Everything we know about sickly Putin’s health from ‘jelly legs to cancer’ as Zelensky says it’s FACT Vlad will die soon

VLADIMIR Putin is clinging to power as rumours swirl that he’s dying from a cocktail of illnesses, with Volodymyr Zelensky saying it's a fact that he will die soon.

The Ukrainian President made the blunt prediction during a speech in Paris, standing alongside French leader Emmanuel Macron as he urged the West to “stay strong” and not ease pressure on Russia.

Zelensky said: “He [Putin] will die soon, and that’s a fact, and it will come to an end.”

The bold claim adds fuel to long-swirling speculation that the 72-year-old tyrant's grip on power may be slipping – not just politically, but physically.

A string of bizarre public appearances and leaked intelligence have been raising alarm bells over the Russian leader’s health.

From trembling 'jelly' legs and bloated features to whispered diagnoses of cancer and Parkinson’s, speculation has exploded that the ageing despot is battling multiple serious illnesses behind the Kremlin walls.

Expert in Russian politics, Dr Stephen Hall, told The Sun: "There's been rumours of Putin being unwell since the mid 2000s if not earlier.

"There are lots of possible theories as to what's been going on in terms of how the Kremlin hides it."

From GROK:

Why haven’t Russian troops been able to conquer Chasiv Yar in Ukraine even though it’s close to Bakhmut which was captured by Russian troops led by Yevgeny Prigozhin almost 2 years ago?

Russian troops have struggled to conquer Chasiv Yar, despite its proximity to Bakhmut (captured in May 2023), due to a combination of geographic, tactical, and logistical challenges, as well as determined Ukrainian resistance. Here’s an analysis of the key reasons:

Chasiv Yar’s elevated terrain provides a significant defensive advantage. Positioned on high ground west of Bakhmut, the town overlooks lower-lying areas, giving Ukrainian forces a vantage point to direct artillery fire and monitor Russian movements. The Siverskyi Donets–Donbas Canal, running through the eastern part of the town, acts as a natural barrier, complicating Russian advances. This canal separates most of Chasiv Yar from its eastern “Kanal” microdistrict, creating a choke point that Ukrainian troops have exploited to slow Russian assaults.

Ukrainian forces have also heavily fortified the area. After losing Bakhmut, Chasiv Yar became a critical defensive stronghold, with prepared positions that have been reinforced over time. These defenses have allowed Ukraine to repel repeated Russian attacks, even as Russia has deployed substantial manpower and resources. The town’s role as a logistical hub—previously supporting Bakhmut and now protecting supply lines to cities like Kramatorsk and Sloviansk—has made it a priority for Ukraine to hold, further bolstering its resistance.

Russian tactics and resource limitations have hindered their progress. Following the capture of Bakhmut, which relied heavily on Wagner Group mercenaries under Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russia shifted focus to other fronts, notably Avdiivka, captured in February 2024 after a costly campaign. This diversion delayed a concentrated push on Chasiv Yar until April 2024, when Russia launched its first major assault on the town. However, the grinding attrition seen in Bakhmut—where Wagner used waves of poorly trained recruits—has been less effective against Chasiv Yar’s fortified positions. Russian forces have faced high casualties, with reports indicating they outnumber Ukrainian troops significantly (sometimes 10-to-1 in certain sectors), yet struggle to translate this into decisive gains due to Ukraine’s effective use of artillery, drones, and counterattacks.

Logistical and morale issues have compounded Russia’s difficulties. The intense fighting in eastern Ukraine has stretched Russian supply lines, and delays in Western aid to Ukraine earlier in 2024 were not enough to give Russia a lasting edge—aid resumed, bolstering Ukrainian defenses. Internal Russian setbacks, such as the Wagner mutiny in June 2023 and subsequent integration of its forces into the regular army, may have disrupted cohesion and momentum in the region.

As of early 2025, Russia controls roughly 40% of Chasiv Yar, primarily east of the canal, but progress has stalled in the town center. Both sides are locked in a war of attrition, with mutual artillery barrages and drone strikes dominating the battlefield. Ukraine’s strategy of exhausting Russian forces, combined with the town’s defensible features, has prevented a swift conquest despite Bakhmut’s fall nearly two years ago. The battle remains a testament to the slow, costly nature of the conflict in this region.

From GROK:

Why did Russia withdraw their Black Sea fleet from their ports in Crimea?

Russia withdrew its Black Sea Fleet from ports in Crimea primarily due to sustained and effective Ukrainian military pressure, particularly through the use of drones and missile strikes. Ukrainian forces, despite lacking a traditional navy, have employed innovative tactics such as sea drones and long-range missiles to target Russian naval assets in and around Crimea. These attacks have damaged or destroyed a significant portion of the fleet, including warships and submarines, making it increasingly untenable for Russia to maintain its naval presence in the region.

The port of Sevastopol, a key base for the Black Sea Fleet, has been a focal point of these Ukrainian operations. Repeated strikes have forced Russia to relocate many of its surviving ships to safer harbors, such as Novorossiysk on the Russian mainland, further east in the Black Sea. This relocation reflects a strategic retreat to protect assets from Ukraine’s growing capability to strike deep into Russian-controlled territory. The shift has been acknowledged by Russian officials and is seen as a response to the fleet becoming vulnerable to Ukraine’s asymmetric warfare tactics, which have disrupted Moscow’s ability to control the western Black Sea and its vital shipping lanes.

From GROK:

Why wasn’t Russia able to conquer the Ukrainian city of Odesa in their attempted invasion of Ukraine?

Russia’s inability to conquer Odesa during its invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022, can be attributed to a combination of strategic, logistical, and military factors. Odesa, a major port city on the Black Sea, was a significant target due to its economic importance and its role in Ukraine’s maritime trade. However, several key elements thwarted Russian efforts to seize it.

First, Ukraine mounted a fierce and well-coordinated defense. Ukrainian forces, bolstered by local volunteers and territorial defense units, were highly motivated to protect Odesa, a culturally and historically significant city. They fortified the coastline with trenches, mines, and anti-ship defenses, anticipating a potential amphibious assault from the Black Sea, where Russia’s navy had a presence. This preparation made any direct landing risky and costly for Russian troops.

Second, Russia faced logistical challenges. After initial gains in southern Ukraine, such as capturing Kherson, Russian forces struggled to maintain momentum. Their supply lines became overstretched, and advancing toward Odesa required navigating difficult terrain and urban areas where Ukrainian resistance could exploit defensive advantages. The Russian military’s broader logistical woes—evident across the conflict—hampered their ability to sustain a push toward Odesa.

Third, Ukraine’s use of naval and anti-ship capabilities disrupted Russian plans. The sinking of the Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, in April 2022 by Ukrainian Neptune missiles was a major blow. This loss weakened Russia’s ability to project power over the Black Sea and support an amphibious operation against Odesa. Additionally, Ukraine’s deployment of drones and other asymmetric tactics kept Russian naval forces at bay, preventing them from staging a landing or bombarding the city effectively.

Finally, Russia’s strategic priorities shifted as the war progressed. Early ambitions of a swift, sweeping victory gave way to a focus on consolidating control in eastern Ukraine, particularly the Donbas region. Odesa, while valuable, was not as immediately critical to Russia’s revised objectives, leading to a reallocation of resources away from the southern coast.

In short, Ukraine’s determined resistance, effective use of anti-ship weaponry, and Russia’s logistical and strategic missteps ensured that Odesa remained out of Moscow’s grasp. The city’s defenses held firm, and Russia never managed to launch a serious ground or amphibious assault to take it.

From GROK:

Why has Russia not been able to conquer more than 20 percent of Ukraine even though their invasion started more than 3 years ago?

Russia’s inability to conquer more than approximately 20% of Ukraine since its full-scale invasion began on February 24, 2022, stems from a combination of strategic miscalculations, logistical challenges, fierce Ukrainian resistance, and international support for Ukraine. Here’s a breakdown of the key reasons:

1. **Underestimation of Ukrainian Resistance**: Russia anticipated a swift victory, expecting to seize Kyiv within days and install a pro-Russian government. However, Ukraine mounted a robust defense, bolstered by high morale, national unity, and effective leadership. Ukrainian forces, including regular troops and territorial defense units, disrupted Russia’s initial plans, forcing a retreat from northern Ukraine, including areas around Kyiv, by April 2022.

2. **Poor Russian Military Planning and Execution**: Russia’s invasion suffered from flawed assumptions and inadequate preparation. The initial assault relied on a relatively small force—estimated at 190,000 troops—spread across multiple fronts, which diluted its effectiveness against Ukraine’s larger and more determined military. Logistical failures, such as shortages of fuel, food, and ammunition, hampered Russian advances, while low troop morale and inexperienced conscripts further weakened their campaign.

3. **Terrain and Defensive Advantages**: Ukraine’s vast geography—over 600,000 square kilometers—presented a challenge for Russia. Much of the terrain, including urban centers and fortified positions in the east, favored defenders. Ukrainian forces capitalized on this, using agile tactics and Western-supplied weapons like Javelin anti-tank missiles and NLAW systems to inflict heavy losses on Russian armored units.

4. **Western Military and Economic Support**: Ukraine has received significant aid from the United States, NATO countries, and other allies, totaling over $118 billion from the U.S. alone by early 2025, alongside substantial European contributions. This aid included advanced weaponry—artillery, drones, HIMARS rocket systems, and, later, ATACMS missiles—that enabled Ukraine to target Russian supply lines and blunt offensives. Sanctions on Russia also strained its economy and military-industrial capacity, limiting its ability to sustain a prolonged war.

5. **Russian Manpower and Resource Constraints**: Despite its larger population and military budget, Russia has struggled with manpower shortages. High casualty rates—estimated at over 750,000 by early 2025, including 120,000 to 200,000 deaths—forced the Kremlin to rely on reluctant conscripts, reservists, and irregular units like the Wagner Group. A partial mobilization in September 2022 and increased recruitment bounties failed to fully address these losses, while the exodus of over a million Russians has exacerbated a brain drain and labor shortage.

6. **Shift to a War of Attrition**: After failing to achieve rapid territorial gains, Russia adjusted its goals to focus on the Donbas region and southern Ukraine. However, Ukraine’s counteroffensives in Kharkiv (September 2022) and Kherson (November 2022) reclaimed significant territory, reducing Russia’s peak control of 27% down to around 18-20%. The war has since devolved into a grinding stalemate, with Russia making slow, costly advances in the east but unable to break through Ukraine’s fortified lines decisively.

7. **Adaptability of Ukrainian Forces**: Ukraine has demonstrated tactical flexibility, leveraging drones, precision strikes, and cross-border operations—like the 2024 Kursk incursion—to expose Russian vulnerabilities. This adaptability contrasts with Russia’s reliance on outdated Soviet-style tactics and its inability to secure air superiority, limiting its offensive potential.

In essence, Russia’s failure to conquer more of Ukraine reflects a mix of its own strategic and operational shortcomings and Ukraine’s unexpectedly resilient defense, amplified by international backing. Three years into the conflict, Russia’s gains remain limited to roughly one-fifth of Ukraine, far short of its original ambitions, as the war continues to drain both sides.

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.