Iraqi Document: Highly Radioactive Atomic Neutron Device (Translation)

Document CMPC-2003-000537 is a secret and personal memo written in November 1999 by the director of the Iraqi National Monitoring Department (NMD) and addressed to the Minister of the Iraqi Military Industrialization Commission (MIC). The memo talks about a Neutron Source Device with High Radioactive Activity that was found in one Iraqi University and the NMD is asking that it should be returned to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Organization. The Neutron Source Device can be also called Neutron Generator or Neutron Initiator. This Neutron Generator device was not declared to the UN inspectors all the time they were in Iraq from 1991 to late 1998 when they were kicked out of Iraq. In fact Neutron generators were prohibited to be used by the Iraqis according to this UN document ( http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/S-2002-515.pdf page 133 of this UN document pdf, an * next to an item means it is porhibited).

The University of Al Mustansirya/Science Faculty informed us in its letter No. 2369 on 24/10/1999 of the existence of a Neutron Source (Am-Be) in one of its laboratories and was previously brought by Dr. Midhat Al Zubaidi one of the ex-researchers (currently retired) of Firnas Center and we did the following:

1. Send a team from the department to investigate this Source where it was revealed it a Source (P-Be) with a high radiation activity (Aciory) brought in the year 1996.

2. A meeting was held in our department on Sunday 14/11/1999 with all the people concerned from the Atomic Energy Agency and the Firnas company and the Science Faculty/Al Mustansirya University and the following was revealed:

A. The Atomic Energy Organization clarified that this Source was not documented in their archives because it was previously shrouded by secrecy and it was delivered to Dr. Midhat Al Zubaidi at the end of year 1989.

B. Dr. Midhat clarified that he received the Source from the Organization in 1993 during the period where the equipment from the previous program were returned to the Al Tuwaitha site and he transferred to the Engineering Faculty/Baghdad University and then it was returned to its current location in Al Mustansirya University in the year 1996.

3. Dr. Khaled Ibrahim Said clarified that it is possible that this Source can be used by the Fourth Group where Dr. Midhat Al Zubaidi was one of its members in the year 1989 and for the purpose of doing some experimentations.

4. Information about this Source was previously requested by the Agency because it was imported to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Organization under the name of Al Basra University. And the Organization sent a team to Al Basra University to investigate or try to find it without any results.

In light of these infractions we suggest the return of the Source to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Organization and including and declaring it among the Radioactive Sources that it possesses.

I also found in my reading of document ISGQ-2003-00000813.pdf which is a 2002 document that the Iraqi were working to produce TANTALUM COATED GRAPHITE as part of research activities for the year 2002. This very special coating of Graphite with Tantalum to create a highly corrosion resistant surface for graphite. The document by itself does not say what is the use for this but for sure one of the few applications is that this Tantalum coated graphite can be used with the highly corrosive UF6 or Uranium Hexafluoride which is the basic component for ENRICHED URANIUM. In fact A Tantalum coated Graphite was totally prohibited for use in Iraq since it falls under the prohibited nuclear activities per this UN document ( http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/S-2002-515.pdf pages 84 and 133 of this UN document pdf, an * next to an item means it is prohibited).

http://www.iraqwatch.org/controlled/annex3text.htm

ANNEX 3
LIST OF ITEMS TO BE REPORTED TO IAEA

Items marked * and shaded are prohibited to Iraq under Resolution 687.
The notation (SC II) or (SC IV) indicates that items of the same type/category are also listed in one of the Annexes (2 or 4, respectively) of the UN Special Commission Plan.

(snip)

12. Tantalum (SC IV)

Tantalum sheets with a thickness of 2.5 mm or greater from which a circle of 200 mm diameter can be obtained.

(snip)

EXPLANATORY NOTE:
Many of the items listed in this section come into direct contact with uranium metal vapor or liquid or with process gas consisting of UF6 or a mixture of UF6 and other gases. All surfaces that come into contact with the uranium or UF6 are wholly made of, or protected by, corrosion-resistant materials. For the purposes of the section relating to laser-based enrichment items, the materials resistant to corrosion by vapor or liquid uranium metal or uranium alloys include yttria-coated graphite and tantalum; and the materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include copper, stainless steel, aluminum, , aluminum alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel and UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.

(snip)

EXPLANATORY NOTE:
Components for these assemblies are made of, or protected by, materials resistant to the heat and corrosion of uranium metal vapor or liquid (such as yttria-coated graphite or tantalum) and may include pipes, valves, fittings, 'gutters', feed-throughs, heat exchangers and collector plates for magnetic, electrostatic (or other) separation methods.

(snip)

EXPLANATORY NOTE:
The crucibles and other parts of this system that come into contact with molten uranium or uranium alloys are made of, or protected by, materials of suitable corrosion and heat resistance. Suitable materials include tantalum, yttria-coated graphite, graphite coated with other rare earth oxides or mixtures thereof.

29.5. *Uranium metal 'product' and 'tails' collector assemblies

Specially designed or prepared product and 'tails' collector assemblies for uranium metal in solid form. These collector assemblies are made of, or protected by, materials resistant to the heat and corrosion of uranium metal vapor, such as yttria-coated graphite or tantalum.

(snip)

http://www.iraqwatch.org/suppliers/update.htm

Iraq's Bomb — an Update

By Diana Edensword and Gary Milhollin

New York Times
April 26, 1993, p. A17

Soon, possibly this week, the U.N. will report that its inspectors in Iraq have found yet another cache of strategic equipment for making nuclear weapons. Their chief inspector at the International Atomic Energy Agency, Maurizio Zifferero, should be embarrassed. He announced in September that President Saddam Hussein's atomic weapons program was "neutralized" and "at zero." He even said that Iraq had "decided at the higher political level to stop these activities."

Saddam Hussein never told the I.A.E.A. about the newly discovered equipment, as required by UN resolutions. And he continues to rain down threats and intimidation on the inspectors, indicating that he has more to hide. In March 1992, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, told inspectors that Iraq had not relinquished the right to build weapons of mass destruction.

Before his army marched into Kuwait in August 1990, Saddam Hussein had a workable bomb design, many key components, a multi-billion dollar nuclear manufacturing base and a global supply network able to exploit lax Western export controls, especially those in Germany. His Western-trained scientists had produced small amounts of plutonium and enriched uranium: the fuels in the bombs that destroyed Nagasaki and Hiroshima. They even did clandestine research in laboratories the I.A.E.A. inspected regularly.

If Saddam Hussein had left Kuwait alone, he might have had his first bomb by now. He still has his scientists on the payroll and has protected the identities of many of his global suppliers. He has even started to get European and American inquiries on future oil sales: petro-dollars for a renewed bomb effort.

Here is a summary of nuclear-related equipment in Iraq today. It draws on export records and reports by inspection teams. The names of manufacturers, who may not have supplied their products directly to Iraq, are given where known. Iraq claimed the equipment was for civilian use The U.S. Government wants most of the material destroyed; the IAEA may let Iraq use it under the agency's monitoring. It was just such "monitoring," however, that failed to detect Iraq's bomb program in the first place.

Found but Not Destroyed or Removed

These items have been tagged for possible destruction, monitoring by the I.A.E.A. or unconditional release to Iraq.

• 580 tons of natural uranium (Brazil, Niger and Portugal).

• 1.7 tons of enriched uranium (Italy).

• 255 tons of HMX, a high explosive for detonating atomic bombs.

• 60 machines that shape metal into centrifuge parts, by Dorries, H&H Metalform, Kieserling & Albrecht, Leifeld and Magdeburg (Germany), Matrix Churchill (Britain) and Schaublin (Switzerland).

• Mass spectrometers to monitor bomb-fuel production, by Finnegan-MAT (US, Germany).

• Two electric frequency converters to power atomic bomb fuel production, by Acomel (Switzerland).

• More than 700 valves that can process atomic bomb fuel, by Balzers, VAT (Switzerland) and Nupro (US).

• Two coordinate-measuring machines to monitor centrifuge production, by DEA (Italy).

• 70 mixer-settler units to extract plutonium, some by Metallextraktion AB (Sweden).

• Machines for milling metal, by Maho, Schiess, SHW and Wotan (Germany), Innocenti (Italy) and Zayer (Spain).

• Two assembly presses and two balancing machines to make centrifuges.

• One resin-mixing and discharge machine to support electromagnetic uranium enrichment, by Millitorr (Britain).

• One jet-molding machine to make centrifuge motors, by Arburg (Germany).

• One 63-ton hydraulic press to shape explosive atomic bomb parts.

• One mainframe computer used to process nuclear atomic bomb codes, by NEC (Japan).

• Two oxidation furnaces for making centrifuge parts, by Degussa (Germany).

• One electron-beam welder to assemble centrifuges, by Sciaky (France).

• Tantalum metal sheets for making crucibles to cast atomic bomb cores.

Still Missing

These items are suspected or known to be in Iraq, but have not been found or accounted for:

• More than $1 million worth of computers, electronic testing machines, computer graphics equipment and frequency synthesizers licensed for shipping to atomic bomb builders, by Hewlett Packard (US).

• More than $7 million worth of computers, licensed for shipping to atomic bomb builders, by International Computer Systems (US).

• Nuclear reactor control panels, instruments and computers salvaged from a damaged reactor, by the consortium Cerbag (France).

• Computers and instruments capable of analyzing metals and powders for atomic bomb manufacture, licensed for shipping to an atomic bomb builder by Siemens (Germany, US).

• $43,000 worth of computers for a nuclear weapon testing site, licensed for shipping by EZ Logic Data (US).

• $30,000 worth of electronic and computing equipment lo measure neutrons and gamma rays, licensed for shipping by Canberra Industries and Canberra Elektronik (US, Germany).

• Five frequency converters capable of powering centrifuges, by Acomel (Switzerland).

• Parts that collected enriched uranium in electromagnetic enrichment machines.

• One jet-molding machine to make centrifuge motors, by Arburg (Germany).

• One powder press suitable for compacting nuclear fuels, by XYZ Options (US).

• $15 million worth of cylindrical presses, by Leifeld (Germany).

• $2.2 million worth of computers, licensed to be shipped to an atomic bomb builder by Unisys (US).

• $280,000 worth of computers and electronic and photographic equipment for nuclear weapons laboratories, licensed to be shipped by Perkin Elmer (US).

• $367,000 worth of computers licensed for shipping to an atomic bomb builder to run its machine tools, by Gerber Systems (US).

• Design plans for a $5.6 million plant to process uranium, by Natron (Brazil).

• More than 100 mixer-settler units to extract plutonium, by Metallextraktion AB (Sweden).

• Centrifuge cascade to enrich uranium.

• Underground reactor and heavy water to produce plutonium.

• Records of Iraq's foreign sources of expertise on uranium enrichment, foreign equipment suppliers and explosive tests of atomic bomb components.

• Records containing identities and current activities of Iraqi nuclear personnel, including those trained by H&H Metalform, Interatom, Leybold, Lurgi and ZSI (Germany), Balzers (Switzerland), Chemadex (Poland), CNEN (Brazil) and Matrix Churchill (Britain).

• Computer database showing status and extent of the entire nuclear weapon program.

Leni; ALL

The administration have decided not to open this subject again until “if” our troops physically find a large quantity of hidden WMD or “Precursors” for WMD.

The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) ended their mission very early and prematurely concluded that there was no WMD or program related to WMD in Iraq.

From the ISG report, they decided to search 20 of the most suspect ammunition depots where potential Chemical Weapons can be found, remind you that there are hundreds if not thousands of ammunition depots in Iraq. Now from those 20 ammunitions depots they only search 2 in details, just TWO!!!. Of course I do not even think that Saddam regime will put their WMD in ammunition depots because those are the most suspect sites and because it can be bombed but they have rather buried it in the Western Desert or somewhere else in Iraq. I do not think there was any attempt by ISG to look at potential burial sites. Moreover the total number of ammunition examined is less than 0.25% of Iraq ammunition that can carry WMD” ( i.e. 122 mm, 155 mm, etc… caliber shells).

I think the ISG have made a lot of conclusions from the Iraqis scientists they have interviewed and other officials who work for Iraq “Military Industrial Commission (MIC)” and Iraq Atomic Energy Commission. The ISG bought what these people told them that there were no WMD or program related to WMD. This is a big mistake on the part of the ISG. First these scientists and officials will not say that there were WMD or programs even if they know about it because they were afraid to be imprisoned by the US forces or even worse they were afraid to be killed by the Baathists even if Saddam is not anymore in power. The ISG and many American officials still do not understand how much fear and horror Saddam has installed in the Iraqi people that the vast majority of population are still afraid of the Baathists till now. Second I think that these scientists may have worked on portions of the WMD program without knowing what are the final results of their works, it is like a Manhattan style project (US first atomic bomb) where the vast majority of workers and scientists did not know what their individuals works were used for.

Very few people in Iraq knew about the WMD and WMD projects, Saddam is one of them. Most of Saddam cabinet did not know about it, including the vast majority of high detainees we have in custody. For political reason we cannot force Saddam or few other high level detainees to tell us anything significant about the WMD or its programs. Moreover there are two very important high level detainees that are still at large and they can very much know about the WMD. There are the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and the Director of the Special Security Organization (SSO). The SSO was in charge of handling, maintaining, and hiding all the WMD and delivering it to the troops in the battlefields. Qusay Saddam Hussein was the Chief of the SSO for a period of time but he was killed before we capture him and I was not sure that if had captured him we would have forced him to speak. Where on the other hand the Director of SSO and IIS can be forced to speak not necessarily us but by the current Iraqi government. Capturing these two guys is very important to know about the WMD.

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