80th Anniversary: The Battle of Midway

In late December 1941, Navy Secretary Frank Knox and FDR met and selected Chester Nimitz to command the Pacific Fleet, which at that time the public perceived as residing at the bottom of Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt said, “Tell Nimitz to get the hell out to Pearl and stay there until the war is won”. Knox informed Nimitz by saying, “You’re going to take command of the Pacific Fleet, and I think you will be gone a long time”.

On Christmas Day 1941 Admiral Chester Nimitz arrived by Catalina flying boat to take command. He did not bring any staff with him. When the door opened, he was assailed by a poisonous atmosphere from black oil, charred wood, burned paint, and rotting flesh. The boat ride to shore engulfed the party in the panorama of sunken hulls and floating wreckage, punctuated by the bodies of dead sailors still surfacing from the blasted ships.

He spent the first days learning everything he could about his new assignment and confirmed the general perception was wrong. The dry-docks, repair shops, and fuel tank farm were intact. The carriers with their escorts, and the submarines stood ready to take the offensive. The war against the Japanese would begin in Hawaii and not on the West Coast. He immediately sent submarines into Japanese waters and conducted carrier operations disrupting Japanese Initiatives. Admiral Raymond Spruance said of Nimitz, “The one big thing about him was that he was always ready to fight….And he wanted officers who would push the fight to the Japanese”.

Nimitz decided some particularly good men had taken a terrible beating and were now suffering terrible reminders and apprehensions. When he officially took command December 31, he told the assembled staffs he had complete and unlimited confidence in every one of them. He related that as head of officer personnel in Washington, he knew they had been selected for their competence. But if any wanted to leave, he would individually discuss their futures and do all he could to get them the assignments they wanted.

However, there were a few key staff members he wanted to stay with him. They included Commander Joe Rochefort, Jr., and Captain Edwin T. Layton. There intelligence unit had not unscrambled the new Japanese call signs or broken into the revised naval code to warn of the Pearl Harbor attack. However, these men later provided the key intelligence convincing Nimitz to hazard all his carriers at Midway.

For the Japanese, the battle for Midway was part of their strategy for establishing the next line of their Pacific Ocean defensive parameter. They intended to conquer Port Moresby in New Guinea, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia, and the Western Aleutians. Thereby, Australia would be severed as a base for an American counter-offensive and the northern flank of the Home Islands would be protected. Specifically, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto considered this initiative would provide the opportunity to draw out Nimitz for the decisive naval battle contemplated by American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan.

This sea fight began with Chester Nimitz determined to meet the enemy in a major battle, but he faced long odds. Solid intelligence had discerned a complex plan disbursing Japanese forces, but Nimitz still had to consider the information could be a ruse, because the basic principle of U.S. intelligence was that an enemy will act according to the best use of their capabilities. For Nimitz that meant giving weight to concentration as the best option. He was also troubled by the uncertainty of locating enemy dispositions expected because of storms west and northwest of Midway. In fact, weather was to play an important part in hiding Japanese carriers from detection. Both sides experienced Horatio Nelson’s admonition that “something must be left to chance; nothing is certain in a sea fight”.

His final instructions to admirals Raymond Spruance and Frank Fletcher were, “In carrying out the task assigned in Op Plan 29-42, you will be governed by the principle of calculated risk, which you will interpret to mean the avoidance of exposure of your force to attack by superior enemy forces without the prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the enemy”.

To understand Nimitz’s and the flyers tenuous position consider that gathering every available U.S. Navy ship achieved an order of battle for Midway, where they might be outnumbered more than three to one. Author Gordon W. Prange compiled the order of battle for the navies. The Japanese had 4 heavy carriers, 2 light carriers, 11 battleships, 10 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, and 53 destroyers for a total of 86 ships. The United States had 3 carriers no light carriers or battleships, 6 heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and seventeen destroyers or a total of 27 ships.

To balance the odds somewhat Nimitz had decided to make Midway Island his fourth aircraft carrier and sent every aircraft under his control forward. He crowded the island with 115 aircraft, including the untried B-17 & B-26 bombers and the obsolete Vindicator dive bombers & Brewster Buffalo fighters. The Army contributed had their bombers but retained fighters to defend the Hawaiian Islands.

This abbreviated narrative now excludes the contribution of thousands, whose combined efforts provided the vital margin needed for victory. Preparing Midway for invasion and assembling the carrier task forces at point “Luck” to attack the Japanese required prodigious achievements in logistics, ship repair, and inspired assessments of naval intelligence. This narrative also does not describe how paying the more bitter price for mistakes in strategic planning, tactical execution, and operational doctrines contributed heavily to the Japanese defeat. Instead, the narrative relates the fearful sacrifice of a few brave men, who in close combat attacked the four heavy carriers of the First Carrier Striking Force on June 4, 1942.

The Japanese transport group was discovered on June 3, but the next morning the curtain rose for the carrier battle. At 5:30AM the PBY patrol by Lieutenant Howard Ady radioed discovery of the Japanese carriers. Fifteen minutes later the PBY patrol by Lieutenant William Chase radioed in the clear, “Many planes headed Midway. Bearing 320 degrees distance 150 miles. These warnings enabled the remaining 66 aircraft crammed onto Midway to get into the air. The updates provided by Ady enabled Admirals Raymond Spruance and Frank Fletcher to launch carrier attacks. All Midway aircraft made attacks against the Japanese carriers except for 21 Marine Brewster Buffalos and 7 Wildcat fighters dedicated to repelling the attackers.

In the ensuing Japanese attack on Midway beginning at 6:16AM, 14 of the 21 Brewster fighter pilots died prompting Captain Philip R. White to say, “It is my belief that any commander that orders pilots out for combat in F2A-3’s (Brewster Buffalo) should consider them lost before leaving the ground”. Captain Francis McCarthy, flying one of the Wildcats, was also killed after shooting down one of eight Zeros attacking him and wingman Lt. Roy Corry Jr. Overall, only 10 fighters survived the fight and only two were in shape to fly again.

The attacks by land-based planes on the Japanese carriers began at 7:48AM. First six TBF Avenger torpedo bombers lead by Navy Lieutenant Langdon K. Fieberling of Torpedo 8 made their attack. These were some of the new torpedo bombers that should have replaced the hopelessly outdated Devastators Lt. Cdr. John Waldron had onboard Hornet, but the Avengers were 24 hours late reaching Hawaii. The planes obtained no hits, but five of six aircraft were destroyed including Fieberling’s and only two of 18 men survived to return to Midway. Ens. Bert Earnest and Radioman Harry Ferrier thereby became with Ens. George Gay the other two “lone survivors” of Torpedo 8.

Next the Army Air Corps made its appearance. Captain James Collins lead four Army B-26 medium bombers rigged to carry torpedoes externally in the first ever attempt to attack enemy ships. They were instructed to launch at less than 1,000 yards to hit 30 knot aircraft carriers with 33 knot torpedoes. Also, they understood most torpedoes failed when released at over 50 feet above the water and at aircraft speeds exceeding 126 mph; a speed at which this aircraft often stalled and crashed when attempting to land. Two of four planes with their 7-man crews perished, and no hits were obtained.

Marine dive bombers closely followed the B-26’s. At 7:55AM Major Lofton Henderson (for whom Henderson Field at Guadalcanal was named) attacked with 16 Dauntless bombers of which 8 were lost with their two-man crews. Henderson’s crews made a glide bombing attack on the Hiryū, because they were untrained in dive bombing tactics. Again, no hits were obtained.

Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Sweeney lead 13 long range Army B-17’s over Nagumo’s position in a level bombing attack from 20,000 feet and obtained no hits on the carriers, escorts, or the transport group. One aircraft was damaged by a Zero and one man was injured. The Japanese were reluctant to attack the heavily armed bombers, but the ships had no trouble evading the bombs dropped nearly four miles above them.

At 8:30AM Marine Major Benjamin Norris led eleven Vindicator dive bombers to the Japanese fleet. The aircraft were considered so ancient pilots called them “wind indicators”. These planes displayed such fragility their fabric fuselage was reinforced with 4” hospital masking tape. They never reached the carriers and unsuccessfully attacked a battleship. Amazingly only two fell to enemy fire, but two more were lost at sea with their two-man crews because of low fuel. By June 6 only three were flyable. The Battle of Midway was this aircraft’s only combat use. The plane was pulled from service in 1943.

Next into the battle from 9:18AM to10:15AM came Torpedo 3, Torpedo 6, and Torpedo 8 from the USS Yorktown, USS Enterprise, and USS Hornet, respectively. In all Lt. Commanders Lance E. Massey, Gene Lindsey, and John Waldron lead 42 Devastator torpedo bombers against the Japanese carriers. The squadrons had become separated from their dive bombers and fighters that were intended to accompany them for coordinated attacks. Waldron left the other Hornet aircraft deliberately replying to Lt. Commander Stanhope C. Ring’s order to follow him, “I know where the damn Jap fleet is. The hell with you”. Now alone these 100 mph torpedo bombers had to evade 300 mph Zero fighters and withstand concentrated task force anti-aircraft fire before launching at less than 1,000 yards. In pressing home their attacks, 35 aircraft with their two-man crews were lost and no hits were obtained. Ens. George H. Gay, Jr., who crashed in the midst of the Japanese carriers, was the lone survivor of this Torpedo 8 attack and was rescued by a PBY the next day.

The USS Hornet fighters and dive bombers spent a fruitless morning. Lt. Commander Robert R. Johnson leading Bombing 8 was unable to find the Hornet and landed on Midway, but 3 of the 14 aircraft had to ditch on the way for lack of fuel. Lieutenant Stan Ruehlow leading Fighting 8 remained determined to find the Hornet, but all ten aircraft had to ditch, and Ensigns Mark Kelly and George R. Hill were never found.

The Japanese carrier task force had withstood eight separate attacks over nearly three hours without a single hit. Not counting the B-17’s that stayed at 20,000 feet, Navy, Marine, and Army flyers pressed home attacks with 79 aircraft. Of those 58 were destroyed, 126 of 174 men perished, and no hits were obtained. While the Japanese found satisfaction in thwarting the attacks, they faced complete frustration in efforts to re-arm and spot aircraft from the hanger decks to strike the American carriers.

Now at 10:20AM Bombing 3, Scouting 6 and Bombing 6 from the USS Yorktown and USS Enterprise respectively found the carriers. They arrived overhead while most Zero fighters were still at low altitude finishing off the American torpedo bombers. The 18 planes of Commander Max Leslie’s Bombing 3 delivered three fatal hits to one carrier, probably the Soryu. For Bombing 6 and Scouting 6, Lieutenant Wade McClusky as group commander, and Lieutenants Earl Gallaher and Richard Best as section leaders attacked the Akagi and Kaga. Most of Best’s section incorrectly followed McClusky and Gallaher in attacks that inflicted five hits and five near misses on the Kaga. Best and his two wingmen attacked the Akagi. The two wingmen obtained near misses, but Best’s 1,000 lb bomb exploded amongst aircraft on the hanger deck to start an uncontrollable fire.

The Japanese task forces that had been impervious to harm from 7:48AM to 10:23AM saw three of their heavy carriers turned into burning wreckage in six minutes. However, a price had to be paid. Max Leslie’s planes returned safely but Scouting 6 and Bombing6 lost 16 aircraft and 11 of 38 two man crews.

The Japanese turn came at 11:52AM when Yorktown radar plot reported, “Bogeys 32 miles and closing”. Despite fearful losses, the Japanese scored hits with three bombs at noon and at 2:42PM their torpedo plane attacks scored two hits and forced the Yorktown to abandon ship. The defending Combat Air Patrol lost one Wildcat compared to 22 of 30 Japanese aircraft lost to fighters and anti-aircraft fire.

There was still one heavy carrier unaccounted for, and at 2:45PM Lieutenant Sam Adams of Scouting 6 radioed Admiral Spruance its location. The Admiral had no fighters or torpedo bombers but ordered Lieutenant William E. Gallaher aloft at 3:30PM to lead 24 planes from three dive bombers squadrons. A half hour later the Hornet launched 16 dive bombers lead by reserve Lieutenant Edgar Stebbins. These 40 aircraft encountered anti-aircraft fire, lighting attacks from Zeros, and superb evasive ship handling. However, there were just too many planes and bombs. At least four hits and many near misses transformed the Hiryu into the fourth blazing funeral pyre of the day. All three dive bombing squadrons got hits and three aircraft with crews were lost.

There were attacks before and after June 4 during the Battle of Midway costing the Japanese Combined Fleet other ships. However, the loss of these four heavy carriers and the many superbly trained aircrews and technicians proved fatal to Japanese plans.

This splendid victory by Navy, Marine and Army Air Corps flyers over the First Carrier Striking Force permanently seized the initiative from the Japanese. One could easily paraphrase Winston Churchill to say never have so many who fought in the Pacific owed so much to so few. Not counting the B-17’s that stayed at 20,000 feet and obtained no hits, about 550 flyers closely engaged the Japanese and suffered nearly 300 deaths. Walter Lord and Gordon W. Prange considered this accomplishment incredible and miraculous. For Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, it was the battle that doomed Japan.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/index.php?name=Sections&req=viewarticle&artid=1096&page=1 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/logs/CV/cv5-Midway.html

Battle of Midway: 4-7 June 1942, Online Action Reports: Commanding Officer, USS Enterprise, Serial 0133 of 8 June 1942

http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=1035 http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WTUS_WWII.htm

I find no evidence the planes flew with bombardiers on June 4 or had Norden bombsights.

http://video.staged.com/localshops/ww_iirare_film__midway__directed_by_john_ford

http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1986/April%201986/0486valor.aspx

http://usnwc.edu/Academics/Library/Naval-Historical-Collection.aspx#items/show/849

“8 May 1942 by dive bombers from USS Yorktown and Lexington which scored three bomb hits: one on the carrier’s port bow, one to starboard at the forward end of the flight deck and one just abaft the island. Fires broke out but were eventually contained and extinguished. The resulting damage required Shokaku to return to Japan for major repairs. On the journey back, the carrier shipped so much water through her damaged bow she nearly capsized in heavy seas, maintaining a high rate of speed in order to avoid a cordon of American submarines out hunting for her.

She arrived at Kure on 17 May 1942 and entered dry dock on 16 June 1942. Repairs were completed within ten days and, a little over two weeks later on 14 July, she was formally reassigned to Striking Force, 3rd Fleet, Carrier Division 1”.

At the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 8 dive bombers from USS Yorktown and Lexington scored three bomb hits on the Shokaku. The resulting damage required her to return to Japan for major repairs. She arrived at Kure on 17 May 1942 and did not enter dry dock until a month later on 16 June 1942.

In comparison the damage the Yorktown sustained after Coral Sea led to the Navy Yard inspectors estimating that she would need at least two weeks of repairs. However, Admiral Nimitz ordered that she be made ready to sail alongside TF 16. Yard workers at Pearl Harbor, laboring around the clock, made enough repairs to enable the ship to put to sea again in 48 hours.

In our family, eight men over three generations volunteered for military service, but never again. All the services are now left-wing social engineering experiments. Any resemblance to a meritocracy is now gone. My son (Marine) and I (Navy) now council against joining.

Say it again, brother! My maternal grandfather fought in WWI, for Scotland. My dad and stepfather served during WWII, also an uncle on my mom's side. An older stepbrother served in Nam. My FIL served in the Army during the Korean War, stationed in Germany. One of his cousins survived D-Day.

I was on active duty at the start of the AVF, from 76-84. Army, Air Defense Artillery. I spent my 4+ years with the same battalion, 6/56 ADA, motto "Night Hides Not"...oops, I just outed myself.

I loved my time in Germany, never really wanted to leave. Unique assignment, air base defense. We had composite Chaparral/Towed Vulcan batteries at Hahn, Bitburg, and Spangdahlem.

Before my next comment, allow me to say the Army treated me very well, they paid for college and I had some great assignments.

I have close to a dozen nephews, along with my two sons. I have never advised them to join the military. It's not the military we knew, and the Courtney Massengales have run off the Sam Damons. I fell far short of resembling Sam, of course, though I gave it a good effort. There were sufficient run-ins with staff pukes and REMFs that kept me from a career.

That was my trump card, never intending to make it a career. I refused to be cowed into submisson by a micro managing superior. Best relationship was with my last battalion commander in Germany, whom I also worked for back at Fort Bliss.

Not only is our military too woke, our generals continue to insist on preparing for the last war. Air Force should be buying thousands upon thousands of drones, as opposed to the next $150 million jet fighter that will be obsolete the moment the first one is delivered.

Where is the leadership today? Case in point: the young soldier that drowned in the Rio Grande. Where were the rules of engagement, where were the flotation devices? IMO, the entire chain of command should have been relieved over the loss of that soldier.

No, it's time for the sons and daughters of our politicians and elites to shoulder the burden of their parents' leadership failures. Don't bring back the draft: rich boys have found a way to avoid the draft since the War Between the States.

Apologies for the length and failure to stay on topic. The Battle of Midway is one of our greatest military victories. If you're ever in Fredericksburg, TX, they have an excellent museum of The War in the Pacific. It's a history lesson unto itself, and the birthplace of Admiral Nimitz is just across the street. You can spend several hours in it, and barely scratch the surface.

What an incredible museum in Fredericksburg. I remember small exhibits like Saburō Sakai’s shattered goggles and Marc Mitscher's ball cap. On two occasions I got to spend hours there

Here is the essay I post every December now.

Social Engineering Defeats Combat Capabilities

Obama’s defense department announcement on December 3 of 2015 about women in combat following repeal of DADT demonstrates attachment to a political ideology fueled by arrogance and reinforced by premeditated ignorance. The defense secretary Ash Carter’s supposed managing any long period of study and vigorous debate sought only those mutually supportive creatures that have metastasized throughout the military to serve a social agenda bringing future needless devastation.

Most of the points highlighted about women in combat arose first when the decision was made to do away with DADT and invite the LGBTQ and whatever communities into the mainstream of military operations. In the case of DADT, the religious fervor driving a delusional Congress and Administration sought comfort from a fallacious study conclusion which showed supposed support for their decision using populations which included garrison and base housing personnel. However, the trigger pullers at the core of military operations rejected the idea.

The foundational comfort for this approach relies on dubious scientific credibility. In 1973 the American Psychiatric Association (APA) decided to remove homosexuality as a mental disorder from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM). Removal followed a two-year campaign Newsweek described as ongoing disruptive, chaotic attacks on psychiatrists and physiologists. Yet throughout these disruptive attacks, no academic papers arose at conferences refuting any research previously done. Eventually onslaughts forced sufficient abstentions, under-votes, and apprehensive responses for a third of APA’s 17,000 plus membership to approve removal.

After this decision, activists targeted leading individual researchers such as Dr. David Reuben, and Masters and Johnson to ensure perpetual sanctity for the APA action. No research papers would again arise to confirm initial therapy success rates of 30% to 60 %, substantiating that 7 of 10 homosexuals could eventually walk away from the lifestyle. Persistent activism over 37 years enabled ubiquitous infiltration of academia thereby ensuring pre-ordained theses, approved flexibility in research designs, suitable human data points, and enchanting statistical enhancements. Psychology and Psychiatry chose to relinquish scientific rigor for popular societal and political acclaim.

Neither decision was compatible with combat operations that too often demand unpredictable and unimaginable endurance and brutality to achieve victory. Only the highest physical abilities and most severe restrictions on human behaviors and interactions can foster the traditionally defined high morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion required. Resorting to war for national defense entails the ultimate Olympics of conflict occurring at the bleeding edge of existence where the unbelievable must become the possible.

Human sexuality, and therefore LGBTQ behaviors and women, simply cannot intrude into this sub-culture where only those displaying the greatest savagely can hope to win. Particularly regarding women, national defense compels the highest in physical achievements where no excuse exists for merging men and women into war environments which are more severe than any found in the segregated Olympic competitions every four years. Certainly, that point becomes obvious with the controversy over transgender females competing in women’s sports.

Combat forms personnel into rigid, task-oriented units. They then descend into a squalid cacophony of shrieking, cursing, sobbing, crashing dissonance to orchestrate the killing of other humans under a discipline which should not allow for neither hate nor joy. These people continuously face extraordinary mental and physical stress and survive by acquiring the wisdom of wild animals that live in the moment without conveniences for eating, sleeping, resting, or other bodily functions. At the point of collision, they undertake operations requiring sacrificial, primitive, and intimate actions. They must display a noble fidelity to each other despite environments that are inherently chaotic, barbaric, and brittle. Overcoming within this alternate reality requires trained killers subject to a totalitarian leadership and narrow focus unimaginable for those who accept human sexuality in its now many varied forms and always see an opportunity for the social alchemy popular in civilian life.

The regimental combat teams for infantry, mechanized, and armored units and special forces units are now the playthings of bureaucrats committed to equal opportunity and affirmative action. They are dismissive of warriors enduring the carnage imperative for triumph. Institutional memories no longer exist for fighting ferocious, shrewd enemies such as the Germans, Japanese, Chinese, and North Vietnamese, who utilized a full array of modern weapons. If one notes the ribbons on any senior officer’s uniform, they show they fought only Arabs that Israelis beat three times at 20 to 1 odds.

Such people now question the necessity for standards which do not dismiss inferior female physical performance, or the psychological degradation of units forced to incorporate LGBTQ and feminist agendas. Social engineering that amalgamates these agendas has become the overarching imperative to which all operational capabilities must submit.

Women can serve in many rolls, but do not belong at the pointy end of the spear and should not be holding the spear to the extent they intrude into the fellowship of combat arms which depend upon savagery and physical strength for victory. LGBTQ and whatever behaviors simply have no place in our military where sexual extravagance breaks down unit cohesion.

As this tragedy unfolds, I will remember the quote that, “Men sleep peacefully in their beds at night because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf”. A lot of good men are going to have to die in years to come to cover up the abandonment of the military as the ultimate meritocracy. This tragedy of women in combat following endorsement of LGBTQ behaviors provides another reason I now always council men to never enter the armed forces. In my wife’s and my families eight men volunteered and served over three generations, but never again.

Partial Bibliography

Jordan Peterson: It’s ideology vs. science in psychology’s war on boys and men The coup of the American Psychological Association undertaken by the ideologues is now complete

https://nationalpost.com/opinion/jordan-peterson-its-ideology-vs-science-in-psychologys-war-on-boys-and-men

Action of APA to remove homosexuality from list of disorders DSM

Link: http://conservativecolloquium.wordpress.com/2007/10/01/homosexual-activists-intimidate-american-psychiatric-association-into-removing-homosexuality-from-list-of-disorders/

Homosexuality and Sexual Orientation Disturbance: Proposed Change in DSM-II, 6th Printing, page 44

http://www.torahdec.org/Downloads/DSM-II_Homosexuality_Revision.pdf

The APA Decision

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+APA+decision+December+1973%3A+declassification+of+homosexuality+as...-a094598255

Exposed: The Myth That Psychiatry Has Proven That Homosexual Behavior Is Normal

http://traditionalvalues.org/content/article/30884/Exposed:%20The%20Myth%20That%20Psychiatry%20Has%20Proven%20That%20Homosexual%20Behavior%20Is%20Normal

Will Hamas place benches to help female IDF soldiers?

http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/226508

'Integrating women into combat is a colossal failure'

israelnationalnews.com

narrative about women in combat

http://www.freerepublic.com/perl/pings

Pentagon manual details rules for transgender military personnel

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/07/19/pentagon-manual-details-rules-for-transgender-military-personnel.html

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The Battle of Midway: Turning the Tide of World War II