Posted on 07/31/2004 7:25:05 AM PDT by yoe
As U.S. elections near and al Qaeda threats abound toward Europe, speculation about the next al Qaeda attack is rife. However, much of the process involved in predicting the next major target appears to be based on a faulty underlying premise -- that al Qaeda's primary goal is to damage or destroy the United States. This misunderstanding of motives not only can lead to confusion over al Qaeda statements and actions, but also trigger false conclusions about the root cause of al Qaeda's prolonged inaction.
The idea that al Qaeda hates the United States and sees it as its primary enemy is the lens through which many, consciously or subconsciously, view the group and its actions. Viewed through this prism, al Qaeda's failure to strike another blow within the United States since the Sept. 11 attacks is viewed as a lack of capability, rather than as a strategic decision by the organization. However, this mindset also gives rise to the seemingly contradictory view that al Qaeda is ready and willing to strike inside the United States -- that sleeper cells are everywhere, simply waiting for their clocks to wind down, and that anything and everything is a likely target.
Peering through this lens also gives rise to the numerous speculations and warnings about ways al Qaeda could strike the United States -- from shooting up election sites to bombing trains to attacking bridges or factories. However, this amounts only to a discussion of the spectrum of U.S. vulnerabilities -- unleavened by the tactical value of potential targets in accordance with al Qaeda's strategic vision. In effect, everything inside the United States is viewed as a potential target. And there are ways of attacking pretty much anything within the country, rendering total protection and security virtually impossible.
This view of al Qaeda is appropriate from a law enforcement and protective security standpoint: It identifies vulnerabilities, raises awareness about how to spot potential threats and prepares those on the front lines to react quickly. An alternative way to view al Qaeda, however, is to take a closer look at its strategic aims, the organization's structure and its previous strategies. This is the intelligence viewpoint: It allows predictive insights into the likely time and place of an attack, helps to narrow the likely target set and offers an opportunity to get inside an enemy's mind. In this way, the center of gravity can be deduced and -- if disrupted or destroyed -- the enemy rendered essentially impotent.
Each approach has its value, but both must work hand-in-hand.
Al Qaeda sees the United States not as the primary focus of its long-term goals, but as a challenger to its ultimate goal: the establishment of a pan-Islamic state stretching across the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Al Qaeda's aims are political, and it sees the United States not only in military or ideological terms, but also as a tool to be manipulated to help achieve a desired end.
To build a pan-Islamic state and re-establish the caliphate, al Qaeda requires a social/revolutionary movement stretching across several Muslim states. Stirring such a revolution is not easy, given the fractious nature of the Islamic world and the strength of many of the key Muslim regimes. To bring about a general uprising, al Qaeda needs to produce two initial elements -- a common enemy against which to rally the people and a prospect for success. To some degree, the United States serves as the vehicle for both.
Al Qaeda has seen from the past that striking at the Muslim regimes in a piecemeal fashion fails to generate sufficient popular support. The case of Egypt is a prime example: The 1981 assassination of President Anwar El Sadat at the hands of the first-ever jihadist group, Tandheem al Jihad (Jihad Organization), backfired in that it did not generate the critical mass required in terms of popular support. In fact, the subsequent crackdown by Cairo nearly decimated the militancy in Egypt. It is out of this Egyptian militancy that Osama bin Laden deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri comes -- he was arrested and jailed on suspicion of being part of the conspiracy to assassinate Sadat.
By striking at the United States, the security guarantor of many of the Muslim states, al Qaeda can show that Islamist militants are anything but impotent, even when facing down the world's sole superpower. This, in turn, shows that the United States is vulnerable -- and by extension, that the Muslim regimes backed by Washington are equally vulnerable, if not more so.
However, striking at the United States also serves to supply the other needed ingredient for al Qaeda's popular uprising -- a common enemy. Al Qaeda has attempted to bait the United States into attacks in the Muslim world for years, but aside from the occasional cruise missile strike, Washington failed to bite -- that is, until the Sept. 11 attacks, which were an offer Washington couldn't refuse. The magnitude of the strikes left no choice for Washington but to engage al Qaeda -- and, given the group's stateless structure, the entire geography of the Middle East, North Africa and South and Southeast Asia were potential U.S. strike zones.
Though al Qaeda knew Washington would strike back in Afghanistan, where bin Laden and other key leaders had taken up residence, we believe the group had another goal in mind -- drawing Washington into an attack against Saudi Arabia, or at least destroying U.S. backing for the Saudi regime. At least 15 of the 19 hijackers involved in the Sept. 11 attacks were Saudis -- a fact that al Qaeda made no attempts to hide. This was not because Saudis were necessarily the best-trained and most trusted operatives, but because their overwhelming presence among the hijackers was designed to drive a wedge between Washington and Riyadh -- and, in the best-case scenario, to draw Washington into physical conflict with Riyadh.
A U.S. military action inside Saudi Arabia -- the keeper of the two holy sites -- would undoubtedly trigger the unification and righteous indignation of the Islamic world that al Qaeda so needs to accomplish its goals. But Washington chose to nibble rather than swallow the bait whole. Saudi-U.S. relations certainly took a hit, and the strains remain, but the United States chose a parallel target -- Iraq -- from which to pressure Saudi Arabia and other surrounding states.
Al Qaeda recently has threatened to draw Washington into another war -- in Yemen.
The choice of Yemen would place U.S. troops on another flank of Saudi Arabia, further straining relations between Washington and Riyadh and generating an impression in the Islamic world that the kingdom is next on the U.S. target list. Al Qaeda is also considering a secondary plan: Drawing Washington into a physical conflict with Pakistan -- which would raise the stakes, since Pakistan is a nuclear power. Moreover, a conflict with Pakistan could well draw in India and Israel, giving the clear appearance of a Christian/Hindu/Zionist assault against Islam and galvanizing the Islamic world.
That said, the next al Qaeda attack in the United States almost assuredly would be designed to draw Washington deeper into a politico-military conflict, and therefore its impact must be equal to or surpass that of the Sept. 11 attacks. This assessment is not intended to downplay the potential for smaller attacks by groups related to, inspired by or sympathetic to al Qaeda, or by groups or individuals with their own messages to send: The Oklahoma City bombing and the Washington, D.C., sniper case are key examples that, with or without al Qaeda, terrorism and violence occur. But neither of those instances triggered a broad counterstrike by Washington or drew the United States and other nations into an international war.
What this does mean, however, is that al Qaeda is not likely to activate a sleeper cell within the United States to undertake moderately damaging attacks against non-symbolic, soft targets -- such as those that have occurred in places like Turkey -- merely because of antipathy for the United States. This would gain the group nothing in terms of its larger strategic aims, but it would burn valuable assets. It also means that in the next, larger attack, al Qaeda likely will attempt to leave a paper trail back to Yemen, or Pakistan, or again to Saudi Arabia.
Al Qaeda's core strength is secrecy: the ability to plan multinational militant operations and remain below the radar of international intelligence agencies. This requires a very small network and makes the group resource-jealous and risk-averse. Carrying out a small attack in the United States, one with little strategic benefit, undermines the group's ability to launch more substantial attacks without detection. In the past, al Qaeda even has put the kibosh on plans by other militant organizations -- for example, the plan by militants in Singapore to strike at U.S. targets in the island state in the months prior to Sept. 11 -- that would have raised alert levels and undermined the likelihood of success for its own major planned attacks.
The U.S. presidential election, however, presents a unique dilemma for al Qaeda's leadership. On the one hand, President George W. Bush has done nearly everything al Qaeda could have hoped for: He has played to his "cowboy" image overseas, having launched a war in Afghanistan and Iraq. His administration also has detained Muslims indefinitely at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and there is an impression that Bush has gone to war against Islam. Given the view that a John Kerry presidency would be more "multilateral" and less confrontational, al Qaeda likely is weighing whether it really is in its best interest to undermine the Bush presidency with a pre-election attack -- which would repeat what al Qaeda views as a successful strategy in Spain last March.
On the other hand, al Qaeda also recognizes the need to occasionally remind its constituency that the United States, and the Muslim states it protects, remain vulnerable. The Bali bombing and the Madrid attacks were reminders of al Qaeda's continued existence and ability to launch attacks, despite the international war that has been declared against the group. Another strike in the United States -- particularly one against the president, the country's best-guarded asset -- would demonstrate that, whatever the United States does, al Qaeda still has the ability to strike at the very heart of the nation. If a stateless organization such as al Qaeda can do so, what could a reinvigorated caliphate accomplish? - goes the argument.
Though al Qaeda's ultimate goals do not require the destruction of the United States or even the removal of the president -- either through a voter backlash following another attack, or a strike against the person of the president himself -- the real end, change in the Islamic world, does require periodic damage. The issue now is the periodicity. Traditionally, al Qaeda has waited about two years between major attacks. If Bali and Madrid count, al Qaeda is still on target; but if these actions are viewed as simple sideshows, another major strike against the United States or its assets abroad is overdue.
Al Qaeda undoubtedly has operatives in place in the United States. These operatives are trained and might even have a vague knowledge of what their eventual operation would involve. The decision to strike, however, ultimately will hinge on whether it is better for al Qaeda to allow the U.S. elections to run their course without risking valuable assets, or whether the group would derive more benefit by trying to demonstrate its own power within the United States.
The perception that it was responsible for Bush's overthrow would tremendously increase al Qaeda's credibility. But if a Bush re-election seems obvious, not intervening in the polls would leave a valuable tool in place. So would timing a strike sufficiently near the elections, which likely would cause the U.S. populace to rally around the sitting president.
Both courses serve one of al Qaeda's bilateral paths toward its ultimate goal. The paths are complementary but, at times, can be in tension.
Once again, STRATFOR states the obvious with ample doses of verboseness.
Total horse manure. They had a stable base of operations in Afghanistan; is running for their lives in the mountains of Pakistan really better? Is fighting the U.S. in Iraq--a new theater of operations for Al Qaeda--really better than fighting the U.S. in the other theaters (where they no longer challenge the U.S. as they used to)? One imagines Al Qaeda pulling out of Iraq to fight the U.S. in the streets of Mecca, saying, "Allahu Akbar! Now we really have the infidel where we want him!"
The Al Qaeda operatives that have been questioned about Sept. 11th have all said the same thing: they never expected the U.S. to fight back. They really thought we would roll over one more time. If Kerry is elected, that will become a good assumption again.
"Once again, STRATFOR states the obvious with ample doses of verboseness."
These seems almost Kerry-esque. And I think they see Al-Qeda as having more power in the Islamofacist world than they probably do, at least at this point in time. My impression is that "Jihad" is a global movement, but not at all centralized. Much more like the Reformation than the Inquisition. Based on Madrid and the recent cave-in of Manila it seems that the center of World Jihad IS now in Iraq, for good or ill. Now that we've handed over general control to the Iraqis I'd like to think our forces are being re-focussed to hunt down the Al Queda people, or whatever they are, who are calling the shots from there.
Muslims in America better pray nothing happens here in an attempt to disrupt our elections. I don't think the rest of us will stand for that.
Debatable premise. Obviously, they want to take over the entire Middle East, Asia (and Europe), and unifying their people against us would certainly help; although I think you could argue that they were already pretty unified against us, judging by the reaction to 9/11. But if Bush had done nothing, then they would have been unified in the delight of feeling that they had overcome us easily and that we were no threat (which would have been true). And then it would have been no problem for them to swamp certain weaker ME states (probably aided by Saddam, who saw himself as the new Saladin) and then move on with their larger program.
By fighting back, Bush showed them that, first of all, we will fight back, even after years of inaction had made them confident that we wouldn't; and he put other ME countries on notice that we were available to help them fight against AQ, since many of their own rulers and people may not like us, but are not particularly thrilled at the idea of being overthrown by AQ and being part of the "new caliphate."
I think we really had no choice but to fight back, and if we had actually done so long before, we would have had more respect in the ME and much more support, rather than less.
Right.
It really needs to be restated from time to time least we start focusing on the trees and forget the forest.
In other words, they are a central power with a goal of grabbing land. This is a vision of an political power competing with the United States in regional hegemony.
The big question here is: are they? or is al Qaeda really just a bunch of individual, small, decentralized organizations as we have been told in the past?
If they are centralized, who is running the show? In other words, who is sitting in the air conditioned strategic think tank running the war?
How many Muslims have really been vocally against the goals of the Al-Queda? I have heard some protest some of the methods, but the goals?
Why are they voting for Kerry this year?
FYI
(and shameless plug)
Jemaah Islamiyah failing to regroup, attack Southeast Asia, says report
eTaiwan News / AP ^ | 7/25/04
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1178016/posts
Jemaah Islamiyah has tried in the last year to carry out terror attacks in Southeast Asia, but failed because of a lack of funds and support from other militant groups, and an absence of planners among its ranks, officials said.
The al-Qaida-linked organization's ability to mount attacks was severely dented by the arrest of scores of militants after September 11, 2001, including Hambali, the group's alleged operations chief, a Malaysian government official told The Associated Press on Friday.
(snip)
"How many Muslims have really been vocally against the goals of the Al-Queda?"
I think you misread my comment, I said the IslamoFACIST world, I just think AL-Queda isn't like the Don Corleone of these folks, I think the different groups, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Whatever the one in the Philippines is, I can't remember their name, I don't think they all get their marching orders from Osama, they are all making it up as they go along. And probably each group is hoping to be on top after they take over the world.
As for Muslims in general, I'm not sure what to think. Obviously many of them are very oppressed within their society. For some people converting to another religion, or marrying against family wishes may get you ostracized, maybe your family would even act as if you were dead, for Muslims they actually KILL you. So it's hard to tell in a situation like this. However, it amazes me that "feminists" are more concerned about being able to have their unborn children killed upon request than they are about the plight of women subgated by Islam.
Let's face it, Al Queda or no Al Queda, these people are a mess. We could have left them in their mess, but they brought the cr*p over here and killed people because of it. Now, basically, they must be hunted down. Bush is trying to "liberate" them, I have no idea if he will be successful or not. But if we fail in liberating them, we're going to have to subjagate THEM, lest they succeed in subjagating US.
And, per usual, concludes with a resounding "maybe, maybe not."
There's some factoid floating around that OBL actually rebuilt his Kandahar family compound shortly before 9/11, indicating he wasn't too concerned about reprisals.
Yep, we tried ignoring them... it didn't work. Again, the book THE PENTAGON'S NEW MAP is a very good read on the subject.
I think they thought we would have a very limited response or not response at all, and they could use the attack for political purposes within their sphere of influence, as they had the other attacks. Publicizing the attacks normally brought into them new investors and more funding. I think that was their goal. They might have a future plan of a pan-Islamic state, but I think they were planning on doing it one country at a time and starting, not with Saudi Arabia, but with very disconnected countries like: Afghanistan, the Sudan, etc. And that is the evidence we have on the ground. This theory of Stratfor is, well, high conjecture to say the least. I don't think it is an obvious theory at all.
I agree with you, I believe they are nothing more than organized criminals wrapping their actions in a patina of religious rhetoric.
They are actually impractical, they seem to live in a magical world where they believe that if all muslims are united under their wise and benevolent leadership then the Golden Age Of Islam (TM) will miraculously be resurrected. But they don't have anything to say about sewage in the streets, illiteracy in the Arab world or bad dental hygiene or any of the other thousands of things that need to be fixed in the muslim world. As the Iranians are finding out, being a devout muslim won't get you a job.
bump for later.
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