The Price of Compromise

Insurgent violence has taken a heavy toll on the U.S. in Iraq. A series of attacks earlier this month pushed the total of American fatalities past 1,800. The mounting casualties have shaken American confidence. Terrorism has hit Iraqis even harder. On Capitol Hill, there are bipartisan calls for the White House to establish a timeline for withdrawal. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has been floating trial balloons. Senior military officials and diplomats, meanwhile, seek to deflate the insurgency. They urge Iraqis to embrace and engage former Baathists, Islamists, and Arab Sunni rejectionists. If the Sunnis can be brought into the fold, the conventional wisdom goes, peace and reconciliation will prevail.

But the conventional wisdom is wrong. The insurgency has gained momentum as a result of failed U.S. policy and well-meaning but wrong-headed assumptions.

The coalition's ouster of Saddam Hussein was popular among the vast majority of Iraqis. They greeted American troops warmly. There were flowers and candies. Iraqis danced as Saddam's statues fell. But the honeymoon faltered and collapsed amid looting and confusion about American intentions.

Throughout the 35-year Baathist dictatorship, survival depended upon maintaining a low profile and divining the leader's wishes. Iraqis would note with whom the leader met as a sign of favor. Officials would parse televised speeches to fine-tune their sycophancy.

Generations of Iraqis continued their Kremlinology when Jay Garner arrived as the director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. They watched as he repeatedly met with Saad al-Janabi, a former Baathist businessman and a close associate of Saddam's late son-in-law, Hussein Kamal. Iraqis interpreted Garner's outreach to an agent of influence of the former regime as a sign that the White House might restore the former regime to power. The fear had precedent. In 1991, President George H.W. Bush called upon Iraqis to rise up in rebellion against Saddam Hussein. They did. But the White House did not come to their aid. According to the Iraqi narrative, Washington shared responsibility for the subsequent massacres by releasing Republican Guard prisoners-of-war in time for their redeployment against the civilians. Garner's choice of dinner guests might have been innocuous to American diplomats and military officers eager to catalyze reconciliation, but it created a chill of distrust among ordinary Iraqis. More importantly, it convinced high-level Baathists that they need fear no justice.

A faulty belief in reconciliation is largely responsible for the disintegration of security in Mosul. Rather than confront Baathists and Islamists, General David Petraeus empowered them. Discussing his strategy at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on April 7, 2004, Petraeus explained, "The coalition must reconcile with a number of the thousands of former Ba'ath officials ... giving them a direct stake in the success of the new Iraq." Good in theory, but the result was Potemkin calm.

Petraeus assigned former Baathist General Mahmud Muhammad al-Maris, for example, to lead Iraqi Border Police units guarding the Syrian border. Al-Maris handpicked allies and poked holes in an already porous border. Petraeus allowed another former Baathist, General Muhammad Kha'iri Barhawi, to be Mosul's police chief. Not only did such a choice demoralize Iraqis who suffered under the former regime, but it undercut security.

On July 26, 2004, Brigadier General Andrew MacKay, head of the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team, told Pentagon officials. "We are seeing an increasing confidence within the Iraqi Police Service as they realize they are more than a match for the terrorists - even more so when they are led by officers of Major General Barhawi's ability." Unfortunately, the confidence was misinterpreted. After the November 2004 uprising in Mosul, Coalition officials learned that Barhawi had organized insurgent cells and enabled Islamists and former Baathists to briefly seize the city. Barhawi is now in prison. And both Iraqis and Americans are dead because of misplaced confidence and baseless theories.

Under Saddam Hussein, Baathists survived by ingratiating themselves to power. Too often, U.S. officials would base judgments on their own conversations, unaware of what former regime officials said behind their backs. The loyalty former regime elements and Islamists show is illusionary. In January 2004, for example, a delegation from the Ninewah provincial council visited Makhmur, a town in the Erbil governorate but tied administratively to Mosul. When an accompanying diplomat excused herself briefly, a translator - a former student of mine - said that councilmen berated the mayor for collaborating with the Americans. In Mosul, Petraeus created not placidity, but rather a safe-haven for terror.

Engagement and reconciliation may be the bread-and-butter of diplomacy, but in Iraq they are a prescription for failure. There is a correlation between re-Baathification and violence. Baghdad's security situation deteriorated sharply after Coalition Provisional Administration head L. Paul Bremer on April 23, 2004 declared, "Many Iraqis have complained to me that de-Baathification policy has been applied unevenly and unjustly. I have looked into these complaints and they are legitimate."

While Bremer argued that only implementation - not policy - changed, Iraqis felt otherwise. Their perception was validated one week later when Coalition forces lifted the siege of Fallujah and empowered former Baathists and insurgents in the name of reconciliation. Within a month, car bombings across Iraqi had increased 600%.

A belief persists in Foggy Bottom, Langley, and the White House that extensive de-Baathification is unpopular and destabilizing. Facts suggest otherwise. The Embassy embraced politicians like Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and former Governing Council member Adnan Pachachi because they favored Baathist reintegration. Given a choice at the ballot box, however, Iraqis rewarded candidates who promised tough implementation of de-Baathification. Pachachi, once the shining star of the State Department, failed to win a single seat. Incumbent Allawi mustered only 15% of the vote.

Engagement has a price. In June 2005, word leaked that U.S. officials had engaged Iraqi insurgents in order to encourage them to join the political process. A National Security Council senior director rationalized the approach by differentiating between "talking to" and "negotiating with" insurgents. The Arab world drew no such distinction. A June 28, 2005 ash-Sharq al-Awsat cartoon depicted Uncle Sam, surrounded by barbed wire, with an insurgent blocking his path to escape. The lesson drawn was that the U.S. was weak, not magnanimous. Violence spiked soon after.

Political compromises sometimes carry a high price. As a consequence of adding 15 Sunni Arab members to the Constitutional Commission, women may lose their rights across Iraqi society. Contrary to popular wisdom, Iraq's Sunni political leaders are more Islamist than many of their Shi'ite counterparts. Blatant sectarian pandering backfires.

American strategy in Iraq is fatally flawed. Not just policy implementation has gone awry, but rather the assumptions upon which policy is based. Iraq is neither an academic problem nor a template upon which to impose theories imported from Bosnia and Kosovo. It is a unique society with a very vocal population. Blinded by a false conventional wisdom, we refuse to listen. The cost has been bitterness among natural allies, emboldening of terrorists, and unnecessary American and Iraqi casualties.

Mr. Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, is editor of the Middle East Quarterly.

The first three sentences contain the factual (?) bullsh*t on which the rest of the article vainly hangs. There is no context. Deaths in wars are not comprehensible unless compared to other wars.

The current Iraq War is the LEAST deadly, measured in deaths per month, than ANY OTHER of the eleven total major wars America has ever fought, beginning with the American Revolution. If we had had the same response for the same level of deaths in combat throughout our history, we would be playing "God Save the Queen" before all baseball games.

If the same level of fearsomeness had gripped the US during World War II (and if we had had immediate communications so we knew about the deaths), we would have quit WW II before noon on D-Day, because it only took a third of a day for that one battle to exceed the deaths in three years of low-grade war in Iraq.

This author has his mind made up before he began typing. Therefore he presented only a partial truth -- what has happened in Iraq. He left out the truth about every other war the US has ever fought, because that larger truth would have put the lie to his preferred conclusion.

Such bad reporting is widespread in the MSM. And that skewed reporting leads to the poll results, to which the MSM says, "See, I told you so." But it all begins with the bad reporting. This writer is a literary coprophage. (Look it up; you'll be grimly amused at how well it fits.)

Congressman Billybob

Latest column: "The Washington Post Doesn't Have a Clue about Government Under a Written Constitution"

The first three sentences contain the factual (?) bullsh*t on which the rest of the article vainly hangs. There is no context. Deaths in wars are not comprehensible unless compared to other wars.

Congressman Billybob

Latest column: "The Washington Post Doesn't Have a Clue about Government Under a Written Constitution"

You are playing games with statistics. The official military rates of dead AND wounded (all casualties) are available on the Internet. Use either number, and the current Iraq War still is the LEAST bloody war. (Official reports of the wounded but not killed are spotty, earlier than the Civil War.)

And, you missed another statistical adjustment that foes the other way, strongly. In absolute number of deaths, the Iraq War per month is still lower than the American Revolution deaths per month. And in absolute numbers, the Revolution is the second lowest.

However, keep in mind that the American population is about 300 million today. In 1790 (first available census) it was 3 million. So, in terms of social impact and harm, every single death then is the same as 100 deaths today.

Lastly, you are saying that total casualties in Iraq are "high" because they are about 10% of soldiers in theater. Do you know that the "Christmas Tree Regiment," the Japanese-American unit that fought with excellence in Italy, suffered more than 100% casualties. That might sound impossible, but it can happen when a unit stays in the field for more than a year, and has soldiers rotated in and out.

Again, THIS is a relatively mild war in blood costs. But people only will realize that if they are given the context of blood costs in other American wars. Compare the business news reports on rising gas prices. They report that oil has now exceeded $60 a barrel. But they also say that in constant dollars, the highest price in the 70s would be $80 a barrel, in constant dollars.

The oil price reporting in the MSM is competent reporting. The deaths in Iraq is not, because of that lack of context.

John / Billybob

"i would have loved those odds while i was in Viet Nam. We lost more men at Khe Sanh than the whole war in iraq." ~ 1dadof3

Exactly. Here's what my Vietnam-vet brother had to EMPHATICALLY say in response to a Marine's letter I sent him on Sunday (also copied below):

HI;

GOOD STUFF, THIS GUY IS THE 2ND MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS OFFICER. ( G-3 )

G-I IS ADMINISTRATION
G-2 IS INTELL
G-3 IS OPERATIONS
G-4 IS SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS
G-5 IS CIVIL AFFAIRS

P.S....THEY JUST REPORTED THAT OVER 43,000 PEOPLE LOST THEIR LIVES ON OUR NATIONS HIGHWAYS THIS YEAR.

BASED ON SOME PEOPLES LOGIC, IT'S TIME WE PULLED ALL OUR PEOPLE OFF THE HIGHWAYS, IT WOULD BE THE ONLY WAY TO STOP SUCH CARNAGE.

ALSO, THESE DEATHS WERE PEOPLE OF ALL AGES AND GENDER ( NOT EVEN SOLDIERS ).

ALTHOUGH THE MEDIA MAINTAINS A CONSTANT DRUMBEAT ON THE CASUALTIES SUFFERED IN IRAQ, THE OVERALL FIGURE OF 1800 IS EXTREMELY LOW HISTORICALLY FOR ANY WAR.

WE LOST THAT MANY PEOPLE IN A MONTH IN VIETNAM, LET ALONE THREE YEARS.

AMERICA NEEDS TO WAKE UP! FREEDOM AIN'T FREE!

IF YOU AREN'T WILLING TO PAY THE MORTGAGE WHERE YOU LIVE; MOVE OUT!

AND....DON'T LET THE DOOR HIT YOU IN THE ASS!

JIM
----- Original Message -----
From: matchett
Sent: Sunday, August 07, 2005 10:42 AM
Subject: Report from Marine in Iraq

This is a report from Col. Bob Chase, G-3, 2dMarDiv in Iraq.

Was talking to Gino and he asked for some details on the MATADOR fight. Figured by now, since many of you might have caught some of the interviews, you'd like to hear, 'the rest of the story..."

Matador is now officially over, supposedly, they were going to fight and destroy us -- guess they missed the turn at the dairy queen. We are back and the final tally was Good Guys: 9 Killed (6 in the one Amtrak) and 30 wounded (most will return to duty). The bad guys, who talk a real good game: 125+ enemy dead, many more wounded, and 39 detainees of some significant value. Not a bad week's work.

As we have said, our intent was to make ourselves big by leveraging our firepower and mobility. This area was a real hell hole for AMZ criminals. We knew it, 1st Division knew it, but working it on a regular basis was tough. We kept some recon there and got the timing pretty well, brought up a bridging unit from the Army in Baghdad, then went across in the middle of the night (that was probably the only part that didn't go on sked -- the bank gradient was poorly assessed) but we had near and far-side security already in and a blocking position near the Syrian Border.

The enemy figured out after about 4 hours that we were there in force. They came down with about 100 fighters (no, scratch that -- they were TARGETS) and made the poor decision to take on a battalion in open ground. They withdrew -- we went after them into a place called Ubaydi. Many mounted boats and tried to escape, we pushed Air and the Cobras sank a bunch of trash barges that night. Meanwhile, we continued to push west across the river. Our far-side units started to see pockets of insurgents move to key areas to emplace mines/IEDs. They came out, snipers took them out; their friends came for the bodies; they, joined them on the deck -- permanently.

The force started getting the tanks across later than we had hoped. Our first casualties came at a high-rise where the enemy had prepared positions; a platoon moved in under fire, 2 Marines, a SSGT and a LCPL were first in the hatch and received a burst of MG fire. As the unit assumed they were dead (no additional fire/no one came out), they lit up the house and dropped it with a couple of 500-pounders. As we moved to recover our Marines (NONE LEFT BEHIND), we discovered that the LCPL, though wounded was still alive (he is serious, but stable). Unfortunately the SSGT had been killed by the initial burst.

We moved on; portions of the task force moving along known rat-lines and others working intell developed in the cities of Ramana and Karabila. Fighting was sporadic, intense, and one-sided in outcome. We followed individuals into buildings, we leveled the buildings; all night, every night, Marine Air had eyes up and shooters on-station -- talk about a guardian angel! Each night we re-assessed, looked at the intel and developed the next target sets. We stayed down there until a few days ago; then shifted to a series of caves in the north.

The caves were on an escarpment and rumors abound about whether these were Bin-Laden like caves; answer no, mostly small caches and some protection from about everything but a hellfire with a laser designator. We exploited some and closed most of them permanently. The enemy propaganda talked a lot about how they were going to kill us as we retreated, etc. They showed pictures of devastation in Al Qaim (caused by an intramural fight between the tribes and foreign fighters, no less) and blamed the Americans. Al Jazeera called to speak to me and interviewed me twice on air. Yes, I called the enemy cowards, again, that hid behind women and children in the cities and caused their death by their cowardice. Played well, enemy swore they had captured/killed the enemy commander. Went on again last night to ridicule them for their lies and continued fear of death, told them the destruction of Al Qaim was evidence that the noble tribes of Iraq also reject those that deface their ho!
ly places and dishonor their dead. We'll see if a wanted poster appears tomorrow. Bad news is, they still didn't get pissed off enough to come out and play

We went back across the river without incident, decided to poke a stick in Ubaydi (where the big fight was), just ONE MORE TIME before we left --NOTHING, they wanted no part of these Marines again. We're all back at base camps and Forward Operating Bases, maintaining, cleaning, talking, and prepping for the next smackdown!

NBC interviewed me again last night, good stuff, but they harped on the casualties. I told them it was war; they wanted to know if a whole squad was killed in the track. As I told them a squad's worth of Marines were killed/hurt (6 KIA, 14 WIA) but it was NOT the catastrophic loss of a squad. NBC wanted to know how to refer to them, as a squad, company, etc. I told them, pretty bluntly, refer to them for what they will always be US MARINES! They continued to push (I was starting to become a bit agitated), they wanted to know how we considered this a success with the deaths (I nearly lost it) and how would we remember them, would there be a ceremony? You know what happens when I get into this mode. Thought you might appreciate the answer:

We can never replace a fellow Marine or best friend, but I can attest that he died doing what we all hope to be doing as Marines, they were advancing, leading, and setting the example. They were being MARINES! It may not matter in the grand scheme of things to anyone but us, but we are singularly proud that we have and know Marines that fought and died like these. We remember and memorialize them and keep them alive every single time we put on this uniform -- we are just honored to wear the same eagle, globe, and anchor as these warrior/heroes. We don't make policy, we don't decide on the fight, but we do fight and win. And when we win, it is because every one of these Marines fight with us in spirit -- and we will not, we cannot let them down. To we Marines, Semper Fidelis is more than a motto. It was to them, and is to us who were privileged to fight with them, a way of life.

Not sure that will get on the tube. Unfortunate, because I think we should all be such Marines when our time comes.

Semper Fi,
Bob

U.S. Dead / Wounded (Iraq)

November 137 / 1427
December 72 / 540
January 107 / 496
February 58 / 409
March 36 / 364
April 52 / 590
May 79 / 385
June 77 / 316
July 53 / *
August 31 / *

If you graph out the wounded (KIA's also work, but that number is more eratic), you'll see the level of intensity of the current conflict in Iraq over time. The above figures go back to November of 2004.

Car bombings from that same time period have gone from 170 per month to just under 100 per month by July 2005.

That declining trend is what the author of the article for this threads calls evidence of an insurgency that is gaining strength.

He's an idiot. Perhaps an idiot with an agenda, but an idiot nonetheless.

Iraqi schools (and there are more schools now) have more teachers and more students now than under hussein. Ditto for hospitals, doctors, nurses, and medicine. Same again for potable drinking water and electricity.

These are all things in line with a declining threat from an insurgency. One would expect quite the opposite if the insurgents and terrorists were able to intensify their attacks month on month for any length of time.

The author, like far too many readers in his audience, is operating under the presumption that the mere *existence* of a conflict indicates that the U.S. must be losing said conflict.

Frankly, that's just wishful thinking from those who didn't back the war in the first place.

Thanks for your input, Southack. I knew you'd have some stats and valuable insight to add to the thread.

In #5 above, Cecily wrote:"I don't know if Michael Rubin could be considered part of the lamestream media. I have read his articles at National Review. I think he is one of the Chalabi fans over there, but I'm not certain. Lamestream or not, he does always seem to be pushing his personal viewpoint, rather than reporting or analyzing events as objectively as possible."

I think she's right about him being a Chalabi fan and that is the key to the slant of the article he wrote. I've always been a cautious Chalabi fan myself - more because of trust in the judgement of people like Laurie Mylroie, et.al., who have a much better handle on the behind-the-scenes goings on including how the Arabist Bush-haters in the State Department and the CIA (who side with the Baathists and hate Chalabi) tried to stop the Iraq war. From what I understand to be the case, when they were unable to stop it, they did their best to maneuver their people into place to undermine Chalabi and allow the Baathists back into the government.

The biggest war has been taking place - not it Iraq, but in D.C. between the Bush Administration and the State Department and CIA. Bush has not been able to get a handle on it until recently when he was able to put his own loyal people in charge in Foggy Bottom, the CIA and the UN. Heads have been rolling ever since, and it isn't over yet by a long shot.

I have no use for these Monday-morning quarterback Bush bashers supposedly on our side, who, if they had been president and tried to implement their agenda, would probably have not gotten nearly as far down the road as Bush has up to this point. Even though mistakes were no doubt made here and there, I think GWB has done the absolute best he could have done given the obstacles they've thrown in his path at every turn. I trust his judgement.

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