Posted on 06/06/2019 9:13:27 AM PDT by Yo-Yo
Miami
After takeoff, the Boeing 737 suddenly warns pilots that the plane is about to lose lift and stall, an erroneous signal from a bad sensor. The control column shakes, loudly. Pilot Roddy Guthrie diagnoses the problem—and then the plane’s nose suddenly pitches down, on its own. Emergency No. 2.
He pulls back on the control column to keep climbing and gets the airplane back to the proper orientation, nose up. But it happens again, with more force. And then a third time, with even more force, so that he’s looking almost straight down at the ground—the most terrifying sight for any pilot.
The episode, a repeat of the system failure suspected in two Boeing 737 MAX crashes, takes place in a Boeing full-motion flight simulator Wednesday morning. A few minutes later, Capt. Guthrie and another pilot try again, this time with Boeing’s proposed software fixes installed—software that’s critical to Boeing, airlines and travelers world-wide.
(Excerpt) Read more at wsj.com ...
Capt. Guthrie, fleet captain for the 737 at American Airlines , faces the same problem with the faulty sensor. This time the stick shaker gives its same loud warning, the result of the faulty sensor, but the 737’s computer never points the airplane down. A yellow caution light comes on and he easily maintains control.
“You don’t see compounding emergencies going on,” Capt. Guthrie says. “The second emergency never occurs. You’ve eliminated a major distractor.”
He and other pilots at American and other airlines have been voluntarily advising Boeing on fixing its troubled model of the 737, grounded in March after crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia killed a total of 346 people. Wednesday morning’s session was the first time he checked out the changes in a full-motion simulator. (He had tested it previously in a stationary cockpit simulator in Seattle.) Boeing is running actual flight tests of the fix, with regulators world-wide scrutinizing the results.
The Fix is in. Now it is up to the regulators to approve the software changes and re-certify the MAX for passenger service.
So now, instead of pitching the plane down automatically, a light comes on.
Must’ve taken a real genius to figure that one out.
This is the problem with using H1 B Visas for this kind of work. In the US, even though it’s happening less and less, we are used being notified or informed of issues and having the freedom to make our own decisions. In other countries, they are used to being ruled not governed. The betters make the decision for you and establish controls to enforce that.
Instead of trusting the pilot to handle the situation, the H1 B figures the problem is too tough for the pilot to solve on their own and thinks it too risky that they have the freedom to make the wrong choice.
Commercial aircraft avionics manufacturers are going heavily into H1B use. Have been for a while.
> H1 B
All right. I am in the software development business. I have worked with MANY of these people. I do not doubt your characterization of this generation of H1Bs. (Their kids will be interesting — and make no mistake, they have STAYED and will not be going back).
But - do you have any data showing that H1Bs were on the project, or are working on any of these projects at Boeing or subcontractors?
The problem is that this aircraft, apparently, has inherent instability. Boeing did not add the MCAS system just because they thought it would be fun to have a system that would grab control from time to time and crash airplanes. They added MCAS because there are certain flight regimes that can lead to a stall unless the pilot, or the aircraft, takes immediate action.
So now you fix one problem by removing the fix that you put in to resolve an even bigger problem. If MCAS will no longer correct for impending stall, how does Boeing intend to deal with the inherent instability problem?
The next Boeing 737MAX accident will be a convention stall, but the passengers will be just as dead.
With all due respect, H1b visas are not in play here. While I do understand your comment and appreciate that perspective this is a case of Boeing Management wanting to deliver a 737 variant that required no additional training to use as a sales tool. Then they needed bigger engines to match the airbus competitor. The larger engines required a nacelle/wing change that change the characteristics of the plane. So in order to keep the “no additional training” point they developed MCAS which automagically made the MAX variant fly the same as the non MAX. Mistake number 1 was to let marketing needs override engineering (typical management mistake). Number 2 was single sensor input.
Any other corporation would go bankrupt through lawsuits.
“Any other corporation would go bankrupt through lawsuits.”
Their defense against this is going to be that they stringently followed all of their own internal rules and procedures.
Man, can't even make this kind of stuff up.
I think a lot of aviation companies get paralysis through over-analysis. Just build a damn airplane.
A big red button for it with sign that says:
“Do not use when taking off or landing”.
If it happens I hope it would be at a high enough altitude for the pilots to save the plane.
Unfortunately take offs and landings are by definition close to the ground. - Tom
Do I sense a sense of sarcasm? S/off
So how do you really feel about H1 B software programmers taking American jobs for half the cost to Boeing?
Do I sense a sense of sarcasm? S/off
So how do you really feel about H1 B software programmers taking American jobs for half the cost to Boeing?
One way of dealing with the problem is that Boeing is sayig the 737MAX us not suitable for High/Hot airports. This is a major restriction on the design.
Addis Ababa, for instance, is no longer a suitable airport for this aircraft.
I believe there is more than a high -hot- humid -runway length problem involved.
The 737s that crashed developed airplane problems while in flight and not in the process of landing or taking off. - Tom
Yeah, and how many were Chinese...
Um, no.
Ignoring the fact that MCAS did NOT make the aircraft fly the same is an egregious error.
It would literally put the stabilizer at max deflection with no action by the pilots to disengage power after multiple cycles.
That’s criminal in my book. The single sensor is another matter altogether.
Mistake #1 was assuming pilots cannot fly an aircraft without stalling (what I argue is a path to automated flight). Mistake #2 was separating AOA disagree as an option which - combined with the lack of training - doomed at least one of the planes. Mistake #3 was letting Boeing certify itself.
The first plane crashed due principally due to failure of the airline to flag the aircraft for a faulty sensor on a maintenance hold, ostensibly damaged by a bird strike.
I will concede, however, that unbeknownst to me Boeing has been incorporating automated flight characteristics similar to MCAS for years in terms of trim while in manual flight. From their point of view, MCAS was a natural evolution.
They just EFFED it up in the worst way possible, got the FAA to let them self-certify it and failed on all accounts in training, manuals & informing pilots while negligently failing to adequately flight test the aircraft to speed it into market.
We may never know if H1B visa engineers played a role, but my knowledge of outsourcing and how EFFED up software is that’s developed by H1B subs merits more than a total dismissal of the matter.
The problem is that the aircraft is more vulnerable to stall than previous versions of the aircraft.
The problem of aerodynamic stall is worst while climbing out after takeoff. This problem is even worse at what is called “high density altitudes”, which is to say High/Hot locations, where the air is less dense.
Less dense air means that the aircraft does not produce as much lift at the same speed as it would at lower altitudes in denser air. This makes the aircraft more likely to stall.
The MCAS system, which has now been disabled, apparently, was designed to prevent a stall from developing by seizing control of the aircraft and pointing the nose down, so the aicraft would pick up speed and come out of stall.
Now Boeing is saying that the aicraft should not be flown into High/Hot airports. So it looks like they are solving the instability problem by just keeping the aircraft away from conditions that are likely to lead to stalls.
Hundreds of people are dead because of the stupidity Boeing’s personnel and management. The override capability of the MCAS system was the result of programmers and engineers mistakenly thinking that they new more about flying airplanes than pilots do. The unforgivable arrogance of their failure to include an “off” button is matched only by hubris of Boeing’s management. They deliberately chose to not inform the pilots of this system’s crash ensuring capability under certain simple sensor failures. If Boeing loses another aircraft to this kind of stupidity, they will be bankrupted. And rightly so.
So you believe the 737 MAX shouldn’t fly again even with the so-called software updates. Right?
What’s it going to take for Boeing to be held to account and that this never happen again?
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