Posted on 12/29/2020 8:01:00 AM PST by Homer_J_Simpson
I love, love the complaints on page 3 about "Abused Words".
Even in 1860, amid all their other troubles, people understood that some words were being used & abused in unseemly ways.
Exibit A: "Commencement" -- a fancy word for "begin" and which has now been relegated, mostly, to scholarly events such as graduations.
Somehow it also ended up in military-speak, as in: "commence firing".
Exibit B: "rupture" versus "disrupt" -- I never thought about those being the same thing and today "disrupt" is far more often used...
So I'm glad to see somebody raised objections at the time, though arguably it didn't help. ;-)
It must have seemed a rather bleak New Year celebration with South Carolina’s secession and threat to the federal harbor forts. Plus, the prospect that other Deep South states could follow SC.
Imagine the tension throughout Q1 1861 while the whole country holds its breath waiting for the other shoe to drop.
Buchanan asked Secretary of War John Floyd what exact orders Major Anderson had at Fort Moultrie in Charleston Harbor. Floyd had earlier sent Major Buell to see Anderson. The results were summarized in a December 11, 1860, memorandum that Floyd retrieved, which you posted:
1st Artillery, Commanding Fort Moultrie, S. C. You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War that a collision of the troops with the people of this State shall be avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course with reference to the military force and forts in this harbor, which shall guard against such a collision. He has, therefore, carefully abstained from increasing the force at this point, or taking any measures which might add to the present excited state of the public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt by violence to obtain possession of the public works, or interfere with their occupancy. But as the counsel and acts of rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint these expectations of the Government, he deems it proper that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so unhappy a contingency. He has, therefore, directed me, verbally, to give you such instructions. You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression; and, for that reason, you are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude; but you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor, and, if attacked, you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts; but an attack on, or attempt to take possession of either of them, will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper, to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar defensive steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act. D. P. BUTLER, Assistant Adjutant General. FORT MOULTRIE, S. C, Dec. 11, 1860.Memorandum of verbal instructions to Major Anderson,
This is in conformity to my instructions to Major Buell.
JOHN B. FLOYD, Secretary of War.
Here is some additional history. Buchanan wasn't happy with the wording of the orders, particularly the part about defending yourself to the last extremity. He prepared a new set of orders and asked Floyd to send them to Anderson, which Floyd did on December 21, 1861 [Official Records, Serial 1, Volume 1, page 103]:
War Department,
Washington, December 21, 1860.
Major Anderson,
First Artillery, Commanding Fort Moultrie, S. C. :
Sir. : In the verbal instructions communicated to you by Major Buell, you are directed to hold possession of the forts in the harbor of Charleston, and, if attacked, to defend yourself to the last extremity. Under these instructions, you might infer that you are required to make a vain and useless sacrifice of your own life and the lives of the men under your command, upon a mere point of honor. This is far from the President's intentions. You are to exercise a sound military discretion on this subject.
It is neither expected nor desired that you should expose your own life or that of your men in a hopeless conflict in defense of these forts. If they are invested or attacked by a force so superior that resistance would, in your judgment, be a useless waste of life, it will be your duty to yield to necessity, and make the best terms in your power.
This will be the conduct of an honorable, brave, and humane officer, and you will be fully justified iu such action. These orders are strictly confidential, and not to be communicated even to the officers under your command, without close necessity.
Very respectfully,
JOHN B. FLOYD.
The book, "Don Carlos Buell: most promising of all" by Stephen Douglas Engle says [Link, pages 61-62] says the following about Anderson's response to Floyd's letter:
When Anderson received the secretary's latest words of guidance, he became furious. Buell's message had allowed Anderson to decide for himself when and how to act. Now the administration was drawing back.
If Anderson thought he already had approval to move to the fort, he wouldn't have wired Washington on December 22 saying [Official Records, Serial 1, Volume 1, pages 105, 106]:
I think that I could, however, were I to receive instructions so to do, throw my garrison into that work [Sumter], but I should have to sacrifice the greater of my stores as it is now too late to attempt their removal.
Anderson’s move to Sumter certainly violated Buell’s Dec. 11 orders which stated: “You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression; and, for that reason, you are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude.” Charleston used patrol boats to keep vessels from approaching Fort Sumter, yet Anderson didn’t think his move would possibly be construed as a hostile attitude?
Here is how Charlestonians reacted. Anderson's move to Sumter did not play well with South Carolinians. From page 8 of the Jan. 1, 1861, New York Times, reporting an article from the Charleston Courier of Dec. 28, 1860. (Italics as reported in the Times):
The newspaper offices were besieged, the hotel halls were thronged, and even the grave and serious gentlemen composing the State Convention shared in the general excitement. On all hands anger and indignation was expressed at the supposed perfidious conduct of the Federal authorities, at whose instance it was first thought the movement was made. The people were greatly incensed at the idea of a willful breach of those assurances of non action which had been volunteered by the Government at Washington and upon which so much reliance and confidence had been placed by the entire population, that every impulse to take the necessary precautions for their own safety had been restrained.
Instinctively men flew to arms. Orders were immediately issued to the following Companies to hold themselves in readiness for service: Washington Light Infantry, Capt. C. H. Simonton; Carolina Light Infantry, Capt. B. G. Pinckney; Meagher Guards, Capt. Ed. McCready, Jr.; altogether forming a portion of the Regiment of Rifles, commanded by Col. J. J. Pettigrew and Major Ellison Capers; also, to the Marion Artillery, Capt. J. G. King; Lafayette Artillery, Capt. J. J. Pope, Jr.; Washington Artillery, Capt. G. H. Walter; German Artillery, Capt. C. Nohrden; all under command of Lieut. W. G. De Saussure; Adjutant, Jas. Simmons, Jr.; Sergeant-Major, E. Prioleau Ravenel; Quartermaster-Sergeant, J. R. Macbeth; Surveyor, A Barbot: Surgeons, P. Gervais Robinson and Middleton Mitchel. Also, the Palmetto Guard, Capt. Thomas Middleton, and Cadet Riflemen, W. S. Elliot.
All the military forces thus ordered out promptly obeyed the summons, and the streets were soon enlivened by the appearance of individual members of the different organizations in their uniforms.
Even the people of Charleston were aware of Buchanan’s promise not to change the disposition of troops in Charleston Harbor in exchange for not placing South Carolina troops into Fort Sumter. How could Anderson have not been aware of it? Anderson really escalated tensions by his move.
Another article from that issue of the Times quoted from the Courier as saying:
Maj. Robert Anderson, U. S. A., has achieved the unenviable distinction of opening civil war between American citizens by an act of gross breach of faith.
Floyd's second orders on December 21 reinforce his original words:
Bruce Catton, The Coming Fury
Home Letters of General Sherman, edited by M.A. DeWolfe Howe, 1909
HEADQUARTERS, 1st January, 1861.
Be it known, to all concerned, that a state of things exists which makes it my duty to warn all public vessels of the United States or any vessel bearing aid and supplies to the garrison at Fort Sumter, or in any way directed to exercise any authority whatever in the waters of South Carolina, that they are hereby forbid to do so, and to abstain from entering especially the harbor of Charleston.
Given under my hand and the seal of the State, the day and year aforesaid:
(Signed)
F. W. PICKENS,
Gov. amd Comm’r in Ch'f in and over
the State of South Carolina."
SOURCE: Samuel Wylie Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter, 1860-1861, p. 138
https://civilwarnotebook.blogspot.com/2015/05/proclamation-of-governor-francis-w.html
WASHINGTON, D. C,
January 1st, 1861.
Sir: We have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th December, in reply to a note addressed by us to you on the 28th of the same month, as Commissioners from South Carolina.
In reference to the declaration with which your reply commences, that “your position as President of the United States was clearly defined in the Message to Congress of the 3d instant,” that you possess “no power to change the relations heretofore existing” between South Carolina and the United States, “much less to acknowledge the independence of that State;” and that, consequently, you could meet us only as private gentlemen of the highest character, with an entire willingness to communicate to Congress any proposition we might have to make, we deem it only necessary to say, that the State of South Carolina having, in the exercise of that great right of self-government which underlies all our political organizations, declared herself sovereign and independent, we, as her representatives, felt no special solicitude as to the character in which you might recognize us. Satisfied that the State had simply exercised her unquestionable right, we were prepared, in order to reach substantial good, to waive the formal considerations which your constitutional scruples might have prevented you from extending. We came here, therefore, expecting to be received as you did receive us, and perfectly content with that entire willingness of which you assured us, to submit any proposition to Congress which we might have to make upon the subject of the independence of the State. That willingness was ample recognition of the condition of public affairs which rendered our presence necessary. In this position, however, it is our duty, both to the State which we represent and to ourselves, to correct several important misconceptions of our letter into which you have fallen.
You say, “It was my earnest desire that such a disposition might be made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possesses the power to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of the federal forts in the harbor of Charleston; and I, therefore, deeply regret that, in your opinion, ‘the events of the last twenty-four hours render this impossible.’” We expressed no such opinion, and the language which you quote as ours, is altered in its sense by the omission of a most important part of the sentence. What we did say was: “But the events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossible.” Place that “assurance” as contained in our letter, in the sentence, and we are prepared to repeat it.
Again, professing to quote our language, you say:— “Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting or asking for any explanation, and, doubtless, believing, as you have expressed it, that the officer had acted not only without, but against my orders,” &c. We expressed no such opinion in reference to the belief of the people of South Carolina. The language which you have quoted, was applied solely and entirely to our assurance, obtained here, and based, as you well know, upon your own declaration — a declaration which, at that time, it was impossible for the authorities of South Carolina to have known. But, without following this letter into all its details, we propose only to meet the chief points of the argument.
Some weeks ago, the State of South Carolina declared her intention, in the existing condition of public affairs, to secede from the United States. She called a Convention of her people, to put her declaration in force. The Convention met, and passed the Ordinance of Secession. All this you anticipated, and your course of action was thoroughly considered. In your annual message, you declared you had no right, and would not attempt, to coerce a seceding State, but that you were bound by your constitutional oath, and would defend the property of the United States within the borders of South Carolina, if an attempt was made to take it by force. Seeing very early that this question of property was a difficult and delicate one, you manifested a desire to settle it without collision. You did not reinforce the garrisons in the harbor of Charleston. You removed a distinguished and veteran officer from the command of Fort Moultrie, because he attempted to increase his supply of ammunition. You refused to send additional troops to the same garrison when applied for by the officer appointed to succeed him. You accepted the resignation of the oldest and most eminent member of your Cabinet, rather than allow these garrisons to be strengthened. You compelled an officer stationed at Fort Sumter, to return immediately to the Arsenal, forty muskets which he had taken to arm his men. You expressed not to one, but to many, of the most distinguished of our public characters, whoso testimony will be placed upon the record, whenever it is necessary, your anxiety for a peaceful termination of this controversy, and your willingness not to disturb the military status of the forts, if Commissioners should be sent to the Government, whose communications you promised to submit to Congress. You received and acted on assurances from the highest official authorities of South Carolina, that no attempt would be made to disturb your possession of the forts and property of the United States, if you would not disturb their existing condition until Commissioners had been sent, and the attempt to negotiate had failed. You took from the members of the House of Representatives, a written memorandum that no such attempt should be made, “provided that no reinforcements shall be sent into those forts, and their relative military status shall remain as at present.” And, although you attach no force to the acceptance of such a paper, although you “considered it as nothing more in effect than the promise of highly honorable gentlemen,” as an obligation on one side without corresponding obligation on the other, it must be remembered (if we are rightly informed) that you were pledged, if you ever did send reinforcements, to return it to those from whom you had received it before you executed your resolution. You sent orders to your officers, commanding them strictly to follow a line of conduct in conformity with such an understanding.
Beside all this, you had received formal and official notice from the Governor of South Carolina, that we had been appointed Commissioners, and were on our way to Washington. You knew the implied condition under which we came; our arrival was notified to you, and an hour appointed for an interview. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday, at three o'clock, and you appointed an interview with us at one the next day. Early on that day, Thursday, the news was received here of the movement of Major Anderson. That news was communicated to you immediately, and you postponed our meeting until half-past two o'clock, on Friday, in order that you might consult your Cabinet. On Friday we saw you, and we called upon you then to redeem your pledge. You could not deny it. With the facts we have stated, and in the face of the crowning and conclusive fact, that your Secretary of War had resigned his seat in the Cabinet, upon the publicly avowed ground that the action of Major Anderson had violated the pledged faith of the Government, and that unless the pledge was instantly redeemed, he was dishonored; denial was impossible; you did not deny it. You do not deny it now, but you seek to escape from its obligation on two grounds: 1st, That we terminated all negotiation by demanding, as a preliminary, the withdrawal of the United States troops from the harbor of Charleston; and 2d, That the authorities of South Carolina, instead of asking explanation, and giving you the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property of the United States. We will examine both.
In the first place, we deny positively, that we have ever, in any way, made any such demand. Our letter is in your possession; it will stand by this on the record. In it, we inform you of the objects of our mission. We say that it would have been our duty to have assured you of our readiness to commence negotiations with the most earnest and anxious desire to settle all questions between us amicably, and to our mutual advantage, but that events had rendered that assurance impossible. We stated the events, and we said that, until some satisfactory explanation of these events was given us, we could not proceed, and then, having made this request for explanation, we added, “and, in conclusion, we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances they are a standing menace, which renders negotiation impossible,” &c. “Under present circumstances!” What circumstances? Why, clearly, the occupation of Fort Sumter, and the dismantling of Fort Moultrie by Major Anderson, in the face of your pledges, and without explanation or practical disavowal. And there is nothing in the letter, which would or could have prevented you from declining to withdraw the troops, and offering the restoration of the status to which you were pledged, if such had been your desire. It would have been wiser and better, in our opinion, to have withdrawn the troops, and this opinion we urged upon you, but we demanded nothing but such an explanation of the events of the last twenty-four hours as would restore our confidence in the spirit with which the negotiation should be conducted. In relation to this withdrawal of the troops from the harbor, we are compelled, however, to notice one passage of your letter. Referring to it, you say: “This I cannot do. This I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. No allusion to it had ever been made in any communication between myself and any human being.”
In reply to this statement, we are compelled to say, that your conversation with us left upon our minds the distinct impression that you did seriously contemplate the withdrawal of the troops from Charleston harbor. And, in support of this impression, we would add that we have the positive assurance of gentlemen of the highest possible public reputation, and the most unsullied integrity — men whose name and fame, secured by long service and patriotic achievement, place their testimony beyond cavil — that such suggestions had been made to, and urged upon you by them, and had formed the subject of more than one earnest discussion with you. And it was this knowledge that induced us to urge upon you a policy which had to recommend it, its own wisdom and the weight of such authority. As to the second point, that the authorities of South Carolina, instead of asking explanations, and giving you the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property of the United States, we would observe, 1st. That, even if this were so, it does not avail you for defence, for the opportunity for decision was afforded you before these facts occurred. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday. The news from Major Anderson reached here early on Thursday, and was immediately communicated to you. All that day, men of the highest consideration — men who had striven successfully to lift you to your great office — who had been your tried and true friends through the troubles of your administration — sought you, and entreated you to act — to act at once. They told you that every hour complicated your position. They only asked you to give the assurance that, if the facts were so — that, if the commander had acted without, and against your orders, and in violation of your pledges, that you would restore the status you had pledged your honor to maintain.
You refused to decide. Your Secretary at War — your immediate and proper adviser in this whole matter — waited anxiously for your decision, until he felt that delay was becoming dishonor. More than twelve hours passed, and two Cabinet meetings had adjourned before you knew what the authorities of South Carolina had done, and your prompt decision at any moment of that time, would have avoided the subsequent complications. But if you had known the acts of the authorities of South Carolina, should that have prevented your keeping your faith? What was the condition of things? For the last sixty days, you have had in Charleston harbor, not force enough to hold the 2 forts against an equal enemy. Two of them were empty; one of those two, the most important in the harbor. It could have been taken at any time. You ought to know better than any man, that it would have been taken, but for the efforts of those who put their trust in your honor. Believing that they were threatened by Fort Sumter especially, the people were, with difficulty, restrained from securing, without blood, the possession of this important fortress. After many and reiterated assurances given on your behalf, which we cannot believe unauthorized, they determined to forbear, and in good faith sent on their Commissioners to negotiate with you. They meant you no harm; wished you no ill. They thought of you kindly, believed you true, and were willing, as far as was consistent with duty, to spare you unnecessary and hostile collision. Scarcely had their Commissioners left, than Major Anderson waged war. — No other words will describe his action. It was not a peaceful change from one fort to another; it was a hostile act in the highest sense — one only justified in the presence of a superior enemy, and in imminent peril. He abandoned his position, spiked his guns, burned his gun-carriages, made preparations for the destruction of his post, and withdrew under cover of the night to a safer position. This was war. No man could have believed (without your assurance) that any officer could have taken such a step, “not only without orders, but against orders.” What the State did, was in simple self-defence; for this act, with all its attending circumstances, was as much war as firing a volley; and war being thus begun, until those commencing it explained their action, and disavowed their intention, there was no room for delay; and, even at this moment, while we are writing, it is more than probable, from the tenor of your letter, that reinforcements are hurrying on to the conflict, so that when the first gun shall be fired, there will have been, on your part, one continuous consistent series of actions commencing in a demonstration essentially warlike, supported by regular reinforcement, and terminating in defeat or victory. And all this without the slightest provocation; for, among the many things which you have said, there is one thing you cannot say — you have waited anxiously for news from the seat of war, in hopes that delay would furnish some excuse for this precipitation. But this “tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act, on the part of the authorities of South Carolina,” (which is the only justification of Major Anderson,) you are forced to admit “has not yet been alleged.” But you have decided. You have resolved to hold by force what you have obtained through our misplaced confidence, and by refusing to disavow the action of Major Anderson, have converted his violation of orders into a legitimate act of your Executive authority. Be the issue what it may, of this we are assured, that, if Fort Moultrie has been recorded in history as a memorial of Carolina gallantry, Fort Sumter will live upon the succeeding page as an imperishable testimony of Carolina faith.
By your course, you have probably rendered civil war inevitable. Be it so. If you choose to force this issue upon us, the State of South Carolina will accept it, and, relying upon Him who is the God of justice as well as the God of hosts, will endeavor to perform the great duty which lies before her, hopefully, bravely and thoroughly.
Our mission being one for negotiation and peace, and your note leaving us without hope of a withdrawal of the troops from Fort Sumter, or of the restoration of the status quo existing at the time of our arrival, and intimating, as we think, your determination to reinforce the garrison in the harbor of Charleston, we respectfully inform you that we propose returning to Charleston on to-morrow afternoon.
We have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully,
R. W. BARNWELL,
J. H. ADAMS,
JAMES L. ORR.
Commissioners.
To his Excellency, the President
of the United States.
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
3½ o'clock, Wednesday.
This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to receive it.
SOURCE: The Correspondence Between the Commissioners of the State of So. Ca. to the Government at Washington and the President of the United States, p. 12-20
https://civilwarnotebook.blogspot.com/2018/08/commissioners-of-state-of-south.html
"You are also authorized to take similar defensive steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act."
What tangible evidence did Anderson have? None. As I remember, the governor had promised to stop any mob from attacking Fort Moultrie.
Besides, Floyd’s communication to Anderson was actually not clear to Anderson. From “Days of Defiance” by Maury Klein (page 152):
(page 152) ”Buell’s visit did little to ease Anderson’s anxiety. Floyd had ordered him to look the situation over and give Anderson instructions that were neither explicit nor to be considered as orders. … The ambiguities nagged at Anderson, who liked things clear and by the book. … The [Charleston] Courier’s Washington correspondent warned of Buell’s visit, “See that they make no change in the distribution of soldiers, so as to put them all in Fort Sumter; that would be dangerous to us.”(page 153) “ … steamers had begun patrolling the waters between Moultrie and Sumter on the night of the 20th. … He [Anderson] knew the Carolinians wanted to keep any federal troops from going to Sumter.”
Anderson obviously knew he did not have orders to move to Sumter. As I posted above in my post 24 from the Official Records, on December 22, Anderson practically begged Washington for orders to move his forces over to Fort Sumter:
“I think that I could, however, were I to receive instructions so to do, throw my garrison into that work [Sumter], but I should have to sacrifice the greater of my stores as it is now too late to attempt their removal.”
He received no such orders.
Now let’s look at how Washington officials reacted to the news that Anderson had moved to Fort Sumter (quotes below from “Days of Defiance”).
Trescot (Assistant Secretary of State): “I will pledge my life that if it has been done it has been without orders from Washington.”Floyd (Secretary of War): Anderson’s move “would not be only against orders but in the face of orders.”
Buchanan: “Buchanan slumped into a chair. ‘My God! … Are calamities … never to come singly! I call God to witness – you gentlemen better than anybody else that this is not only without but against my orders. It is against my policy.' ”
Floyd to Buell: “This is a very unfortunate move of Major Anderson. It has made war inevitable.”
And once the Mississippi is retaken, South Carolina won't be so far "astern," will it?
For clear evidence, you need look no further than Homer's post #28, of Gov. Pickens' orders.
They sound ominous & threatening to me.
I'd want to be as safe as possible.
In Homer's post #27 an astute military observer notes how vulnerable Fort Moultrie is.
So why ever would Maj. Anderson delay moving out of it?
The Diary of George Templeton Strong, Edited by Allan Nevins and Milton Halsey Thomas
What? The "stay out of our waters" statement issued on January 1, 1861? That statement, made after Anderson moved to Fort Sumter on December 26, 1860 against his orders, justified Anderson to move his command? Man, that Anderson was clairvoyant.
A "stay out of our waters" statement is what any self governing entity might say to potential enemies.
Remember what South Carolina said in its causes for secession document? They cited the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution: "... the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." Respectively means individually.
That Amendment was proposed by Madison in 1791 because three states had put in their ratification documents that they could resume or reassume their own governance, and four other states had proposed Tenth Amendment like statements that accomplished the same thing. That made a majority of the original states, and, like it or not, the Amendment was ratified and became part of the Constitution. It overruled anything to the contrary in the earlier text of the Constitution. As Madison said when proposing what became the Tenth Amendment, the Constitution already means this, but it doesn't hurt to add it (my paraphrasing of his words).
In Homer's post #27 an astute military observer notes how vulnerable Fort Moultrie is.
So why ever would Maj. Anderson delay moving out of it?
Moultrie could have been overrun eventually if South Carolina put enough troops into the effort. However, Anderson had had the entrance to Moultrie made such that people had to crawl through a tunnel one by one to get into the fort. Foster, I think it was Foster, had experimented in Moultrie with buried mines that popped up out of the ground when trod upon. In his experiments he had not yet added an explosive charge that would detonate in the air after it popped up out of the ground. Workers had told the South Carolinians of the mine experiments at Moultrie. Moultrie's soldiers could sweep invaders off of the upper parts of the fort with their muskets, but Moultrie's defenders could be quickly overcome if enough soldiers came at them. I don't doubt that Moultrie could be overcome.
The point, however, is that the December 21th order to Anderson from Floyd (that was dictated to Floyd by Buchanan) said the following (from the Official Records): Mp>
Sir. : In the verbal instructions communicated to you by Major Buell, you are directed to hold possession of the forts in the harbor of Charleston, and, if attacked, to defend yourself to the last extremity. Under these instructions, you might infer that you are required to make a vain and useless sacrifice of your own life and the lives of the men under your command, upon a mere point of honor. This is far from the President's intentions. You are to exercise a sound military discretion on this subject.
It is neither expected nor desired that you should expose your own life or that of your men in a hopeless conflict in defense of these forts. If they are invested or attacked by a force so superior that resistance would, in your judgment, be a useless waste of life, it will be your duty to yield to necessity, and make the best terms in your power.
This will be the conduct of an honorable, brave, and humane officer, and you will be fully justified in such action. These orders are strictly confidential, and not to be communicated even to the officers under your command, without close necessity.
In other words, if a superior force came at you in Moultrie, surrender before your people get killed. As I have pointed out earlier from a book about Buell, Anderson was upset by Floyd's latest orders because they took away any flexibility he had under the orders he got from Buell. Consequently, on the next day, December 22, Anderson asked Washington for orders to move to Sumter, which Washington never gave him.
Moving Anderson's troops to Sumter would piss the Carolinians off, something Anderson knew and Buell's "orders" told him to avoid. It would also put Anderson's forces in a situation where they could be starved out eventually. Once in Fort Sumter, Anderson was offered free food supplies by the Governor, but Anderson refused the offer.
Which more than justifies Maj. Anderson's move to Fort Sumter.
rustbucket: "It would also put Anderson's forces in a situation where they could be starved out eventually.
Once in Fort Sumter, Anderson was offered free food supplies by the Governor, but Anderson refused the offer."
Our Lost Causers have posted endlessly on the subject of Gov. Pickens allegedly feeding Maj. Anderson's troops in Fort Sumter.
Some insist that such fresh food supplies continued up until the week before Lincoln's "war fleet" arrived on April 12.
But I've seen no historical evidence that Anderson received anything from Charleston while in Fort Sumter, and certainly his communications with Washington suggested nothing of the kind.
You might try searching in the Official Records, Serial 1, Volume 1, page 230-231.
Fort Sumter, S. C, April 1, 1861.
Maj. Robert Anderson, First Artillery, Commanding:Major: In compliance with your request, I have the honor to submit the following list of provisions sold to Capt. J. G. Foster, Corps of Engineers, for the subsistence of the employes (sic) in his department at this post, and have expressed the quantities in numbers of rations, viz:
Five and one-half barrels of pork—one thousand four hundred and sixty-seven rations.
Twenty barrels of flour—three thousand four hundred and eighty five rations.
One hundred and eighty pounds hard bread—one hundred and eighty rations.
Two and one-half bushels of beans—one thousand rations.
One hundred and seventy-four pounds coffee—one thousand seven hundred and forty rations.
Seven hundred and seventy-four pounds sugar—five thousand one hundred and sixty rations.These provisions, which have necessarily been consumed by others, would have added to the time we have already been at this post subsistence for the following number of days, respectively:
Pork—Sixteen and twenty-seven-ninetieths days.
Flour and hard bread—Forty and sixty-five-ninetieths days.
Beans—Eleven and one-ninth days.
Coffee—Nineteen and one-third days.
Sugar—Fifty-seven and one-third days.
Or, with what is now on hand, at least thirty-five days of comfortable subsistence for the command, including the laundresses, who were sent away about two months ago.I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
NORMAN J. HALL,
Second Lieutenant, First Artillery, A. A. C. S.
Apparently, Anderson was buying provisions for the outside workmen who remained at the fort, but not for the soldiers. As I remember, the first time Anderson tried to procure beef and other food supplies back in January, the supplies did not arrive. It turned out that the supplier had not been paid for months. This was back when the US government had a severe shortage of money with which to pay its bills (a shortage that you have dismissed as non existent in the past). Even Congressmen were not getting regularly paid back then.
Somehow, Anderson was apparently able to get funding from the US government for the workmen's food supplies and to pay the back bills owed the supplier. But for the troops, Anderson for some reason decided to rely on the provisions he had brought over in the schooners his troops had hijacked in December. It was the food supplies for the troops that were about to run out. I don't know whether Washington's shortage of money contributed to Anderson's decision not buy food for the troops, but to use the food supplies he had brought to Fort Sumter in December to feed the troops.
Dumb decision on Anderson's part. He should have taken the governor up on the offer of food for the fort.
As I remember, any alleged "shortage of money" was instantly solved the same way all such "shortages" have from time-immemorial been solved -- when Congress authorized the treasury to borrow more money.
When did that happen?
Well, for certain on the last day of the 36th Congress, March 3, 1861, but also many times before that.
Consider: Northern Doughfaced Democrat President, New Hampshire's Franklin Pierce, personal friend of Jefferson Davis, was able to reduce the national debt from $66 million in 1852 to $29 million by the end of his term in 1857.
Pierce was a somewhat tragic figure and Democrat in the financial mold of Andrew Jackson.
He was followed in the Presidency by another Northern Doughfaced Democrat, Pennsylvania's James "Lightfoot" Buchanan, who increased the national debt back to $65 million by the end of 1860.
Considering these debt increases typically came a few million dollars at a time, we are looking at something like ten different Congressional actions over Buchanan's four years.
Where did all that money go?
Well... some went for a splendid naval adventure in Paraguay and some to suppressing the Mormon rebellion in Utah, and some kept a Colonel named RE Lee busy chasing "Indian savages" and Mexican "banditti" in Texas -- all those campaigns commanded by Southerners, by the way.
The rest was referred to by Republicans in their 1860 platform:
Just like today...
Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 1859-1865, edited by Don E. Fehrenbacher
Springfield, Illinois, January 3, 1861.
Hon. Simon Cameron.
My dear Sir: When you were here, about the last of December, I handed you a letter saying I should at the proper time nominate you to the Senate for a place in the cabinet. It is due to you and to truth for me to say you were here by my invitation, and not upon any suggestion of your own. You have not as yet signified to me whether you would accept the appointment, and with much pain I now say to you that you will relieve me from great embarrassment by allowing me to recall the offer. This springs from an unexpected complication, and not from any change of my view as to the ability or faithfulness with which you would discharge the duties of the place. I now think I will not definitely fix upon any appointment for Pennsylvania until I reach Washington.
A. Lincoln.
SOURCE: John G. Nicolay & John Hay, Abraham Lincoln Complete Works, Volume 1, p. 665-6
https://civilwarnotebook.blogspot.com/2016/09/abraham-lincoln-to-simon-cameron_70.html
New York January 3d 1861.
My dear Sir,
I have this moment received your note Nothing could be more fair or more satisfactory than the principle you lay down in regard to the formation of your council of official advisers. I shall always be convinced that whatever selection you make it will be made conscientiously.
The community here had been somewhat startled this morning by the positiveness with which a report had been circulated, reaching this city from Washington that Mr. Simon Cameron was to be placed in the Treasury Department. Forgive me if I state to you how we all should regard such an appointment – I believe I may speak for all parties, except perhaps some of the most corrupt in our own – The objection to Mr. Cameron would not be that he does not opinion hold such opinions as we approve, but that there is among all who have observed the course of our public men an utter, ancient and deep seated dullness of his integrity – whether financial or political. The announcement of his appointment, if made on any authority deserving of credit would diffuse a feeling almost like despair. I have no prejudices against Mr Cameron except such as arise from observing in what transactions he has been engaged as I have reason to suppose that whatever opinion had been formed respecting him in this part of the country has been formed on perfectly impartial and disinterested grounds. I pray you, again, to excuse this my giving you this trouble. Do not reply to this letter – Only let us have honest rigidly upright men in the departments – whatever may be their notions of public policy. I am, dear Sir,
W C Bryant
Hon. A. Lincoln.
SOURCES: Abraham Lincoln Papers in the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
https://civilwarnotebook.blogspot.com/2016/07/william-cullen-bryant-to-abraham_47.html
Whereas, The Union is in danger, and, owing to the unhappy divisions existing in Congress, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for that body to concur in both its branches by the requisite majority, so as to enable it either to adopt such measures of legislation, or to recommend to the states such amendments to the Constitution, as are deemed necessary and proper to avert that danger; and
Whereas, In so great an emergency, the opinion and judgment of the people ought to be heard, and would be the best and surest guide to their representatives; therefore,
Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law, without delay, for taking the sense of the people and submitting to their vote the following resolutions (above quoted as "V") as the basis for the final and permanent settlement of those disputes that now disturb the peace of the country and threaten the existence of the Union.
SOURCES: George Ticknor Curtis, Constitutional History of the United States from Their Declaration of Independence to the Close of Their Civil War, Volume 2 , p. 528
https://civilwarnotebook.blogspot.com/2017/09/an-additional-resolution-to-crittenden.html
PRINCETON, Jan. 3d, 1861.
My Dear Sir: — I received last evening a copy of the Southern Presbyterian, for Dec. 29th, 1860, containing a notice headed “The Princeton Review on the State of the Country.” The article in the Review thus denominated, you characterize as “an unfortunate, one-sided and lamentable attack upon the South.” I think, my dear sir, that it will promote the cause of truth and brotherly love which we both have at heart, if you will permit the Editor of the Review to state to your readers in few words the design of the article on which you pronounce so unfavorable a judgment.
It was intended to produce two effects within the limited range of its influence; first, to convince the South that the mass of Northern people are not abolitionists or hostile to the rights and interests of the South; and second, to convince the North that the course adopted by the abolitionists is unjust and unscriptural. You say that the writer of the article in question “affirms that the aggressions or grievances of which the South complains have no real existence.” The article, however, says that the South has “just grounds of complaint, and that the existing exasperation towards the North is neither unnatural nor unaccountable.” It says that “the spirit, language and conduct of the abolitionists is an intolerable grievance.” It says that “tampering with slaves is a great crime. That it is a grievance that would justify almost any available means of redress.” It admits that all opposition to the restoration of fugitive slaves, whether by individuals, by mobs or legislative enactments, is immoral, and that the South has a right to complain of all such opposition. It admits that the territories are the common property of the country, and that the South has the same rights to them that the North has, and it calls for an equal division of these territories on the plan of the Missouri compromise. The article does not deny the reality of the grievances complained of, but it denies that those grievances are justly chargeable on the people of the North. It endeavors to prove, by a simple process of arithmetic, that the abolitionists against whom these charges justly lie, are comparatively a mere handful of the people of the North. Southern men and ministers of the highest eminence pronounce the abolition party to be not only Antichristian but atheistic, to be perjured and instinct with the spirit of the French revolutionists, and then the North is pronounced to be thoroughly abolitionized. We know this to be untrue. We know this to be a false judgment pronounced upon thousands and hundreds of thousands of pious, God-fearing people. We hold it, therefore, to be a solemn duty to all concerned to show that such judgment is altogether unfounded, in fact. Such is the main design of the article in question. Whatever may be thought of its execution, the design must of necessity commend itself to every good man. If Southern men knew the North as we know it, they would no more think of secession than they would of suicide. We have done what we could out of a pure conscience to convince the South that we are not hostile to its rights and interests. If our Southern brethren take this in evil part we shall deeply regret it, but cannot repent of what has the full assent of our reason and conscience.
* * * It nowhere advocates coercion in the present crisis. It deprecates all appeal to force, and urges acquiescence in the recommendation of a convention of the States, that disunion, if it must come, may at least be peaceably effected.
EDITOR OF THE “PRINCETON REVIEW.”
SOURCE: Archibald Alexander Hodge, The Life of Charles Hodge, p. 462-3
https://civilwarnotebook.blogspot.com/2015/06/reverend-dr-charles-hodge-to-editor-of.html
There is a lot of truth in what you say. [Source].
When Congress met in December 1860, ‘the treasury was empty – bankrupt. There was no money to pay the public creditors, who were then pressing for payment. There was not money enough even to pay members of Congress.'” 26 Flaherty noted that the outgoing Buchanan Administration, especially southern sympathizers, effectively cleaned out the government’s coffers before departing office in the winter of 1860-1861. 27 “The management of Secretary [Howell] Cobb had thoroughly depleted the Treasury: he had spared no efforts to accomplish this result. On the 4th of March, 1861, there was not money enough left in its vaults to pay for the daily consumption of stationery; no city dealer would furnish it on credit,” remembered Treasury official Lucius Chittenden.
However, the Democrats weren't the only problem. Republicans had effective control of the House in the 1860-1861 session. That session of Congress basically proposed increasing the government debt from almost 70 million to 250 million. See [my old post 107],
A Republican-controlled coalition controlled the House in the 36th Congress (1860-1861); Democrats controlled the Senate until Feb. 4, 1861. The Tariff Bill mentioned in my post 107 was being pushed by Republicans and was finally passed and signed into law on March 2, 1861, after many Southern Democrats had left the Senate.
To pay for the Civil War Federal spending rose from its historical average of around 2% of GDP in 1860 to peak at 13% of GDP in 1865, while national debt rose from $65 million in 1860 to nearly $3 billion in 1866, then about 33% of GDP.
It took until 1880 to reduce spending below 3% of GDP and until 1890 to get the national debt down to 10% of GDP.
Those numbers never fully returned to pre-war averages.
By stark contrast, today's Federal spending & debt are both way off the charts.
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