Do Second Amendment “Arms” Include Cannons?

Whether they were common or not it irrelevant. Whether the 2nd Amendment made concealed carry a fundamental right is relevant. The common law did not make it a right, and the 2nd Amendment did nothing to add it to the right.

This is where you and I disagree. The Constitution is determined by what was meant at the time it was written. At the time it was written, there were no laws requiring a permit for open or concealed carry.

That is fact.

It was clear, from the discourse at the time, the Second Amendment applied to individual citizens, and was commonly considered a right of the individual.

The Second Amendment was put in place to protect that right. The Fourteenth Amendment was put in place to prevent the States from infringing on Second Amendment rights, among others.

Blackstone correctly noted English law allowed for regulation. The Second Amendment is stricter, by design, than English law.

Just because the Second Amendment was not enforced, does not mean it should not be enforced.

It’s true, especially if you were fighting your country’s enemies but you still needed the letter of marque to make it legal to do so in defense of your country.

To legally attack ships flying another country's flag, yes. But to defend oneself against attack, or to fight stateless actors (pirates)? No letters of marque were needed.

The Constitution is determined by what was meant at the time it was written.

It is determined by the meaning given to it by the voters or people who adopted it. It is the meaning that would have been given by a reasonable person during the framing era.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 9, 188-189 (1824), Marshall, CJ

As men whose intentions require no concealment generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said. If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well settled rule that the objects for which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction. We know of no reason for excluding this rule from the present case. The grant does not convey power which might be beneficial to the grantor if retained by himself, or which can enure solely to the benefit of the grantee, but is an investment of power for the general advantage, in the hands of agents selected for that purpose, which power can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents or lie dormant. We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers other than is given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in connexion with the purposes for which they were conferred.

United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)

The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning; where the intention is clear there is no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 410; Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S.139; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662; Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1; Edwards v. Cuba R. Co., 268 U.S. 628; The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655; Story on the Constitution (5th ed.) § 451; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (2nd ed.), pp. 61; 70.

Heller at 554 U.S. 576-577:

“[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.” United States v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 731 (1931); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188 (1824). Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.

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At the time it was written, there were no laws requiring a permit for open or concealed carry. That is fact.

That there were allegedly no laws prohibiting concealed or open carry at the time the Constitution was written is absoutely meaningless. At the time the Constitution was written there was no law requiring lots of things. The absence of a law requiring a permit to do something did not transform doing any such thing into a constitutional right. That is an absurdity.

The content of the Constitution is determined by the words that it contains, not by the absence of state laws requiring permits to do things.

It was clear, from the discourse at the time, the Second Amendment applied to individual citizens, and was commonly considered a right of the individual.
The Second Amendment was put in place to protect that right.

What discourse? The Framers and the people knew what the Right to Bear Arms was, as held by the English Common Law under which the colonies had existed since before they were born. There was no debate on the meaning of RKBA. Everybody knew what it meant.

The Common Law, as I quoted to you, made it clear that it was an individual right,

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk1ch1.asp

Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England
Book the First - Chapter the First: Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals (1765)
5. THE fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same statute 1 W. & M. ft. 2. c. 2. and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.

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The Second Amendment was put in place to protect that right.

Heller at 554 U.S 599,

The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defense and hunting. But the threat that the new Federal government would destroy the citizens' militia by taking away their arms was the reason that the right—unlike some other English rights— was codified in a written Constitution.

In McDonald, at 561 U.S. 787, Justice Alito stated,

In Heller, we rejected the suggestion that the right was valued only as a means of preserving the militias. 554 U.S., at 598-599. On the contrary, we stressed that the right was also valued because the possession of firearms was thought to be essential for self-defense.

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The Fourteenth Amendment was put in place to prevent the States from infringing on Second Amendment rights, among others.

The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to make citizens of the freedmen, to prohibit states from making or enforcing laws abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, and to provide Congress with the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of the Amendment. It was not self-enforcing. No part of the Bill of Rights became enforceable against the states until the Supreme Court incorporated it against the States. Some parts of the Bill of Rights have never been so incorporated and are not enforced against the states, for example, the Fifth Amendment requirement for a Grand Jury does not apply to the states. The Privileges or Immunities Clause pertains to United States citizenship only, not to said privileges or immunties acquired by virtue of State citizenship. The Equal Protection Clause required states to give similarly situated persons or classes similar treatment. The Due Process clause forbids any state to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. The Bill of Rights is incorporated against the states under the Due Process Clause.

In McDonald, Justice Alito concluded his opinion at 561 U.S. 791,

We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.

Blackstone correctly noted English law allowed for regulation. The Second Amendment is stricter, by design, than English law.

Please quote the hidden codicil in the Second Amendment which makes the English Common Law Right to Keep and Bear Arms more or less strict. The States adopted the English Common Law before they adopted the Articles of Confederation or the Constitution. The English Common Law was adopted, with no provision of strictness, by the original thirteen states, Vermont, the District of Columbia, and the Northwest Territories. The right did not change, it was adopted without change. The Second Amendment says not a mumbling word about what the RKBA consists of.

You are making crap up again.

“Now if your cannon is on a boat, then that might work.’

With all the trouble Freepers have with guns and boats, a cannon is a sure goner.

The right did not change, it was adopted without change. The Second Amendment says not a mumbling word about what the RKBA consists of.

You are being silly. The Constitution was based on the philosophy of natural rights. The English law was not.

The English law had proved to be insufficient because of the attempt to disarm the colonists prior to and during the revolution.

The framers of the Constituion and the people of the time did not believe the government had the right to disarm the people.

Your interpretation allows the government to disarm the people.

It is precisely why the Second Amendment was put in place.

You are being silly. The Constitution was based on the philosophy of natural rights. The English law was not.

Notwithstanding the lack of citations, the idea that English common law has no basis in the philosophy of natural rights is wrong.

Richard. H. Helmholz, "Natural Law and Human Rights in English Law: From Bracton to Blackstone," 3 Ave Maria Law Review 1 (2005)

Pages 3-4:
Roscoe pound spoke for many when he dismissed [natural law] out of hand, concluding, "English lawyers have never had much concern with philosophy and natural law found little place in their books." Let us look at the evidence. Some of it supports the exact opposite of Pound's dismissal of natural law. For example, no fewer than nine Latin editions and seven English translations of Samuel Pufendorf's most famous work dealing with natural law were published in England between 1682 and 1758. But suppose we stick to English lawyers. Let them be our test. One must first determine who counts as an English lawyer...I have omitted the English civilians, the lawyers who practiced in the courts of Admiralty, the Church, and many courts of Equity, when they turned their pens to general descriptions of English law. Their ordinary sources of authority were those of the European ius commune, so that by training and inclination, they naturally conceded legitimate authority to the law of nature. For present purposes, therefore, John Cowell (d. 1611), Richard Zouche (d. 1661), and Thomas Wood (d. 1722), do not count, although they most certainly did link natural law with what they called the municipal law of the realm and we the English common law. I have also excluded theologians and philosophers, though perhaps unfairly, as not sufficiently legal in profession and outlook. On this slim ground, influential thinkers like Richard Hooker (d. 1600), Thomas Hobbes (d. 1679), and John Locke (d. 1704), all of whom had something to say about natural law, are ignored in this account.

Page 5-11:
A list of English common lawyers who described the natural law as being either part of, or else a legitimate source for, the English common law, from the time of Bracton in the thirteenth century to that of Blackstone in the eighteenth, is much longer...The list of common law jurists who wrote positively about the law of nature as it figured in the law of England includes Sir Francis Ashley (d. 1635), Sir Francis Bacon (d. 1626), Matthew Bacon (d.c. 1759), Henry Ballow (d. 1782), Danes Barrington (d. 1800), William Bohun (fl. 1732), Britton (fl. 1300), John Brydall (d.c. 1705), Robert Callis (d. 1642), Sir Charles Calthrope (d. 1616), William Cawley (fl. 1680), Sir Edward Coke (d. 1634...[Here, insert numerous names in alphabetical order, in the dozens]...and lastly (although out of order), Anonymous. The list long, and no doubt could be made longer...It should not even convince us that natural law was often on the mind of common lawyers, although the list does seem substantial enough to show that [Oliver Wendell] Holmes's dismissive view of natural law was not shared by many of the them. On the contrary, they seem have to accepted it as a component part of the laws of England. They did not regard it as an exotic foreign import, but rather as a legitimate source of English law.

Page 12:
One other notable feature worth mentioning arises..English common lawyers did not customarily use the terms "Law of Nature" or "Natural Law" in so many words. Instead they looked to what "reason" dictated or what would avoid "inconvenience" in practice, thereby applying the same general principles as did the civilians who expressly cited natural law. The words were different, but the substance was not. That attitude is evident in vocabulary used in many of the English cases.

And from the conclusion, on page 22:
Perhaps the most that can be said with assurance, therefore, is that the history of rights within the Western tradition ought to take note of the place of common law in the writings and assumptions of English common lawyers.

Though they may not have been as forthright or consistent in vocabulary or verbiage as the founders of America's legal tradition were, to state that English common law had no basis in natural rights is hogwash.

(I highly recommend getting into the habit of providing some citations for your points in the future, since your statements keep being rebutted by cited evidence to the contrary.)

The right did not change, it was adopted without change. The Second Amendment says not a mumbling word about what the RKBA consists of.
You are being silly. The Constitution was based on the philosophy of natural rights. The English law was not.

You are being assiten. You are just making crap up and spewing. The RKBA in the Constitution is the same RKBA that was in the colonies under the English Common Law. Natural law is a philosophy. The Constitution set forth the organic law of the nation. It is not a philosophy lesson.

Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-282 (1897)

The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten amendments to the Constitution, commonly known as the Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay down any novel principles of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we nad inherited from our English ancestors, and which had from time immemorial been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case. In incorporating these principles into the fundamental law there was no intention of disregarding the exceptions, which continued to be recognized as if they had been formally expressed. Thus, the freedom of speech and of the press (art. 1) does not permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or indecent articles, or other publications injurious to public morals or private reputation, the right of the people to keep and bear arms (art. 2) is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons, . . . .

We do not have courts of philosophy which enforce theories of philosophy. We do have the group of states from the Founding and Framing era who all formally adopted the English Common Law.

Constitutional Law, Sixth Edition, Jerome A. Barron & C. Thomas Dienes, Black Letter Series, West Publishing, 2005, p. 164,

A. THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION
1. NATURAL RIGHTS
Despite some contrary judicial opinion in the early years of the Republic, the claim that there are extra-constitutional "natural rights" limiting governmental power has generally not been accepted by the courts. If the federal government exercises one of its delegated powers of the states exercise their reserved powers, some express or implied constitutional, statutory, or common law limitation must be found if the governmental action is to be successfully challenged.

STATE BY STATE REVIEW
ADOPTION OF LAW IN THE FOUNDING ERA

1. Connecticut

Constitution of Connecticut — 1776.
PARAGRAPH 1. Be it enacted and declared by the Governor, and Council, and House of Representatives, in General Court assembled, That the ancient Form of Civil Government, contained in the Charter from Charles the Second, King of England, and adopted by the People of this State, shall be and remain the Civil Constitution of this State, under the sole authority of the People thereof, independent of any King or Prince whatever. And that this Republic is, and shall forever be and remain, a free, sovereign and independent State, by the Name of the STATE OF CONNECTICUT.

2. Delaware

Constitution of Delaware — 1776.
ART. 24. All acts of assembly in force in this State on the 15th day of May last (and not hereby altered, or contrary to the resolutions of Congress or of the late house of assembly of this State) shall so continue, until altered or repealed by the legislature of this State, unless where they are temporary, in which case they shall expire at the times respectively limited for their duration.
ART. 25. The common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law as has been heretofore adopted in practice in this State, shall remain in force, unless they shall be altered by a future law of the legislature; such parts only excepted as are repugnant to the rights and privileges contained in this constitution, and the declaration of rights, &c., agreed to by this convention.

3. Georgia

Constitution of Georgia — 1777.
The Constitution of Georgia did not address this issue. It was addressed in Statute law and by judicial opinion.
Georgia, Act of February 25, 1784
3. Sec. I. Be it enacted, &c. That all and singular the several acts, clauses, and parts of acts, that were in force and binding on the inhabitants of the said province, on the 14th day of May, in tbe year of our Lord 1776, so far as they are not contrary to the constitution, laws, and form of government now establisbed in this state, shall be, and are hereby declared to be in full force, virtue, and effect, and binding on the inhabitants of this state, immediately from and after the passing of this act, as fully and effectually, to all intents and purposes, as if the said acts, and each of them, had been made and enacted by this general assembly, until the same shall he repealed, amended, or otherwise altered by the legislature: And also the common laws of England, and such of the statute laws as were usually in force in the said province, except as before excepted.
Straffin v. Newell, Superior Court, Chatham County, Georgia, T.U.P.C. 172 (1808)
I shall decide upon the second ground only. At the trial, the protest of the master of the vessel was admitted as evidence in chief. Now the protest of the master is not evidence per se; it can only be used in a court governed by the rules of the common law, to impeach the testimony of the master himself, or as incidentally corroborative of the log-book. There was therefore a misdirection of the judge, on this point of the evidence.
In this case the plaintiff is the administrator of the master, which ought to have suggested an invincible objection to the admissibility of the protest. 2 Esp. Rep. 489; 7 D. and E. were cited by Davis and Berrien.
This court is governed by the rules and principles of the common law, so far as they are permitted to operate by our constitution and laws. The case therefore cited from 1 Dallas, p. 6, militating with those rules and principles, cannot be received as authority.
Rule made absolute.
Patterson v. Winn, 5 Peters 233, 240 30 U.S. 233 (1831) (from the Circuit Court of Georgia), Justice Story:
The common law is the law of Georgia; and the rules of evidence belonging to it are in force there, unless so far as they have been modified by statute, or controlled by a settled course of judicial decisions and usage. Upon the present question, it does not appear, that Georgia has ever established any rules at variance with the common law; though it is not improbable, that there may have been, from the peculiar organization of her judicial department, some diversity in the application of them, in the different circuits of that state, acting, as they do, independent of each other, and without any common appellate court to supervise their decisions. We think it clear, that by the common law, as held for a long period, an exemplification of a public grant, under the great seal, is admissible in evidence, as being record proof of as high a nature as the original. It is a recognition, in the most solemn form, by the government itself, of the validity of its own grant, under its own seal; and imports absolute verity, as matter of record.
The authorities cited at the bar fully sustain this doctrine. There was, in former times, a technioal distinction existing on this subject, which deserves notice. As evidence, such exemplifications of letters-patent seem to have been generally deemed admissible. But where, in pleading, a profert was made of the letters-patent, there, upon the principles of pleading, the original, under the great seal, was required to be produced; for a profert could not be of any copy or exemplification. It was to cure this difficulty that the statntes of 3 Edw. VI., c. 4, and 13 Eliz., c. 6, were passed, by which, patentees, and all claiming under them, were enabled to make title in pleading, by showing forth an exemplification of the letters patent, as if the original were pleaded and set forth. These statutes being passed, before the emigration of our ancestors, being applicable to our situation, and in amendment of the law, constitute a part of our common law. A similar effect was given by the statute of 10 Ann., c. 18, to copies of deeds of bargain and sale, enrolled under the statute of Hen. VIII., when offered by way of profert in pleading; and since that period, a copy of the enrolment of a bargain and sale is held as good evidence as the original itself. 1 Phil. Evid., ch. 5, § 2, p. 208-302; ch. 8, § 2, p. 352-6; 408-11; Bac. Abr. title Evidence, F. p. 610, 644, 646; Com. Dig. Evidence, A, 2; 1 Stark. Evid. § 33, p. 152; 2 Saund. Plead. & Evid. 638; Page's Case, 5 Co. 53; 12 Vin. Abr. tit. Evidence, A, b, 25, p. 97; A, b, 33, p. 114; 1 Saunel. 189, note 2. Such, then, being the rule of evidence of the common law, in respect to exemplifications, uuder the great seal, of public grants, the application of it to the case now at bar will be at once perceived; since, by the laws of Georgia, all public grants are required to be recorded in the proper state department.
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961) (from the Supreme Court of Georgia)
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The State of Georgia is the only State — indeed, apparently the only jurisdiction in the common law world — to retain the common law rule that a person charged with a criminal offense is incompetent to testify under oath in his own behalf at his trial. Georgia in 1866 abolished by statute the common law rules of incompetency for most other persons. However, the statute, now Georgia Code § 38-416, expressly retained the incompetency rule as to persons “charged in any criminal proceeding with the commission of any indictable offense or any offense punishable on summary conviction. . . .” Two years later, in 1868, Georgia allowed the criminal defendant to make an unsworn statement. The statute enacted for that purpose, as amended, is now Georgia Code, § 38-415, and provides:
“In all criminal trials, the prisoner shall have the right to make to the court and jury such statement in the case as he may deem proper in his defense. It shall not be under oath, and shall have such force only as the jury may think right to give it. They may believe it in preference to the sworn testimony in the case. The prisoner shall not be compelled to answer any questions on cross-examination, should he think proper to decline to answer.”

4. Maryland

Constitution of Maryland — 1776.
III. That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common law of England, and the trial by jury, according to the course of that law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes, as existed at the time of their first emigration, and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and of such others as have been since made in England, or Great Britain, and have been introduced, used and practised by the courts of law or equity; and also to acts of Assembly, in force on the first of June seventeen hundred and seventy-four, except such as may have since expired, or have been or may be altered by acts of Convention, or this Declaration of Rights — subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State: and the inhabitants of Maryland are also entitled to all property, derived to them, from or under the Charter, granted by his Majesty Charles I. to Cæcilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore.

5. Massachusetts

Constitution of Massachusetts — 1780 (quote from Chapter VI)
ART. V. All writs, issuing out of the clerk's office in any of the courts of law, shall be in the name of the commonwealth of Massachusetts; they shall be under the seal of the court from whence they issue; they shall bear test of the first justice of the court to which they shall be returnable who is not a party, and be signed by the clerk of such court.
ART. VI. All the laws which have heretofore been adopted, used, and approved in the province, colony, or State of Massachusetts Bay, and usually practised on in the courts of law, shall still remain and be in full force, until altered or repealed by the legislature, such parts only excepted as are repugnant to the rights and liberties contained in this constitution.
ART. VII. The privilege and benefit of the writ of habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this commonwealth, in the most free, easy, cheap, expeditious, and ample manner, and shall not be suspended by the legislature, except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time, not exceeding twelve months.

6. New Hampshire

Constitution of New Hampshire — 1776
The Constitution of New Hampshire did not address this issue. It was addressed in Statute law and by judicial opinion.
New Hampshire, Laws of the State of New Hampshire, passed January session, 1943; pp. 231-33, 259.
6. Common Law Lien. When any factor, or any third party for the account of any such factor, shall have possession of goods and merchandise, such factor shall have a continuing general lien, as set forth in section 1 of this chapter, without recording the notice and posting the sign provided for in this chapter.
7. Construction. This act is to be construed liberally to secure the beneficial interest and purposes thereof. A substantial compliance with its several provisions shall be sufficient for the validity of a lien and to give jurisdiction to the courts to enforce the same. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting or limiting any existing or future lien at common law or any rights at common law, or any right given by any other statute or provision of the Revised Laws.
13-a. Register Authorized. In addition to his common law and statutory powers the attorney general shall have the authority to prepare and maintain a register of all public trusts heretofore or hereafter established or active in the state.
Wells v. Pierce, 27 N.H. 503, 512 (1853)
Equity, as a great branch of the law of their native country, was brought over by the colonists, and has always existed as a part of the common law, in its broadest sense, in New Hampshire.
Dion v. Cheshire Mills, 92 NH 414 (1943)
… except for the brief period 1682 to 1699 we never had separate courts of chancery. At all other colonial periods, equity practice was in the common-law courts, as now, and even when there was a court of chancery, the common-law Court of Common Pleas undertook in one instance to exercise equity jurisdiction. Barefoot v. Wadley, supra.

7. New Jersey

Constitution of New Jersey — 1776
XXI. That all the laws of this Province, contained in the edition lately published by Mr. Allinson, shall be and remain in full force, until altered by the Legislature of this Colony (such only excepted, as are incompatible with this Charter) and shall be, according as heretofore, regarded in all respects, by all civil officers, and others, the good people of this Province.
XXII. That the common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law, as have been heretofore practised in this Colony, shall still remain in force, until they shall be altered by a future law of the Legislature; such parts only excepted, as are repugnant to the rights and privileges contained in this Charter; and that the inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain confirmed as a part of the law of this Colony, without repeal, forever.

8. New York

Constitution of New York — 1777
XXXV. And this convention doth further, in the name and by the authority of the good people of this State, ordain, determine, and declare that such parts of the common law of England, and of the statute law of England and Great Britain, and of the acts of the legislature of the colony of New York, as together did form the law of the said colony on the 19th day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five, shall be and continue the law of this State, subject to such alterations and provisions as the legislature of this State shall, from time to time, make concerning the same. That such of the said acts, as are temporary, shall expire at the times limited for their duration respectively. That all such parts of the said common law, and all such of the said statutes and acts aforesaid, or parts thereof, as may be construed to establish or maintain any particular denomination of Christians or their ministers, or concern the allegiance heretofore yielded to, and the supremacy, sovereignty, government, or prerogatives claimed or exercised by, the King of Great Britain and his predecessors, over the colony of New York and its inhabitants, or are repugnant to this constitution, be, and they hereby are, abrogated and rejected. And this convention doth further ordain, that the resolves or resolutions of the congresses of the colony of New York, and of the convention of the State of New York, now in force, and not repugnant to the government established by this constitution, shall be considered as making part of the laws of this State; subject, nevertheless, to such alterations and provisions as the legislature of this Stnte may, from time to time, make concerning the same.

9. North Carolina

Constitution of North Carolina — 1776
The Constitution of North Carolina did not address this issue. It was addressed in Statute law.
North Carolina, Act of 1715, Chap. 5
2. Be it therefore enacted by the authority aforesaid, and it is hereby enacted and declared, That the common law is, and shall be, in force, in this government, except such part in the practice, in the issuing and return of writs, and proceedings in the court of Westminster, which for want of several officers cannot be put in execution; which ought to be supplied by rules of the general court of this government, being first approved of by the governor and council, which shall be good in law, from time to time, till it shall be altered by act of assembly.
3. And be it further enacted and declared by the authority aforesaid, That all statute laws of England, providing for the privileges of the people, as also, all statute laws made for limitation of actions, and preventing of vexatious law suits, and for preventing immorality and fraud, and confirming inheritances and titles of land, are and shall be in force here, although this province, or the plantations in general, are not therein named.
North Carolina, Act of 1778, Chap. 133
An act to enforce such parts of the statute and common laws al have been heretofore in force and use here, and the acts of Assembly made and passed when this territory was under the government of the late proprietors and the crown of Great Britain, and for reviving the several acts therein mentioned.
1. WHEREAS doubts may arise, upon the revolution in government, whether any and what laws continue in force here: for prevention of which,
2. Be it enacted, &c. That all such statute's, and such parts of the common law, as were heretofore in force and use within this territory, (b) and all the acts of the late general assemblies thereof, or so much of the said statutes, common law, and acts assembly, as are not destructive of, repugnant to, or inconsistent with the freedom and independence of this state, and the form of government therein established, and which have not been otherwise provided for, in the whole or in part, not abrogated, repealed, expired, or become obsolete, are hereby declared to be in full force within this state.

10. Pennsylvania

Constitution of Pennsylvania — 1776
The Constitution of New Hampshire did not address this issue. It was addressed in Statute law. There is a provision using a noteworthy turn of phrase.
SECT. 42. Every foreigner of good character who comes to settle in this state, having first taken an oath or affirmation of allegiance to the same, may purchase, or by other just means acquire, hold, and transfer land or other real estate; and after one year's residence, shall be deemed a free denizen thereof, and entitled to all the rights of a natural born subject of this state, except that he shall not be capable of being elected a representative until after two years residence.
Pennsylvania, Act of 1777, An Act to revive and put in force such and so much of the late laws of the province on Pennsylvania, as is judged necessary to be in force in this commonwealth, and to revive and establish the Courts of Justice, and for other purposes therein mentioned.
II. Be it therefore enacted, and it is hereby enacted, That each and every one of the laws or acts of General Assembly, that were in force and binding on the inhabitants of the said be province on the fourteenth day of May last, shall be in force from and and binding on the inhabitants of this state from and after the tenth day of February next, as fully and effectually, to all intents and purpores, as if the said laws, and each of them, had been made or enacted by this General Assembly; and all and every person and persons whomsoever are hereby enjoined and required to yield obedience to the said laws, as the case may require until the said laws or acts of General Assembly respectively shall be repealed or altered, or until they expire by their own limitation; and the common law and such of the statute laws of England as have heretofore been in force in the said province, except as is hereafter excepted.
Morris’s Lessee v. Vanderen, S. Ct. of Pennsylvania, 1 Dallas (Pa) 64, (1782)
It is the opinion of the court, however, that the common law of England has always been in force in Pennsylvania; that all statutes made in Great Britain, before the settlement of Pennsylvania, have no force here, unless they are convenient and adapted to the circumstances of the country; and that all statutes made since the settlement of Pennsylvania, have no force here, unless the colonies are particularly named. (c) The spirit of the act of assembly passed in 1718 supports the opinion of the court.
The statute of limitations, 32 Hen. VIIL, c. 2, has always been received in Pennsylvania.
Republica v. Mesca et al, Court of Oyer and Terminer at Philadelphia, 1 Dallas (Pa) 73 (1783)
The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the court as follows: —
MCKEAN, C. J. — The point before the court has been well argued; and on a full consideration of the subject, we now find little difficulty in pronouncing our decision. The first legislature under the commonwealth, has clearly fixed the rule, respecting the extension of British statutes, by enacting that “such of the statutes as have been in force in the late province of Pennsylvania, should remain in force, till altered by the legislature;” and it appears in evidence, that the 28 Edw. III, c. 13, has been in force in the late province, since a trial per medietatum linguæ was allowed in the case of a burglary committed by one Ottenreed, in the mansion-house of Mr. Clifford.
United States v. Worrall, U.S. Circuit Court, District of Pennsylvania, 2 Dallas (Pa) 384 (1798)
The prosecution against Henfield was not expressly on the treaty, but on the law of nations, which is a part of the common law of the United States; and the power of indicting for a breach of treaty, not expressly providing the means of enforeing performance in the particular instance, is itself a common-law power. Unless the judicial system of the United States justified a recourse to common law, against an individual guilty of a breach of treaty, the offence, where no specific penalty was to be found in the treaty, would, therefore, remain unpunished.
The Will of Sarah Zane, Opinion of the Circuit Court of the United States, Eastern District of Pennsylvania (1833)
The first law passed on the change of government, declared the province laws in force till altered or repealed; also the common law and such parts of the statute laws of England as had been before in force.—” And so much of any law or act of Assembly as declares, orders, directs, commands any matter or thing repugnant to, or inconsistent with the constitution, is hereby declared not to be revived, but shall be null and void, and of no force or effect.” 1 Dallas' Laws, 722.

11. Rhode Island

Constitution of Rhode Island — 1842. (superceded charter of 1663)
Sec 13. No man in a court of common law shall be compelled to give evidence criminating himself.
Rhode Island, Act of April 30, 1700, An Act, for putting in Force the Laws of England in all Cases, where no Particular Law of this Colony hath Provided a Remedy.
Be it Enacted by the General Assembly, and by the Authority of the same, That in all Actions, Matters, Causes and things whatsoever, where no Particular Law of this Colony is made to Decide and Determine the same; that then and in all such Cases the laws of England shall be put in Force to Issue, Determine and Decide the same. Any Usage, Custom or Law to the contrary hereof notwithstanding.
Rhode Island, Act of 1750 (1749?), “a bill for introducing into this colony, such of the statutes of England, as are agreeable to the constitution, and make report of their doings, the greatest part of whom, presented what followeth; [list of English statutes] … and all and every of the statutes, aforesaid, be, and they are hereby introduced into this colony, and shall be in full force therein, until the General Assembly shall order otherwise.”
Whereas, this Assembly, at their session in October last, appointed a committee, to prepare a bill for introducing into this colony, such of the statutes of England, as are agreeable to the constitution, and make report of their doings, the greatest part of whom, presented what followeth:
"We, the subscribers, being appointed to report what statutes of Great Britain are, and ought to be in force in this colony, do report as followeth: that the following statutes, viz.:
The statute of Merton, concerning dower.
The statute of Westminster the first, as far as it concerns bail.
The statute of Glocester.
The statute of Westminster the second, de donis conditionalibus.
The statutes of the 1st Henry V., of additions.
The statues of partition, in general.
The statutes of the 32 Henry VIII., concerning leases, saving and excepting the last paragraph of the said statute.
The statutes of 21 James I., chapter 16th, for limiting real actions; and that of 32 Henry VIII., chapter 2d.
The statutes of James and Elizabeth, and all statutes that concern bastardy, as applicable to the constitution of this colony.
All statutes that are against criminal offenders, so far as they are descriptive ot the crime; and where the law of this colony hath not described and enjoined the punishment, then that part of the statute that relates to the punishment, also; always saving and exceping such statutes, as from the nature of the offences mentioned in them, are confined to Great Britain, only.
The statute of Henry III., commonly called the statute of uses.
The statute of 29 Charles II., commonly called the statute of frauds and perjuries.
The statutes of 22 and 23 Charles II., chapter 10th, for distributing the estates of intestates.
The statute of 3 and 4 William and Mary, chapter 14th.
The statute of 4 and 5 Anne, chapter 16th, relating to joint tenants, and tenants in common.
That part of the statute of Anne, that subjects lessees that hold over their term against the will of the lessor, to the payment of double rent, during the lime they hold over.
All statutes relating to the poor, and relating to masters and their apprentices; so far as they are applicable in this colony, and where we have no law of the colony.
All which statutes, we are humbly of opinion have heretofore been, and still ought to be in force in this colony.
D. UPDIKE,
J. HONEYMAN, JR.,
J. ALPIN."
And this Assembly, having taken the said report into consideration, do vote and resolve, that all and every of the statutes, aforesaid, be, and they are hereby introduced into this colony, and shall be in full force therein, until the General Assembly shall order otherwise.

12. South Carolina

Constitution of South Carolina — 1776
XXIX. That the resolutions of this or any former congress of this colony, and all laws now of force here, (and not hereby altered,) shall so continue until altered or repealed by the legislature of this colony, unless where they are temporary, in which case they shall expire at the times respectively limited for their duration.
South Carolina, Act of 1712, An Act to put in force in this Province the Several Statutes of the Kingdom of England or South Britain, therein particularly mentioned.
I. Be it enacted by the Most Noble Prince, Henry Duke of Beaufort, Lord Palatine, and the rest of the true and absolute Lords and Proprietors of this Province, by and with the advice and consent of the rest of the members of the General Assembly, now met at Charlestown, for the Southwest part of this Province, and by the authority of the same, That the several statutes, and the several paragraphs and sections, or numbers of the paragraphs of the several statutes of the Kingdom of England, entituled as followeth, and made and enacted in such years of the reigns of the Kings and Queens of England, as before the titles of the several statutes is in this Act set down, and as the same are distinguished and divided into paragraphs and sections or numbers, by Joseph Keble of Gray's Inn, Esq., in his Statutes at Large, from Magna Charta to the end of the reign of King Charles the Second, and continued, with the addition of all the statutes made in the reign of King James the Second, and King William and Queen Mary, to the end of the last sessions of Parliament, May the third, 1695, in the seventh year of the reign of his late Majesty, King William the third, in two volumes, printed at London, in the year of our Lord one thousand six hundred ninety and five, and as the same are further continued in a third volume of the Statutes at Large, beginning with the seventh and eighth years of the reign of the late King William the third, and continued to the end of the last session of Parliament, March the fourteenth, 1704, in the fourth year of the reign of her presena Majesty, Queen Anne, printed at London in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and six, together with an Addenda to the said tbird volume, beginning with the fourth year of the reign of her present Majesty Queen Anne, and continued to the end of the last session of Parliament, April the first, 1788, in the seventh year of her said present Majestie's reign, printed at London in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eight, and the statutes printed since the said third volume and the addenda, being statutes made in the seventh and eighth years of her present Majestie's reign, at the Parliament summoned to be held at Westminster, the eighth day of July, Anno Dom. 1708, in the seventh year of her Majestie's reign, and by several writs of prorogation begun and holden on the sixteenth day of November, 1708, being the first session of the said Parliament and from thence continued by several prorogations to the fifteenth day of November, 1709, being the second session of the said Parliament, which statutes were printed at London by her Majestie's printers, in the years 1708, 1709 and 1710; are and are hereby to be in as full force, power and virtue as if the same had been specially enacted and made for this Province, or as if the same had been made and enacted therein by any General Assembly thereof, (that is to say,) … [continues for another 180 pages]

13. Virginia

Constitution of Virginia — 1776
The Constitution of Virginia did not address this issue. It was addressed in Statute law and at the Constitutional Convention of Virginia in 1788.
Patrick Henry, Debates and Other Proceedings of the Convention of Virginia, 2nd Ed., pp. 316-17.
When our government was first instituted in Virginia, we declared the common law of England to be in force.
Virginia, Statute § 1-200, The Common Law, (Code 1919, § 2, § 1-10; 2005, c. 839.)
§ 1-200. The common law.
The common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue in full force within the same, and be the rule of decision, except as altered by the General Assembly.
(Code 1919, § 2, § 1-10; 2005, c. 839.)

14. Vermont

Vermont Act of November 4, 1797; An Act, adopting the common law of England, and declaring that all persons shall be equally entitled to the benefit and privilege of law and justice.
Sect. 1. It is hereby enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Vermont, That so much of common law of England, as is applicable to the local situation, and circumstances, and is not repugnant to the constitution, or to any of the acts of the legislature of this state, be, and hereby is adopted law, within this state; and all courts are to take notice thereof, and govern themselves accordingly.
1 V.S.A. § 271, common law adopted
§ 271. Common law adopted
So much of the common law of England as is applicable to the local situation and circumstances and is not repugnant to the constitution or laws shall be laws in this state and courts shall take notice thereof and govern themselves accordingly.

15. District of Columbia

District of Columbia, Act of February 27, 1801, An Act concerning the District of Columbia. [2 Stat. 103]
SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the laws of the state of Virginia, as they now exist, shall be and continue in force in that part of the District of Columbia, which was ceded by the said state to the United States, and by them accepted for the permanent seat of government; and that the laws of the state of Maryland, as they now exist, shall be and continue in force in that part of the said district, which was ceded by that state to the United States and by them accepted as aforesaid.
District of Columbia, Act of March 3, 1801, An Act supplementary to the act intituled “An act concerning the District of Columbia.” [2 Stat. 115]
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That all indictments shall run in the name of the United States, and conclude, against the peace and government thereof. And all fines penalties and forfeitures accruing under the laws of the states of Maryland and Virginia, which by adoption have become the laws of this district…
District of Columbia, Act of May 3, 1802, An Act additional to, and amendatory of, an act, intituled “An act concerning the District of Columbia.” [2 Stat. 193]
Be it enacted by the Senate and House oj Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the circuit court of the county of Washington, in the territory of Columbia, shall have power to proceed in all common law and chancery causes which now are, or hereafter shall be instituted before it, in which either of the parties reside without the said territory, in the same way that non-residents are proceeded against in the general court or in the supreme court of chancery in the state of Maryland.
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the circuit court of the county of Alexandria, in the district of Columbia, shall have power to proceed in all common law and chancery causes which now are, or hereafter shall be instituted before it, in which either of the parties are non-residents of said district of Columbia, in the same way, and under the same regulations observed by the district court or by the high court of chancery in Virginia, in proceeding against non-residents.

16. Northwest Territory

Northwest Territory, Act of July 14, 1795, A Law declaring what laws shall be in force.
The common law of England, all statutes or acts of the British parliament made in aid of the common law, prior to the fourth year of the reign of King James the first (and which are of a general nature, not local to that kingdom) and also the several laws in force in this Territory, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered, as of full force, until repealed by legislative authority, or disapproved of by congress.

Thanks for more thoughtful answers.

I don’t have much use for either the legislature (Congress) or Usurper Biden, either one.

It looks to me that if we don’t quickly tell the feds (including the federal judiciary) to pound sand, we will quickly lose our country due to the invasion. (I’m in Texas, and our spineless governor is doing nothing to stop the invasion.)

I’m in favor of secession if we first try “alter or abolish,” and that fails.

Unfortunately, that will mean the end of the USA as a super power, and then we will probably be invaded by China, not to mention the refugees of the entire world.

I agree with your assessment; Texas is in the same shape as most of the rest of the country—the cities are communist, and the urban is not. The cities dominate. Once the left controls the ballots, they cheat and flip the state.