A RUSSIAN AGENT AT THE RIGHT HAND OF BIN LADEN?

The Arabic television channel Al Jazeera broadcast an audiotape on December 19, 2003, that was said to be from Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the right hand man of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. In it, Zawahiri claimed that his group was chasing Americans everywhere, including in the United States. This claim helped raise the terror threat level.

But where is Zawahiri, whose head now carries a price of US$25 million? Recent media reports have said that he is hiding in Iran, though Iranian authorities deny this. Yet it could be that Russian intelligence knows exactly where he is and may even have regular contact with the elusive Egyptian.

There are many accounts of Ayman al-Zawahiri published in the press. These stories cover Zawahiri's childhood and his relatives, his study of medicine, his connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, his involvement in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, his close relations with Osama bin Laden, and his role in major terrorist attacks against the United States. But there are few authors who mention that Zawahiri spent half a year in close contact with representatives of Russian intelligence while in their custody.

Significantly, these contacts led to a change in Zawahiri's political orientation. Long talks with Russian intelligence officers "forced a critical change in his lethal planning. ...America, not Egypt, became the target... Freed from Russian jail in May 1997, Dr. Zawahri found refuge in Afghanistan, yoking his fortunes to Mr. bin Laden. [Zawahiri's group] Egyptian Jihad, previously devoted to the narrow purpose of toppling secular rule in Egypt, became instead the biggest component of al Qaeda and a major agent of a global war against America. Dr. Zawahri became Mr. bin Laden's closest confidant and talent scout." [1]

The story of Zawahiri's Russian experience begins on December 1, 1996, when he was traveling under the alias "Mr. Amin" along with two of his officers--Ahmad Salama Mabruk, who ran Egyptian Jihad's cell in Azerbaijan under the cover of a trading firm called Bavari-C, and Mahmud Hisham al-Hennawi, a militant widely traveled in Asia. The group was accompanied by a Chechen guide. They were trying to enter Russia between the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus Mountains in an effort to discover whether Chechnya could become a base for training militants. It was here that the group was arrested by Russian police for a lack of visas. They were soon handed over to the Federal Security Service, the successor to the KGB.

When Zawahiri's computer was later discovered in Afghanistan by two journalists, it provided insight into Zawahiri's side of the story. In short, it goes as follows:

The Russians failed to: 1) find out Zawahiri's real identity and the goals of his visit to Chechnya; 2) read the Arabic texts in his laptop, which would have revealed the nature of his activities; and 3) read the coded messages that he sent from custody to his friends.

Yet based on my own twenty years' experience with Russian intelligence people involved in Arab affairs, these claims simply do not ring true. The Soviet KGB had good--albeit indirect--connections with Islamic fundamentalists, including the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Jihad. The curriculum of Arab terrorists who studied at Moscow International's Lenin School placed special emphasis on cooperation between Marxists and Islamists. Soviet instructors would encourage Arab terrorists to consider the Muslim Brothers and other Islamic extremists as "allies in class struggle."

Good contacts between the KGB and Islamic fundamentalists existed at the time of the Egyptian Jihad's 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat, after which Zawahiri was jailed by Egyptian authorities. Since the KGB followed these events very closely and may have even been indirectly involved in the plot, the KGB would have put Zawahiri's name into its records at that time. Therefore, when Zawahiri crossed the KGB's path again, that organization likely would have soon discovered his real identity.

Additionally, local Islamic organizations flocked to Zawahiri's aid during his detention and trial in such large numbers that the Russians and even Zawahiri's own lawyer were puzzled by the outpouring. [2] This would have been another tip-off to the authorities that they had more than just a mere merchant (Zawahiri's reported claim) in custody. Also, the fact that he was arrested along with a Chechen should have raised additional suspicions.

Perhaps most difficult to believe from Zawahiri's version is that his captors would not have read the Arabic information contained within his laptop computer. Russian intelligence has probably the best Arabists in the world. One of them--Dr. Evgeny Primakov--headed the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service from December 1991 until January 1996 and made a considerable efforts to bring many talented Arabists into this service. These individuals would have been able not only to read Zawahiri's Arabic text, but also to decode his encrypted messages without any problem.

Thus, with Zawahiri's true identity and purpose uncovered by the Russians, these authorities would have been faced with several options. One would have been deportation to either Egypt or the United States, with gratitude from those governments for Russian President Yeltsin, burnishing his image as a fighter against terrorism. But apparently the Russians decided not to do this, believing perhaps that their national interest was better served by another alternative.

One should bear in mind that at the time of Zawahiri's capture, Chechnya was enjoying a period of actual independence from Moscow. The Kremlin was having great difficulty finding "agents of influence" among the Chechen people. At the same time, Moscow knew that representatives of al Qaeda and other foreign Islamic fundamentalists were present in Chechnya and exercised strong influence on the Chechen leaders, especially on the military commanders. It would have been logical, therefore, for the Russians to try to persuade Zawahiri to cooperate with them in directing the activities of Arabs in Chechnya, in getting information about the plans and activities of Chechen leaders, and in influencing the Chechen leadership.

It may not have been too difficult for Russian officers to persuade Zawahiri to go along with such a plan. The prisoner would have been very frightened by the prospect of being deported to Egypt or remaining jailed in Russia. Furthermore, methods of torture during interrogation used by KGB officers would have truly almost scared Zawahiri to death. Execution very likely was just one threat.

Once made aware that the KGB knew of his true identity, Zawahiri would have realized that it would be useless to lie further. At a minimum, Zawahiri would have had to agree to cooperation with Russian intelligence to save his life and to buy his freedom. It is possible that the Russians also offered some form of assistance to Zawahiri and al Qaeda. This could have been in the form of explosive technology or other weaponry.

It is notable that Taliban and al Qaeda militants in Afghanistan received regular re-supplies of Russian arms. The man responsible for these deliveries was Victor Anatolievich Bout, the son of a top KGB officer. His father's connections helped establish Bout in the arms trade, which is linked to the Russian government and particularly to its intelligence services. Bout and his family currently reside in the United Arab Emirates. [3]

It is also not difficult to imagine that the Russians managed to get some information from Zawahiri about his colleagues that could have been used to blackmail him if he tried to avoid cooperation after his release. With an agreement reached between Zawahiri and the Russians, the authorities would have taken steps to make the Egyptian look "clean" to his Arab comrades and the Chechens. It would not have been difficult for them to stage Zawahiri's trial, at which the judge gave him only a six months' sentence, much of which he had already served.

A final note: Arabs are still very active among the Chechen militants today, and yet the Russians appear to turn a blind eye toward their infiltration and do not hunt them particularly. Even the most influential among the Arabs, Khattab, may well have been killed by his own people. Arabs have also never been listed as POWs. Perhaps the Russian forces have an order to kill Arabs on the spot: Nobody wants them to reveal unwanted information during interrogations. Thus left alone, the Arabs exercise significant influence over the activities of Chechen commanders according to orders from Zawahiri. Presumably they do so without understanding that they could well be the Trojan horses who actually execute the Kremlin's orders. For example, the Arabs apparently do not encourage Chechen militants to direct any attacks against Russian leaders in Moscow. This could be accomplished simply by refusing to pay for such operations.

In contrast, the Arabs do seem to encourage the taking of hostages from among the common people, as in the Moscow youth club Nord-Ost incident, thus making it easier for the Kremlin to stoke public anger against "Chechen terrorists." This in turn helps Vladimir Putin garner popular support for his own authoritarian actions as well as those of his former KGB colleagues who now occupy 65 percent of top governmental positions. Dr. Zawahiri may thus be the queen in the Kremlin's chess game not only in Chechnya, but also in Russia's power struggle at the highest levels. If so, it is not likely that the Russians would surrender him merely to help win the global war on terror.

1. "Saga of Dr. Zawahri Sheds Light On the Roots of al Qaeda Terror;" Andrew Higgins and Alan Cullison; The Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2002. 2. Ibid. 3. "International Business of Russian Mafia," Sueddeutsche Zeitung, February 1, 2001.

If you haven't read the original article, read it...then read what follows. I'm posting this in response to comments from the Putin Mafia above--TTS

MEMO TO CIA FROM KGB DEFECTOR, ANATOLY GOLITSYN, 1 FEBRUARY 1995 (Taken from his book, Perestroika Deception, Edward Harle Limited, 1998, ISBN 1-899798-03-X).

Excerpt (footnotes removed):

THE EVENTS IN CHECHNYA EXPLAINED IN TERMS OF RUSSIAN STRATEGY

The events in Chechnya, like the events of August 1991 and October 1993, have been deliberately staged largely for Western consumption by the Kremlin strategists in the pursuit of their objectives. One indication of this is the timing of the events. Chechnya declared its independence from Russian in 1991. Yet for three years the Russians did not react, other than ineffectually. Why did they do so only at the end of 1994?

Independence for Chechnya is a wholly artificial concept...their territory has no direct access to the outside world. The Chechens lost half their numbers in exile under Stalin. By 1994 50% of the population of Chechnya were ethnic Russians. Russians control the pipeline to Noverossiisk, giving them powerful leverage in the area. Given these circumstances the idea of a serious Chechen independence struggle is a non-starter.

Equally artificial is the Russian choice of method for dealing with Chechen aspirations. The Yeltsin Government inherited over 70 years’ worth of Soviet experience of dealing politically and militarily with nationalist opposition in the Republics. Yet it chose to wield an enormous military sledgehammer to crack a small nut in Chechnya, when the only rational way to handle the situation would have been the path of negotiation leading to a peaceful settlement as in the case of Tatarstan.

In earlier Memoranda I suggested that the confrontation between Yeltsin and his then Vice-President Rutskoi and the parliamentary Speaker Khasbulatov—a confrontation which culminated in the televised bombardment of the ‘White House’ in Moscow [a new kind of ‘Reichstag Fire’: see page 163] was contrived by the strategists with Rutskoi and Khasbulatov playing the role of provocateurs. The release and amnesty granted to Rutskoi and Khasbulatov after a ludicrously truncated period of imprisonment was consistent with their having played such a provocative role.

Frequent press mentions during December 1994, in the Chechnyan context, of Khasbulatov, himself a Chechen, provided a possible pointer to provocation there: he could well have played a role behind the scenes as an advisor to the ‘Chechen Fighters’. Another pointer to the likelihood of provocation ins Dzhokhar Dudayev’s own background. Like Shevardnadze in Georgia and Aliyev in Azerbaijan, Dudayev is a ‘former’ Communist. He is also a former Soviet Air Force General.

The conduct of the Chechnyan operation raises a number of questions. For instance: why, given the vast military and secret police experience at their disposal, did the Russians choose to dispatch in to Chechnya in the first place, inexperienced young Soviet army draftees who put up a poor performance in front of Western television cameras? Why were the Russian special forces who, for example, captured General Pal Maleter during the Hungarian upheaval of 1956, too inept to capture any of the Chechen leaders? How did the Chechen Fighters come to be so well armed? Why did the army and Ministry of the Interior troops not take immediate action to surround the city of Grozny and cut off the one route which remained available for the movement of Chechen Fighters and supplies in and out of the city centre?

Why, with their huge preponderance of firepower, did it take the Russians so long to capture the Presidential Palace, the symbolic centre of Chechen resistance? Why, before the Palace fell, were its Chechen defenders, according to their own accounts, allowed to leave, taking their Russian prisoners with them, so that they were free to continue the struggle elsewhere? Why was the bombardment of buildings in the centre of Grozny conducted with what Chancellor Kohl described as ‘senseless madness’? And why, as the Chechen fighters ‘took to the hills’, was a local guerrilla leader willing to receive a Western journalist in his own home in a mountain village without disguise, providing his full name and a history of his family? [The New York Times, 20 January 1995].

I am skeptical about much of the Western press and television coverage of Chechnya. In the first place, coverage was restricted by various factors. For example, Western access to Russian troops engaged in the operation was severely limited according to John Dancey, the NBC News correspondent in Moscow, speaking on the Donahue-Pozner Program on 12 January 1995. The bombardment itself was a powerful disincentive to intrusive journalism, and reporters obviously cannot be blamed for their inability to provide a coherent account of the fighting which took place in the centre of Grozny.

The important general point is the Western press and TV representatives reported the events as Westerners observing what they took to be a real conflict in a free society. It is not their fault that they were not briefed concerning the possibilities of provocation along Communist lines. Hence they were not looking for evidence of mock confrontations, faked casualties of planted information. The prominent Western reporters themselves, though courageous, appeared young and lacking in experience as war correspondents.

Nevertheless, some revealing items surfaced in the coverage. For example, the New York Times reported on 15 January that ‘some of the least serious’ of the Chechen fighters ‘would parade before the cameras’ at the Minutka traffic circle. That report prompted questions as to how many serious Chechen fighters were actually involved in action against Russian troops. Another report insisted that ‘ the last Western reporters’ had left the area of the Presidential Palace, where the ‘murderous fighting’ was concentrated and that Chechen fighters were no longer able to move easily to the south of the city in order to brief journalists about what was happening. It seems therefore that there were no Western eyewitnesses of the ‘final battle’ for the Palace, and that much of the evidence on the fighting was derived from Chechen fighters, whose reliability the reporters were no position to assess.

Two Western reporters were killed during these events. Though these deaths were reported as accidental, the fact is that the Russians would have no compunction about eliminating Western journalists if they thought they might be liable to expose their provocation. It was no coincidence that 40 Russian rockets were targeted at, and hit, Minutka Circle—which up to that moment had been favoured for meetings between journalists and fighters. Almost certainly, Russian officers who told journalists that they had arrived in Grozny without maps were briefed to tell this tall story. A Russian General who was shown on television going through photographs taken by reporters, said the pictures they had taken were useful because they helped him to assess what was going on in Grozny. In all likelihood, he was checking to make sure that the photographs taken by the reporters conveyed the images the Russian wanted conveyed for international public consumption.

The spectacular and continuous bombardment of buildings in the centre of Grozny, many of them probably empty, struck me as deliberately designed to monopolise television cameras, replicating in many ways the ‘Reichstag Fire’ bombardment of the ‘White House’ in Moscow in October 1993.

Inevitably, the detonation of so much high explosive was accompanied by casualties. But the actual number of casualties was probably limited by the departure of many inhabitants of the centre of Grozny before the bombardment started in earnest. As early as 7 January 1995, the Red Cross reported that 350,000 people had fled from the fighting, a figure equivalent to over 80% of the population of Grozny. It would be interesting to know to what extent the authorities encouraged or arranged the evacuation of central Grozny before the bombardment began.

Verification of casualty number is the most difficult problem. According to Dudayev, cited in The New York Times of 12 January, 18,000 Chechens had already died, a figure which the reporter said ‘seems exaggerated’. Casualty figures for the Russian army quoted in The New York Times of 17 January varied from 400 to 800 killed. Again there is no knowing whether these figures were exaggerated or minimized. The Russian authorities are reported to have delayed the admission of European observers interested in verifying numbers. Even if they were eventually to arrive on the scene, such observers would be unlikely to be able to check the numbers allegedly buried in mass graves. Total casualties will probably never be known with any certainty. From the Kremlin strategists’ point of view, casualties are inevitable during this kind of operation and a necessary price to pay of the attainment of defined strategic objectives.

THE KREMLIN’S OBJECTIVES AND THE CHECHNYA CRISIS

The timing of the Chechnyan crisis is an essential key to understanding the strategic objectives which underlie it. The crisis followed closely on the Republican Congressional victory, with its possible consequence of a reversal in the US military rundown. Contrived and televised Russian military bungling during the Chechnyan campaign has sent a strong message to the West that Russian military leaders are divided amongst themselves and that there is widespread incompetence and low morale in the army—factors which demonstrate that it can be discounted as a serious military adversary for the foreseeable future.

This message is intended to influence US Congressional debate on the subject of Russia’s military potential and the size of US forces required to maintain a balance with it. The message can also be used as a pretext for deepening the partnership between the US and Russian armed forces by seeking American advice and help in ‘reforming’, reorganizing and retraining the Russian army in order to enable it to serve as a ‘democratic’ system.

The events in Chechnya have enabled the Russians to play especially on European fears of destabilization in Russia and the development there of an internal ‘Bosnian situation’. These fears have injected a further boost to the European desire for partnership with the ‘democratic forces’ in Russia in developing democratic solutions to Russian problems. European hopes of promoting real democracy in Russian will of course prove illusory. The Russians will use the partnership to ease their entry into European institutions as a rightful member of the ‘European house’, a house which over the longer term they intend to dominate.

Given continuing Russian influence and leverage in Eastern Europe, East European and eventually Russian involvement in NATO are in the long term Russian strategic interest in accordance with Sun Tzu’s principle of ‘entering the enemy’s camp unopposed’. Though for different reasons, I share the view expressed by a writer in The New York Times of 11 January 1995 that East European membership would mean the ruin of NATO. The ruin of NATO is a long-term Russian objective, towards the achievement of which much progress has already been made. The televised spectacle of Russian barbarity in Chechnya has aroused apprehension in neighboring states of comparable Russian military operations against themselves, thereby strengthening the argument that former members of the Warsaw Pact should be admitted to membership of NATO. Yeltsin’s firmly expressed opposition to their membership and his Foreign Minister’s ambivalence (see, for instance, The New York Times of 20 January 1995) can be read as possible preludes to dramatic ‘change’ in Russian policy, perhaps under a new government.

Furthermore, the reassertion of Kremlin control over Chechnya through massive military intervention (which, despite the calculated impression of bungling, achieved its objective, thereby itself revealing the contrived nature of the televised ‘bungling’), the spectacular, televised destruction of buildings in Gozny and the publicity surrounding the level of casualties, have sent the strongest possible signals to genuine would-be Muslim and non-Muslim secessionists in Chechnya and other Republics that secessionism is a very dangerous game. The strategists may well have chosen Chechnya for their demonstration of force specifically because real secessionism can be more easily contained in that territory than in others.

It would also be consistent with the strategists’ method that the publicized impression of Yeltsin’s inept handling of the Chechnyan situation was intended in part to help destroy suspicions that Russian leaders are capable of implementing a long-range strategy, as this Author has consistently contended that they do. For the strategists, it is particularly important to keep obscuring this fact, even though it is largely beyond Western comprehension, since belated Western understanding of strategic continuity would inevitably lead to the far-reaching reassessment of Soviet-Chinese strategy and objectives which they seek to preclude.

Just as consistently, the Russian scenario for Chechnya provides for a peaceful solution of the Chechnyan problem under either Yeltsin or his successor. Khasbulatov might emerge as a new Chechnyan leader just as Shevardnadze and Aliyev emerged in Georgia and Azerbaijan respectively. Although at present there is obvious European revulsion against Russian brutality in Chechnya, given a peaceful solution and the associated psychological sense of ‘relief’, European and Arab capital could be attracted to help finance the reconstruction of Grozny and to undertake investment in the Caucasian oil industry.

In my letter of 12 October 1993 I referred to the military/nationalist option as the third course upon which the Kremlin strategists might embark in future to adjust the style and leadership of a new government if, for example, Yeltsin was considered to have exhausted his usefulness in extracting concessions from the West. In this context, the Chechnyan ‘crisis’ can be seen not as a likely cause of a military coup, but as a possible planned prelude to a change of government. The new government might be military of nationalistic. Certain indications that this is envisaged, are apparent.

It should be remembered, too, that the emergence of ‘perestroika’ in Russia was accompanied by the tightening of military and political control in China, starting with the Tienanmen Square episode. Far from being coincidental, this was the result of a joint Sino-Soviet decision—confirmed during Gorbachev’s visit immediately ahead of the Tienanmen Square provocation—that, while one main pillar of the Leninist world was engaged in ‘perestroika’, the other should be held under firm control. Similarly, the introduction of a Chinese version of ‘perestroika’, which may be expected in China after the death of Deng, would be a probable reason for a tightening of control in Russia.

Since an outright military or nationalist government might prejudice the flow of Western aid and the continued ‘cooperation’ with the West which furthers the strategists’ interests, it is more likely that the Kremlin stategists will opt for a hybrid solution involving, for example, a new President and Commander-in-Chief with a military background and a ‘reformist’ Prime Minister, in the context of overtly tighter KGB control. The President would be presented as a guarantee of Russian stability while the Prime Minister’s task would be to ensure the continued flow of Western aid and the continuation of cooperative operations. The transition might be brought about, for example, by the resignation of Yeltsin on health grounds and/or through elections, due anyway in 1996, for which the strategists would have chosen and groomed their presidential candidate. In this way, ‘legitimacy’ could be preserved and the election could be used as further ‘proof’ that democracy, cherished by the West, was ‘working’ in Russia (albeit in step with increasing authoritarianism).

Yes. It is yet another corroborated testimony on this matter against a deluge of straw man propaganda.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

MEMO TO CIA FROM KGB DEFECTOR, ANATOLY GOLITSYN, 1 FEBRUARY 1995 (Taken from his book, Perestroika Deception, Edward Harle Limited, 1998, ISBN 1-899798-03-X).

Excerpt (footnotes removed):

THE EVENTS IN CHECHNYA EXPLAINED IN TERMS OF RUSSIAN STRATEGY

The events in Chechnya, like the events of August 1991 and October 1993, have been deliberately staged largely for Western consumption by the Kremlin strategists in the pursuit of their objectives. One indication of this is the timing of the events. Chechnya declared its independence from Russian in 1991. Yet for three years the Russians did not react, other than ineffectually. Why did they do so only at the end of 1994?

Independence for Chechnya is a wholly artificial concept...their territory has no direct access to the outside world. The Chechens lost half their numbers in exile under Stalin. By 1994 50% of the population of Chechnya were ethnic Russians. Russians control the pipeline to Noverossiisk, giving them powerful leverage in the area. Given these circumstances the idea of a serious Chechen independence struggle is a non-starter.

Equally artificial is the Russian choice of method for dealing with Chechen aspirations. The Yeltsin Government inherited over 70 years’ worth of Soviet experience of dealing politically and militarily with nationalist opposition in the Republics. Yet it chose to wield an enormous military sledgehammer to crack a small nut in Chechnya, when the only rational way to handle the situation would have been the path of negotiation leading to a peaceful settlement as in the case of Tatarstan.

In earlier Memoranda I suggested that the confrontation between Yeltsin and his then Vice-President Rutskoi and the parliamentary Speaker Khasbulatov—a confrontation which culminated in the televised bombardment of the ‘White House’ in Moscow [a new kind of ‘Reichstag Fire’: see page 163] was contrived by the strategists with Rutskoi and Khasbulatov playing the role of provocateurs. The release and amnesty granted to Rutskoi and Khasbulatov after a ludicrously truncated period of imprisonment was consistent with their having played such a provocative role.

Frequent press mentions during December 1994, in the Chechnyan context, of Khasbulatov, himself a Chechen, provided a possible pointer to provocation there: he could well have played a role behind the scenes as an advisor to the ‘Chechen Fighters’. Another pointer to the likelihood of provocation ins Dzhokhar Dudayev’s own background. Like Shevardnadze in Georgia and Aliyev in Azerbaijan, Dudayev is a ‘former’ Communist. He is also a former Soviet Air Force General.

The conduct of the Chechnyan operation raises a number of questions. For instance: why, given the vast military and secret police experience at their disposal, did the Russians choose to dispatch in to Chechnya in the first place, inexperienced young Soviet army draftees who put up a poor performance in front of Western television cameras? Why were the Russian special forces who, for example, captured General Pal Maleter during the Hungarian upheaval of 1956, too inept to capture any of the Chechen leaders? How did the Chechen Fighters come to be so well armed? Why did the army and Ministry of the Interior troops not take immediate action to surround the city of Grozny and cut off the one route which remained available for the movement of Chechen Fighters and supplies in and out of the city centre?

Why, with their huge preponderance of firepower, did it take the Russians so long to capture the Presidential Palace, the symbolic centre of Chechen resistance? Why, before the Palace fell, were its Chechen defenders, according to their own accounts, allowed to leave, taking their Russian prisoners with them, so that they were free to continue the struggle elsewhere? Why was the bombardment of buildings in the centre of Grozny conducted with what Chancellor Kohl described as ‘senseless madness’? And why, as the Chechen fighters ‘took to the hills’, was a local guerrilla leader willing to receive a Western journalist in his own home in a mountain village without disguise, providing his full name and a history of his family? [The New York Times, 20 January 1995].

I am skeptical about much of the Western press and television coverage of Chechnya. In the first place, coverage was restricted by various factors. For example, Western access to Russian troops engaged in the operation was severely limited according to John Dancey, the NBC News correspondent in Moscow, speaking on the Donahue-Pozner Program on 12 January 1995. The bombardment itself was a powerful disincentive to intrusive journalism, and reporters obviously cannot be blamed for their inability to provide a coherent account of the fighting which took place in the centre of Grozny.

The important general point is the Western press and TV representatives reported the events as Westerners observing what they took to be a real conflict in a free society. It is not their fault that they were not briefed concerning the possibilities of provocation along Communist lines. Hence they were not looking for evidence of mock confrontations, faked casualties of planted information. The prominent Western reporters themselves, though courageous, appeared young and lacking in experience as war correspondents.

Nevertheless, some revealing items surfaced in the coverage. For example, the New York Times reported on 15 January that ‘some of the least serious’ of the Chechen fighters ‘would parade before the cameras’ at the Minutka traffic circle. That report prompted questions as to how many serious Chechen fighters were actually involved in action against Russian troops. Another report insisted that ‘ the last Western reporters’ had left the area of the Presidential Palace, where the ‘murderous fighting’ was concentrated and that Chechen fighters were no longer able to move easily to the south of the city in order to brief journalists about what was happening. It seems therefore that there were no Western eyewitnesses of the ‘final battle’ for the Palace, and that much of the evidence on the fighting was derived from Chechen fighters, whose reliability the reporters were no position to assess.

Two Western reporters were killed during these events. Though these deaths were reported as accidental, the fact is that the Russians would have no compunction about eliminating Western journalists if they thought they might be liable to expose their provocation. It was no coincidence that 40 Russian rockets were targeted at, and hit, Minutka Circle—which up to that moment had been favoured for meetings between journalists and fighters. Almost certainly, Russian officers who told journalists that they had arrived in Grozny without maps were briefed to tell this tall story. A Russian General who was shown on television going through photographs taken by reporters, said the pictures they had taken were useful because they helped him to assess what was going on in Grozny. In all likelihood, he was checking to make sure that the photographs taken by the reporters conveyed the images the Russian wanted conveyed for international public consumption.

The spectacular and continuous bombardment of buildings in the centre of Grozny, many of them probably empty, struck me as deliberately designed to monopolise television cameras, replicating in many ways the ‘Reichstag Fire’ bombardment of the ‘White House’ in Moscow in October 1993.

Inevitably, the detonation of so much high explosive was accompanied by casualties. But the actual number of casualties was probably limited by the departure of many inhabitants of the centre of Grozny before the bombardment started in earnest. As early as 7 January 1995, the Red Cross reported that 350,000 people had fled from the fighting, a figure equivalent to over 80% of the population of Grozny. It would be interesting to know to what extent the authorities encouraged or arranged the evacuation of central Grozny before the bombardment began.

Verification of casualty number is the most difficult problem. According to Dudayev, cited in The New York Times of 12 January, 18,000 Chechens had already died, a figure which the reporter said ‘seems exaggerated’. Casualty figures for the Russian army quoted in The New York Times of 17 January varied from 400 to 800 killed. Again there is no knowing whether these figures were exaggerated or minimized. The Russian authorities are reported to have delayed the admission of European observers interested in verifying numbers. Even if they were eventually to arrive on the scene, such observers would be unlikely to be able to check the numbers allegedly buried in mass graves. Total casualties will probably never be known with any certainty. From the Kremlin strategists’ point of view, casualties are inevitable during this kind of operation and a necessary price to pay of the attainment of defined strategic objectives.

THE KREMLIN’S OBJECTIVES AND THE CHECHNYA CRISIS

The timing of the Chechnyan crisis is an essential key to understanding the strategic objectives which underlie it. The crisis followed closely on the Republican Congressional victory, with its possible consequence of a reversal in the US military rundown. Contrived and televised Russian military bungling during the Chechnyan campaign has sent a strong message to the West that Russian military leaders are divided amongst themselves and that there is widespread incompetence and low morale in the army—factors which demonstrate that it can be discounted as a serious military adversary for the foreseeable future.

This message is intended to influence US Congressional debate on the subject of Russia’s military potential and the size of US forces required to maintain a balance with it. The message can also be used as a pretext for deepening the partnership between the US and Russian armed forces by seeking American advice and help in ‘reforming’, reorganizing and retraining the Russian army in order to enable it to serve as a ‘democratic’ system.

The events in Chechnya have enabled the Russians to play especially on European fears of destabilization in Russia and the development there of an internal ‘Bosnian situation’. These fears have injected a further boost to the European desire for partnership with the ‘democratic forces’ in Russia in developing democratic solutions to Russian problems. European hopes of promoting real democracy in Russian will of course prove illusory. The Russians will use the partnership to ease their entry into European institutions as a rightful member of the ‘European house’, a house which over the longer term they intend to dominate.

Given continuing Russian influence and leverage in Eastern Europe, East European and eventually Russian involvement in NATO are in the long term Russian strategic interest in accordance with Sun Tzu’s principle of ‘entering the enemy’s camp unopposed’. Though for different reasons, I share the view expressed by a writer in The New York Times of 11 January 1995 that East European membership would mean the ruin of NATO. The ruin of NATO is a long-term Russian objective, towards the achievement of which much progress has already been made. The televised spectacle of Russian barbarity in Chechnya has aroused apprehension in neighboring states of comparable Russian military operations against themselves, thereby strengthening the argument that former members of the Warsaw Pact should be admitted to membership of NATO. Yeltsin’s firmly expressed opposition to their membership and his Foreign Minister’s ambivalence (see, for instance, The New York Times of 20 January 1995) can be read as possible preludes to dramatic ‘change’ in Russian policy, perhaps under a new government.

Furthermore, the reassertion of Kremlin control over Chechnya through massive military intervention (which, despite the calculated impression of bungling, achieved its objective, thereby itself revealing the contrived nature of the televised ‘bungling’), the spectacular, televised destruction of buildings in Gozny and the publicity surrounding the level of casualties, have sent the strongest possible signals to genuine would-be Muslim and non-Muslim secessionists in Chechnya and other Republics that secessionism is a very dangerous game. The strategists may well have chosen Chechnya for their demonstration of force specifically because real secessionism can be more easily contained in that territory than in others.

It would also be consistent with the strategists’ method that the publicized impression of Yeltsin’s inept handling of the Chechnyan situation was intended in part to help destroy suspicions that Russian leaders are capable of implementing a long-range strategy, as this Author has consistently contended that they do. For the strategists, it is particularly important to keep obscuring this fact, even though it is largely beyond Western comprehension, since belated Western understanding of strategic continuity would inevitably lead to the far-reaching reassessment of Soviet-Chinese strategy and objectives which they seek to preclude.

Just as consistently, the Russian scenario for Chechnya provides for a peaceful solution of the Chechnyan problem under either Yeltsin or his successor. Khasbulatov might emerge as a new Chechnyan leader just as Shevardnadze and Aliyev emerged in Georgia and Azerbaijan respectively. Although at present there is obvious European revulsion against Russian brutality in Chechnya, given a peaceful solution and the associated psychological sense of ‘relief’, European and Arab capital could be attracted to help finance the reconstruction of Grozny and to undertake investment in the Caucasian oil industry.

In my letter of 12 October 1993 I referred to the military/nationalist option as the third course upon which the Kremlin strategists might embark in future to adjust the style and leadership of a new government if, for example, Yeltsin was considered to have exhausted his usefulness in extracting concessions from the West. In this context, the Chechnyan ‘crisis’ can be seen not as a likely cause of a military coup, but as a possible planned prelude to a change of government. The new government might be military of nationalistic. Certain indications that this is envisaged, are apparent.

It should be remembered, too, that the emergence of ‘perestroika’ in Russia was accompanied by the tightening of military and political control in China, starting with the Tienanmen Square episode. Far from being coincidental, this was the result of a joint Sino-Soviet decision—confirmed during Gorbachev’s visit immediately ahead of the Tienanmen Square provocation—that, while one main pillar of the Leninist world was engaged in ‘perestroika’, the other should be held under firm control. Similarly, the introduction of a Chinese version of ‘perestroika’, which may be expected in China after the death of Deng, would be a probable reason for a tightening of control in Russia.

Since an outright military or nationalist government might prejudice the flow of Western aid and the continued ‘cooperation’ with the West which furthers the strategists’ interests, it is more likely that the Kremlin stategists will opt for a hybrid solution involving, for example, a new President and Commander-in-Chief with a military background and a ‘reformist’ Prime Minister, in the context of overtly tighter KGB control. The President would be presented as a guarantee of Russian stability while the Prime Minister’s task would be to ensure the continued flow of Western aid and the continuation of cooperative operations. The transition might be brought about, for example, by the resignation of Yeltsin on health grounds and/or through elections, due anyway in 1996, for which the strategists would have chosen and groomed their presidential candidate. In this way, ‘legitimacy’ could be preserved and the election could be used as further ‘proof’ that democracy, cherished by the West, was ‘working’ in Russia (albeit in step with increasing authoritarianism).

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