Posted on 05/07/2006 9:06:41 AM PDT by strategofr
The abrupt resignation (ouster?) of Porter Goss as director of the Central Intelligence Agency lays bare the rocky state of Americas most prestigious secret service amid critical missions on three fronts, Iraq, Afghanistan and the war on al Qaeda.
The White House quickly denied US media reports that the CIA chief, entrusted 20 months ago with reforming the agency after the twin intelligence failures of 9/11 and Iraq, had been forced to quit. At a hastily called press conference Friday, President George W. praised Goss for his help to make this country a safe place and help us win the war on terror. But he inserted a barb: "Porter's tenure at the CIA was one of transition."
Goss insisted: "The agency is on a very even keel, sailing well"
However, that judgment is not shared by most intelligence watchers.
Indeed, DEBKAfiles intelligence sources note the CIA is on its uppers in three vital spheres:
1.US forces are not getting to grips with either of the two segments of the Iraqi guerrilla insurgency: the mostly secular Baathists and the extremist Islamist Iraqi groups and al Qaeda. The continuous upsurge of violence in Iraq means the CIA has failed by and large to penetrate the most dangerous insurgent groups.
2. While the Taliban-al Qaeda rebellion rages in Afghanistan, Abu Musab al Zarqawis Iraq wing - far from being crushed - has in the last six months opened up new terror fronts in Sinai, Egypt, Palestinian territories and Algeria.
3. On Iran, the CIA comes up short on two interconnected issues: derailing Irans nuclear program with the help of local surrogates which, given the millions of expatriate Iranian exiles who detest the clerical regime, should pose fewer difficulties than penetrating al Qaeda. Secondly, American operatives should have been able to head off the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and intelligence agents who have permeated every corner of Iraqi politics and whose influence in Baghdad often prevails over the word from Washington - despite the presence of 135,000 US troops.
The CIA, like any service of its ilk, cannot handle its missions without superb counter-intelligence and clandestine services and the taking of operational risks.
When he took command of the agency from George Tenet in September 2004, Porter Goss started out by trying to steer the secret agency in the right direction for overcoming these grave shortcomings. His attempts to reform and shake up key personnel were quickly challenged by the upper and professional echelons, which meted out the treatment traditionally reserved for outsiders.
Goss spent 10 youthful years up until 1971 as a CIA spy. From 1989 up until his appointment as 19th director of the intelligence agency, he served on the House Intelligence Committee. No part of this record qualified him as an insider in CIA terms. He was dismissed as a Bush political appointee and his efforts to make changes met the sort of resistance the spy services core personnel have put up successfully for decades.
An obvious analogy is the case of Gosss predecessor, President Bill Clintons nominee John Deutsch. Taking office in May 1995, he believed like Goss that if he brought in his own people who came to be dubbed Deutschland - he would be able to fend off the internal pressures and intrigues besetting any external new broom.
However, the career echelon cold-shouldered him (some of them because he was a Jew) and after 19 months he threw in the sponge.
From the 2005 appointment of John Negroponte as Director of National Intelligence - the post of czar of all US spy agencies created after the Sept. 11 al Qaeda attacks the new CIA directors days were numbered. Traditionally the agency chief is first among his peers in the other American undercover services. Although the two had been friends, Negropontes appointment upset that internal balance and further weakened Goss in his struggle with the agency veterans. When the inevitable clash occurred, the president favored the czar.
The CIA chiefs departure will not make life easier for Negroponte but rather put him and indirectly the president on the spot. The intelligence overseer ranks in CIA terms as an outsider even more than Goss. A career diplomat, he comes from the posts of ambassador to the UN, followed by the embassy in Baghdad. He will come up against the same difficulty as the departing director when he sets about implementing the necessary overhaul to adapt the agency to post-Sept. 11 challenges.
The Director of National Intelligence may try inserting as a cushion his principal deputy, Air Force General Michael Hayden 61, in the top CIA slot, hoping that as an accredited member of the rarefied spook community he gets better treatment than Goss. Hayden was director of the National Security Agency in 2001 and in charge of the controversial wiretapping program of conversations with suspected overseas terrorists without a warrant. But it is by no means certain that Negropontes remedy is the cure.
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Bad Title.
It's only a few days to the deadline...and that would mean a petition etc. Would that be possible at this late date?? Nice dream!
Depends what one considers a "front". The terrorist 'front in so called 'palestinian territories was always ther, it's called Hamas. Does one or two terrorists fleeing Iraq and going to Israel and joining up with Hamas constitute a front? Ditto for Algeria and Egypt.
"On Iran, the CIA comes up short on two interconnected issues: derailing Irans nuclear program with the help of local surrogates which, given the millions of expatriate Iranian exiles who detest the clerical regime, should pose fewer difficulties than penetrating al Qaeda."
Nice armchair generaling. But reality is something different. Iranians can't even get near these heavily guarded sites, and there aren't peasants milling around selling tomatoes from donkey carts in front of them either. Planting operatives within the regime is no easy task. I'm sure they will call everyone you list on your resume'.
Some people have a far too simplistic view of things.
>>US Secret Service Embattled<<
I'd have more confidence in this story if they actually knew what the Secret Service was.
I pretty much agree with you.
If the DNI, DIA and other military intelligence organizations begin to assume missions from the CIA, the CIA could at some point be left to wither on the vine and leave the subversive moles with dead telephones. The expanded military agencies could be staffed with vetted personnel, some of which might be transferred from the CIA. This might be the game plan and why we are seeing such a frantic effort by the shadow government to oppose it.
I am thinking that Bush emphasizes effective management and a general is a much more experienced manager of a big organization than a congressman. I am also thinking that they have achieved unified operations in Defense and someone who knows that could help break down the silos in intel.
""Abu Musab al Zarqawis Iraq wing - far from being crushed - has in the last six months opened up new terror fronts in Sinai, Egypt, Palestinian territories and Algeria."
Depends what one considers a "front". The terrorist 'front in so called 'palestinian territories was always ther, it's called Hamas. Does one or two terrorists fleeing Iraq and going to Israel and joining up with Hamas constitute a front? Ditto for Algeria and Egypt."
Your point is well taken. However, I believe the Israelis view it quite negatively that Al Qaeda has finally directly connected up with a loss in the field. Whether this is the CIA's "fault" is quite a different question (and sounds like a dubious assumption.)
""On Iran, the CIA comes up short on two interconnected issues: derailing Irans nuclear program with the help of local surrogates which, given the millions of expatriate Iranian exiles who detest the clerical regime, should pose fewer difficulties than penetrating al Qaeda."
Nice armchair generaling. But reality is something different. Iranians can't even get near these heavily guarded sites, and there aren't peasants milling around selling tomatoes from donkey carts in front of them either. Planting operatives within the regime is no easy task. I'm sure they will call everyone you list on your resume'."
I have to agree. I had a funny feeling when I read this part, but you have expressed the issue extremely well. Debka's analysis looks pretty weak here. If they had tried to argue that the CIA should have accomplished more inside Iran, there might have been some validity there (I don't know). But the argument they actually made---you have effectively demolished.
"Some people have a far too simplistic view of things."
Valid comment here. I have found Debka Files to sometimes be very good. In the immediate aftermath of the London terrorist strike, they presented an analysis (within 12 hours of the event). In the days after the strike, every analysis I read around the world was in sharp disagreement with the Debka analysis. But five days after the fact, when the British government presented its analysis of what happened, it seemed to me to match Debka's initial analysis almost exactly.
While most freepers are 100% hostile to Debka, a few have said that they are accurate within their local purview. Since the London episode was an example of Muslim terrorism, it might be considered within Debka's purview, so perhaps that is why they did well with that one.
Being an American, I have noticed that I can definitely see the weaknesses in some of the things they do vis a vis America. But I will admit, that this Iranian analysis is not impressive, which should be an area of Debka's strength.
">>US Secret Service Embattled<<
I'd have more confidence in this story if they actually knew what the Secret Service was."
good point by both of you.
"It appears General Hayden, was picked to make the job of CIA Director more palatable with the new rules, being all Intel Agencies now report to the Director of National Intelligence. They no longer control their own budgets, nor have a complete say in where the boundaries are drawn as to what their mission involves.
If the DNI, DIA and other military intelligence organizations begin to assume missions from the CIA, the CIA could at some point be left to wither on the vine and leave the subversive moles with dead telephones. The expanded military agencies could be staffed with vetted personnel, some of which might be transferred from the CIA. This might be the game plan and why we are seeing such a frantic effort by the shadow government to oppose it."
Your point is well taken and that might be what is happening. If so however, it is a big mistake. Military intelligence is important. So is a separate agency like the CIA. Military intelligence needs to be able to focus on strictly military matters. The military has a certain job. Military intelligence helps them do it. They also have a certain focus of expertise.
When the State Department and the CIA are dysfunctional, it is natural for the military to start trying to take over both functions for themselves. First of all however, they will not be good at them. Second of all, we don't really want our military to start to get that kind of power and scope. They should continue to play their original assigned role---to fight and win wars.
I believe Goss made a good start to cleaning the moles out of the CIA. I don't know if you recall, but he suggested quitting right at the beginning when he saw how bad it all was, and Bush encouraged him to stick with it. Lets not forget, the man is 67 years old. I'm in my mid-50s and I don't make any bones about it---age matters. I suspect he did as much as he felt he could accomplish---but the vital job of cleaning out the CIA must continue, and the vital job of cleaning out the State Department, must be begun at some point.
"I am thinking that Bush emphasizes effective management and a general is a much more experienced manager of a big organization than a congressman. I am also thinking that they have achieved unified operations in Defense and someone who knows that could help break down the silos in intel."
Well, I don't have much of a sense of the new guy yet, but I dislike the fact that he comes from the NSA. The problem with the CIA is that they've let human intelligence (HUMINT) atrophy for a long time. Much of the impetus for this came from Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, I wonder why. What happened as a result is, the CIA started to rely more on the NSA's stuff, which is not how the CIA is supposed to operate. Putting an NSA guy in charge of the CIA may, in itself, be a bad sign.
"Your analogy to a whithering vine does strike a cord that could not be so far fetched."
I have essentially responded to this idea in Post 16.
"With things being as they are, perhaps GWB really feels this guy will do a good job at the CIA, both as policeman and championing the CIA role."
All things on balance, I am also optimistic that this may be another good Bush appointment.
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