Gen. Giap: Kerry's Group Helped Hanoi Defeat U.S.

www.newsmax.com ^ | Tuesday, Feb. 10, 2004 10:25 PM EST

[InvisibleChurch]

Tuesday, Feb. 10, 2004 10:25 PM EST Gen. Giap: Kerry's Group Helped Hanoi Defeat U.S.

The North Vietnamese general in charge of the military campaign that finally drove the U.S. out of South Vietnam in 1975 credited a group led by Democratic presidential front-runner John Kerry with helping him achieve victory.

In his 1985 memoir about the war, General Vo Nguyen Giap wrote that if it weren't for organizations like Kerry's Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Hanoi would have surrendered to the U.S. - according to Fox News Channel war historian Oliver North.

That's why, he predicted on Tuesday, the Vietnam war issue "is going to blow up in Kerry's face."

"People are going to remember Gen. Giap saying if it weren't for these guys, [Kerry's group], we would have lost," North told radio host Sean Hannity.

"The Vietnam Veterans Against the War encouraged people to desert, encouraged people to mutiny - some used what they wrote to justify fragging officers," noted the former Marine Lieutenant Colonel, who earned two purple hearts in Vietnam.

"John Kerry has blood of American soldiers on his hands," North said.

[Southflanknorthpawsis]

I'm not so sure Kerry can let go of the Vietnam issue since that is about all he's run on during this entire primary.

What do you suppose most uninformed people know about Kerry? My guess is, if asked, their answer would be, "War hero."

[freebilly]

John Freakin' Kerry says you also committed war atrocities, so who am I going to believe? You? Or some scumbag lying POS who actively worked against America 33 years ago...?

[RightOnline]

Like almost any other Democrat.......Kerry is a miserable piece of walking s**t. I don't need further evidence of this.....let alone the memoirs of some N. Vietnamese scumbag general.

[Nick Danger]

Sun-Tzu say:

Lie quietly in weeds until opponent gets nomination. Knock down vulnerable opponents too soon, only invulnerable opponents left."

[ntnychik]

It's Daniel Ortega, of Nicaragua. Here's a thread of Boston Globe photos of Kerry's career. You'll find the pic of Kerry, Ortega and Harkin in Part 6. Click to the second picture. Part 3 has more war pics, Part 4 has ex-wife pics (she looks like him), Part 5 has swell Dukakis and Mondale pics and a great photo of Kerry decorating a needleless tree for Acid Rain activists. Sorry I don't have the ability to post the individual pics. http://www.boston.com/globe/nation/packages/kerry/062003.shtml

[kabar]

Point of order (or something): When Kerry left 'Nam was he discharged ... or was he a reserve officer moved from active to "inactive" status? If a reserve officer would that put his pro-Hanoi activities in a different legal light?

Excellent question. What I find most curious is the fact that Kerry lists in his bio that he served in the Naval Reserves from 1972-78. The questions I would pose about this service are: (1)Did he initiate the request to join the reserves in 1972?; (2) Was he in the active or inactive reserves?; (3) If in the active reserves, would he make his records public? and (4)Why did he join the reserves after castigating the political and military leadership for what amounts to a policy fostering war crimes in 1970-1 and while fighting was still going on in Vietnam?. This seems to be fertile ground for further investigation. I can only surmise that Kerry joined the Naval Reserves after a two year hiatus to build a more acceptable resume to further his political ambitions.

Since Kerry was commissioned in 1966 and served until 1970, I assume he was discharged. I doubt if he would be kept in the inactive reserves until 1978.

[Spiff]

No direct quote, only people quoting him. See http://brianwillson.com/awolkerry.html

This is not THE George S. Patton, Jr., but his son General George S. Patton III. Patton died in 1945.

[Wolverine]

You will want to read this

 

Interesting comments about Uncle Walter and the Media.

 

http://www.11thcavnam.com/education/americanlegion.htm

SPECIAL ISSUE = The American Legion Magazine = September 2003

 

JIM BOHANNON

Syndicated on nearly 500 stations through Westwood One Radio.

 

Excerpt

 

Without doubt, it can be said the enemy viewed reporters as tools for achieving their goal of victory. "Our purpose is, through a progression of all-out attacks, to cause many U.S. casualties and so erode the U.S. will that the antiwar influences will gain decisive political strength," said Pham Van Dong, former prime minister of North Vietnam. Moreover, Ho Chi Minh famously predicted, "For everyone of yours we kill, you will kill 10 of ours. But in the end, it is you who will grow tired."

 

The biggest single question of media influence on the outcome of the Vietnam War centers on the Tet Offensive of Jan. 31, 1968, and ample evidence shows that headlines dealt a lot more with expectations than fact.

[Happy2BMe]

It would be nice to have those links.

[Ben Hecks]

"Since Kerry was commissioned in 1966 and served until 1970, I assume he was discharged. I doubt if he would be kept in the inactive reserves until 1978."

I thought everyone had a minimum 6 year obligation - if so, Kerry would have been in the inactive reserve until 1972. He testified before Congress in 1971 so he would have been subject to military authority at the time. The main issue I have is that he must have known that some of his "band of brothers" were imposters therefore he gave false testimony under oath.

[Wolverine]

Email from a friend

 

Kerry Discussion: Thoughts of a Vietnam POW

by Joe Crecca

28 Jan 04


The rigors and hardships of being a POW aside, I remember the so-called, "Peace Movement," and "Peace Marches and Rallies" that were taking place back home in the USA Our captors were more than willing, within their means, to provide us with any and all anti-US and anti-Vietnam War propaganda. Without a choice in the matter, we listened to the "Voice of Vietnam" broadcasts by, "Hanoi Hannah" and were shown newspaper and magazine photos and articles about those opposing the war back in the States. One of the peace marchers’ standard slogans was to, "Bring our boys home now and, alive." The warped thinking of such people was that by demonstrating against US involvement in Vietnam, they'd be shortening the war and reducing the number of American casualties. These demonstrators would also try to make one believe that their efforts would bring POWs like me home sooner. They were utterly wrong on both counts not to mention the detrimental effect their actions had on the morale of our troops and our POWs.

John F. Kerry was not just one of these demonstrators. He was leading them.

Therefore, these so-called demonstrations for peace had the exact opposite effect of what they were purporting to accomplish. Instead of shortening the war the "So-called Peace Movement" served only to protract the conflict resulting in a vastly greater number of Americans killed and wounded, greater economic burdens and longer periods of incarceration for Americans held captive in Vietnam. The war would have been over much sooner and with a much more favorable result if those in the "So-called Peace Movement" would have instead rallied behind the Commander-in-Chief to accomplish our mission and then, withdraw.

It is inescapable to think of the so-called peace movement and the antiwar demonstrators without also thinking how many fewer names there would now be engraved into the black granite of the Vietnam Wall if these same people had supported our efforts instead of trying to derail them. After all, fighting against a political regime that up to that time had murdered over a hundred million people couldn't have been all bad. But, John F. Kerry thought and acted differently. How many more names on the wall can he take credit for?

After the war ended, some of the war protesters hung on to their antiwar postures for a while. Some of them realized the errors of their ways almost immediately while for others it took twenty to twenty-five years. >p> But some, like John F. Kerry have not realized there was anything wrong with what he did. Instead, he hopes we will see him as a courageous Vietnam veteran. I do not. He hopes we will admire his bravery. I do not. I remember him more for his misdeeds upon his return from Vietnam.

However, in the present political arena, he evidently has succeeded in gaining the support of some well-meaning but misled Americans. Given his past record, it is just astonishing that he has garnered any support from our nation's veterans.

I hope all will reconsider their support for Senator Kerry in light of his actions which were so detrimental to our Vietnam combat soldiers, sailors and airmen many of whom are not here today to tell you themselves.

Thank you for considering my views. Please share what I have written with your fellow vets....

Joe Crecca
Vietnam POW
22NOV66-18FEB73

[Intolerant in NJ]

The North Vietnamese general in charge of the military campaign that finally drove the U.S. out of South Vietnam in 1975...actually, after Tet and especially the calamitous "Easter Offensive" in 1972, Giap was eased out of command and was not in charge of NVN troops at the end (the North Vietnamese knew they were losing the war even if brilliant observers such as Walter Cronkite in this country didn't)...nevertheless, according to Lewis Sorley in his fine book A Better War, After the war Admiral Elmo Zumwalt visited Vietnam and talked with Communist leaders. "General Giap was very clear," said Zumwalt. "They always they had to win it here (in the United States) and the Jane Fondas of this world were of great use to them.".....

[kcvl]

Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap


Born: 1912
Place of Birth: An Xa, Vietnam
Military University: none
Wars Fought:
-World War II
-First Indochina War(French-Indochina War 1946-1954)
-Second Indochina War(Vietnam War 1965-1972)
-Third Indochina War 1979-81
Vietnam War:
Gen. Giap planned and directed the military operations against the French that culminated in their defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. During the 1960's Giap controlled guerrilla operations against South Vietnam and the United States and planned the Tet Offensive of 1968.

In his book, Giap clearly indicated that NVA troops were without sufficient supplies, and had been continually defeated time and again.

By 1968, NVA morale was at it's lowest point ever. The plans for "Tet" '68 was their last desperate attempt to achieve a success, in an effort to boost the NVA morale. When it was over, General Giap and the NVA viewed the Tet '68 offensive as a failure, they were on their knees and had prepared to negotiate a surrender.

At that time, there were fewer than 10,000 U.S. casualties, the Vietnam War was about to end, as the NVA was prepared to accept their defeat. Then, they heard Walter Cronkite (former CBS News anchor and correspondent) on TV proclaiming the success of the Tet '68 offensive by the communist NVA. They were completely and totally amazed at hearing that the US Embassy had been overrun. In reality, The NVA had not gained access to the Embassy--there were some VC who had been killed on the grassy lawn, but they hadn't gained access. Further reports indicated the riots and protesting on the streets of America.

According to Giap, these distorted reports were inspirational to the NVA. They changed their plans from a negotiated surrender and decided instead, they only needed to persevere for one more hour, day, week, month, eventually the protesters in American would help them to achieve a victory they knew they could not win on the battlefield. Remember, this decision was made at a time when the U.S. casualties were fewer than 10,000, at the end of 1967, beginning of 1968.


http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Camp/7624/Generals/giap.htm

[kcvl]

General Vo Nguyen Giap: "Once Again We Will Win"

This excerpt is part of an essay published in a Vietnamese journal in 1966. General Giap was the architect of the North Vietnamese victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The original title was "The Entire People Resolutely and Unanimously Step Up Their Great Patriotic War to Defeat the Aggressors."

The American Imperialists' scheme is to prevent the collapse of the puppet army and administration, to launch offensives aimed at wiping out the revolutionary forces in the South, especially the Liberation Armed Forces, to strive to consolidate the areas still under their control and gradually to carry out pacification by priority sectors, to attack the liberated zones and to wrest back some of the lost areas, to seek every means to encircle and isolate the southern theater. At the same time, they intend to intensify sabotage warfare against the North and carry on deceptive "peace offensives." Banking upon a force of over seven hundred thousand men, to be increased eventually, they hope to realize the above-mentioned scheme by means of more radical and efficacious measures. They reckon that they can gradually win military and political successes, secure a position of strength to end the war with a solution favorable to them, or if need be, to prolong or expand the aggressive war. ...

First of all, the United States imperialists are the enemy not only of the Vietnamese people but also of progressive people throughout the world. In the present situation, whereas the socialist camp is growing, the national liberation movement surging, the workers' movement in the capitalist countries and the movement for peace and democracy developing, the forces of imperialism are continually declining. In the over-all relation of forces in the world the American imperialists are not in a strong but in a weak position and have to scatter their forces to cope with the situation everywhere. That is precisely why they cannot send to South Vietnam whatever number of troops without reckoning with their difficulties in every field in the world, right in the United States, and in the Vietnam theater.

The dispatch of an expeditionary force for the invasion of our country is itself fraught with most fundamental dangers that they cannot overcome. ...

The introduction of American troops into the South aims at preventing the collapse of the puppet army and administration and at creating favorable conditions to consolidate and strengthen the puppet forces. But the United States imperialists openly invade the South of our country at a moment when the puppet army and administration are seriously weakening. At this point, the more open is the United States aggression, the more isolated and differentiated the puppet army and administration, and the sharper the contradictions between the United States imperialists and their placemen. Those people in the puppet army and administration who still have some national feeling will become more conscious of the real situation, and the number of those who cross over to the people's side will increase. Consequently, the introduction of more United States troops, far from retrieving the predicament of the puppet army and administration, aggravates the mercenary army's destruction and disintegration, and the puppet administration's collapse in the face of our people's resistance. When the American imperialists' crack troops are defeated by our people, the disintegration and collapse of the puppet army and administration will be all the more inevitable.

The strong points of the United States imperialists are limited, whereas their weak points are basic ones. As the aggressive war goes on, the latter will become more visible and more serious and will surely lead the American imperialists to ignominious failure.

Above are the American imperialists' strong and weak points after some hundred thousand enemy troops have been introduced into South Vietnam. On our side, we do not enjoy the advantages attached to a country with a wide territory and a large population, but our people are resolved to carry on their just patriotic war to defend our life and wrest back our independence and freedom. In this fierce and protracted revolutionary war against such a cruel enemy as American imperialism, our force has developed unremittingly and has many a time put him into confusion. Weak in equipment and technique and in economic potential, we have absolute political and moral superiority, a correct leadership, the strength of an entirely united people, the invincible people's war, and the sympathy and strong support of people throughout the world. It is certain that, as we fight, we will score ever greater victories and become stronger. These are the fundamental factors accounting for our people's final victory in the sacred liberation war for national salvation against United States aggression. Whatever the number of expeditionary troops that the aggressors may bring in, they can in no way escape the inevitable: they will be defeated; the ultimate victory will be ours.

First, our Party has a correct revolutionary line. This line is the condensed expression of the clever and creative combination of Marxist-Leninist general principles with the correct practice of our revolution. This is the line of the people's national democratic revolution progressing to socialism in a former colonial and semi-feudal country. Our Party's line has been tested in our people's long and heroic revolutionary struggle and has led our revolution from one victory to another. In the light of this line, Vietnam has been the first colony to rise up and defeat the mighty army of an imperialist power-France-to liberate itself, the North of our country is also the first state to take the path of socialism in Southeast Asia. ...

Our compatriots in the South have closed their ranks in the fire of the revolutionary struggle, fighting for twenty years, now overcoming countless difficulties and braving a cruel enemy with a fin-n resolve to march forward, to fight, and to win. Today our people in the South have the National Liberation Front, a broad organization with a correct line and a program which enjoys great prestige at home and abroad. Starting the fight with spikeboards and mantislike guns, they have built big and heroic Liberation Armed Forces comprising three categories of troops, having high combativeness, skillful strategy and tactics, versed both in guerrilla warfare and large-unit operations and credited with wiping out big units of the puppet and American forces. The heroic Liberation Armed Forces have developed everywhere and have been conducting ever more powerful operations throughout the South Vietnam theater, from the Ben Hal River to Ca Mau Cape, from the Western Plateaus to the delta countryside and even in the vicinity of big towns. At present the liberated zone accounts for the majority of the population and territory of the South; the Front's policies are being gradually applied there, a new life under an independent and democratic regime is being built, and, in fact, the liberated zone has become the image of tomorrow's entirely liberated South Vietnam.

Meanwhile, the people in the North are steadily progressing to socialism with an ardent love for the fatherland and for socialism and with an unprecedented political and moral unity. The North, thanks to its excellent political system and its strong economic and national defense potential, is not only a source of inspiration but also a solid rear for our entire people's struggle for national salvation against the United States imperialists. This is a favorable condition which did not exist in our former resistance against the French colonialists.

Since the extension of the war to the North, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's army and people have been resolutely fighting and have initially foiled the enemy's sabotage air warfare. In response to the call of the Party Central Committee, the government, and President Ho Chi Minh, our people in the North have launched a strong movement for national salvation, carrying out production and fighting at the same time to defend the North, give wholehearted and all-out support to the liberation revolution in the South, and make a substantial contribution to the common victory of the whole nation.

The Vietnamese people have a tradition of unity and unbending resistance against foreign invasion, but if we look back to its millenary history as well as to the revolutionary struggle of the past many years, we shall realize that never have they united so firmly and so broadly as today, and never has their will to fight off the aggressors and defend the country been promoted to such a degree.

In our country, people's war has developed according to the general laws of all revolutionary wars and also to the specific laws of the Vietnamese society and theater of operations. Hence, it is a revolutionary war waged by a whole people on all planes, a revolutionary war fought by a small nation in a narrow and thinly populated country, having an underdeveloped economy, relying on the strength of an entire people united in the struggle. With it the people will finally beat an enemy originally many times stronger.

Generally speaking, people's war in Vietnam is revolutionary armed struggle developing on the basis of the political struggle of the masses brought to a high level. The boundless strength of the revolutionary masses has pervaded the revolutionary armed forces and has given them an extraordinary capacity to fight and to win. Moreover, the outstanding characteristic of people's war in our country at the present stage is that, in its very process, armed struggle and political struggle are very closely coordinated, supporting and stimulating each other. ...

[kcvl]

002438 GIAP, GENERAL VO NGUYEN Big Victory Great Task: North Viet-Nam`s Minister of Defense Assesses the Course of the War, , , .

[WorkingClassFilth]

I've got a copy of Giap's book right here.

It is actually a reprint of an extended article entitled 'Great Victory of the Spring 1975 General Offensive and Uprising' published in the Vietnamese papers 'Nhan Dan' and 'Quan Doi Nhan' on June 31 and July 1, 1975. The English translation appeared in an article entitled 'A New Development of the Art of Leading a Revolutionary War' in the Vietnam Courier of August and September of 1975.

The book form is titled: 'How We Won The War' by Generals Vo Nguyen Giap & Van Tien Dung, 1976, RECON Publications.

It is in the intoduction by Danny Schechter (a news director for WBCN-FM in BOSTON), that the clear observation is made that "There will be plenty of postmortems to come on how and why the U.S. lost Indochina. It might be more interesting to think about how the people won Indochina -- and how the anti-war movement helped them do it." (p.12)

Later on he states that "Most importantly, the [North] Vietnamese reached out to the American people...I realized how heroic it was when I met some of the victims of out own bombing and heard them transcend blind rage in order to send greetings to the American anti-war movement. Politically, the Vietnamese always believed in the importance of the anti-war movement, small and impotent as it may have appeared to some of its supporters. They encouraged it as best they could, knowing that creating a climate of opinion hostile to the war would be one important way of ending it. In the end, their victory was accelerated by Congress' refusal to vote more aid. That refusal was a response to a climate of public opinion which the anti-war movement helped forge." (p.18)

Note that Giap is not the speaker of these thoughts. Aside from these introductory remarks, Giap, himself, says nothing specifically about the anti-war movement in America. He speaks in generalities about "flexible forces...fighting over decades...mass mobilization...striking the vital points of the enemy at the favorable moment".

In the book 'The Tunnels of Cu Chi' the french author interviewed NVA and VC commanders in the South after the war. As I recall, they spoke clearly about the needed role of the anti-war movement to put pressure on when they were suffering under the bombings and the pressure of U.S. ground forces. They would simply connect with their agents in the anti-war movement, drum up a protest or riot and the heat would drop off. I'll look around and see if I can dig up that book and the relevant passages.

BTW, Kerry still sucks and I consider his service record null and void. When he repudiated his service himself by disrespecting his nation, its soldiers and the symbols of its respect for him (the medals), his record became a moot point. Kerry, and his vaunted record, blow - big time.

[kcvl]

Giap of course, is a legend, with a larger-than-life image which the party and State in Hanoi, as well as the world's press, have enthusiastically contributed.

[kcvl]

Interview with Vo Nguyen Giap
Viet Minh Commander

Q: Was Diên Bin Phû a conventional military victory or was it a victory for military warfare?

Giap: The victory at Diên Bin Phû was a victory for the people. But then, of course, while the concept of a people's war and guerrilla warfare are not entirely separate, they are separate nonetheless. In this case, it was the people's war that was victorious. And guerrilla warfare was one aspect of that people's war. It's all quite complicated.... What is the people's war? Well, in a word, it's a war fought for the people by the people, whereas guerrilla warfare is simply a combat method. The people's war is more global in concept. It's a synthesized concept. A war which is simultaneously military, economic and political, and is what we in France would call "synthesized." There's guerrilla warfare and there's large-scale tactical warfare, fought by large units.

Q: What was new about the idea of the "People's War"?

Giap: It was a war for the people by the people. FOR the people because the war's goals are the people's goals -- goals such as independence, a unified country, and the happiness of its people.... And BY the people -- well that means ordinary people -- not just the army but all people.

We know it's the human factor, and not material resources, which decide the outcome of war. That's why our people's war, led by Ho Chi Minh, was on such a large scale. It took in the whole population.


Q: What do you think about the significance of Diên Bin Phû for the world?

Giap: The history of the Vietnamese people goes back thousands of years. During that time we've repelled thousands of invaders. Only, in former times the countries that tried to invade us were on the same economic level as we were. Theirs, like ours, was a feudal society. That was the case, for example, when we fought the Chinese in the 13th century. But Diên Bin Phû was a victory in another era. What I mean is that in the latter half of the 19th century, when western imperialism divided the world into colonies, a new problem emerged. How could a weak, economically backwards people ever hope to regain its freedom? How could it hope to take on a modern western army, backed by the resources of a modern capitalist state? And that's why it took us 100 years to fight off the French and French imperialism. Diên Bin Phû was the first great decisive victory after 100 years of war against French imperialism and U.S. interventionism. That victory that put an end to the war and marked the end of French aggression. From an international point of view, it was the first great victory for a weak, colonized people struggling against the full strength of modern Western forces. This is why it was the first great defeat for the West. It shook the foundations of colonialism and called on people to fight for their freedom -- it was the beginning of international civilization.

Q: Was Diên Bin Phû an easy victory because the French made so many mistakes?

Giap: It's not as simple as that. We believed that in the French camp, French general staff and the military chiefs were well informed. They'd weighed up the pros and cons, and according to their forecasts, Diên Bin Phû was impregnable. It has to be said that at the beginning of the autumn of '53, for example, when our political headquarters were planning our autumn and winter campaigns, there was no mention of Diên Bin Phû. Why? Because, the Navarre plan didn't mention it either. They had a whole series of maneuvers planned.

For us, the problem was that Navarre wanted to retain the initiative whereas we wanted to seize it. There is a contradiction that exists in a war of aggression whereby you have to disperse your forces to occupy a territory but rally your mobile forces for offensive action. We took advantage of this contradiction and forced Navarre to disperse his forces. That's how it all started. We ordered our troops to advance in a number of directions, directions of key importance to the enemy although their presence wasn't significant. So the enemy had no choice but to disperse their troops. We sent divisions north, northwest, toward the center, towards Laos; other divisions went in other directions. So to safeguard Laos and the northwest, Navarre had to parachute troops into Diên Bin Phû, and that's what happened at Diên Bin Phû. Before then, no one had heard of Diên Bin Phû. But afterwards, well that's history, isn't it? French General Staff only planned to parachute in sufficient troops to stop us advancing on the northwest and Laos. Little by little, they planned to transform Diên Bin Phû into an enormous concentration camp, a fortified camp, the most powerful in Indochina. They planned to draw our forces, break us, crush us, but the opposite took place. They'd wanted a decisive battle and that's exactly what they got at Diên Bin Phû -- except that it was decisive for the Vietnamese and not for the French.

Q: Before Diên Bin Phû, do you think the French ever imagined you could defeat them?

Giap: Well, everyone at Diên Bin Phû, from the French generals and representatives of the French government to the American generals and the commanding admiral of the Pacific Fleet, agreed that Diên Bin Phû was impregnable. Everyone agreed that it was impossible to take. The French and then the Americans underestimated our strength. They had better weapons and enormous military and economic potential. They never doubted that victory would be theirs. And yet, just when the French believed themselves to be on the verge of victory, everything collapsed around them. The same happened to the Americans in the Spring of '65. Just when Washington was about to proclaim victory in the South, the Americans saw their expectations crumble. Why? Because it wasn't just an army they were up against but an entire people -- an entire people.

So the lesson is that however great the military and economic potential of your adversary, it will never be great enough to defeat a people united in the struggle for their fundamental rights. That's what we've learned from all this.

Q: Why was the National Liberation Front so successful in expanding the areas it controlled between 1960 and 1965?

Giap: Throughout our long history, whenever we've felt ourselves to be threatened by the enemy, our people have closed in the ranks. Millions of men, united, have called for "Unification above all," for "Victory above all".... The National Liberation Front was victorious because it managed to unite most of the people and because its politics were just.

Q: Did you change your tactics at all when the American troops began to arrive after 1965?

Giap: Of course, but even so, it was still a people's war. And, a people's war is characterized by a strategy that is more than simply military. There's always a synthesized aspect to the strategy, too. Our strategy was at once military, political, economic, and diplomatic, although it was the military component which was the most important one.

In a time of war, you have to take your lead from the enemy. You have to know your enemy well. When your enemy changes his strategy or tactics, you have to do the same. In every war, a strategy is always made up of a number of tactics that are considered to be of great strategic importance, so you have to try to smash those tactics. If we took on the cavalry, for example, we'd do everything we could to smash that particular tactic. It was the same when the enemy made use of strategic weapons.... And, when the Americans tried to apply their "seek and destroy" tactic, we responded with our own particular tactic that was to make their objective unattainable and destroy them instead. We had to...force the enemy to fight the way we wanted them to fight. We had to force the enemy to fight on unfamiliar territory.

Q: Was your Têt offensive in 1968 a failure?

Giap: As far as we're concerned, there's no such thing as a purely military strategy. So it would be wrong to speak of Têt in purely military terms. The offensive was three things at the same time: military, political, and diplomatic. The goal of the war was de-escalation. We were looking to de-escalate the war. Thus, it would have been impossible to separate our political strategy from our military strategy. The truth is that we saw things in their entirety and knew that in the end, we had to de-escalate the war. At that point, the goal of the offensive was to try to de-escalate the war.

Q: And did the de-escalation succeed?

Giap: Your objective in war can either be to wipe out the enemy altogether or to leave their forces partly intact but their will to fight destroyed. It was the American policy to try and escalate the war. Our goal in the '68 offensive was to force them to de-escalate, to break the American will to remain in the war....

We did this by confronting them with repeated military, as well as political and diplomatic victories. By bringing the war to practically all the occupied towns, we aimed to show the Americans and the American people that it would be impossible for them to continue with the war. Essentially, that's how we did it.

Q: You are familiar with those famous pictures of April 1975, of American helicopters flying away from the American Embassy. What do those pictures mean to you?

Giap: It was as we expected. It marked the end of the American neo-colonial presence in our country. And, it proved that when a people are united in their fight for freedom, they will always be victorious.

When I was young, I had a dream that one day I'd see my country free and united. That day, my dream came true. When the political bureau reunited Hanoi with Laos, there were first reports of evacuation. Then the Saigon government capitulated. It was like turning the page on a chapter of history. The streets in Hanoi were full of people.

The pictures of the helicopters were, in one way, a concrete symbol of the victory of the People's war against American aggression. But, looked at another way, it's proof that the Pentagon could not possibly predict what would happen. It revealed the sheer impossibility for the Americans to forecast the outcome. Otherwise, they would have planned things better, wouldn't they.

The reality of history teaches us that not even the most powerful economic and military force can overcome a resistance of a united people, a people united in their struggle for their international rights. There is a limit to power. I think the Americans and great superpowers would do well to remember that while their power may be great, it is inevitably limited.... Since the beginning of time, whether in a socialist or a capitalist country, the things you do in the interests of the people stand you in good stead, while those which go against the interest of the people will eventually turn against you. History bears out what I say.

We were the ones who won the war and the Americans were the ones who were defeated, but let's be precise about this. What constitutes victory? The Vietnamese people never wanted war; they wanted peace. Did the Americans want war? No, they wanted peace, too. So, the victory was a victory for those people in Vietnam and in the USA who wanted peace. Who, then, were the ones defeated? Those who were after aggression at any price. And that's why we're still friends with the people of France and why we've never felt any enmity for the people of America....

Q: Who invented the idea of People's war? Whose idea was it originally?

Giap: It was originally a product of the creative spirit of the people. Let me tell you the legend of Phu Dong...which everyone here knows well. It's a legend set in prehistoric times. The enemy was set to invade, and there was a three-year-old boy called Phu Dong who was growing visibly bigger by the minute. He climbed on to an iron horse and, brandishing bamboo canes as weapons, rallied the people. The peasants, the fisherman, everyone answered his call, and they won the war. It's just a legend and like popular literature, the content is legendary, but it still reflects the essence of the people's thinking. So, popular warfare existed even in legends, and it remained with us over the centuries.

Q: Why do you think Vietnam is almost the only country in the world that has defeated America? Why only Vietnam?

Giap: Speaking as a historian, I'd say that Vietnam is rare. As a nation, Vietnam was formed very early on. It is said that, in theory, a nation can only be formed after the arrival of Capitalism -- according to Stalin's theory of the formation of nations, for instance. But, our nation was formed very early, before the Christian era. Why? Because the risk of aggression from outside forces led all the various tribes to band together. And then there was the constant battle against the elements, against the harsh winter conditions that prevail here. In our legends, this struggle against the elements is seen as a unifying factor, a force for national cohesion. This, combined with the constant risk of invasion, made for greater cohesion and created a tradition -- a tradition that gave us strength.

The Vietnamese people in general tend to be optimistic. Why? Because they've been facing up to vicissitudes for thousands of years, and for thousands of years they've been overcoming them.

Q: What was the contribution of Marxism and Leninism to your theory of a People's War?

The People's War in Vietnam pre-dated the arrival of Marxism and Leninism, both of which contributed something when they did arrive, of course.

When the USSR collapsed, we predicted that 60 to 80 percent of our imports and exports budget would be eliminated because we depended upon aid from the USSR and other socialist countries. So people predicted the collapse of Vietnam. Well, we're still hanging on and slowly making progress. I was asked what I thought of Perestroika, so I answered that I agreed with the change and thought it was necessary in political relations. But Perestroika is a Russian word, made for the Russians. Here we do things the Vietnamese way. And we make the most of our hopes and the hopes of those in Russia, China, the USA, Japan, Great Britain -- but we try to assimilate them all.

As I mentioned, the Vietnamese people have an independent spirit, stubborn people, I suppose, who do things the Vietnamese way. So now the plan is to mobilize the entire population in the fight against backwardness and misery. While there are the problems of war and the problems of peace, there are also concrete laws, social laws, great laws, which retain their value whether in peace or war. You have to be realistic. You have to have a goal. You have to be a realist and use reality as a means of analyzing the object laws which govern things. To win, you have to act according to these laws. If you do the opposite, you're being subjective and you're bound to lose. So, we learn from the experience, both good and bad, of Capitalism. But, we have our own Vietnamese idea on things. I'd like to add that we are still for independence, that we still follow the path shown us by Ho Chi Minh, the path of independence and Socialism. I'm still a Socialist but what is Socialism? It's independence and unity for the country. It's the freedom and well-being of the people who live there. And, it's peace and friendship between all men.

[jamaly]

Patriotic Bump!!!

[kcvl]

How We Won the War
by Vo Nguyen Giap


Overblown rhetoric, but insightful, April 30, 2001
Reviewer: JJ Timmins (see more about me) from Gaithersburg, MD United States


In this book, North Vietnam's head commie General, Vo Nguyen Giap, (Vo Nu-en Yap) raps a bunch of nationalistic commie rhetoric as he explains how North Vietnam reunited with South Vietnam.

It's insightful because it shows the head commie general's strategy for the war. For one, they knew the US was 10,000 miles away. They 'bled' the US to death, knowing they could lose 10 Vietnamese for every American, and they'd still win. They also persuaded the US press to their side, and the US countryside was rife with their political organizers.

I'm not choosing sides in this review, but Giap fails to talk about how most of his units were usually completely wiped out anytime they confronted the US military head-on. But wars are fought on political levels as well as military, and that's where they won. This knowledge is what the book will give you, if you can read past the weird translation and Giap's constant rhetoric. You can have the strongest, best military on the planet and still lose if your country's politicos fail you, and the domestic front doesn't have the 'national will' to back you up.

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0916894010/103-8279953-7761429?v=glance