Chertoff delayed federal response, memo shows

WASHINGTON - The federal official with the power to mobilize a massive federal response to Hurricane Katrina was Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, not the former FEMA chief who was relieved of his duties and resigned earlier this week, federal documents reviewed by Knight Ridder show.

Even before the storm struck the Gulf Coast, Chertoff could have ordered federal agencies into action without any request from state or local officials. Federal Emergency Management Agency chief Michael Brown had only limited authority to do so until about 36 hours after the storm hit, when Chertoff designated him as the "principal federal official" in charge of the storm.

As thousands of hurricane victims went without food, water and shelter in the days after Katrina's early morning Aug. 29 landfall, critics assailed Brown for being responsible for delays that might have cost hundreds of lives.

But Chertoff - not Brown - was in charge of managing the national response to a catastrophic disaster, according to the National Response Plan, the federal government's blueprint for how agencies will handle major natural disasters or terrorist incidents. An order issued by President Bush in 2003 also assigned that responsibility to the homeland security director.

But according to a memo obtained by Knight Ridder, Chertoff didn't shift that power to Brown until late afternoon or evening on Aug. 30, about 36 hours after Katrina hit Louisiana and Mississippi. That same memo suggests that Chertoff may have been confused about his lead role in disaster response and that of his department.

"As you know, the President has established the `White House Task Force on Hurricane Katrina Response.' He will meet with us tomorrow to launch this effort. The Department of Homeland Security, along with other Departments, will be part of the task force and will assist the Administration with its response to Hurricane Katrina," Chertoff said in the memo to the secretaries of defense, health and human services and other key federal agencies.

On the day that Chertoff wrote the memo, Bush was in San Diego presiding over a ceremony marking the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II.

Chertoff's Aug. 30 memo for the first time declared Katrina an "Incident of National Significance," a key designation that triggers swift federal coordination. The following afternoon, Bush met with his Cabinet, then appeared before TV cameras in the White House Rose Garden to announce the government's planned action.

That same day, Aug. 31, the Department of Defense, whose troops and equipment are crucial in such large disasters, activated its Task Force Katrina. But active-duty troops didn't begin to arrive in large numbers along the Gulf Coast until Saturday.

White House and homeland security officials wouldn't explain why Chertoff waited some 36 hours to declare Katrina an incident of national significance and why he didn't immediately begin to direct the federal response from the moment on Aug. 27 when the National Hurricane Center predicted that Katrina would strike the Gulf Coast with catastrophic force in 48 hours. Nor would they explain why Bush felt the need to appoint a separate task force.

Chertoff's hesitation and Bush's creation of a task force both appear to contradict the National Response Plan and previous presidential directives that specify what the secretary of homeland security is assigned to do without further presidential orders. The goal of the National Response Plan is to provide a streamlined framework for swiftly delivering federal assistance when a disaster - caused by terrorists or Mother Nature - is too big for local officials to handle.

Dana Perino, a White House spokeswoman, referred most inquiries about the memo and Chertoff's actions to the Department of Homeland Security.

"There will be an after-action report" on the government's response to Hurricane Katrina, Perino said. She added that "Chertoff had the authority to invoke the Incident of National Significance, and he did it on Tuesday."

Perino said the creation of the White House task force didn't add another bureaucratic layer or delay the response to the devastating hurricane. "Absolutely not," she said. "I think it helped move things along." When asked whether the delay in issuing the Incident of National Significance was to allow Bush time to return to Washington, Perino replied: "Not that I'm aware of."

Russ Knocke, a spokesman for the Department of Homeland Security, didn't dispute that the National Response Plan put Chertoff in charge in federal response to a catastrophe. But he disputed that the bureaucracy got in the way of launching the federal response.

"There was a tremendous sense of urgency," Knocke said. "We were mobilizing the greatest response to a disaster in the nation's history."

Knocke noted that members of the Coast Guard were already in New Orleans performing rescues and FEMA personnel and supplies had been deployed to the region.

The Department of Homeland Security has refused repeated requests to provide details about Chertoff's schedule and said it couldn't say specifically when the department requested assistance from the military. Knocke said a military liaison was working with FEMA, but said he didn't know his or her name or rank. FEMA officials said they wouldn't provide information about the liaison.

Knocke said members of almost every federal agency had already been meeting as part of the department's Interagency Incident Management Group, which convened for the first time on the Friday before the hurricane struck. So it would be a mistake, he said, to interpret the memo as meaning that Tuesday, Aug. 30 was the first time that members of the federal government coordinated.

The Chertoff memo indicates that the response to Katrina wasn't left to disaster professionals, but was run out of the White House, said George Haddow, a former deputy chief of staff at FEMA during the Clinton administration and the co-author of an emergency management textbook.

"It shows that the president is running the disaster, the White House is running it as opposed to Brown or Chertoff," Haddow said. Brown "is a convenient fall guy. He's not the problem really. The problem is a system that was marginalized."

A former FEMA director under President Reagan expressed shock by the inaction that Chertoff's memo suggested. It showed that Chertoff "does not have a full appreciation for what the country is faced with - nor does anyone who waits that long," said Gen. Julius Becton Jr., who was FEMA director from 1985-1989.

"Anytime you have a delay in taking action, there's a potential for losing lives," Becton told Knight Ridder. "I have no idea how many lives we're talking about. ... I don't understand why, except that they were inefficient."

Chertoff's Aug. 30 memo came on the heels of a memo from Brown, written several hours after Katrina made landfall, showing that the FEMA director was waiting for Chertoff's permission to get help from others within the massive department. In that memo, first obtained by the Associated Press last week, Brown requested Chertoff's "assistance to make available DHS employees willing to deploy as soon as possible." It asked for another 1,000 homeland security workers within two days and 2,000 within a week.

The four-paragraph memo ended with Brown thanking Chertoff "for your consideration in helping us meet our responsibilities in this near catastrophic event."

According to the National Response Plan, which was unveiled in January by Chertoff's predecessor, Tom Ridge, the secretary of homeland security is supposed to declare an Incident of National Significance when a catastrophic event occurs.

"Standard procedures regarding requests for assistance may be expedited or, under extreme circumstances, suspended in the immediate aftermath of an event of catastrophic magnitude," according to the plan, which evolved from earlier plans and lessons learned after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. "Notification and full coordination with the States will occur, but the coordination process must not delay or impede the rapid deployment and use of critical resources."

Should Chertoff have declared Katrina an Incident of National Significance sooner - even before the storm struck? Did his delay slow the quick delivery of the massive federal response that was needed? Would it have made a difference?

"You raise good questions," said Frank J. Cilluffo, the director of George Washington University's Homeland Security Planning Institute. It's too early to tell, he said, whether unfamiliarity with or glitches in the new National Response Plan were factors in the poor early response to Katrina.

"Clearly this is the first test. It certainly did not pass with flying colors," Cilluffo said of the National Response Plan.

Mike Byrne, a former senior homeland security official under Ridge who worked on the plan, said he doesn't think the new National Response Plan caused the confusion that plagued the early response to Katrina.

Something else went wrong, he suspects. The new National Response Plan isn't all that different from the previous plan, called the Federal Response Plan.

"Our history of responding to major disasters has been one where we've done it well," Byrne said. "We need to figure out why this one didn't go as well as the others did. It's shocking to me."

To read the National Response Plan, go to: http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NRP(underscore)FullText.pdf

Even before the storm struck the Gulf Coast, Chertoff could have ordered federal agencies into action without any request from state or local officials.

I am pretty damn sure this is patently untrue, dating back to the Posse Comitatus act. Knight Ridder ought to be fined.

The general statement is true. FEMA can order its own people at resources anywhere it wants to. There are a few things it can't do. It can't demand states to pay for relief that states don't request.

FEMA is powerless to violate Posse Comitatus. Posse Comitatus is a prohibition against the use of active duty military to perform domestic law enforcement. It is -that- narrow. FEMA has no control over active-duty military, so it is impossible for FEMA to violate posse comitatus. There are legal exceptions that permit the use of active duty military to perform civil police function, but as you can imagine, the exceptions describe extreme circumstances - far beyond the events that followed in the wake of Katrina.

Sure - although I should have said "coordination" rather than "control," I guess - although in practice there may not be much distinction:

National Response Plan notes from DHS.

The idea of the "Incident of National Significance" designation was to consolidate coordination of the many responding agencies, because normal interagency coordination and communication is too slow for large-scale incidents. It is not necessary for the state to request this designation, but they can.

My primary point, though, is that this designation does not signal the beginning of Federal support, it only changes the organizational structure of it (and is supposed to streamline the ability of the folks on the ground to obtain more resources, if needed.)

Under the NRP, first responders quite explicitly still are supposed to respond immediately and/or pre-stage, as they did.

In the case of Katrina, the situation quite dramatically changed sometime late Monday night (we think), and this became clear to everybody by Tuesday, when the "Incident" was formally declared.

Cboldt: I'm not sure that Incident of National Significance results in consolidation of command and control in the Fed apparatus. Would like to see a cite for that.

Sure - although I should have said "coordination" rather than "control," I guess - although in practice there may not be much distinction:

I take the terms to be synonymous, for the most part - although in practice of course they aren't.

And there very well may be some point where "control" is supposed to pass from state to fed - but it is absolutely necessary that those players agree to "make the transition" at some point. And a smooth transition is very hard to pull off. If you've worked in business, you know what sorts of crap goes down when a responsibiluty and authority is transferred from one person or department to another.

I've read most of the National Response Plan, with discussion at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1477440/posts?page=786#786 and following. Since then, I've read most of the rules that FEMA operates under. Here is a pair of rules that I just plain can't reconcile cleanly ...

TITLE 44--EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND ASSISTANCE
CHAPTER I--FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
PART 206_FEDERAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE FOR DISASTERS DECLARED ON OR AFTER NOVEMBER 23, 1988
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_04/44cfr206_04.html
Subpart B_The Declaration Process
Sec. 206.42 Responsibilities of coordinating officers.
(b) The SCO [State Coordinating Officer - Mr. Art Jones] coordinates State and local disaster assistance efforts with those of the Federal Government working closely with the FCO. The SCO is the principal point of contact regarding coordination of State and local disaster relief activities, and implementation of the State emergency plan. The functions, responsibilities, and authorities of the SCO are set forth in the State emergency plan. It is the responsibility of the SCO to ensure that all affected local jurisdictions are informed of the declaration, the types of assistance authorized, and the areas eligible to receive such assistance.
Subpart C_Emergency Assistance
Sec. 206.64 Coordination of assistance.
After an emergency declaration by the President, all Federal agencies, voluntary organizations, and State and local governments providing assistance shall operate under the coordination of the Federal Coordinating Officer. [William Lokey named to handle Lousiana, by Michael D. Brown]

I can't figure out, from those apparantly contradictory assignments of responsibility, who is supposed to be "in charge of what." The Declaration of Emergency came before the storm, but the rules are arranged as though events will always be "event, declaration, response." The rules provide no help as far as how to accomplish a smooth (yet temporatry) transfer or authority and responsibility.

I think it's a symptom of overplanning and too much government, and you watch, we'll be getting more of both.

I've read most of the National Response Plan...

So, I'm not the only dork who downloads those things and pores over them? ;-)

I can't figure out, from those apparantly contradictory assignments of responsibility, who is supposed to be "in charge of what."

I think resolving apparent contradictions like that are the reason for the designation of "Incident of National Significance." I'm not sure that it can really achieve the goal, as every level of government will always retain control of its own resources, regardless who is "coordinating."

I think it's a symptom of overplanning and too much government, and you watch, we'll be getting more of both.

I agree completely with that assessment of the NRP, and sadly, with that prediction for the future.

FWIW, I think this impacts only the relationship between federal agencies. I haven't found a single reference that describes how this designation impacts the relationship between FEMA and the state, and lots of references as to how this designation cuts inter-federal red tape to the benefit of FEMA itself.

Anyway, it's up to the government players to figure out how they will cooperate, and it's up to the voters to say, "Enough already, just give up on it, stop overpromising. Let us take care of ourselves."

And yes, there are a number of us dorks out here ;-)

This pretty well expresses the consequences of "Incident of National Significance."

According to this, FEMA is still a go-between, providing on-scene incident command structure (I presume these are state agents) with more direct line (and cutting the bureacracy) to federal operational and/or material resources.

And I am still scratching my head over the application of 44 CFR 206.64.

All incidents are handled at the lowest possible organizational and jurisdictional level. Police, fire, public health and medical, emergency management, and other personnel are responsible for incident management at the local level. For those events that rise to the level of an Incident of National Significance, the Department of Homeland Security provides operational and/or resource coordination for Federal support to on-scene incident command structures.
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0569.xml

E-mail to Senator Susan Collins sent in the past 15 minutes ...

Please explain the relationship between 44 CFR 206.42 and 44 CFR 206.64.
Rule 206.42 recites, "The SCO [State Coordinating Officer] is the principal point of contact regarding coordination of State and local disaster relief activities, and implementation of the State emergency plan."
Rule 206.64 recites, "After an emergency declaration by the President, all Federal agencies, voluntary organizations, and State and local governments providing assistance shall operate under the coordination of the Federal Coordinating Officer."
Does one rule have precedence over the other? If so, when? What is the formal mechanism that indicates a transition to FCO authority?
Given that Katrina is declared an Incident of National Significance, does this gives the FCO authority to override the Police in Gretna, Louisiana? See http://edition.cnn.com/2005/US/09/13/katrina.bridge/
I advocate that you and the rest of Congress admit that government is a resource of last-resort, and that people need to look out for themselves because government is a an entaglement of self-serving bureacracies.

I haven't found a single reference that describes how this designation impacts the relationship between FEMA and the state,

It strikes me as a more or less meaningless bureaucratic designation. There are many vague references about coordinating and communicating, but when you boil it all down, designating this an "Incident of National Significance" amounts to stepping in front of state and local resources. It seems pretty clear from reading the NRP that it is really meant to cover WMD attacks, in which there may not be too much in the way of local authorities, or at least not any with the means to deal with such incidents. Although natural disasters are certainly mentioned in the plan, they seem to me to be almost an afterthought, and there are repeated statements that things should always be dealt with at the lowest level of government first.

I can't find anything in the NRP that really changes, fundamentally, the way the Feds respond to hurricanes. That may well change now - but this is the first time the designation has been used.

... designating this an "Incident of National Significance" amounts to stepping in front of state and local resources.

My impression is that Fed "stepping in front of" State is conditional. If the state has command and control capability (it does in Katrina), then the state drives the bus. Pretty much what you say referring to WMD attack, where Fed takeover is justified because local authorities are literally gone. The other code phrase in the NRP is "catastrophic events."

The protocol does not appear to intend the Feds to override an existing state command and control structure. If the state actors are there, it's up to them to ask for intervention.

I am still seriously puzzled by the language of 44 CFR 206.64. It says, "all ... State and local governments providing assistance shall operate under the coordination of the Federal Coordinating Officer."

The Feds can't unilaterally take control just because of a natural disaster, even though they may want to. I would think the state could reasonably say "screw you" to that rule.

... when you boil it all down, designating this an "Incident of National Significance" amounts to stepping in front of state and local resources.

In that case, as of Wednesday, August 31, FEMA was responsible to quell the civil unrest; deliver relief to the ThunderDome and Convention Center, then evacuate them; evacuate the hospitals; evacuate the populace; decide whether mandatory evacuation is prudent and enforce the decision; etc.

At some point, command and control would revert to the state actors.

My impression is that FEMA has all along subordinated itself to state command, while trying to anticipate asset needs, report asset availability, and coordinate asset delivery.

In a world of too many cooks, I prefer the cooks to be my STATE cooks - even if they suck.

I agree with all your interpretations. As far as the timeline, there was always food at the Superdome, and evacuation buses first arrived there on Aug. 31st. The first reports of people beginning to gather at the COnvention Center were late on the 31st, and reports of large crowds surfaced on Sept 1st - also the day the first buses arrived there.

Regardless of whether it was a disaster area, an emergency disaster area, or an incident of national significance, help arrived early and in force. The implication of the article at the top of this thread, that the people languished for days for want of Chertoff's memorandum declaring an Incident of National Significance, is ludicrous.

The implication of the article at the top of this thread, that the people languished for days for want of Chertoff's memorandum declaring an Incident of National Significance, is ludicrous.

The implication of the article, as you take it (not that you agree with the article - just saying that you take the article as saying this), is that FEMA had full command and control as of August 31. Even if it was entitled to it, FEMA didn't have it. And even if it had it, it has to rely of field reports provided by state or media actors in order to command and control effective relief.

And of course, none of what went down hinged on Chertoff's declaration of Incident of National Significance. The Coast Guard and others were out there working without FEMA orders.

The implication of the article, as you take it (not that you agree with the article - just saying that you take the article as saying this), is that FEMA had full command and control as of August 31.

No, that's not what I take to be the point of the article at all. The article (and especuially the headline) implies that help was not available without the declaration of the 31st, and that simply isn't true. First responders were out in force making rescues, shelters were set up throughout the region, supplies were being delivered, and other states and the Feds had sent help. It is simply not true that Federal help was slowed by virtue of the declaration of an Incident of National Significance being made two days after the hurricane, one day after the flood.

And of course, none of what went down hinged on Chertoff's declaration of Incident of National Significance.

Yes!

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