13, 2005). While this may not result in a devastating attack on the oil infrastructure of the Gulf, the strengthening of vulnerable spots around the world bears tremendous costs.

This stage, discussed widely by analysts and the media during the past three years, is marked most prominently by the emergence of al-Qaeda splinter groups and the question of what, if any, relationship they have to bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. The train bombings in Madrid and London demonstrated that those responsible did not have strong ties to al-Qaeda's leadership. There were, however, ties at some level between the bombers and clerics that did have a relationship to bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and/or camps in Afghanistan. These same clerics, notably Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Basir al-Tartusi and others, provide ideological weight to the basic ideas set out by al-Qaeda leaders and offer guidance to aspiring mujahideen.

The rise of al-Qaeda in Europe, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Qaedat al-jihad fi bilad al-Rafidayn (al-Qaeda in Iraq) and others has demonstrated that the movement is not directed from the top down, but that these organizations seem to center around local leaders who pledge their allegiance to bin Laden as emir, or commander, and their role is subsequently acknowledged by the al-Qaeda leadership. This is again consistent with their policy of being an inspirational force rather than a formal organization.

Al-Qaeda appears now to be one step closer to realizing its final goal of establishing an Islamic state in the face of U.S. defeat. As al-Zawahiri stated at the end of July, "All the world is a battlefield open in front of us...it is a jihad for the sake of God; we will attack everywhere." His statements hailed the developments in Lebanon as a step toward their plan of regional war by drawing the United States into an ever expanding battle "from Spain to Iraq."

Reviewing the developments of the war against al-Qaeda during the last five years, one sees their strategy being carried out in the various stages described above—inspiring Muslims around the globe, the creation of franchise organizations, frequent attacks in countries that support the United States and its allies and the gradual widening of the battlefield to the point that al-Qaeda itself becomes less and less relevant. The most critical issue now, however, is what action the United States will take to weaken the spirit of this now global movement in order to stem the influence and recruiting power that the movement has gained.

Find this article at:

http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370127

Al Qaida contractor targeted Canada as base to infiltrate U.S.

http://www.geostrategy-direct.com/

Ahmed Zarabib
DOSSIER: H

Al Qaida contractor targeted Canada as base to infiltrate U.S.

In 2005, Spanish police uncovered operational and logistics cells of
the Salafist Brigade linked to Al Zarqawi. These networks engaged in
credit card fraud, robberies, drug trafficking and vehicle theft.

Ahmed Zarabib
• Affiliation: Salafist Brigade for Combat and Call
• Age: 40s
• Whereabouts: Dead after clash in eastern Algeria

Algeria's military has scored a major victory against a top terror
organization with the death of Ahmed Zarabib, founder of the Salafist
Brigade for Combat and Call.
Algeria's methods included excellent intelligence, crack troops and a
ruthless search for suspects. The U.S. has been learning from the
Algerians and for good reason: the Salafists have been highly
effective in Europe and are taking aim at the U.S. via Canada.

Zarabib helped convert the Salafist Brigade into the leading
contractor for Al Qaida, which has established cells in Western Europe
and North America.

Zarabib, who was also known as Ahmed Abu Al Baraa, was killed in a
battle with Algeria's military on Jan. 17 in the mountains near
Toudja, a town about 260 kilometers east of Algiers. He was a cleric
who ran a mosque near Algiers before becoming Islamic warrior in the
1990s.
The Salafist Brigade is the only remaining insurgency network in
Algeria. The brigade stemmed from the Armed Islamic Group, founded in
1992 and believed to have faded into oblivion over the past year.

Some members of the Armed Islamic Group have gone over to the Salafist
Brigade. Under Zarabib, the Salafist Brigade went international and
has become a leading contributor to the Sunni insurgency in Iraq.
Islamic sources said the group has been assigned responsibility for
recruitment and training of thousands of Muslims prepared to join the
Sunni insurgency war in Iraq. The sources said the Salafists have
established camps in Algeria for training and indoctrination.

Islamic sources said the Salafists recruited Moroccans to fight the
United States in Iraq. The Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, or GICM,
an Al Qaida-aligned network active in European Union states and a
Salafist ally, recruited the Moroccans. The recruits were then sent
for training to Salafist camps in Algeria.

Zarabib and his colleagues made sure to provide the Islamic religious
interpretations and rulings that permitted the recruits to participate
in everything from mass murder to robbery and drug trafficking.
One colleague, Nasreddine El Eulmi, permitted Islamic terrorists to
use and sell drugs to finance the campaign in Algeria.

The Salafist alliance with Al Qaida formed over the past five years.
But in 2003, the Salafist Brigade's Nabil Sahrawi announced his
group's allegiance to Al Qaida. A year later, he was killed in an
Algerian military offensive.
The current Salafist leader has been regarded as closer than ever to
Al Qaida's interests. Abdul Malek Dourkdal is a chemist and specialist
in explosives. He reportedly trained in Afghanistan and became close
to the Al Qaida leadership.

Under Dourkdal's tenure, the Salafist Brigade has stopped spending
most of its energy in attacking Algerian soldiers and police. The
current target is civilians, particularly Westerners, and the group
has established cells in Canada, France, Italy and Spain.
A key Salafist alliance has been with the GICM, responsible for
recruiting the dozen suicide bombers who carried out the multiple
bombings at Casablanca in May 2003, which left 44 dead. The GICM is
also suspected of carrying out the Madrid train explosions that killed
191 people in March 2004.

Western intelligence sources said the Salafist Brigade has sought to
overthrow the regimes of neighboring Mauritania and Morocco. Salafist
targeting of Morocco was based on Al Qaida's priorities, which set the
North African kingdom as that after Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
Morocco has been used as a way station for Salafist operatives headed
for Europe. Over the past decade, the Salafist Brigade has established
terror cells throughout European Union states. Many of these cells
began as criminal networks and gradually diverted funds to terror
activities as financing from Gulf Arab countries decreased. The
activities have included robbery, smuggling and drug trafficking.

Hayder Mili, a prominent researcher in Islam, said the European cells
were established by the GIA in the 1990s. At first, the cells engaged
in drugs and weapons trafficking to finance the Islamic insurgency in
Algeria.
One GIA operative, Ahmed Ressam, planned a series of robberies to
acquire funding for his aborted attack on the Los Angeles airport in
1999.

"New Al Qaida affiliates, notably the Salafist Group, GICM and North
African branches of Takfir wa al-Hijra [Excommunication and exile]
have inherited old GIA networks spread across Europe and are actively
involved in various types of trafficking to fund operations, trade in
weaponry and explosives and move/shelter militants," Mili said. "In
Europe, this nexus is mostly active in France and especially Spain,
which because of its geography is a major transit and destination
point for Moroccan cannabis as well as a hub for forged documents and
credit cards."

Both GIA and later the Salafist Brigade found that the best operatives
in Europe were Christians who converted to Islam. In France, the
Salafists recruited converts to pose as businessmen to travel
throughout Europe without attracting suspicion.
"This phenomenon is in full expansion," Pascal Mailhos, head of the
French intelligence service Renseignements Generaux, told the French
daily Le Monde.

Spain is another major target of the Salafist Brigade. In 2005,
Spanish police uncovered operational and logistics cells of the
Salafist Brigade linked to Al Zarqawi. These networks engaged in
credit card fraud, robberies, drug trafficking and vehicle theft.

Despite their war against the West, Algerian terrorists have no qualms
against cooperating with European Christians. GIA and the Salafists
have worked with the Sicilian Mafia and Russian organized crime in
such areas as trafficking and money laundering.

"Ethnic or religious links are not necessarily essential for
collaboration to take place," Mili said. "For example, the Madrid
bombings were facilitated by members of local criminal groups and
petty thieves. Since traffickers and terrorist organizations have
similar logistical needs, there is ample room for collaboration in
money laundering and even facilitating illegal immigration."

Indeed, the Salafist Brigade was reluctant to work with Moroccan
terrorists. Islamic sources said the group regarded the Moroccans as
weak and insisted that operations be led and even conducted by
Algerian nationals.
For their part, the Moroccans found the Algerians extremely brutal.
Still, by 2003, the two nationalities put aside their differences and
began to work together.

"These prevailing attitudes seem to have been pushed aside in favor of
a more multi-national approach," the Washington-based Jamestown
Foundation said in a report. "The reasons for this change are not
presently clear, but it is likely that counter-terrorism efforts and
the globalization of jihad have been the main driving factors."
Indeed, Al Qaida has been encouraging the Salafist Brigade to
cooperate with other groups, particularly in North Africa. Al Qaida
spokesmen have called for the establishment of what they termed "Al
Qaida Organization in the Arab Maghreb," which would serve as both an
umbrella organization as well as support network for North African
terrorist cells in Spain.

In Canada, the Salafist Brigade has established cells to infiltrate
the United States. In the summer of 2005, Canadian agents uncovered a
Salafist cell in Toronto that included an Algerian explosives expert
trained by Al Qaida.

The cell included four Algerians who sought refugee status in Canada.
Osama Bin Laden has named Canada as one of five targeted Christian
nations and Western intelligence sources said the vast country could
include up to 50 Salafist and other Islamic terror cells.

A key concern was whether the Salafist Brigade would enter the field
of weapons of mass destruction. As early as 2004, the group and its
North African allies were seeking a ton of industrial high explosives
in order to assemble a so-called dirty bomb. In late 2005, the
Salafists were reportedly involved in an Al Qaida plot to acquire
uranium from Russian traffickers.

Algeria has figured out how to fight the Salafist Brigade. The
strategy combines constant military pressure to uncover terrorist
strongholds and arrest suspected supporters. In 2004, Algerian troops
killed Salafist leader Sahrawi, the third such leader to have met a
violent end.
At the same time, Algerian President Abdul Aziz Bouteflika has been
tempting terrorists with offers of amnesty. The offers have been
enough to create fissures in the Salafist Brigade and lead to the
defections of scores of operatives. "There are at this moment some
pockets of terrorists from the GSPC that we are going to put out of
commission," Algerian Interior Minister Yazid Zerhouni said.

[cleaning out my emails, this is out of date, but will never be completely out, as long as the war lasts. granny]

Islam’s Low Intensity Terrorism

http://www.chronwatch.com/content/contentDisplay.asp?aid=19428

Islam's Low Intensity Terrorism

Written by Justin Darr
Wednesday, February 08, 2006

Islam is like the neighbor everyone has that people say "is alright
once you get to know him." The more you "get to know him," however,
the more it seems that your first impression was correct. A jerk is a
jerk. No matter how many times you see the guy place his trash cans
neatly at the end of the drive on time for the Tuesday pick up, the
silent aggressive stares let you know that this guy has is something
dysfunctional going on that sooner or later will erupt into big
problems.

Usually, you just try to ignore these people as long as possible, just
a simple "Hello," or wave on the way to work. Then comes the day when
your son's football flies over the fence and, wham! The guy picks up
the ball and locks it in his garage.

Now, you have the unpleasant task of going over and confronting this
idiot about why he cannot exist by the rules of common civility that
have served us so well for generations, risking the chance of the guy
acting like the moron he is an chasing you across the yard with a
garden rake.

It is not really that hard of a decision. Experience teaches that
such blowhards usually have nothing to back up their words other than
a glass chin and big mouth. So, you accept the risk because you
understand the consequences of your inaction will lead to even grander
displays of indecorousness by your neighbor and spending the rest of
your life with your son wondering if the zipper is on the front or
side of your pants.

This is the situation the western world faces with Islam. For a
"religion of peace," Islam sure seems to have a mean streak. The
facts regarding Islamic society's apparent inability to peacefully
coexist with its non-Muslim neighbors, and endless litany of hatred
and bloodlust spewed by its religious leaders toward anyone who
happens to disagree with them, has left nothing to conclude except
that Islam makes anything but a good neighbor.

Here is a quick test to see my point. Do a survey of all the areas of
the world counting sizable Muslim populations abutting large
non-Muslim populations that are NOT in a near perpetual state of
violent conflict. Hope you have one hand ready.

In other areas, where Muslims are not actively killing those around
them, they choose to promote their agendas by making thinly veiled
threats of unless others stop "provoking" them, they will be unable to
stop from erupting the simmering violence that lurks just under the
surface of their communities. This is an attempt to take advantage of
the western world's obsession with political correctness where it is
far easier to give into demands, no matter how ridiculous, than deal
with the fools who are making them and be declared "insensitive."
However, no matter what the excuses or justifications, the actions of
many Muslim leaders amount to low intensity terrorism.

Nothing demonstrates this point better than the current situations
with the Muslim world's vicious overreaction to a few political
cartoons out of Europe depicting the prophet Mohammad wearing a bomb
as a turban, and the breakdown of negotiations with Iran over its
nuclear fuel enrichment program.

Curiously, despite the differences in these situations, the Muslims
involved are using the same low intensity terrorist tactics to achieve
their ends.

In Europe, cartoonists have fled into hiding in fear of their lives as
Muslims have marauded through hotels in the Gaza Strip searching for
Westerners to kidnap, and protestors dressed as suicide bombers,
prayed for further terrorist attacks in western civilians, and carried
signs saying, "Freedom Go to Hell," "Europe You Will Pay, Your 3/11 Is
on the Way," and "Butcher Those Who Insult Islam," in London, England.

In Iran, 1979 American Embassy terrorist leader now turned Iranian
president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is threatening to cut off all foreign
oil exports, "wipe Israel off the map," launch insurgent attacks into
Iraq and Afghanistan, and restart full uranium enrichment efforts and
in the wake of the IAEA referring Iran to the Security Council.

In both cases, the responses enormously outweigh the initial
"provocation."

Iran is threatening to destroy the world economy and destabilize the
entire Middle East just because we understand that a nation that has
spent its entire history supporting and engaging in terrorism has no
business possessing highly enriched uranium for any reason.

And, Muslims around the world are threatening us with widespread
violence if we do not toss aside our most cherished freedoms and
silence a few cartoonists who noticed that the vast majority of
terrorists just happen to be emulating the words and deeds of Mohammad.

The disproportionate nature of these responses is less of a reaction
to any actual offense that may have occurred than it is an attempt to
intimidate those who might dare to affront or oppose Islam in the
future. In both cases the message is clear: If you ever cross us
again, you will be responsible for the violence that ensues.

There is no clearer definition of low intensity terrorism than these
heavy-handed attempts to blackmail the free world.

The civilized world is now faced with a choice. Do we allow ourselves
to be intimidated by Islam's low intensity terrorism because we feel
that it is a better alternative than the more overt terrorism so many
Muslims love, sacrificing our freedom and security in the process?
Or, do we decide to stand up for what we know is right?

I do not know about you, but I think it is time to go get our
football.

About the Writer: Justin Darr is a freelance writer living in the
Philadelphia area with his wife, Erin, and twin children. He can be
read widely on the Internet and in print publications in the United
States and Europe. Justin Darr is a proud member of the MoveOff
Network.

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